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PREFACE 
The "Nifi^ties" M s always" exercised a fascination for 
Australian historians. The decade saw a flowering of 
Australian literature. It saw tremendous social and 
economic changes. Partly as a result of these changes, 
these years saw the rise of a new force in Australian 
politics - the labour movement. In some colonies, this 
development was overshadowed by the consolidation of a 
colonial liberal tradition reaching its culmination in 
the Deakinite liberalism of the early years of the 
tlommdhwealth. Developments in Queensland differed from 
those in the southern colonies. The labour movement was 
more militant, but less influential during the Nineties. 
The liberalism best exemplified by Sir Samuel Walker 
Griffith did not survive the tumultuous events of the 
decade which began with a bitter strike and culminated 
in Federation. In between. Queenslanders endured the 
most severe depression they had yet known. It is not 
surprising then, that the period is rich in political 
incident, and represents a fertile field of study. 
Writing the political history of a decade presents 
peculiar 'difficulties, both ih raiethodology and selection. 
The thesis is conceived as a study of the Parliament, and 
of the elections which determined its composition and 
11. 
character- So much of that which is called "politics" 
occurs outside Parliament and elections, but rigid 
selection is necessary in determining priorities. 
Consequently, there is scant attention paid to public 
opinion, and to the social mores which give rise to that 
opinion. Indirectly, one can gauge the state of the 
public mind from election results, which are covered in 
Sections Two and Three of this thesis. 
Sections Two and Three are roughly chronological. 
Section One attempts to introduce and analyse the problems 
and Issues reaching their culmination in the Nineties. 
A purely chronological approach was found to involve 
tedious repetition, and also to cloud an analysis of the 
parliamentary scene. Thus, Section One discusses the 
various decisions and problems which confronted Queensland 
governments during the Nineties without analysing their 
parliamentary and electoral repercussions. Sections Two 
and Three analyse just these repercussions. 
There are many people I would like to thank for their 
help and encouragement. In particular, I am Indebted to 
my supervisor, R.M.S. Hamilton, and to the Head of my 
Departtient, Professor Gordon Greenwood, who has shown such 
admirable patienc©. I must also thank my typist. Merle 
Grinly for an excellent Job, completed under considerable 
difficulty. May I also thank Peggy Burke for her truly 
magnificent proof reading. 
INTRODUCTION 
Queensland has not been well served by political 
historians and, for the most part, general histories are rare 
and of questionable quality. C.A. Bernays' Queensland Politics 
during Sixty Years 1859-1919 is a narrative account of 
Queensland Parliaments with little interpretative value and 
a considerable amount of bias. There are some regional 
histories of great value such as D.B. Waterson's Darling 
Downs study. Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper, and G.C. 
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Bolton's A Thousand Miles Away, a general history of North 
Queensland. And as Waterson remarks, too often has 
Queensland been relegated to the footnotes of histories of 
New South Wales and Victoria.-^  Edited by D. Murphy, R. Joyce 
and C. Hughes, Prelude to Power is an attempt to partly remedy 
this deficiency. It is a study of the rise of the Labour 
Party from I885 to 1915. The years between I890 and 19OO 
naturally receive much attention, but primarily as a crucial 
1. Bernays, C , Queensland Politics during Sixty Years 
1859-1919 (Govt. Printer, Brisbane^ /<?/?) 
a,: Waterson, D.B., Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper 
(Sydney Univ. Press, 1958). 
Bolton, G.C, A.Thousand Miles Away: A Brief History of 
North Queensland to 1920 i^^i.^^^^,^J^^,> 1963). 
3. Waterson, D.B., op.cit., p.l. 
4 Murphy, D,, Joyce, R.B, & Hughes, C.A., Prelude to Power 
(Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1970). 
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decade for the labour movement. Indeed, this decade is 
usually seen as a period where the main political theme 
•is the rise of the Labour Party throughout the eastern 
colonies. In Queensland, this picture is only partially 
valid, for what gave the decade its especial.significance 
was the decline of the Liberal Party, and the complete 
dominance of a political philosophy based on property, 
rather than the rise of a labour movement dedicated:to the 
philosophy of "socialism".^ 
Queensland held a unique place in the political history 
of Eastern Australia. During the Eighties, the Parliament 
had shown a relatively clear cut bi-partisan division, so 
unlike the factionalism of New South Wales. During the 
Nineties, there was no evidence of the Lib-Lab coalition 
which characterized southern.developments. While Victoria 
experimented with liberal legislation, Queensland remained, 
sunk, it seemed forever, in the mire of conservatism and 
|» The historical debate surrounding the question of Labour's 
socialism is too well known to need repeating here. For 
the "orthodox" view of earlier years, see Lloyd Ross, 
William Lane and the.Australian Labour Movement (Sydney, 
N.D.); V.G. Childe, How Labour Governs (2nd Ed., M.U.P , 
1964). For more recent Interpretations, D.W. Rawson's 
"Labour, Socialism.and the Working Class" (A.J.P.H., 
VII, I, p.77), and.Labor in Vain? (Melbourne, 1966) and 
Dalton, J.B., "An InterpreMve Survey", in Murphy, Joyce 
and. Hughes, op.cit., p.3. 
fi» Loveday, P. & Martin, A.W., Parliament, Pactions and 
Parties (M.U.P., 1966). 
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reaction. This thesis then is partly an attempt to explain 
the nature of Queensland polities- during'this very 
controversial decade. 
While the two-party alignment of the Eighties showed 
considerable stability, it was not supported by any extra-
parliamentary or. intra-party organization. Were they then, 
simply two giant factions, revolving around two powerful 
leaders, Samuel Griffith and Thomas Mellwraith? Perhaps 
they may, more properly, be described as cohesive groups, 
7 
sharing a similar social and political outlook. Fundamental 
differences between Liberal and Conservative did exist, but 
they shared a common vision, the economic advancement of 
the colony. Where they diverged was in the practical 
application of this vision. In as much as either side could 
be said to possess a philosophy it was a philosophy of 
material progress from which social progress would almost 
inevitably follow. 
Liberals, however, did tend towards the belief that 
with a little "engineering'*, the benefits of economic 
progress could be more equitably diffused. This attitude, 
for the most part paternalistic in the extreme, was not 
shared by their opponents, who tended to pin their faith on 
7. "Parties" are defined on p.v. 
iv. 
free enterprise, at least as far as it was compatible with 
the economic realities of Queensland's climate and distances. 
Liberals worked upon.ithe*,.assumption that if the State provided 
greater opportunities to acquire land, to exercise the 
franchise, and to enjoy equitable labour conditions, all 
citizens would be able to advance their aims. This entailed 
an enormous amount of intricate legislation,- involving the 
^tate in the promotion of economic progress, but not' in the 
protection of those.unable to partake of this progress. 
The oldj poor and Intsirm continued to remain firmly outside 
the largesse of the iSftate. In the boom conditions of the 
Eighties, such policies had proved relatively successful, 
but the Depression of the Nineties had vastly increased 
the number of people enmeshed in the net of economic hardship, 
and Liberal rejection of, and by, the working population. 
The Nineties thus saw the demise of what had been known 
as the Liberal Party. In I89O, the electorate was stunned 
by the coalition between Griffith and .Mellwraith, This threw 
the old political order into chaos; the old divisions 
disappeared to be replaced by an agglomeration of individuals, 
led mostly by the old conservatives. If we could not call 
the well-disciplined groups of the Eighties "parties", how 
are we to describe this new development? 
V. 
Parties may be defined as groups possessing a coherent 
leadership, a cohesive philosophy, machinery for the 
selection of candidates and.machinery'for the conduct of 
elections. The Ministerialists of the Nineties exhibited 
all these characteristics, but to only a limited extent. 
Throughout the decade, Robert Buleock and R.P. Adams, 
formerly organizers for the Liberal Party, strove to build 
up the organization of the Ministerallsts, both within the 
"party" and for electoral purposes. The Queensland Patriotic 
League and its successor, the Queensland Political Association, 
were quite effective in the engineering and scrutiny of 
electoral rolls. Their attempts, to define common policy 
objectives, and to pre-seleet candidates often were met with 
considerable hostility. Moreover, branches were rarely in 
contact with the central offices, and most parliamentarians 
objected to attempts to curtail their freedom of action. 
The Ministerialists., who did not evolve a more formal'title 
throughout their long period in office, therefore lacked the 
attributes of the modern.party. On the other hand, they 
did share a common philosophy which was. not simply based on 
hostility to the Labour Party, and this guaranteed a fair 
degree of diselpiine within and without parliament. 
A spirit of materialism seemed to pervade the whole 
decade, perhaps not surprising after the hardships induced by 
the depression. Nowhere was this materialism highlighted 
VI. 
more than in the Queensland Parliament, dominated by men 
who were fairly typical products of colonial capitalism.' 
They reflected the peculiarieconomic and social conditions 
of Queensland. They needed to be tough, self-reliant and 
above all, wealthy. Men.like Mellwraith, Philp and,Nelson 
were self-made men, who had capitalized on the boom conditions 
to achieve, their position.and.wealth. Pastoralism and its 
associated:..trading activities, along with mining, provided 
the basis of the Queensland economy and these men controlled 
it. Prom their position of power and influence they expounded 
at great length the virtues of self-help, and certainly were 
not.inclined to favour government sponsored social 
amelioration. Colonial society produced many such men, and 
they had little sympathy with those.who had failed to take 
advantage of the "boundless opportunities" offered by the 
economic system. 
The: political.elite closely corresponded with the socio-
economic elite, and.capitalists, as closely associated in 
business and. society,; as... they were in government, controlled 
the decision-making process, This,was inherently undesirable, 
as it created a situation,where graft and corruption were 
facilitated. The Nineties produced many; examples of political 
jobbery, and the involvement of parliamentarians in such 
scandals as the. Mirani-Cattle Greek railway, the Clifton 
Lands transaction, and last but certainly not least, the 
Vll. 
Queensland National Bank- failure, demoralized Queensland 
public life, along with her finances. This close connection 
between politics and finance created a monopoly of power, 
which led to poor administration, a lamentable absence of 
political principle, and a complete disregard for the 
political rights of.many Queenslanders. 
Thus there was a remarkable degree of homogenet^among 
the leaders of the Ministerial Party, and they shared a 
common vision of a capitalist society based upon property 
and free enterprise. The idea of property as the basis of 
society and the arbiter of political privileges was also 
embraced by the opposition radicals and the Labour Party. 
Both enthusiastically supported the Cooperative Communities 
Land Settlement Act:, providing for small farming units 
worked on a "cooperative" principle. This principle, however, 
usually Involves the acceptance of, firstly, the 
individualistic impulse, not essentially different from 
capitalism. Moreover, the Act was the fullest expression 
of the agrarlanism and. yeoman farmer ideal, so fully embraced 
particularly, in the northern colony. 
Opposition to what became known as the Continuous 
Ministry came from a small group of ex-Liberals who could 
not join the Coalition, and from the Labour Party. The 
fledgUng party of the working man exhibited all the party 
characteristics we have already discussed, but as the decade 
vlll. 
wore on, it too began to fray around the edges, culminating 
In open rupture in 1907. Moreover, the party failed to 
transcend its highly regional character, increasing its 
o 
seats by only eight between 1893 and 1899 Why was there 
no Lib-Lab compromise in Queensland? This was probably the 
result of economic rather than purely political reasons, as 
Q 
suggested by Ian Turner.^ Queensland was industrially 
backward, her farming was limited to small areas Isolated 
from each other, and pastoralism was relatively more powerful 
than in the southern colonies. The smaller craft unions WERE-
correspondingly weak, compared to their mass pastoral 
counterparts. The unskilled workers in the mass unions were 
more militant and less inclined to compromise. But it was 
the weakness of the Liberals which was the key to the 
situation, and this had both economic and political elements. 
Faced with the necessity to re-assert themselves after the 
1890 Coalition, the Liberals found they did not have a 
sufficiently strong power base. Many small farmers and 
businessmen, traditional Liberal.supporters tended to support 
the conservatives because of the notorious financial 
inability of the old Liberal Party. There also appeared to 
8. Labour Party strength was concentrated in-the north and 
west, and the Party failed to establish a base in 
metropolitan or farming areas. 
f« Turner, I., Industrial Labour and Politics (A.N.U., 
Canberra, 1965), Ch. 1. 
IX. 
exist a general timidity, a reluctance to change and 
experiment within the whole community caused primarily by 
the tremendous psychological shock engendered by the 
depression. This climate was not designed to help either 
of the opposition forces. 
The failure of the Liberals and the Labour Party to 
compromise meant that the Coalition, its hegemony established 
after the 1893 Elections, was free to pursue its course with 
little possibility of defeat. The Continuous Ministry 
produced six Premiers - Griffith, Mellwraith, Nelson, Byrnes, 
Diekson and Philp, each more mediocre than the last. The 
absence of a strong leader meant not only the growth of 
factionalism within the government, which at times threatened 
to endanger its existence, but a gradual downturn in government 
activity. What activity there was was saturated with the 
morality of expediency and political eynieism. Above all, 
there was the crushing sense of.reaction, and the Continuous 
Ministry fell, characteristically, not because of its 
repressive nature, or because of its conservatism, but because 
5y 1903, its own weight prevented it from satisfying the 
leeds of the business community upon which it depended, 
iereft of ideas, weakened by the mediocrity of its unchanging 
ersonnel, the Government brought about its own sorry downfall. 
•Mr M 
The final collapse of the Continuous Ministry brought to 
power the long-needed Lib-^ Lab Coalition, whose task was 
to rescue Queensland.from the drift and muddle, from the 
repression and corruption and from the all pervading 
expediency which had characterized the preceding decade. 
SECTION ONE - THE SUBSTANCE OF POLITICS 
CHAPTER 1 
THE MEN OF POLITICS 
The Parliament between I88O and.l890 had witnessed 
the consolidation of a clear-cut, and unquestioned bi-
partisan party division. A Liberal Party, led by Sir 
Samuel Walker Griffith, and a Conservative Party, led by 
Sir Thomas Mellwraith, were clearly recognizable. In I89O, 
however, the personal coalition of these two lifelong 
political enemies destroyed the traditional political 
alignment. The next decade saw the development of a new, 
and very'different party division, caused by the rise of a 
radical Labour Party. In a sense, the new situation changed 
the role of personalities in the politics of the Colony, for 
the growing political consciousness of Labour meant that 
basic goals also tended to change, and the political division 
tended to become greater than the sum of personalities. 
Whatever their political differences. Parliamentarians 
during the Eighties belonged to, and represented, the economic 
elite of the Colony. Liberals tended to represent urban 
business, the miners and the agricultural community, while 
Conservatives represented large-scale finance and pastoralism. 
2,. 
Their primary political aim, despite these differences, was 
economic development, although they may have seen its means 
of attainment in a different light. The Liberals saw 
economic development in the light of social justice, and 
therefore evinced concern for the conditions of the working 
man. The rise of labour however, meant that the working 
man was now represented by the working man-, and not the 
middle class Liberal, with his paternalistic attitude born 
of Immense social differences. Property tended to retreat 
before this new political force, with the result that the 
distinguishing characteristics of Liberal and Conservatives 
became blurred as the Liberal Party merged with its old 
enemies. 
During the Eighties, Griffith and Mellwraith dominated 
politics. They were able to do so because there were few 
irreconcilable differences between the parties, and the 
maintenance of party solidarity depended upon the strength 
of its leaders. Moreover, their very pre-eminence deprived 
either party of alternative leaders. Confronted with the 
need to contain the challenge of Labour, the Coalition 
Party, after the departure of Griffith and Mellwraith, had 
no leader of their prestige. It became a loose knit group 
ruled by what eOuld only be described as a junta. The 
Continuous Ministry, which had begun with the Coalition in 
3. 
1890 was to govern Queensland until 1903. It provided a 
procession of six premiers - Griffith, Mellwraith, Sir 
Hugh Muir Nelson, T.J. Byrnes, J.R. Dickson and Robert Philp. 
The Cabinet rarely changed, except for.an occasional 
reshuffle in portfolios, and these few men controlled Queens-
land Government. The absence of a single strong leader meant 
a growth in petty jealousies and factionalism amongst a 
group of ambitious, and yet mediocre politicians, and this 
was reflected in the aridity of Queensland politics in the 
Nineties, Nor were the opponents of the Continuous Ministry 
men of great individual appeal, but the organization of the 
Labour Party was such that personalities tended to be less 
Important than in the ruling party. On the whole, it may 
be argued that during the Nineties, Queensland political 
life was as devoid of great men as it was of great principles 
and yet, however colourless, it is men who participate in 
polities, and give character to political action. Who were 
the men of Queensland piolities? 
During the first three years of the decade, the 
domination of Griffith and Mellwraith continued. Until 
1890, they had been deadly enemies in public, and were 
scarcely friends in private life. They were two enormously 
different characters, but they shared a certain charisma, 
which gave colour and excitement to political life. 
4, 
Samuel Griffith was born in Wales, of humble ancestry, 
his early life circumscribed by the narrow confines of 
evangelical Protestantism. His father, Edward, a Minister 
of the Congregational Church, had arrived in New South Wales 
in 1855. Edward then journeyed to Queensland to undertake 
missionary work. He "was a founder of la.frequent 
contributor to the Queensland Evangelical Standard and was 
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unashamedly partisan in his political activities". Not 
surprisingly, Samuel Griffith took an early Interest in 
politics and public questions. Even before his graduation 
from the- University of Sydney, he began to watch and listen 
to the debates of the Queensland Parliament. 
Ifrlffith was admitted to the Bar in I867, and five years 
later was elected Liberal representative for East jvioreton. 
His career and religious background were essential influences 
in his political development. His turn of mind was legalistic 
and logical in the extreme, and he seemed to appreciate social 
issues in an academic rather than a practical way. He could 
draft excellent Bills, such as the Employers Liability Bill, 
but seemed emotionally unlnvolved with the problems of the 
working class. More effective in opposition than in power. 
1. See below, Chs. 2 and 8 for further discussion of the 
relation between Protestantism and the Libei^al Party. 
t. Vockler, J.C., 'ISlr Samuel Walker Griffith^' (Unpub. B.A. 
thesis, U. of Q,, .1953), p.23. 
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Griffith combined trenchant critical ability with a type of 
opportunism. Essential in an opposition, this combination 
was often detrimental to party unity while in power. 
The close association between Protestantism and the 
Liberal Party may have contributed to Griffith's early 
success. The son of Edward Griffith, it was thought, would 
greatly assist the Protestant cause. Yet, often he found 
the association more of an embarrassment than a blessing. 
He fought the attempts of the Queensland Evangelical Standard 
to merge religion with politics, and in general tried to 
divorce himself from the factionalism inherent in such a 
situation. According to Vockler: 
Griffith, himself, was not a total abstainer, nor 
was he a thoroughly convinced non-conformist. There 
can be no doubt that he found the activities of the 
'•' sectarians unpleasant. Nor can I readily conceive 
that he found his own father's active electioneering 
,., an unmixed blessing ... but these same interests 
were a power )Arhich the Liberals could ignore only 
at their peril.3 
Griffith tried, with only moderate success, to draw in all 
the factions of the Liberal Party into one homogeneous unit. 
While his success was certainly not complete, the unity of 
the party by I885 had reached a degree hitherto unknown. 
Even the public split with Dickson in I887 was not so 
damaging as had been anticipated. 
3, Ibid., pp.114-5, 
4, See below, Ch. 2. 
6. 
The ability to compromise, which was the greatest 
reason for his success, was, however, limited by Griffith's 
austerity of nature. Sir Charles Dilke observed: 
Sir Samuel Griffith is the ablest lawyer in 
Queensland, and is for that- reason perhaps less 
successful as a statesman in office- He is, as 
his foes declare - cold of temperament - an 
argumentative rather than a thinking leader. 
He is a man of education and an unblemished 
character but he lacks sentiment, and is a 
little inclined to be overbearing. He lost 
when in power some of his ablest colleagues, 
who would not submit to his rule, and in his 
last appeal to the electors^ was at a 
disadvantage not only through the weakness of 
his leading supporters, but through the Imke-
warimjiess of his friends...^ 
The "coldness of temperament" often noticed in Griffith 
did not characterize his greatest political opponent - Sir 
Thomas Mellwraith. Mellwraith was a man of often violent 
proportions, with a romantic vision of Queensland, and a 
great Australian nationalist. He was forever an optimist. 
7 
His schemes for the giant transcontinental railways show 
his faith in the future of Australia, arid of his place in it, 
A capitalist, he shared many of the characteristics of his 
American counterparts - the confidence of a selfmade man, 
o 
an overall vision which subordinated parts to the whole, 
and a complete lack of appreciation that economic progress 
5. In the 1888 Election. nocntHan 
6. Dilke, C , Problems of Greater Britain. (Lond.,' l890),p.204, 
7, See below. Chapters 2 and 4. 
8, His rupture with the squatters in I883 over proposed land 
resumation for the Transcontinental Railway Bill is an 
indication of this trait. 
f. 
did not necessarily mean social progress. 
Thomas Mellwraith was born in Ayrshire in 1835, and 
emigrated to Australia twenty-one years later- While in 
Victoria he was elected an associate of the Institute of 
Civil Engineers, and worked for the Railway Department. He 
emigrated to Queensland, and with considerable resources at 
his disposal he began to build up a small pastoral empire. 
By 1881, Mellwraith and J.C. Smythe held between them 620 
g 
square miles of prime pastoral land. A few years later, 
the Scotsman branched into other areas of investment, 
particularly banking, pastoral finance and sugar- Entering 
Parliament In I87O, he was appointed Minister for Works in 
McAlister's Government in 1873, only to resign two years 
later- Discussing his resignation, the Brisbane Courier 
gives some insight into the style of his whole political 
career: 
He brought to Government a considerable reputation 
for energy and Independence and a commanding 
knowledge of railway construction. He appeared to 
put out of sight all but practical considerations 
in the exercise of his official authority; and 
provided he secured economy and efficiency he 
cared little what political animosities he stirred 
up. This feature of his Ministerial dealings had 
probably not a little to do with the unpleasantness . 
which culminated in his resignation.1^ 
9. Dlgnan, Dj<^ ''Sir Thomas Mellwraith'' (Unpub. B.A. Thesis 
U. of Q.)^S'0 
10. Brisbane Courier, 7 November 1875. 
s . 
This stubbornness, e#efgy and lack of caution characterized 
Mellwraith in his later career, and was to cause unpleasantness 
on more than one occasion. 
A clumsy and often very bad speaker, he often took 
refuge in bluster, not a very effective political weapon. 
When roused, however, he could sometimes be remarkably 
effective. Francis Adams remarked: 
It is in the hours of passionate debate or turbulent 
public gathering that this clumsy and Ineloquent 
orator should be seen by those who. would comprehend 
something of the vehement enthusiasm of his followers. 
Then the torrent of his fiery words is Overwhelming.il 
In his ^ dealings with his. friends' and colleagues, Mellwraith 
showed generosity and tolerance, but in return demanded 
absolute loyalty and obedience. He was not a devious 
politician, and approached a problem in a clear-cut straight-
forward manner, often causing uproar in his own party, but 
usually able to persuade his colleagues to place their trust 
i n ft', 
m him.. 
Mellwraith emerges as a more appealing character than 
Griffith, but he "was ever subject to the philosophical out-
look of the Conservative, who falls to appreciate the outlook 
of the dissident group and is prone to argue that if various 
groups sink their.differences and pull together, the good 
I X . Adorns f. > The. Aus-tralians Cf- f/shar a^ufn^) /o-^afeA'^  /ffsr) />p7S ^. see . 
iSfAi fhen these tactics failed. It usually meant painful 
public splits as'in I883 and 1888. See Chapters 4 and 9. 
9-
fortune of the privileged will automatically be bestowed on 
12 the enterprdsing members of the underprivileged." 
Mellwraith had no real conception of social issues; his 
various grandiose schemes took no account of the human 
element, which might have been almost incidental. He had no 
sympathy with the unsuccessful, who had failed to capitalize 
upon the same conditions that he had. It seems that in the 
vastness of his schemes,;he failed to appreciate that men 
make dreams - not cattle, bricks or railway tracks. 
Despite their manifest failings, both Griffith and 
Mellwraith could win the confidence of large sections of the 
colony's population. Perhaps their stories end in failure 
13 during the difficult Nineties -^  and yet they, of all Queens-
r 
land public men of their time, still retain their place in 
the history of the colony. 
Perhaps because of the strength of Griffith and 
Mellwraith, their followers and successors were men of far 
more limited appeal and capacity. Nelson, Philp and Dickson, 
were not men of outstanding character, and on the .opposite 
side of the House, labour leaders did not attract zealous 
personal support. Outside the House, men such as Lllley still 
exerted some influence, while the party organizers Robert 
12. Dlgnan, D., op.cit., p.69. 
13. See below. Chapters 3, 7 and 12, 
10, 
Buleock. for the Conservatives and Albert Hinchcllffe for 
Labour wielded great power- The relative power of a number 
of individuals, as opposed to the political domination of 
two personalities is one of the major characteristics of the 
decade. 
There was a remarkable degree, of homogeneity among the 
leaders, of the Conservative Party, particularly as its 
composition did not change dramatically from the pattern of 
the Eighties, The political elite of the colony corresponded 
with the socio-economic elite, with very few exceptions. 
The following table gives some indication of the socio-
economic background. It includes three men who exerted 
great Influence, but who never became Premiers during the 
hegemony of the Continuous Ministry - Hugh Tozer, A.J. Thynne 
and J.M. Macrossan. 
Birth Place 
Australia 
Byrnes 
Mbrehead 
Tozer 
Religion 
Anglican ;^ :: 
'I " 
Tozer 
Dickson 
Occupation 
Pastoral and 
Investment 
Mellwraith 
Nelson 
Morehead 
Education 
Private or 
Grammar 
Morehead 
Philp 
11. 
Birth Place 
England 
Dickson 
Dalrymple 
Scotland 
Mellwraith 
Nelson 
Philp 
Ireland 
Macrossan 
Thynne 
Wales 
Griffith 
Religion 
Roman Catholic. 
Byrnes 
Thynne 
Macrossan 
Protestant 
Griffith 
Philp 
Nelson 
Mellwraith 
0-ecupatlon 
Law 
Byrnes 
Thynne 
Griffith 
Other 
Macrossan 
Education 
Tertiary 
Griffith 
Mellwraith 
Thynne 
Tozer 
Nelson 
Little formj 
Macrossan 
Macrossan then, is the odd man out. He was not reputedly 
wealthy, he was engaged in various occupations, at one stage 
12. 
a miner, at another a selector, and had received little 
fonnal education. And yet, in the late Eighties he was 
regarded by many as the real power behind the Government of 
14 Boyd Dunlop Morehead, Byrnes too, was somewhat atypical. 
He was the first native born Queenslander to become Premier, 
and one of the few Roman Catholics in Australia to reach 
such a high office. Born in Brisbane in i860, the boy early 
showed scholastic promise, and after attending the Brisbane 
Grammar School continued his studies at the University of 
Melbourne from where he graduated as a Bachelor of Arts and 
a Bachelor of Laws, According to G.W, Power, 
At the University he retained the characteristics 
which distinguished him at school - an even temper 
and well balanced mind, a thorough Interest in his 
fellow men, a sturdy common sense, relieved by a 
keen appreciation of humour, and a tendency to 
show brilliance rather than Industry-15 
In 1890, Griffith chose the young ba.rrister to represent 
the Government in the Legislative Council as Solicitor-General, 
He was elected to the Assembly in 1893, and was appointed 
Attorney-General, In his early years, Byrnes was not a very 
1 6 popular member and his strong and successful advocacy of 
17 the Peace Preservation Bill earned him the undying enmity 
14, See below^Ch, 9-
15, Sketches and Impressions of T,J. Byrnes, (Alex Muir 
& Co,, Brisbane, 1902), p,37. 
16, Mellwraith's opinion of him was very low. He regarded 
him as far from conscientious, 
17, See below Ch, 13, 
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of the Labour Party. In his position as Attorney-General, 
Byrnes managed to avoid the battles of Parl^.amentary life, 
and to a great extent his career, was one of unfulfilled 
promise. His death in 1898, after less than a year as 
Premier^left an impression of great loss. Men had felt he 
eou-ld perhaps raise the standard, of political life, and t  
recapture some of the personal appeal of his mentor. Sir 
Samuel Griffith. 
The death of Byrnes deprived the Continuous Ministry 
of one of its keenest intellects. Yet the Ministry, and the 
party which had supported it, continued to be dominated by 
business and financial interests. The early Conservative 
alliance with the pastoral industry hp-d shifted slightly, 
and the I896 Elections returned a party with a far greater 
proportion of businessmen. 
Byrnes' brief reign held promise of uniting the 
Ministerial Party, which had, three years after the departure 
of Mellwraith,become faetlonallzed. Pactions led by E.B. 
Forrest, John Leahy and John Macdonald-Paterson had been 
clearly evident during the I896 election, and these groups 
proved far from amenable to party discipline. The absence 
of a strong leader meant that extra-parliamentary organizations 
tended to exert more influence. The Queensland Political 
Association was the medium through which some sort of control 
14. 
was attempted. It was an outgrowth of the Queensland 
Patriotic League, formed in I89O by Robert Buleock to combat 
the challenge thrown out by the formation of the Australian 
Labour Federation, The later organization was far more 
powerful, and the Premier, Hugh Muir Nelson, was the chairman. 
The Political Association attempted to build up a sophisti-
cated pre—selection system, and the absence of strong 
parliamentary leadership allowed Buleock to gain a position 
1 o 
of extraordinary power. 
The influence of the Q.P.A. tended to decline after I896, 
but six years later, continued dissension within Ministerial 
ranks led to the formation of the National Liberal Union, 
which exercised wider powers than either of its predecessors. 
This growth of organizational polities was partly the result 
of the inability of the Ministerialists to produce a leader 
who could reconcile Individuals and individual loyalties. 
Gradually, extra-parliamentary organizations gained greater 
power, and began to infringe upon selection of candidates 
and general policy. 
The lack of unity observable in I896 was one of the 
reasons why Nelson had recommended Byrnes for Premier rather 
than Robert Philp, member for Townsvllle, and long time 
18, See below^ Ch, 10 
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Cabinet Minister- It was felt that Philp was too much a 
Northern man, and that this would cause further dissension. 
Philp was a foundation member of the colonial export company, 
Burns-Phllp and was closely associated with many other 
exporting and financial concerns. A sound business man, 
Philp did not have great qualities as a Premier, or even as 
a financier of the colony. By far the most conservative of 
the Ministerial leaders, Philp lacked imagination and colour. 
He may be described as an able, but unimaginative administrator, 
competent in performing allotted duties, but unable to 
command the respect necessary to strongly assert his leader-
ship. 
The parochialism which characterized Queensland politics 
was still evident throughout the Nineties. Many members 
regarded themselves as delegates rather than representatives. 
They regarded Parliament as the forum in which to make the 
views of their electorates public, rather than a place to 
legislate for the entire colony mindful of all Interests 
rather than sectional demands. One such politician was 
W.H. Groom. Groom had been elected to the first Parliament 
of Queensland, and was known as the "father of the House". 
Yet because he was primarily a "constituency" politician 
Groom remained outside the main corridors of power, even 
though his liberal philosophy made him a bulwark in the 
16. 
disorganized opposition forces after I89O. Unfortunately he 
did not have sufficient personal prestige to unite the forces 
of opposition to the government. Sectional interests often 
tended to overshadow the considerations of "national" policy. 
Thus, in I883 and in I892, much opposition to Mellwraith's 
proposed land grant railways centred around the parochial 
• T . 19 jealousies. 
At its inception, the Labour Party was understandably 
free of these sectional and factional divisions. Throughout 
the _first half of this decade, there was little division 
within Labour ranks. And yet, this was not caused by the 
presence of a strong leader, but by his absence. The structure 
of the party was such that strong leadership in parliament 
would be divisive rather than cohesive. The relatively 
20 
sophisticated extra-parliamentary organization of the party 
meant that it shared, and at times controlled, the policy-
making function. Parliamentarians were regarded as only one 
facet of the Labour movement, and a strong leadership in 
Parliament was not regarded as conducive to the party's 
effectiveness. Moreover, such leadership was felt to be 
contradictory to the democratic aspirations of the movement. 
William Kidston, of all the Labour leaders in this early 
period, came closest to the leadership Ideals of the non-labour 
19, See below, Ch. 4. 
20, See below, Ch, 10. 
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parties. He emerged as one of the party's major leaders in 
1899, and was the moving force behind the Lib-Lab coalition 
of 1903. K.J. Wanka describes the attitude of many sections 
of the party to his leadership: 
To strong sections of the Labour movement, Kidston 
was coming to represent Bonapartlsm, which has been 
and remains a strong fear in labour ideology. He 
was the "strong man" who, by virtue of his 
personality, popular appeal, skill, and ruthless 
determination, could take control of the mass 
movement .,, the strange quirk of the Labour 
Party, to seem to prefer the opposition benches 
to domination by a strong capable leader with a 
touch of arrogance, but with a clear view of the 
party's purpose, has been one of its lasting 
features,21 
This suspicion of individuals and the faith placed in strong 
extra-parliamentary organization is illustrated by the role 
of two labour stalwarts - Albert Hinchcllffe, Secretary of 
the Australian Labour Federation, and Thomas Glassey, the 
first Labour Parliamentary leader-
Born in Northern Ireland in l844jGlassey arrived in 
Brisbane in 1884, Here, he created and became the first 
Secretary of the Miners Association at the Bundamba Mines. 
Pugnacious, painstakingly thorough, and at times long-winded, 
Glassey provided the Infant Labour Party with the steady, if 
not outstanding, leadership that it needed, but as the party 
matured, his limitations became more apparent. His position 
21, Wanka, K.J.,, "William Kidston" in Murphy, Joyce & Hughes, 
PFfludi^ e to Power. (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1970), pp.203-4. 
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was well described by S.A, Rayner: 
Glassey was not a good parliamentary leader, though 
he was successful as an organizer. His lack of 
early education had hampered his Intellectual 
development and this proved a disadvantage in a 
party where many of his followers were more widely 
read, had a greater knowledge of Queensland 
conditions, and possessed a greater mental 
alertness .... His obstinate determination that 
had proved such a valuable asset when facing 
large majorities single-handed was not appreciated 
by his own party when opinlons^"?*T^ He seems to 
have lacked the tact and especially the capacity 
for diplomacy and Intrigue so necessary to 
maintain his position and to keep his party united.22 
During the growing split in the Labour ranks beginning in 
1896 Glassey's chief opponent was Albert Hinchcllffe, 
organizer of the Trades and Labour Council, and later Secretary 
of the Australian Labour Federation. Hinchcllffe was in 
many ways Glassey's complete antithesis. His mind was agile, 
and he was adept at the in-fighting which characterized so 
much of the history of early labour- Unlike Glassey, he was 
the spokesman for Queensland unionism, and while he was never 
23 
elected to Parliament -^  Hinchcllffe's influence in the party 
was probably greater than any other individual. His position 
was one of considerable power, and during his entire career, 
he constantly aspired to the socialist goal, to be achieved 
by the capture of the Government by a strong, union based 
22. Rayner, S.A,, "Thomas Glassey" in Prelude to Power, 
pp,196-97. 
23. "He eventually entered the Legislative Council during 
the Morgan-Browne Coalition, 
»*• y » 
24 political party. it was his influence which prevented the 
formation of a Lib-Lab Coalition before 1903, and it was 
only his temporary eclipse by William Kidston which eventually 
allowed such a combination. While Wlllian Lane inspired a 
vision of a new socialist society, Albert Hinchcllffe 
provided it with its radical, non-doctrinaire, pragmatic 
character. Nevertheless, he was not prepared to compromise 
the party's principles in order to gain power. His two 
closest associates. Mat Reid and Henry Boote, were determined 
that even after the Coalition in 1903, Labour "would not 
become 'too respectable' nor would it forget that it was a 
25 party born to seek radical, socialist goals". 
The practicality of men such as Hinchcllffe, Fisher 
and Reid was tempered by a continuing faith in socialism. 
For this reason, the party tended to lack the opportunism 
which characterized their opponents during this period. It 
was a man such as Kidston who combined the two ingredients 
and gained a dominant position in Queensland politics. But 
in doing so, he had lost the motivating force of the 
socialist ideal, and alienated men like Fisher, Reid and 
Hinchcllffe. Nevertheless,, during the party's slow, but 
24. Murphy, D.J., "Two Administrators" in Prelude to Power^ 
B.222. 
25. UTld,, p.230. 
20. 
steady progress during the Nineties, this problem was only 
foreshadowed, although all its elements were present in the 
growing hostility between the leaders of the A.L.F. and some 
of the parliamentary leaders. 
During the Nineties, Labour parliamentarians were not 
men of great individual appeal, but the party was more than 
the sum of its parts. Held together by a comparatively well 
defined ideology, the Labour Party possessed a basic unity 
which was entirely lacking in their opponents. The Ministerial 
Party was simply a conglomeration of individuals, who would 
give their allegiance to this leader or that, .but who were not 
united in a common vision or ideology. If a strong leader 
emerged, then the party retained a degree of unity, but in 
the absence of such a man, Parliament witnessed a debilitating 
factionalism which eventually led to the eclipse of 
conservatism. 
21, 
CHAPTER 2 
POLITICS IN THE EIGHTIES 
Queensland politics during the decade of the eighties 
operated within a two-party, rather than a factional frame-
work. A democratic franchise enabled Queenslanders to 
participate in a parliamentary'system which exhibited all the 
characteristics of balanced and mutually opposing party 
alignment, buttressed by mutually opposed economic interests. 
Two Premiers dominated political life - Thomas Mellwraith 
(I878-I883) leader of the party commonly called Conservative, 
and Liberal Party leader, Samuel Griffith (I883-I888). The 
dominance of these two individuals led to the stabilization 
of party life after the chaotic factionalism which had 
characterized Queensland polities prior to I878. Parties 
were nevertheless somewhat amorphous. Existing groupings 
were not consolidated by extra-parliamentary organization. 
Leaders therefore depended primarily upon political patronage, 
and their position was reinforced by the existence of a 
solid core of support from a small group of faithful adherents, 
This lack of formality did not mean that the existence of 
parties merely depended upon political whim. On the contrary. 
22, 
the eighties saw the emergence of two relatively tightly-
knit organizations. They were united in a common aim - the 
economic development of the Colony,- but differed in their 
conception of the best means by which to fulfil this 
ambition. 
The development of Queensland meant the development 
of the primary Industries of the Colony by the Increase in 
communications, labour and efficiency. Many Queenslanders 
thought that primary industry would benefit by closer 
settlement of the land. Others felt that efficiency would 
be maximized by a system of large-scale freeholdlng. 
Throughout the decade, land, labour and communieations were 
the major issues around which parties revolved, and it was 
on these Issues that battle was joined between Liberal and 
Conservative. It is therefore the intention of this chapter 
to examine the nature of the political system, and the issues 
which occupied the attention of its participants. 
ELECTORAL MACHINERY 
Electoral arrangements may be characterized as overtly 
democratic. The Legislative Assembly Act of I867 provided 
that any person who was qualified to exercise the franchise 
could stand as a parliamentary candidate, with the exception 
of Ministers of Religion^members of the nominative Legislative 
23, 
Council, and any person holding office of profit under the 
Crown. The franchise was determined by the I867 Elections 
2 
Act. The vote was thus conferred upon all natural born, 
or naturalized adult male citizens, who met at least one of 
the following conditions - who had resided in his electoral 
district for a minimum period of six months, or who owned 
or leased property with a elear value of d^lOO.OO, or an 
annual value of i'lO.OO. Individuals who owned property in 
more than one electorate were entitled to one vote per 
property in all electorates save that in which he held his 
residence qualification. Prohibited from voting were women, 
all men in the armed services and police force, as well as 
convicted felons and those certified insane. Thus, the 
principle of manhood suffrage was embodied in the Elections 
Act. In practice, however, it was open to considerable 
abuse. The very existence of a plural vote negated the ideal 
of manhood suffrage, and while it is difficult to ascertain 
the effect of its establishment and maintenance, it remained 
a rallying point for radical, and later, labour politicians. 
Most of the abuses were primarily the result of the 
laws which covered the registration of voters. Originally, 
1, Q.G.G., 1399. 
2, Based on the N.S.W- Act of I858. 
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electors were required to ensure that their names appeared 
on the rolls, which were collected annually. Courts of 
Petty Sessions employed collectors to gather names, and 
compiled the electoral rolls. An Act was passed in I872 
to prevent Impersonation. It Introduced JPorms called voter's 
rights, which were required to be produced by each voter 
before polling. These however, soon became negotiable, and 
as a result the system proved a failure. On introducing an 
amending bill in 1874, the Postmaster-General explained: 
A man might get possession of half a dozen Voters' 
rights and vote for them too, at half a dozen 
polling places. The Voter's right promoted 
bribery under the ballot..,. It was easy for an 
unscrupulous person to buy up Voters' rights and 
so prevent electors recording their votes.3 
The abolition of the rights did not solve all problems. 
Justices of the Peace and members of the Revision Courts 
were too often open to political and pecuniary pressure, and 
were often political appointees. In 1879, the law was again 
revised. The earlier Act of 1874 had appointed police and 
other "suitable" officials to collect the names, which the 
Petty Sessions Courts would revise. The new Act made provision 
for civilian collectors. Griffith did not think this would 
curtail the appointment of partisan collectors: 
He had noticed in some country papers that 
police were insufficient, and that a majority 
3. Q.P.D,, XVII, (1874), 696, 
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of the bench, consisting of political partisans, 
appointed collectors who were political partisans 
and electioneering agents.4 
Registration was automatic, by written application. 
Quarterly Registration Counts revised the rolls and Clerks of 
Petty Sessions were responsible for disqualification, while 
Returning Officers actually prepared the rolls. 
Elections were held every five years, and usually 
extended over a number of weeks. The number of candidates 
was not limited in any seat, voting was by secret ballot, 
each vote being single and non-transfeios-able. 
In operation, the electoral system was characterized 
by two major abuses - roll stuffing (the placing of illegal 
names an the roll), and the disqualification of fully 
5 
qualified voters. Moreover, staggered elections meant 
that if a candidate was defeated an one electorate, he 
could contest another on a different polling day. While 
this was no doubt of advantage to all candidates, it was of 
particular advantage to the Government, empowered to arrange 
the order of elections. 
4. Q,P,D., XXIX, (1879), 242. 
5. As Party organization became more sophisticated. Electoral 
Committees organized groups especially to criticize the 
rolls. 
6. In 1883, aware that urban sentiment was against him, 
Mellwraith ensured that all non-urban contests in the first 
batch of elections were relatively safe Government Seats. 
Moreover, the system allowed Influential candidates to 
contest doubtful seats without endangering their place in 
Parliament. In I883, B^D. Morehead attempted to win 
Fortitude Valley, was defeated, and returned to the 
safety of Balonne. 
26. 
PARTY ORGANIZATION AND PATRONAGE 
Leaders depended to a great extent upon personal 
patronage to maintain party unity, but both parties possessed 
a steady and consistent core of adherents. Of those members 
who sat in both Eighth and Ninth Parliaments, twenty displayed 
a consistent voting pattern behind one of the two leaders. 
The table below indicates the composition of these groups: 
THE PARTY STALWARTS 
Mellwraith Griffith 
A. Archer (Blaekall) 
J. Hamilton (Cook) 
P. Lalor (Maranoa) 
B.D. Morehead (Balonne) 
J.M. Macrossan (Townsvllle) 
A. Norton (Port Curtis) 
P. Perkins (Aublgny) 
J, Stevenson (Normanby) 
W. Bailey (Wide Bay) 
S. Grimes (Oxley) 
A. Rutledge (Kennedy) 
J, Horwltz (Warwick 
J.R. Dickson (Enoggera) 
P. Kates (Darling Downs) 
W. Kellett (Stanley) 
J. Macfarlane (Ipswich) 
W. Miles (Darling Downs) 
W.H. Groom (Drayton and 
Toowoomba) 
These men constituted a factor of enormous strength in the 
27. 
party system, a nucleus around which other members grouped 
themselves. The membership of these small groups also 
indicated the major areas in which the opposing leaders 
gathered voting support. None of Mellwraith's adherents 
represented the metropolitan area or Its environs. Perkins 
was the only Darling Downs representative. With the exception 
of Macrossan, all belonged to pastoral electorates, and 
Archer, Lalor, Hamilton, Stevenson, Perkins and Morehead were 
either pastorallsts or engaged in pastoral Investment. In 
contrast, Griffith's support was derived primarily from urban 
electorates, or south-eastern farming electorates. Electoral 
support thus reflected differing economic Interests, 
constituting one basis of party division. 
Election results in I883 further reinforce this argument, 
indicating a very clear pattern of regional support. In I883, 
nearly all Griffithlte members, except those representing the 
7 8 
Darling Downs' represented urban electorates. On the other 
hand, a great majority of those who supported Mellwraith 
were returned from Northern and Western constituencies, 
9 
primarily concerned with pastoralism or sugar-
In the absence of any coherant system of pre-selectlon. 
7. Horwltz, Kates, Kellett, Miles, Groom. 
8. See Appendix 2. 
9. The exceptions were Logan (Stevens), Murilla (Nelson), 
Dalby (Jessop) and Aublgny (Perkins). 
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candidates were chosen either by fairly select electoral 
committees, or, more rarely, by public demand in the form of 
requisition. There is some evidence that as early as 1882, 
Liberal Robert Buleock buttressed his activities as a roll 
scrutineer by gradually developing a rudimentary pre-selectlon 
system at a meeting attended by Liberal leaders and others. 
Buleock engineered the selection of W. Brookes in preference 
to W. Widdop,.as Liberal candidate for the 1882 by-election 
in the North Brisbane electorate. . Pre-selectlon was, 
however, still in its infancy, as were other aspects of party 
organization. Such procedures held more advantage for the 
Liberal Party, less homogeneous than their opponents, who 
possessed the great unifying characteristic of comjijon economic 
interest in the form of pastoralism. 
While there was little formal party organization, it 
was nevertheless clearly recognized that "parties" did exist. 
Leaders in the house employed various methods of securing 
individual and group loyalties. The Liberal Party was closely 
associated with several politicized extra-parliamentary groups, 
The Worklngmen's Political Reform League, sponsored by Arthur 
Rutledge, had branches in Brisbane, Ipswich and Rockhampton. 
Like the Anti-Coolie League, it was primarily interested in 
10. Morrison, A.A,, "Liberal Party Organizations before 
1900". (Typescript Fryer Library) p.8. 
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preventing the importation of coloured labour. These 
singular groups were an electoral advantage because they 
helped to attract and organize voting power, but any attempt 
to form a complex and general extra-parliamentary organization 
12 
received little support. 
One method of gaining support, employed by both parties, 
was that of providing personal or monetary aid to aspirants 
for parliamentary honours. In I883, Mellwraith undertook to 
pay a third of the costs of Patrick 0'Sullivan's campaign in 
13 the electorate of Carnarvon. Another means of gaining 
support was to bestow favours on various electorates. This 
was especially effective where groups of representatives 
formed a solid, regional "bunch" within Parliament. 
Discussing the career of W.H. Groom, D.B. .Waterson gives an 
example of this type of mechanism: 
Between 1879 and I890, Groom was a loyal supporter 
of Griffith's Parliamentary Liberal Party. While 
he was prepared to log-roll with the other Downs 
members during this period, his record in divisions 
on confidence motions and matters of party solidarity 
was remarkably consistent. This devotion was 
certainly rewarded by extraordinary government 
expenditure whenever the "Liberals" were in power, 
but it was also responsible for a sharp decline in 
Investment during Mellwraith's first term of office 
between 1879 and I883. l4 
11. Ibid., p. 13. 
12. One such attempt. The Queensland Political Reform League, 
was virtually Ignored by Parliament and Press. 
13. Morrison, A.A., op.cit,, p.7. 
14. Waterson, D.B. , Sq;uatter3 S e l e c t o r , S torekeeper . (Sydney 
Univ. P r e s s , 1968), p .230 . 
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In employing such methods, the leaders were primarily 
concerned with gaining voting strength inside Parliament. 
Many members, however, valued their independence and freedom 
of action. According to biographer, B.A. Knox, Arthur 
Morgan's "whole parliamentary career, up to the time when he 
formed the Coalition of 1903, displays an insistence on the 
independence of a parliamentary representative to act upon 
his own initiative where necessary, and on his own judgment 
15 
at all times". ^ Nevertheless, this cherished ideal of 
Independence was often subordinated to the greater advantages 
of parliamentary solidarity, for the furtherance of individual 
ambitions, and those of the electorates. 
PARTY ISSUES 
Throughout the eighties, three issues dominated the 
political scene - land, railways and coloured labour- Their 
significance is Increased by the observation that these same 
issues continued to dominate political action in the next 
1 6 decade, at times with even greater intensity. The period 
saw two general elections, and it is possible, on the basis 
of policies enunciated in the campaigns, to discover the 
different attitudes of the major parties. The election of 
15. Knox, B.A., The Honourable Sir Arthur Morgan. (Unpub. 
B.A. Thesis, U, of Q. , 1955), p.12.' 
16, See Chapters 3, 4, and 5, 
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1888 is the subject of a separate chapter, but issues in 
1883 in which the Liberals were victorious give a good 
indication of policy differences. 
In 1883, a number of smaller Issues, such as temperance 
in some metropolitan electorates, calls for triennial 
parliaments, and payment;, of members, occupied some of the 
election platforms.. But the overriding Issues were land 
grant railways, land settlement arid coloured immigration. 
The election had been preceded by the resignation of Thomas 
Mellwraith's Government after the parliamentary defeat of 
the transcontinental railway bill, in which was embodied 
the prineip^ pa. of railway construction by private enterprise. 
Proposals for the Importation of coolie labour to work the 
sugar plantations had also caused considerable public uproar-
Land policies of the Conservative administration had come 
under severe attack from their opponents, who .alleged that 
their policies were unduly favourable to large propertied 
17 Interests. These issues dominated the I883 election. The 
major concern for Governments was the economic development of 
the Colony, and this implied efficient utilization of land, 
labour and communications. Thus, it is not surprising that 
17. Sir Charles Dilke argued that land was the major divisive 
issue in the Colony ^ Dilke, C., Problems of Greater 
Britain. (L'^ n'dorf, I89O), pp.205-210: 
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such questions dominated the period between I883 and I888. 
Economically, the time could not have been more 
propitious. The decade was a period of expansion, in which 
a widespread belief in the abundance and bounty of Queensland's 
great natural resources held sway. T.A. Coghlan estimated 
that between I876 and l880,^8 million was invested in 
Queensland's public and private investment areas. In the 
first>half of the new decade, the figure expanded to 
i 18 
3-20,000,000. Developing at a tremendous rate, the 
Queensland economy was nevertheless inherently unstable, for 
there was a sectoral Imbalance, caused by overdependence 
19 
upon building and pastoral industries. Harold Finch-
Hatton, an English aristocrat and sfuatter in Queensland, 
observed with alarm that speculation in sugar was reaicWing 
huge proportions: 
There is very little doubt that a great deal of 
money will be dropped in these northern sugar 
speculations.... It is probable that in the 
future the growing of sugar will develop into 
an enormous industry,,, but it is certain that 
numbers of people- will be ruined in the process 
of developing it,,, the prices paid for land 
during the run on sugar growing were far too 
high to allow any profit,., by and bye, the 
reaction will set in 20 
18. Cited in Crook, D.!'. , "Aspects of Brisbane Society in The 
Eighteen-ElghtiesJ*. (Unpub. B.A, Thesis, U, of Q. 1958). 
19. See Chapter 3. 
20. Plnch-Hatton H, Advance Australia, (Allen & Co., Lond., 
1885), p.157. 
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In the first half of the decade, however, public confidence 
was enormous. Success and fortune were to be found, and 
Queenslanders, while looking to the State to encourage 
industry, still retained great faith in the efficacy of 
private enterprise. Short, sharp recessions, like that of 
1879, could not dampen the spirit of enterprise and 
,21 investment. 
RAILWAYS 
Under conditions of economic bouyancy punctuated by 
sudden, short slumps, the Mellwraith Government announced 
deficits of il69,000 In 1879 and i22,000 in I88O. Most of 
the deficit in I88O had been caused by a sharp drop in 
railway revenues. Since the development of the colony was 
seen partly in terms of increasing communications, the 
Inefficiency and costliness of government railways was 
h;|;ghly disturbing. The railways were showing a consistent 
loss, so Mellwraith introduced the Railways Companies 
Preliminary Act in I88O- This was designed to "provide for 
and encourage the construction of railways by private 
enterprise," Mellwraith described the purpose of the Bill 
several years later: 
21, This recession eame at a time when Queensland was still 
recovering from the effects of severe drought (I876-8) 
and was caused by a brief balance of payments crisis. 
Butlln, *f.G,, Investment in Australian Economic 
Development I86I-I9OO. (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964), 
p. 10-
34-
The great object of the Bill was to be an 
intimation to the world that if they offered 
to construct railways in the interior of 
Australia on the principle.laid down in the 
measure, and on terms that would command 
themselves to the Government, then the 
Government would accept their agreement. 
This Preliminary Act was passed without division, with only 
two dissenters, W.H. Groom and George Thorn. This is strong 
indication that, at this time, the majority of Queensland 
parliamentarians shared the Premier's faith in the ability 
of private enterprise to build and maintain profitable 
railways, without ensuing social disruption. The Government 
preferred that the risk of railway construction be undertaken 
by private companies, and the Parliament accepted the idea, 
as yet unaware of the liabilities and responsibilities 
implied by private control of essential communications. 
The first railway proposal under the I88O Act was the 
Warrego Railway Bill, narrowly passed in 1882. Mellwraith 
had subsequently withdrawn the Bill, and in I883 Introduced 
the Transcontinental Railway Bill, intending to pass a more 
ambitious scheme, before presenting the clearly unpopular 
Warrego proposals to Parliament. The Telegraph commented: 
The Premier has declared it to be his fixed 
determination to carry the Transcontinental 
Railway Bill and the Warrego Railway Bill 
through Parliament this session, if possible 
22. Q,P.D., XXXIX, (1883), p.67. 
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by a purely party vote, and there is no doubt 
whatever that he means what he says.23 
The Transcontinental Railway Bill (T.R.B.) was a measure in 
which was planned a railway from Point Parker on the Gulf 
of Carpentaria to Charleville. The project was to be 
undertaken by a private syndicate, under the direction of 
General W. Fielding, and was to be financed mainly from 
Britain. The Telegraph hinted that Mellwraith was financially 
24 involved in the scheme and while this was unlikely, he had 
done much to encourage the formation of various syndicates. 
It was generally supposed that Collier and Co. had been 
encouraged by Mellwraith to participate while he was Minister 
for Works in 1874. The formation of the Transcontinental 
Railway Syndicate had coincided with a visit by Mellwraith 
to London, although there is evidence to suggest that he did 
not know of it until after its formation. Nevertheless, it 
was still widely rumoured that Mellwraith was not a dis-
27 interested advocate of the scheme. 
The syndicate opened negotiations with the Government 
23. Telegraph, 3/7/83. 
24.. Telegraph, 4/7/83. 
25. Memg Col-Sef. to Collier & Co. (Undated Q.S.A.). 
26. Mcllii^ raith fo Kimber & .Co., 1/1/80 (Q.S.A.). 
27. According to the Rev. sH, .Lllley, "Sir Thomas Mellwraith 
and his friends, whether true or not were strongly 
suspected too of not being uninterested promotjers of 
this projected syndicate of Land Grant Railways", Lllley, 
W,| Xife of the Hon. W, Brookes. (City Printing Works, 
Brisbane, 1902). 
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in. January 1882,. with final agreement being reached in the 
following year. Seven and a half years were allowed for 
the construction of the line, and land was to be granted to 
the syndicate in alternate blocks at. the rate of 10,000 
acres per mile south of the Gulf watershed, and 12,000 
acres north of that point. The total area to be granted was 
29 twelve million acres. -^  
Mellwraith, on the evidence of the reaction to the 
Warrego Railway Bill, expected a tough battle over the new 
proposal. Hostility from squatters, faced with the loss of 
about half their runs, had been gathering momentahi since 
l88l. Oscar de Satge was prepared to fight an election on 
this issue alone: 
I became a candidate with the co-operation and 
promlse of support of a number of neighbours and 
powerful ..friends, with the view of opposing the 
famous Warrego and Transcontinental Railway 
scheme S.30 
Mellwraith, when introducing the Bill, attempted to reassure 
the squatters. He argued that "the squatter, through whose 
land the line goes will derive a benefit from the line equal 
to, or greater than, the damage he suffers on account of the 
31 land taken from him". His arguments failed to convince 
28. Q,.P.D., XXIX, (1883), p.79. 
29. Q.V.P., II, (1883), pp.545-49. 
30* De Satge, 0., Pages from the Journal of a Queensland 
Squatter. (Hurst & Blackett^i,oNopfiC,jqoi) pqi. 
31. Q.P.D., XXXIX, (1883), p.79-
37. 
colleagues and opponents alike. Griffith, who had voted 
for the 1880 Bill ex;^ J.alned his new opposition in terms of 
greater knowledge of the evils of private ownership of 
railways. Much Liberal opinion had changed when they had 
familiarized themselves with the results of such schemes in 
the United States, and many now believed that such ownership 
could only lead to fraud and corruption. The large amount 
of land which would be handed over to the companies had also 
been unforeseen. Suspicion that Mellwraith and his friends 
were financially Involved also alienated some sections of 
32 public opinion.-^ Thus the self-interest of the squatters, 
combined with the opposition to private ownership of railways, 
made Mellwraith's task almost impossible. Most men professed 
to agree with de Satge: 
It was a scheme, in fact, for setting up an Independent 
sovereignty in the heart of Queensland, according to 
which foreign capitalists concerned in it might do 
everything in its own territory even coin money, and 
in all trade, defy competition.33 
While it was expected that Mellwraith would find it 
difficult to pass the Bill, most commentators were surprised 
by the ease with which he was defeated. The T.R.B. was 
defeated by 27 votes to I6, with eleven abstentions. Only 
32. T^. , 10/7/83 
33. De Satge, op.cit, p.339. 
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four Government supporters actually crossed the floor, of 
whom only one, William Allen, was Influential within the 
party.^ Of the eleven absentees, eight were Ministerialists.-'-' 
The majority of those Ministerialists opposed to the Bill 
represented squatting constituencies. It appears however, 
that the desertion was only temporary, caused by objection 
to the T.R.B. and nOt to the Government in general. Those 
Ministerialists who voted against the Bill or had abstained, 
all sat on the opposition benches after,Mellwraith's defeat 
in the I883 election.^^ 
The defeat of the Government by such a wide margin left 
Mellwraith little alternative but to tender the resignation 
of the Ministry and to call for a new mandate. - The Toowoomba 
Chronicle observed that: 
It is perfectly clear that a majority of the present 
Legislative. Assembly are not only opposed to the 
particular application of the land grant principle 
of making railways known as the Transcontinental 
project, but to the, abstract principle Itself.37 
The furore which surrounded the T.R.B. masked to a 
certain extent its primary purpose - to develop the 
communications of the colony. This aim was common to Liberals 
34. Stevens, Weld-Blundell, Ferguson, Allen. 
35. Baynes, Feez, Govett, Perssc^,Walsh, Morehead, Jessop, 
McWhannell. 
36. Only McWhannell, Stevens, Ferguson, Govett, Morehead 
were re-elected. 
37. Toowoomba Chronicle, 10.7.83. 
m-
and Conservatives. Their differences were rooted in the 
question of control. Mellwraith cherished the principle of 
responsible private enterprise; Griffith felt that only the 
State should control such enormous undertakings. The 
Liberals in office were as enthusiastic as their opponents 
about the extension of railways. In 1886, the Government 
proposed the construction of eight major lines, stressing 
in the proposals the need to open" up land for farming as 
opposed to pastoral areas. The close link between land and 
railways was expressed by the Telegraph: 
Progress has ever been the watchword of liberalism 
in Australia, the greatest good for the greatest 
number. The land for the people, population, 
settlement and no class legislation.... It is 
quite consistent with all that the party has 
always done or tried to do, that the leaders of 
real progress... are now proposing an expenditure 
of i6,000,000 for the construction.of railways 
in the Colony.38 
CLOSER SETTLEMENT 
In keeping with the movement in the southern colonies 
to unlock the lands, land policy in Queensland attempted 
almost from the beginning to promote closer settlement. Most 
of the land laws from i860 aimed at preventing the alienation 
38, Telegraph, 13.6.84. 
40. 
of large tracts of cultivatable land. The Unoccupied Crown 
Lands Occupation Act of i860 made provision for fourteen 
year leases for unoccupied land, held in runs not less than 
25, and not more than 100 square miles. Also in i860, the 
Crown Lands Alienation Act had authorized the Governor in 
Council to sell by auction Crown Lands at an upset price 
of il per acre, and to set aside 100,000 acres in*agricultural 
reserves. In. I863, an Agricultural Reserves Act allowed the 
selection for purchase of up to 320 acres of land for 
agricultural purposes. The coastal and Darling Downs 
districts were declared settled districts in I868, and an 
Act provided for the resumption of half the property in 
these areas for the purposes of closer settlement. " 
The move towards legislative encouragement of closer 
settlement was continued in the seventies, with several Acts 
designed to tighten pastoral leasing conditions and to ease 
conditions on agricultural settlement. Such legislation was, 
however, insufficient to curb the gradual extension of hugh 
•I • 
pastoral holdings. Waterson describes the results: 
The result was always the same. Whatever the 
conditions Imposed, capital and the lawyers 
always found a way, and the early land acts 
were no real Impediment to the freeholdlng of 
39- This spate of legislation ended in I868, when the same 
Act defined the limits of selections - 80 acres 
maximum for agricultural land and. 60 acres minimum 
for pastoral. 
41. 
great estates. The' squatters thus wanted things 
all ways. Secure in their knowledge that they 
could circumvent any legislation devised by 
political men, they desired Immense acreage at 
little cost and with few onerous conditions.^0 
With their great capital resources, pastorallsts retained 
the advantage thus created, particularly at times when general 
capital was short.,-and they were usually able to buy up good 
land with little competition. In the administration of the 
Land Acts can be found another reason for the success of 
the squatters: "Divided control between the survey office 
and. the Lands Department, administrative confusion, political 
influence ... were almost as Important in affecting the 
4l 
ultimate fate of resumed lands as the Acts themselves". 
The usual methods of family selection, dummying, and deliberate 
evasion of residence and improvement conditions were used by 
pastorallsts to circumvent Acts designed to promote closer 
42 
settlement. 
By such methods, repeated all over the colony, the 
liberal land laws were ignored and negated. Land reform 
40. Waterson, D.B., op.cit., p.26, 
41. Ibid., p.34. 
42. One flagrant example of such activities occurred in I867. 
A Leasing Act of I866 was accompanied by a Memorandum by 
which free selection in agricultural reserves before 
survey was granted in lots between 80 to 320 acres at a 
rental of 2/6 an acre. Receiving advance, warning, squatters 
selected 14,878 acres near Warwick in less than two weeks. 
Waterson, (Ibid., p.40-4l) rema]hi?s, "False declarations, 
blank powers-of-attorney and transfer forms were as 
abundant as confetti. Men made a jest of the swindle". 
42., 
became a major political issue, intensified by the close 
connection between Mellwraith and the pastorallsts. It 
had been clear during the I883 elections that Griffith 
Intended to propose sweeping land reform measures, and on 
his accession to the Premiership he appointed squatter C.B. 
Dutton as Minister for Lands^ Dutton, -well Informed and well 
educated, was a late convert to the ideas of Henry George, 
and non-alienation of land.was. a major part of his programme. 
Griffith's Ministerial programme contained the principles 
upon which the Government intended to base its land policy: 
It may be as well to say that the objects we shall 
try to obtain by our land legislation ... will be 
to deal with the pastoral lands of the interior 
in such a manner as to encourage the pastoral 
tenants to spend money upon them in improvements 
while at the same time securing to the country 
an adequate return for the lands occupied.... 
We shall in every way discourage the alienation 
of pastoral land.^3 
The Crown Lands Bill of 188.4 was the clearest expression 
of Liberal land policy. Dutton described its three major 
aims as (1) providing "the amplest and readiest means of 
obtaining land on most moderate terms by all men in the 
community"; (11) preventing "the general tendency of a 
certain class of people who have exhibited a very inordinate 
greed for the acquisition and monopoly of land"; (ill) 
43. Q.P.D., XLI, (1884), p.36. 
43. 
checking the tendency to acquire land fraudulently and 
44 
using it for speculation. The Government sought to 
realize these aims by asking the squatters to pay for the 
benefit of Increased transport facilities by higher rents, 
which in turn would pay the interest on the *10,000,000 
loan raised for the purposes of extending communications. 
The squatters would also suffer the resumption of part of 
their land to provide for closer settlement in the settled 
areas. In return, Griffith promised the squatters greater 
security of tenure. The Land Board, comp3Dls.;ed of two civil 
servants and set up to try to curb administrative abuse, was 
a major target of opposition attack. Mellwraith regarded 
it as a major weakness in the Bill: 
The Bill, instead of strengthening land administration 
by judiciously enlisting the aid of trusted 
representative men possessing local .knowledge ... 
wouldtinlversally entrust tHe entire administration 
in a Central Board, hampered by legal technicalities 
and delayed by difficulties and cost of procuring 
local administration.45 
The Land Bill was regarded as a "cause celebre" by Liberals 
and radicals. The language of Dutton's attack on the 
squatters indicated that he regarded it with almost crusading 
zeal. The Week commenting on opposition to the Bill 
44. Q.P.D., XLIII, (1884), pp.251-253. 
45. Ibid. , p.317. 
44 
demonstrated this attitude: "The leader of the opposition 
... spoke avowedly as the advocate of the squatters ... but 
he has, at present, an almost hopeless task if he tries to 
46 do more than modify the 'people's' bill." 
The bill attacked the principle of freehold as the most 
desirable form of holding property, and replaced it by the 
principle of leasing. Pastorallsts felt that if they could 
afford to buy land, there was no reason why they should not 
do so. Their individualist philosophy had not changed since 
1866, when a pastorallst described their attitude: "If they 
had run a race and won it, there was no reason why they 
47 
should be prevented from running any more." Nevertheless,-
most squatters agreed to come under the provisions of the 
Act, thus releasing about 100,000 acres for closer settlement. 
Despite all its manifest virtues, the Bill did not fulfil 
Liberal hopes. In attempting to limit the privileges of the 
squatters it met with a small degree of success. But as 
an attempt to promote closer settlement it failed, as it 
failed to raise revenue to any significant extent. It tried 
to do too many things, and succeeded in none. The Act was 
48 
46. Week, l8.10.84. 
47. Q.P.D., Ill, (1866), p.369. 
48. Q.P.D., XLVII, (1884), p.1106. 
45, 
to produce many amendments in the following decade, as 
pastorallsts, beginning to feel the effects of depression, 
began to agitate for relaxation of leasing conditions. 
LABOUR FOR THE SUGAR INDUSTRY 
The sugar industry of North Queensland was regarded as 
a potential source of great wealth, provided that planters 
could get sufficient cheap labour for the fields. It was, 
moreover, a common belief that white men could not work in 
49 the North and that the industry would perish without some 
form of cheap labour. During the Eighties, there were two 
proposed sources of such labour - India and the Islands of 
the South Pacific. Throughout the Eighties and through 
the Nineties, a continuing source of political problems was 
the acceptance of such labour as part of Queensland life. 
The attitude of the planters is well expressed by Plnch-
Hatton: 
The planters are a small community; but the absolute 
identity of their interests, and the fact that numbers 
of them live close together, makes it easy for them 
to co-operate ... they are absolutely dependent for 
their existence upon being able to obtain a sufficient 
supply of coloured labour to do their work in the cane 
fields .., the result of any attempt on the part of 
the Brisbane Government to stop black labour would 
inevitably be to make the North of Queensland insist 
on separation from the South.50 
49- The 1890-91 proposals for Indentured Italian labour 
raisell the question - "Were Italians considered White"? 
50. Plnch-Hatton, op.cit., pp.l58-l6l. 
46. 
COOLIE LABOUR 
A major issue in the I883 ^^lection campaign was the 
proposal of the Ministry to Import coolie labour for the 
sugar industry. In 1862,. an Indian Immigration Act had 
provided for the importation of Indiali coolies by agreement 
between the Indian and Queensland Governments. Until I883, 
the Act had remained on the Statute Books, but had not been 
utilized because the Indian Government refused to sanction 
such a policy. In I88I, however, Mellwraith had made 
provision in the. estimates for the appointment of an 
immigration agent to India. The issue was one with which 
the Mellwraith Government was closely identified. In May 
1883, J.M. Macrossan wrote to Mellwraith that "Coolies will 
51 be a great thorn in our side".-'^  After the election, he 
expressed great relief that his support of coolie labour 
52 had not proved as damaging as he had anticipated. 
Nevertheless, the threat of coolie labour alarmed many 
Queenslanders, and the Liberals entered the elections pledged 
to abolish any legislative encouragement of such labour. 
.The Bill to repeal the Indian Immigration Act was passed 
in the Assembly without division. The opposition's main 
51. Macrossan to Mellwraith, 25.5.83. (Mellwraith corres-
pondence, Oxley Library). 
52. Macrossan to Mellwraith, 25.8.83. Ibid. 
47. 
argument was that repeal was both unnecessary and harmful, 
and could open the door to negotiations between private 
53 individuals and the Indian Government. Such arguments 
were unrealistic in view of the Indian Government's refusal 
to negotiate with the Queensland Government, and the threat 
of coolie labour was successfully destroyed. 
PACIFIC ISLAND LABOUR 
The repeal of the Indian Immigration Act did not unduly 
alarm the sugar planters, or directly threaten their 
Interests. There was another source of labour, which was 
both cheaper and easier to obtain - black labour from the 
Islands of the South Pacific. The attitude of the Liberal 
Government to "Polynesian" labour was thus crucial to the 
planting Interests. 
The question of Pacific Island labour had always been 
a divisive one, not least, as Plnch-Hatton recognized, because 
it also affected the question of North Queensland separation. 
It was recognized that Griffith was determined to prohibit 
the importation of such labour, particularly because many 
Pacific Islanders, Intended only to work in the canefields, 
had gradually rmovsU jt^^io other parts of- the industry. In 
1884, Griffith intro-duced an Act aimed at restricting them 
53. Q.P.D., XLI, (1884), p.57. 
48. 
to work in the fields. His primary concern was the 
maintenance of the conditions of work for white labour, 
although he was also alarmed at the growth of absentee 
landlordism: 
If we go on introducing black labour into this, 
colony we shall have a number of large estates 
managed by a few owners; but more frequently by 
managers for absentee owners with large gangs 
of inferior races.54 
The opposition provided-little resistance to this Bill, 
although the remarks of Maurice Hume Black indicated the 
strong interconnection between black labour and separation: 
It was impossible ... for a Parliament, sitting in 
Brisbane to legislate for the various Industrial 
conditions (in Queensland).... When he cast his 
eyes over the Ministerial benches what did he see? 
He saw nothing but the southern portion of the 
Colony represented. It was essentially a Brisbane 
Government.55 
Given the basis of electoral support for each party, it is 
not surprising that northerners felt they would receive more 
favourable treatment from Mellwraith. On the other hand, it 
was not merely parochialism which Induced-Griffith's stance 
on black labour- The working population of the north was 
also hostile to the trade in men. The men of the gold fields, 
who primarily returned Liberal members, were staunch opponents 
54. Ibid.., p.134. 
55. Ibid., p.137. 
49. 
of cheap black labour- For this reason, J.M. Macrossan, 
a long-standing representative of the miners, was opposed 
to "Polynesian" labour-
Pacific Island labour was not a strictly partisan 
question; there were many shades of opinion among parlia-
mentarians. At one extreme, there was a group of southern 
Liberals, who during the 1884 debate, pushed for a poll tax 
of ^ 50 on each imported labourer- William Brookes led 
this group, a man who "lent his energies most fully to 
oppose the systematic Importation of alien races to work 
upon the sugar plantations of Queensland.... He regarded it 
as a horrible denial of human rights, and contrary to the 
57 
best traditions of the British people"."^' Liberals who 
represented sugar constituencies, however, tended to support 
the planters. In Mellwraith's party, Macrossan was opposed 
to such men as M.H, Black and B,D, Morehead, who thought 
cheap labour desirable, not only on the sugar plantations, but 
in all other areas where it would be found profitable- The 
majority of this party, however, agreed with the opinion of 
Governor Musgrave who wrote in 1885: 
I do not, however, share the opinion of Mr- Griffith 
that it will eventually be found possible to 
successfully prosecute the cultivation of sugar 
56. Brookes, Isambert, Smyth, White, Buckland, Higson, Grimes, 
Salkeld, Jordon, Foxton, Mldgely, MacParlane. 
57. Lllley, op,cit,, p.105. 
50. 
cane in the tropics by means of white labour, I 
believe this to be physically Impossible,58 
Griffith, fixed in his intention of abolishing the 
trade, introduced a Bill in I885 to curtail the importation 
IT q 
of Polynesians after I89O. Once again, the Bill passed 
without division. To soften the blow, Griffith planned to 
institute a system of central sugar mills, subsidized by 
the State, and.thus to reduce the costs of employing white 
labour. Mellwraith had "no doubt that the Premier would be 
able to carry his scheme for subsidizing planters with sugar 
mills. It would receive support from both sides, but he did 
not believe that one fifth of the members who supported it 
believed it,,,. At the present time. It was unpopular to 
advocate black labour, because the working classes were 
deceived on the subject". 
The planters had thus failed in their attempts to 
convince the public that the sugar Industry could not survive 
without black labour- More persuasive had been the humanitarian 
and political arguments of Brookes and Griffith. Sir Charles 
Dilke' expressed these arguments better, perhaps, than 
anyone: 
The Queenslanders have not yet solved the problem 
of the settlement of a tropical country by Englishmen 
58. Musgrave to Sec. of State (Colonies) Confidential, 13-4.85. 
59. See below,Chapters 5 and 12. 
60. Q.P.D., XLVII, (1884), p.1144. 
51. 
and of its cultivation by English hands.... 
If the other colonies permit their northern 
sister to continue her course of importing 
dark skinned labourers to form a peon 
population, a few years will see her a 
wealthy cotton and sugar growing country, 
with all the vices of a slave holding 
Government, though without the name of 
slavery.61 
CROSS CURRENTS IN PARTY LIFE 
The large majority gained by the Liberals in I883 had 
the effect of robbing party life of much excitement. At 
no time did the Griffith Government appear in danger of 
defeat, and in July I887, the Courier, noting the political 
tranquillity, if not apathy, called upon the Government to 
seek a fresh mandate. The apparent consensus shared by 
the parties was destroyed a month later when J.R. Dickson 
resigned from the Ministry on the question of the imposition 
of a property tax. The public unanimity of the Liberal 
Party was shattered. While division on party questions 
had shown a remarkable cohesion in Liberal ranks, significant 
nuances of opinion can be gauged on such questions as social 
services, temperance and reforms in the parliamentary system. 
il, Dilke, C , op. clt, 
62. Brisbane Courley,> 8.7.I887. 
63* Callaghan, P., rolit,ical Alignments in the Queensland 
Legislative Assembly. . (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q. 
1968), 
Nominates five party divisions - election of speaker 
(1883) Crown Land Bill (1884) Customs Duties Bill (I885) 
Warwick St. George Railway (I886) Committee of Ways and 
Means (I887). 
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An analysis.of division lists on such,Issues may prove 
Instructive: 
DIVISIONS 
AYES NOES 
1, TRIENNIAL PARLIAMENTS BILL SECOND READING 
Rutledge: Griffith: Dickson: Dutton 
Sheridan: Eraser: Brookes: Aland 
Smyth: Isambert: Jordan:White: 
Salkeld: Bale: Mellor: Kates: 
Grimes: Buckland:Campbell: Stevens: 
Poote: MacParlane: M.Patterson: 
Foxton: Bailey: Beattle 26 
Norton: Archer: Morehead: 
Chubb: Black: Stevenson: 
Nelson: Higson: Palmer: 
Ferguson: Donaldson: 
Hamilton: Moreton 13 
2. MEMBERS EXPENSES BILL SECOND READING 
Aland: Annear: Bailey: Brookes: 
Brooks: Brown: Buleock: Campbell: 
Dickson: Dutton: Foxton: Praser: 
Griffith: Grimes: Higson: Horfetz: 
Isambert: Jordan: Kellett: Lissner: 
Mellor: Miles : More.ton: Rutledge: 
Sheridan: White-: Buckland: 
McMaster 28 
Black: Donaldson: 
Govett: Hill: Murphy: 
Nelson: Norton: Philp: 
Stevens: Stevenson: 
Palmer: Jessop 
12 
3. BEER DUTY BILL SECOND READING 
Annear: Beattle: Brookes: Dickson; 
Dutton: Poote: Praser: Griffith: 
Grimes: Hogson: Isambert: Jordan: 
Kates: MacParlane: Mellor: 
Mldgely: Miles: Moreton: Rutledge: 
Salkeld: White: Wakefield: Bailey 
23 
Archer: Black: Chubb: 
Horwltz: Ferguson: Jessop: 
Lalor: Macrossan: 
Mellwraith: Norton: More-
head: Palmer: Hamilton: 
Lissner 
14 
53. 
AYES NOES 
REPEAL.OF CONTAGIOUS DISEASES ACT 
Brookes: Buckland: Buleock: 
Ferguson: Praser: Grimes: Jordan: 
Kates: MacParlane: Miles: Rutledge:. 
Sheridan:. Wakefield: McMaster: 
Salkeld. 
Groom - Casting vote 15 
Chubb: Dickson: Dutton: 
Foxton: Griffith: Hill: 
Horwltz: 
Lissner: 
Pattison 
Hamilton 
Kellett 
Moreton 
: Philp: 
: Murphy 
FT 
Norton 
15 
5. LICENSING BILL AM. TO CLAUSE ll4 Mellwraith 
Annear: Archer: Bailey: Black: 
Chubb: Foote: Govett: Lissner: 
Macrossan: Mellwraith: Norton: 
Palmer: Smyth: Ferguson 
14 
Aland: Brookes: Campbell: 
Dickson: Dutton: 
Griffith: Grimes: Groom: 
Jordan: Kates: MacParlane 
Mellor: Miles: Norton: 
Rutledge: Salkeld: 
Sheridan: Wakefield: 
White: Buckland: 
McMaster 
21. 
6. LICENSING BILL MacParlan'^ '^ s Amendment 65 
Aland: Beattle: Buckland: Campbell 
Donaldson: Poote: Grimes: Salkeld,: 
Higson: Jordan: McMaster: Mellor: 
Wakefield: White: MacParlane: 
Mldgely 
16-
Archer: Black: Brookes; 
Chubb: Dickson: Dutton; 
Ferguson: Govett: 
Griffith: Groom: Hill: 
Isambert: Mellwraith: 
Miles: Moreton: Norton; 
Palmer: Rutledge: 
Sheridan: Smyth: 
Stevenson: Bailey: 
Stevens: 23 
64, Mellwraith moved that 1/5 rather than 1/10 of ratepayers 
were needed to provide sanction for a local option poll. 
65. MacParlane moved an amendment to omit the clause which 
exempted persons selling liquor in Military canteens. 
54. 
7» EMPLOYERS LIABILITY BILL AMENDMENT TO CLAUSE 4 (Hlll)^^ 
Adams: Bailey: Black: Brown: 
Donaldson: Poote: Grimes: 
Hill: Horwltz: Jessop: Kates 
Kellett: McWhannel: Murphy: 
Pattison: Smyth: MacParlane: 
Mellor 
18 
Aland: Brookes: Brooks: 
Buleock: Chubb: Dickson: 
Dutton: Ferguson: ^rigflth: 
Hamilton: Isambert: 
Lissner: McMaster: Mldgely: 
Miles: Moreton: Norton: 
Philp: Rutledge: Salkeld: 
Sheridan: White: Wakefield: 
Buckland p^i 
THE PROTESTANT PACTION 
Divisions 3, 4 and 6 were concerned with the moral 
questions of temperance and prostitution. The close 
connection between Protestantism and the Liberal Party Is 
indicated by the solid core of Liberals voting in the 
affirmative. In these divisions some members voted 
together on all three issues, (MacParlanej Jordon, Grimes, 
Wakefield), The size of the temperance group may be 
67 
estimated by_voting In divisions 3 and 6. They were not 
joined by any Conservative members and constituted a solid 
core within the Liberal Party. Most of the members of this 
group were engaged in small business - Poote, MacParlane, 
66, To omit sub section 2 of clause 4 - to cover injury to 
workmen "By reason of negligence" on the part of an 
employee in a capacity of superintendence-
67. MacParlane, Beattle, Foote, Grimes, Higson, Jordan, 
McMaster, Wakefield, Mellor, Mldgely, White, 
55. 
Salkeld and McMaster were all engaged in the retail trade. 
Grimes was a farmer and Jordan a civil servant. Jordan, 
Mellor and Macfarlane were Wesleyan Methodists. Many of 
these members voted, in opposition to Griffith, to repeal 
the Contagious Diseases Act. This Act, based on an English 
counterpart, had been passed in 1868, and required that 
"certain women" were to undergo periodic health checks to 
prevent the spread of venereal disease. Unfortunately the 
Act did not specify which women were to come under its 
provisions. Throughout I885, Parliament was flooded with 
petitions from women's organizations and religious groups, 
primarily Protestant. Many regarded the Bill as an 
infringement of civil rights, Jordan, introducing the 
motion for repeal, argued that it was. degrading in concept 
6R 
and a denial of female rights. Macfarlane considered the 
Bill not only ineffective in preventing prostitution but also 
69 discriminatory. Most speakers also regarded the Bill as 
inherently immoral, because it practically gave a State 
licence to practise prostitution. This line was followed 
by Jordan, Grimes and Macfarlane who were especially concerned 
with its effect on poorer members of the community, often driven 
68. Q.P.D., L, (1886), p.1527. 
69, Ibid. , p. 15:32;. Macfarlane argued that "A man might 
steal away'the virtue of the daughters of our working 
class with no redress whatsoever". 
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to prostitution by intense poverty- It is significant 
that the extreme opponents of coloured labour largely 
70 
corresponded with this Protestant - Humanitarian faction. 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
Debate on the Contagious Diseases Act also brought to 
light intra-party divisions on the question of the role of 
the State. Griffith and Rutledge represented two opposite 
shades of opinion. Griffith in opposing the motion argued: 
Of course we cannot stamp the disease out; but 
if we find a number of persons engaged in an 
unlawful occupation, which Is likely to have 
the effect of spreading the disease, has the 
State not a right to say, "We cannot stop the 
practice of your unlawful occupation; but so 
long as you continue to practise It we will 
take care that you do not affect the people 
of the colony^ 'V 71 
Rutledge maintained that this exceeded the limits of the duty 
of the State: 
.?. Is syphilis the only form of hereditary disease; 
are not consumption and insanity hereditary 
diseases? And yet, what Statesman was ever 
yet bold enough to say that because the 
children of consumptive parents will suffer 
all kinds of miseries, we should enact a law 
forbidding consumptives to marry?72 
Griffith's conception of the role of the State was also 
responsible for the introduction of the Employers Liability 
70. See footnote 56. 
71. Q.P.D., L, (1886), p.1528. 
72. Ibid., p.1539. 
3 I • 
Act, a transcript of an English Act passed in I88O, with 
the aim;:of extending, the responsibilities of the employers. 
It did not cover injuries caused by faulty machinery, unless 
it could be proved that this stemmed from the negligence of 
the employer. The Bill did cover, however, injuries 
received through the negligence of an employer in a 
delegatbry capacity. In Committee, the amendment proposed 
by Lumley Hill was aimed at deleting this clause. While 
the second reading had passed without division, votes in 
pommittee did not follow party lines. Several Ministerialists 
73 
voted against the clause. The majority were employers of 
a large labour force, although small.farmers and pastorallsts, 
who delegated so much authority to managers, also felt it 
to be directly threatening. Many felt State interference 
was being taken too far. Grimes remarked: "I quite agree 
> 
that the employer should be made responsible for any damage 
which is sustained through his carelessness, but I do not 
go so far as to make him liable for the carelessness of 
those employed. Poote agreed with his colleague: "I 
think we are going a little too far in some of our 
legislation"."^^ 
73. Bailey, Foote, Adams, Grimes, Horwltz, Kates, Kellett, 
MacParlane, Mellor, Smyth. 
74. Q.P.D. , p.296. 
75. Ibid. , p.294. 
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This laissez-faire attitude was shared by many 
Liberals, and may have been responsible for the dearth of 
social legislation in the Liberal period. During the 
sessions of 1884, I885 and I886, four Bills were Introduced 
aimed at controlling the liquor trade.' In 1884, a Health 
Bill and an Insanity Bill were passed, a very mild excursion 
into the field of public health. The Offender's Probation 
Bill slightly eased criminal punishment, and the Criminal 
Act Amendment Bill was largely formal and unconcerned with 
social welfare. Apart from .one Bill designed to prevent 
the sale of opium to Aborigines, and several to protect 
the Polynesians, these were the only Bills designed to 
Increase the scope of welfare legislation. 
The Liberals, with their opponents, believed that if 
national wealth was increased, social wealth would naturally 
follow. Thus if they provided greater opportunities to 
acquire land, equitable labour conditions, and greater 
opportunities to...exercise the vote, the stage would be set 
for all citizens to advance their aims. This entailed an 
enormous amount of Intricate legislation, involving the 
State in the promotion of national progress, but not in 
the protection of individuals unable to partake of economic 
76. The Licensing Bill, Beer Duty Bill, Liquor Bill, 
Queensland Spirits Duty Bill Increased duties on 
beer and spirits, and placed greater restrictions 
on their iale-
59. 
advances. 
RAISING REVENUE 
Until 1887, the Liberals, despite differences of 
opinion on such issues as temperance, presented a 
harmonious appearance- On no great issue did the Liberals 
disagree to such an extent as to cause a public split. 
In 1887., however, Griffith's proposal to levy a tax on 
property split the party, and greatly reduced the Ministry's 
chances of re-election in the following year-
The failure of the Land Act to realize expected 
revenue had, by I887, led the Government into considerable 
financial difficulty. The Governor's speech in I887 
indicated continued confidence: 
The Public finances have however, not escaped 
the natural consequences of the long continued 
adverse seasons, but have no doubt that with 
careful administration, they will shortly 
exhibit their usual satisfactory condition.77 
Many commentators forecast that differences would arise 
between Griffith and his Treasurer, J.R. Dickson, as to the 
best method of recovering the deficit. The Brisbane Courier 
thought that Griffith was likely to favour increased taxation, 
78 
while Dickson sought the remedy in increased land sales. 
77. Q.P.D., L.Il., (1887)., p.5. 
78. Brisbane Courier, 10.8.87. 
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The resignation of Dickson on the eve of the presentation 
of the Financial Statement therefore caused little surprise. 
In his explanation Dickson wished it to be "distinctly 
understood that in retiring from the Government I do not 
cease to be a Liberal member .... I do not consider that 
when a member differs from the Griffith Government he must 
necessarily retire from Liberal ranks. I have yet to learn 
that the new Gospel which has been propounded by the Premier 
must necessarily embrace all, and surround all and contain 
all.the principles of Liberalism".'^ 
Dickson could see no necessity or justification for a 
land tax, particularly as the necessary revenue could be 
raised by the far less painful means of Increased land 
sales. Several other leaders, including party organizer 
On 
Robert Buleock, agreed with him. The Ministerial split 
was not however regarded as serious by the Telegraph, 
which observed that "the political situation, while it Is 
full of interest, is not theoretically, full of difficulty". 
The newspaper was confident that.Griffith could fill Dickson's 
place in the Ministry and still retain the confidence of the 
Ministry. Griffith, however, was not prepared to press the 
79. Q.P.P., Lll, (1887), p.266. 
80. Buleock, Kellett, Foote, MacDonald« Paterson, Brooks, 
Hill. 
81. Telegraph, 6.8.87. 
81 
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issue, and even though he carried his land tax proposals, 
he announced their withdrawal on 31 August. 
Griffith was thus prepared for the electorate to 
decide the issue- The importance of the split can be over-
estimated. Its chief significance lay in the electoral harm 
done by the publicity surrounding the trouble. Because the 
composition of the party was heterogeneous, differences of 
opinion inevitably arose, none of which proved Insurmountable 
at this time. The situation was not Inherently dangerous 
to the maintenance of the prevailing system of two balanced 
and mutually opposing parties. 
A PHILOSOPHY OF DEVELOPMENT 
Between I883 and I888, it was clear that fundamental 
differences between the.two parties existed. With the 
same primary aim, the economic development of the Colony, they 
differed as to the methods by which these alms might best be 
achieved. In as much as either side could be said to possess 
itvtnf 
a philosophy^of material development, material progress, 
from which social benefits would inevitably follow. In 
many ways, the manner in which they conceived these aims 
reflected the sectional economic interests within the parties -
mining on a large scale, pastoralism and sugar on the one 
hand, and merchandizing and agriculture on the other- Their 
differences were as significant as their similarities, and 
were conducive to the maintenance of the two party system. 
62. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE DEPRESSION 
In February I892, the Brisbane Courier described the 
economic situation of the colony in the following manner: 
General business is paralysed, property is 
practically valueless, and even sovereigns 
are of small account because of the fear 
of losing them, and the doubt whether value 
can be obtained in any business transaction 
whatsoever- The Government of the Colony is 
weighted with a certain measure of responsibility 
for the depression. It has Indulged in a 
wasteful expenditure of borrowed money... 
[It] cannot be permitted to rest with folded 
hands now that the collapse in values has set In.l 
Depression in business which had reached perhaps its lowest 
point in I892, had been in evidence as early as I890, when 
the Queensland correspondent of the Australian Insurance and 
Banking Record commented that "Money with us is very tight, 
and extreme.caution still continues on the part of monetary 
institutions and private individuals alike. The banks keep 
2 
up their restricted rates and show no sign of change". 
According to Lewis, the depression in Queensland began as 
early as I886, caused primarily by a sectoral imbalance in 
1. Brisbane Courier, 10.2.92. 
2. A.I,B.R,, IV, 6, June I89O, p,455. 
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colonial investment patterns. This imbalance was the 
result of overinvestment in residential and pastoral property, 
Government economic behaviour was also partly responsible 
because of flagging government revenue at a tim:e when the 
public sector needed considerable buoyancy to counter-
balance the contraction in private Investment. Moreover, 
evidence that the Government could not balance their 
accounts was contained in every yearly budget report. The 
chronic deficit of the Queensland Government had one result 
which was unique in the Eastern Colonies - in Queensland, 
fiscal policy was regarded not as a total theoretical 
approach to government finance, but simply as a means of 
raising revenue. Fiscal policy was thus -not unconnected 
with the depression in Queensland, and could be regarded as 
partly a consequence of the economic circumstances of the 
Colony-
Political and social consequences of the depression 
were enormous. In many ways, depression conditions 
contributed to the rise of militant labour for, as working 
conditions deteriorated, the labour unions became more 
demanding. The depression also contributed to the .decline 
3. Lewis,f^ G., The Crisis Years (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q. 
1964). . "^  ~~ 
4, Lib'eral financial ineptitude was one of the primary 
causes of. the defeat in the 1888 General Election. 
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of liberal fortunes during the nineties, because the 
economic methods of Sir Samuel Griffith were unable to meet 
the new needs of the colony. Large-scale unemployment and 
depression in all industries therefore had great repercussions 
which were to be felt long after business had begun to 
revive. 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
In 1885, the pastoral and building industries controlled 
about 80% of the gross private Investment, a percentage which 
5 had not altered to any significant extent a decade later^ 
According to Butlin, there had been a sharp rise in pastoral 
Investment beginning in 1882 and continuing till I89I. The 
reasons for this increased Investment lay in an increase in 
overseas borrowing, by colonial governments as well as banks 
and other specialized financial institutions. In the 
southern colonies, good seasons throughout the Eighties were 
a further Inducement to Investment, In Queensland, serious 
droughts in 1884-6 and 1888-9 do not seem to have weakened 
confidence, given such buoyant conditions in the South, 
Butlin observes however that "Prom this high point, sustained 
after other major sectors had begun to contract, the level 
5« Butlin, N,G,, Investment- in Australian Economic DevOlop-
• ment I86I-I90I. (C.U.P., 1964), pp.36-8. 
fi. Except for a general disarray ±^^1^90^ Maritime Strike. 
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of pastoral investment fell heavily to touch bottom in 
1897",''' 
The process of overseas borrowmng in pastoral Investment 
tended to be self-complicating. Banks and finance companies 
multiplied.as it became ever easier to obtain finance. An 
overseas correspondent for the London Times reported in 1893 
that "At present, it is generally held that the pastoral 
o 
industry- is suffering from the malady of overcapitalization". 
The correspondent noted that the interest rate on capital 
grew in geometric relation to the multiplication of sources 
of finance: 
The English investor lends money into a land and 
mortgage company and receives a fair rate of 
Interest. The company lends it at a higher rate 
to an Australian Bank. The bank- lends it at a 
still higher interest to the station owner, and 
by the time it gets to the land it must pay 
profit to the owner. Interest to the Bank, 
interest to the company and interest to the 
English Investor,9 
Under these conditions, it should not have been surprising 
that investors found their profit margin narrowing. Banks 
and finance companies,. moreover, exercised little control 
over how their money was utilized. In Queensland, 
pastorallsts ploughed more money into their land in order 
f, B u t l i n , N.G. ,. op .c i t . , p . 4 7 . 
i . The Times (London), L e t t e r s from Queensland. (j|30cpiillan, 
Lond., 1193), p . 6 9 . 
! • Ibid., p.71. 
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to recoup the losses of the late seventies. It was not 
until too late that the dangers of overstocking and non-
replenishment of pastures were perceived. L'HUiller 
maintains that the pastoral industry had reached the limits 
of its productive capacity by the late eighties, "and 
investment expenditure added little to future productive 
capacity and export earnings. In fact, the excessive flow 
of funds until I89I from Britain and at home Increased the 
already dangerous situation of excessive capacity." 
A similar situation existed in urban residential 
Investment. Lewis argues that the production of building 
materials did.not seriously fall away until I89O, thus 
contradicting Butlin's assertion that "the clearly marked 
slump from 1885-7 was the end of the main building phase-
in Queensland." Neither the value of production, nor the 
size of the workforce contracted to any significant extent 
until 1890, but by I892, values had dropped to levels below 
12 those pertaining in 1884. Lewis-argues that in the 
Queensland context, Butlin's emphasis upon the Importance of 
the building industry was misplaced, given the small percentage 
of the workforce engaged in the industry during the period. 
10. L'Hulller, "Depression and a national economy", N. Griffin 
(ed,) Essays in^the Economic History of Australia. 
(Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1967). 
11. Butlin, N.G,, op,clt, , p.ll6, 
12. Lewis,f.G,, op,clt,, p.l66. 
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Moreover, Brisbane, the centre of the Industry, did not 
appear to experience the extremes of the building boom 
which had occurred in the southern capitals. Despite this 
relative moderation, land purchased at Inflated and 
unrealistic prices was left unsold, and new buildings 
13 
remained unoccupied as the depression worsened in intensity, 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
The dominant place occupied by the pastoral industry in 
the private sector was paralleled in the sphere of government 
Investment, The financial policies of the Queensland 
Government were heavily weighted in favour of rural, 
particularly pastoral, industries. The greater part of most 
government expenditure was concentrated in primary Industry, 
particularly in the provision of communications throughout 
the vast colony. Between i860 and 1915, gross Investment in 
railways alone totalled about 72^ of the gross public 
investment, and from I871 until I89I, the number of persons 
employed in transport and communications industries rose four-
14 fold. In order that this expansive railway policy be 
implemented, the Queensland Government, along with those of 
all other Australian colonies, had engaged in extensive overseas 
13, Brisbane Courier, 10,2,92, 
14, Laverty, J,, "The Queensland Economy, 1860-1915". Murphy, 
Joyce, Hughes (eds). Prelude to Power, (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 
1970), p,31. 
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borrowing. On a per capita basis, Queensland borrowing 
equalled that of the southern colonies between I883 and 1893, 
The loan policy of the Queensland Government was, however, 
considered irresponsible by the A,I,B.R.: 
For several years past, Queensland politicians 
have been so deeply engrossed in the excitement 
of party warfare that the'public financial 
position has received scant attention at their 
hands. It has been the general practice to rely 
Incautiously upon the future of the great 
underdeveloped resources of the country.15 
Many commentators also criticized the utilization of public 
money. The greater part of the proceeds from loans was 
poured into the construction of railways. The A.I.B.R. 
described the cavalier manner in which these loans were 
raised: 
Hitherto, loans have been obtained supported by 
a list of proposed lines, with estimates which 
were little better than guesses. The Government 
then found it convenient to spend the money in 
accordance with the exigencies of their position, 
and to apply for parliamentary sanction of the 
expenditure Incurred by them at the next 
parliamentary session.16 
Moreover, 'as public money continued to pour into railway 
development the return was becoming visibly less. There 
were several reasons - inadequate surveys often led to 
spiralling costs; most railways followed settlement, and 
15. A.I.B.R,,, XIV, 9 (Sept. I89O ), p.633. 
16. i.B.r.D., p.632. 
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therefore expanded into areas already reaching maximum 
capacity. In addition, too many railways were built as a 
result of political pressure- One example of this was the 
second section of the Cairns-Herberton railway, the contract 
for which was described by the Courier as "grossly Improper 
in its inception and calamitously expensive in its sequence 
17 
,,, it was essentially a political transaction throughout." 
According to the Warwick Argus, "the whole of the Government 
work in connection with this contract for the second section 
of the Cairns-Herberton railway has been a muddle of 
1 8 incompetency and favouritism". 
In many areas, the value of railways was lessened by 
exorbitant freight costs. In I892, the Warwick Argus 
described this situation: 
Not a few of our farmers are living on credit, 
not -because they have nothing to sell, but 
because the railway and other charges render 
it impossible to sell at a profit just now.l° 
Unfortunately, this was a vicious circle. While revenue 
continued to fall, it was impossible to reduce freight charges, 
but the shrinkage of revenue had led to the situation in the 
first place- Mellwraith, in his I89O Financial Statement 
concluded that it was the failure of land revenue which had 
17. Brisbane Courier, 24.1.93. 
18. Warwick Argus, 27.2.92. 
19. Warwick Argus, 6.9^92. 
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led to the disastrous financial state of the Queensland 
railways, as it was from this source that interest on railway 
20 loans was to be met. While this was to some extent true, 
the A.I.B.R. also pointed out that under the Morehead 
Government, the "policy of constructing payable main trunk 
lines has been perverted into the opportunist plan of making 
little country branches and extensions, ostensibly as feeders, 
but which have now become recognized as "leeches and Blood-
II 2 1 suckers". 
Whatever the reasons, the deficit continued to grow. 
In 1883-4 the net revenue from 552 miles of line stood at 
i l 4 8 , 2 9 5 - 0 . 0 . In 1889-90 the r e t u r n was i 7 7 , 6 9 2 . 0 . 0 from 
22 919 miles of line. The Importance of railways is recognized 
by Butlin: 
It was Queensland's uncertainty of the future of 
railway investment which induced the early slackening 
of public capital formation. Moreover the decline 
in financial performance reflected the much more 
serious difficulty, that the inability to expand 
freight income was due, in large measure, to the 
failure of railway Investment, in the late eighties, 
to continue to stimulate export earnings.23 
This policy of extensive borrowing created an artificial 
economic environment, and was self-defeating, because on 
most occasions, new loans had to be raised to meet interest 
20. Q.P.D., LXI, (1890), p.576. 
21. A.I.B.R., XIV, 9, (Sept. I89O), p.633. 
22., Q,P.D., LXI, (1890), p.577. 
23. Butlin, N.G., op.cit. , p,446. 
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on already borrowed capital. The Maryborough Chronicle 
expressed this opinion: 
Our State borrowing policy while it brought about 
a specious prosperity, in liberal expenditure of 
money throughout the colony, which we foolishly 
accepted as genuine while it lasted, is responsible 
almost solely for the stagnant depression that 
now afflicts us.24 
FISCAL POLICY 
The continued unsatisfactory state of Government finances 
was a major reason for Mellwraith's introduction of a policy 
of full-scale protection in 1888. Prior to this date, 
Queensland had followed a policy of only very limited 
protection, based on I87O legislation. In I87O, the 
Government was forced to choose between imposing a land tax 
or an income tax for the purposes of raising revenue. In 
a squatter dominated Parliament, the former was very 
unlikely, and the income tax was generally unpopulai?- The 
Government thus decided to introduce customs duties. The 
new tariff mainly aimed at replacing the difficult to police 
ad valorem duties by fixed duties on the same articles. The 
ad valorem duties which remained were increased from 7.1/2^ 
to 105?. The Government exempted certain raw materials which 
were used in industries which the Government hoped to 
develop. The taxes remained fairly moderate, but opponents 
24. Maryborough Chronicle, 9.6,92. 
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of the pastorallsts argued that the tariff was a cynical 
piece of class legislation. They argued that the most 
efficient and fair method*'by which to raise revenue was 
to place an export tax on wool, rather than to spread the 
tax burden into areas where people could leas t afforljl i t . 
Mellwraith introduced a thorough-going revision of 
the tariff in 1888. He explained: 
The Government have done everything they possibly 
could to reduce the expenditure. They found that 
under the ordinary rate of taxation, a large 
deficit had accrued which must be provided for. 
That deficit they propose to provide for by 
increasing the Customs Duties of the colony, and 
in one item (25) abolishing the excise. The 
duties proposed ... are not calculated, from their 
weight to depress trade, but they are sufficient 
to encourage industries in many dlrectlons.2D 
This decision had not come as a surprise. Brisbane merchants 
had long been aware that Mellwraith was a strong protectionist, 
arguing that the colony needed a protective tariff to 
encourage native Industry. The Brisbane Courier in I889 
indicated that the revision was expected in criticizing 
Donaldson'simembershlp of the Chamber of Commerce: 
Mr- Donaldson's position.as President for the last 
six or seven months has been a difficult and 
anomalous one. It was known that the new 
Government was committed to a revision of the 
25. The Beer Duty, an I888 Election issue. 
26. Q.P.D., LV, (1888), p.215. 
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tariff along protectionist lines, which Involved 
the subordination of the ... mercantile interests 
to the industrial interests. 27 
Brisbane merchants, who constituted a fairly large group 
within Mellwraith's National Party (a name coined for the 
1888 election) were directly opposed to the policy of 
protection. If the finances had been healthier, it is 
doubtful whether Mellwraith, despite his enormous prestige, 
could have defeated the combination of free traders, 
merchants, pastorallsts and northerners. Thus, while 
the onset of depression was not directly responsible for 
the advent of a high protective tariff in Queensland, 
only the necessity to raise revenue in a sagging economy 
gave Mellwraith the opportunity to implement the policy. 
Pastorallsts opposed protection as they were 
primarily interested in the export market, and a low 
tariff enabled them to Import necessities as cheaply 
as possible. In 1888, John Murray argued: 
I have always looked upon protection from a 
produeir's point of view,, and I hold that no 
protective Ibariff can possibly benefit the 
producing Interests, from the simple fact 
that our staple products are articles of 
export. 28 
27. Brisbane Courier, 1.1.89. 
28. Q.P.D., LV, (1888), p.340. 
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Free traders believed that a high protective tariff could 
only lead to an unstable, because artificial economy, 
and that Queensland would have to Import labour to provide 
for local industries which would be artlfleally fostered 
29 by protection. Yet, freetraders could not deny the 
slow development of Queensland industry, and thus had to 
pay lip service to "the encouragement of native industry" 
which could only be fostered through protection. Thus, 
until 1896, no major politician actually declared himself 
30 
a free trader- Protection was not a contentious issue 
during the 1893 General Election, but in I896, Nelson 
promised a,, further revision of the tariff. The Courier, 
discussing claims for protection on Queensland foundry 
machinery, indicated the changing climate of opinion in 
April 1896: 
The Government should be infinitely more concerned 
about the foundations of prosperity than about 
one of the many and comparatively insignificant 
superstructures.31 
Northern opinion throughout the period was decidedly anti-
protection, as most Northerners felt that their population, 
consisting largely of adult males Importing necessities 
from the South could only suffer. Louis Goldring reflected 
29. Ibid., p.341. 
30. One exception was B.D. Morehead who described protection 
as "a most heretical system of taxation". Q.P.D., LXVIII, 
(1892), p.1050. 
31. Brisbane Courier, 8.4.96. 
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this attitude in 1888: 
As a Northerner, I am bound to be a free trader. 
I always was averse to protection ... the tariff 
which has been presented will affect the residents 
of the North more than those of the South .... 
To make protection successful we must have a 
large population, and unfortunately we have not 
got it.32 
Nevertheless, the free traders had less than a fighting 
chance in 1888 and the issue was not again to become 
significantly contentious until the late nineties, when 
the threat of inter-colonial free trade, forced them to 
33 take up the cudgels against federation. 
The debate surrounding fiscal policy had one most 
fundamental characteristic - it rarely revolved around a 
question of principles. Because the 1888 and I893 tariffs 
possessed primarily a revenue raising character, shrill 
cries were heard from those adversely affected, but none 
expressed opposition to protection in principle. The 
depression contributed to the advent of full—scale 
protection in Queensland, and as economic conditions began, 
and continued to improve, so also did the strength of 
protection wane. 
THE BANKS 
The beneficial effects of the I888 tariff upon 
32. Q.P.D., LV, (1888), p.325. 
33. Free trade, protection, federation, arguments are 
discussed in Ch. 6. 
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Government finance were largely dissipated by a government 
borrowing policy which was both foolish and reckless. The 
general ineptitude, at times bordering on corruption, 
which was evident in spending policy was also a feature of 
its dealings with the financial institutions of the Colony. 
The Government made no attempt,to curtail speculation in 
the private sector or the operations of the Banks. There 
had been considerable early support for local banks, 
particularly after the early and spectacular success of the 
34 Queensland National Bank. There was not, however, a 
favourable ratio between local and overseas Investment. At 
the beginning of I890, local deposits stood atj|'10.1/4 
million, while deposits elicited from outside the colony 
totalled abOut All million. 
In early I89I, the Government needed i l million to 
pay Interest on loans falling due. The usual practice was 
simply to raise a new loan. British investors, however, 
already made cautious by the failure of the giant British 
Baring Company refused to invest, "fhe A.I.B.R. commented, 
not without some satisfaction "Queensland has at length 
met with a rebuff on the London money market ... the result 
34, See below, Ch, 7. 
35. LewiSjF.G. , op.cit. , p.226. 
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of the application was as complete a failure as has yet 
been suffered by an Australian colony". British 
Investors were no doubt becoming impatient with the manner 
in which Queensland loan money was being utilized. It was 
local conditions such as these, rather than the external 
conditions of the Baring crisis, which initially led to 
the decreasing willingness of British Investors to take 
chances in.Queensland. 
Throughout I89I and l892ftthese Investors began and 
k 
continued to withdraw money from the Queensland Blanks and 
finance companies. In March, April and May, I892, 
^310,000.0.0 was withdrawn, particularly from the Q.N.B. 
37 Only the action of the Government saved it from closing. 
Mellwraith continued to negotiate loans from the Bank of 
England, in order to pay Interest oh British loans, rather 
than to disturb the deposits in the Q.N.B. In December 
1892, the Government borrowed i600,000.0.0 in order to 
prop up the bank. This dangerous expedient could not 
continue indefinitely, and the Q.N.B. with thirteen of its 
counterparts, was forced to suspend payments in May, I893. 
The reasons for the bank failures, which proved the 
low point of the depressio'n years, are many. A severe 
36. A,I.B.R., XV, 6 (June I89I). 
37. See below, Ch, 7. 
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drought had again left the pastoral Industry in a state 
of partial paralysis. Huge.floods had occurred in 
Brisbane and its environs, spreading as far as the Mary 
River, Combined with these natural disasters was Govern-
ment policy, L'Huilller maintains that: 
In two respects. Investment expenditures of colonial 
governments were just as contributory to the 
crisis as those of the private sector- Firstly, 
the capital outlays of the late eighties added 
little to the productive capacity. And secondly, 
public capital formation contracted at a time 
when the economy badly needed some stimulus.3° 
In following a policy of rigid retrenchment as the signs 
of depression became ever more apparant, Queensland 
politicians were following conventional theory and practice. 
The eventual cessation of all public works, as well as , 
retrenchment in the Civil Service only led to a worsening 
unemployment situation, which in turn further depressed 
the economy. 
The depression reached its nadir as the banks closed 
their doors. Hasty remedial legislation avoided further 
disaster, but it was too late to halt its already tremendous 
socio-economic, and hence political effects. The worsening 
economic situation in part explains the failure of political 
liberalism, and the rise of political - industrial labour. 
38. L'Huilller, oR^Qit,, p,190. 
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More Immediate, however, was the sudden, sharp rise in 
unemployment, and the deterioration in working conditions. 
QUEENSLAND WORKING CONDITIONS 
Conditions of work for most Queenslanders were far 
from salubrious. Factory legislation was almost non-
existent, and very little protection was afforded the 
average worker- The decade of the eighties had seen boom 
conditions and correspondingly high wages, but as the 
depression set in, the growth of unemployment destroyed 
the bargaining power even of skilled workers. For the 
semi-skilled and unskilled, the situation was disastrous. 
Even before the depression, working conditions were often 
completely insanitary and hours were long.-^ " In the 
slaughtering trade men worked from l4 to 17 hours a day. 
The retail trade was equally demanding, from 8 to 11 hours 
per week day, and up to 14 hours on Saturdays. The Royal 
Commission into Shops, Factories and Workshops drew 
attention "to the fact that women and young girls are 
working in factories the same number of hours as the men, 
whilst wages paid them barely reach one-half the amount 
4o 
earned by their stronger co-workers." Exploitative 
child labour was common, and the Royal Commissioners found 
39. Most of the material for the following section has been 
drawn from the Report of the Shops, Factories and Work-
shops Commission. Q.V. P. . 11 (1891). p.959. 
40. Ibid., p.959. 
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4l 
children of 10 and 11 years in many factories. Whitfield 
argues that: 
Overcrowding, bad lighting and ventilation. 
Insanitary conditions, danger from machinery 
and fire, even "sweating" were factors which 
both groups of opinion admitted did obtain in 
a large number of factories and shops.^2 
"Sweating" was indeed a common occurrence in Queensland 
industrial life. In the conditions of depression, employees 
would take home enough work to occupy several people. In 
other cases, middlemen could sub-let material for others 
to work, and would make enormous profits. The firm which 
received the work was not concerned how and by whom the 
work was done, and the "sweated" workers were often swindled 
43 
and abused. -^  Moreover, the long hours of work, frequently 
combined with overtime, for which only tea money was usually 
paid, were rarely Intemflfpted by paid holidays. The Royal 
Commission was told by one butcher that if he dared to ask 
44 for a holiday, he would be immediately dismissed. 
With such conditions, it is not surprising that the 
majority report of the Royal Commission recommended sweeping 
state intervention. Among their more Important demands 
were: 
41. Ibid., p.961. 
42. Whitfield, ©., The Early•Factories and Shops Legislation 
of Queensland, (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q., 1968), p.34. 
43. Ibid, p.17. 
44. Ibid,, p,21. 
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(1) That 6,00 p,m. be legally declared closing.time 
(2) That no child (under l4) be employed in any shop, 
factory or workroom 
(3) The appointment of special sanitary inspectors 
(4) All apprentices to be engaged by written agreement 
(5) A law to enforce a weekly pay day 
(6) A statutory eight hour day 
In other areas of Queensland employment, conditions 
were better regulated. Stoodley points out that miners 
often resented the amount of regulation In this industry! 
The evidence suggests that the lead in agitations 
for reform came from the press ... and was taken 
up only by a few miners and managers, but that the 
great majority of miners were either too afraid, 
too conservative or too naturally careless to seek 
safety regulation; comfort seems to have been more 
Important to them than safety.^6 
Miners however, had little to fear from wage reductions. 
Gold was not a commodity greatly affected by falling wOrld 
prices, and it retained its price while other primary 
products declined disastrously. Pastoral employees, however, 
were in a very different position. Because much work was 
seasonal, job stability was considerably reduced. Chances 
of re-employment must have worried many shearers. In I89I, 
45. Report of iCommlssion, op.cit., p.691. 
46. StoodleyJ- The Queensland Gold Miner in the Late Nineteenth 
Century' (Unpub. M.A. Thesis, U. of Q.). 
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pastorallsts reduced wages in many branches of the industry, 
While shearing rates remained stable at 20/- per hundred 
sheep, various classes of labourers' rates were cut 
severely. Further reductions followed in 1893-4 and 
despite long and bitter strike action, the new rates remained 
47 in force. ' 
These wage cuts were paralleled in many other Queensland 
industries. Worst affected were shedhands and shephards, 
agricultural labourers, carpenters and painters. In some 
cases, the reductions did not reach serious proportions 
48 
until 1895, and wages climbed only slowly after this date. 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
The hardship caused by falling wages'was compounded 
by growing unemployment, although the exact rate is difficult 
to deteraiine, as neither the Government nor contemporary 
journals published accurate assessments. In June I892, 
however, the Brisbane Courier reported that unemployment 
demonstrations were becoming a daily occurrance. On 
6 June, 1892, a deputation claiming to represent 1,000 
unemployed, sought and was granted a meeting with Griffith, 
who offered sympathy but little else-"^ The reports of the 
Government Labour Bureau, beginning in I893, also give some 
47. See below, Ch. 12. 
48. Lewisgc,op.clt. , p.237. 
49. Brisbane Courier, 21.6.92. 
50. Ibid., 6.6.92. 
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indication of the unemployment rate, although it is 
Impossible to ascertain how many men did not apply to the 
Bureau for work. The following table, abstracted from 
these reports, indicates that unemployment was worst in 
areas where infant industries had become economically 
51 Important. 
Place 
UNEMPLOYMENT - 1893-96 
Total Registrations Demand No.. Unprovided For 
Brisbane 
Bundaberg 
Ipswich 
Mackay 
Maryborough 
Rockhampton 
Toowoomba 
Townsvllle 
10,988 
2,812 
3,051 
§5 
13 
2,984 
1,798 
1,793 
9046 
1481 
511 
130 
85 
932 
1798 
4705 
1942 
1332 
2540 
2022 
Thus, of those men registered for unemployment during 
the period, nearly 8,000 could not be found work. The worst 
51. Extracted from yearly report. Govt. Lab. Bureau. 
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year was I893, when a little over 2,500 men could 
not be found work. The general labourer suffered most 
severely, although in I893 carpenters were almost Impossible 
to place following the collapse of building industry. The 
figures also indicate a situation of undersupply in the 
North, probably due to climatic conditions and the fact 
that migrants tended to move to the more temperate southern 
regions. 
The Government made only feeble attempts to rectify 
the situation. This was partly the result of its own 
retrenchment policy, and its unwillingness to provide public 
works. Prevailing attitudes towards unemployment were also 
contributory. The general belief in the virtue of self-
help and laissez falre was succinctly conveyed by the 
Courier: 
The functions of Government cannot be held to 
cover a supply of work and wages for those who 
may be elsewhere crowded out of employment,52 
Relief works, such as employment in the Botanic Gardens^were 
regarded as ultimately degrading, even by the unemployed. 
The Government, however, showed no inclination to offer more 
useful work. The Worker advocated land grants to place the 
unemployed on the land, coupled with the complete cessation 
52. Brisbane Courier, 14.1.91. 
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oi State aided immigration. In reply, the Courier, 
while agreeing that the use of the land was a logical 
solution, and that loans to farmers were more defensible 
53 than relief works;"^  still maintained that "the socialist 
doctrine that the State must provide work for those 
54 
willing to work is impractical and intolerable". 
Employers continued to feel the effects of this 
disastrous depression long after general business had 
revived. By 1895, most commentators believed the worst was 
over- The A.I.B.R. commented -upon the economic situation 
in January I895; 
It is true that all trades connected with construction 
in all its manifold forms are still suffering severely, 
and that for them there is as yet no ray of dawn; but 
for all this, the reorganization or absorption of the 
industrial forces is making much headw^f^ ... as regards 
... colonial indebtedness, it Is much less as far as 
the absolute amount of yearly remittance is concerned 
.... While moreover, colonial borrowing in England 
has been stopped except for conversion purposes, the 
heavy calls made on British shareholders by banks and 
squatting companies ... have greatly alleviated any 
strain on the Australian financial resources.55 
53. Ibid., 6.2.91. 
54. Ibid., 24.1.94 
55. A.I.B.R., Jan. 1895, p.l. 
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CHAPTER .4 
RAILWAYS 
The size and terrain of the Colony of Queensland, with 
its basic economic structure of primary industry, meant 
that the development of communications was one of the first 
concerns of Queensland governments. The faith In the natural 
resources of the colony was underpinned by what may be 
described as a "philosophy of development", shared by both 
liberals and conservatives. The building of railways was 
seen as the most necessary of the Government services if 
the colony was to aspire to wealth and productivity. 
Unfortunately, the extension of railways was also the most 
financially hazardous of the Government operations. It has 
been argued in Chapter Three that it was the uncertainty of 
future railways development which was one of the initial 
causes for the withdrawal of capital froi^ i the colony. The 
financial failure of Government railways naturally led to 
discussion of the merits of private railways. During the 
Eighties, the Mellwraith Government had fallen on the issue 
of railways built by private companies on the land grant 
principle- The Liberal Government of I883-I888 had been 
87. 
equally concerned with the extension of railways, but into 
agricultural rather than pastoral areas. But the problem 
of making railways remunerative was a constant source of 
worry for the administration, for losses on the railways 
meant retrenchment in other, less vital areas. Industries 
dependent upon haulage suffered from high railway rates, 
but the rates could not be reduced because the railways 
were still "in the red". The preoccupation with railways -
private or government, agricultural or pastoralr continued 
into the nineties and this chapter is designed to examine 
this facet of administration. 
GOVERNMENT RETRENCHMENT 
Despite the^great Importance of communications, the 
decade of the nineties saw very little actual construction. 
During the eighties, the length of line in use had jumped 
from 635 miles to 2003 miles, but the next decade saw that 
total increased by only 798 miles. Moreover, some of the 
railways had been laid by private companies and local 
authorities, rather than by the government. The depression 
was thus taking its toll. In 1894 and 1895, only six miles 
were added, with a further seven miles in I896. Construction 
1. These and subsequent figures have been abstracted from 
the yearly reports of the Railway Commissions, found 
in the Q.V.P. 
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began to pick up in I897, with an average yearly Increase 
of 115 miles until I9OO. Even this was a relatively modest 
programme, compared with the giant schemes envisaged in 
the eighties and early nineties. By the end of the decade, 
agitation for railway extension was becoming more strident, 
and many commentators argued that i l t t ie Government was not 
prepared to extend the lines, private companies fehould be 
enabled to do so. Such an opinion was expressed by the Mackay 
Mercury in I9OO: 
Queensland obviously cannot borrow, and the question 
is whether we are prepared to allow railways to be 
built and mining fields developed by outside 
capitalists, or whether we prefer to remain without 
railways and with our mineral resources locked up 
for an indefinite time .... The essential thing 
is that Queensland is years behind in railway 
construction, and her development is being 
hampered thereby. The people want railways, and 
so long as provision is made safeguarding the 
interests of the Country, there is no valid 
objection to our getting railways by the only 
available method.2 
THE RAILWAYS CONSTRUCTION (LAND SUBSIDY) ACT 
These arguments had been caused by the proponents of 
the Transcontinental Railway Bill in I883, and again in I892, 
when the coalition Government introduced the Railways 
Construction (Land. Subsidy) Act. The Toowoomba Chronicle 
2. Mackay Mercury, 28.7.1900. 
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•^reshadowed the arguments of the Mercury: 
It must be recognized that the borrowing powers 
of the Colony have reached their limit .... 
Under these circumstances we are placed now in 
a very different- position from that which we 
occupied previously, and a well digested scheme 
for the construction of railways on the land 
grant system would no doubt be acceptable to 
the Country.3 
While the Transcontinental Railway Bill (T.R.B.) had been 
a concrete, well planned and specific Act, the I892 proposal 
was a very general measure designed to clear the way for 
the construction of land grant railways, rather than 
proposing any particular line or lines. 
The major clauses of the Bill covered the conditions 
and types of contract. There were three alternative 
contracts: 
(I) The railway should remain the property of the company 
for a fixed period not exceeding fifty years and then 
revert to the State. 
(II) The line should become the property of the State as soon 
as completed. 
(ill)It should remain the property of the Company subject to 
right of purchase by the Crown. 
The value of the land to be granted was limited by the above 
3. Toowoomba Chronicle. 20.3.92. 
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terms. Under the first contract, the land should be equal 
to twice the cost of construction; under the second 
alternative, land equal to the sum of the cost of 
construction; and under the third, the cost of construction 
plus the value of the land, which was to be valued before 
signing the contract. Clause l4 provided for parliamentary 
ratification of the contract within fourteen days of its 
completion. Reasonable compensation on expenses already 
Incurred if the contract was not ratified was provided in 
clause 16. 
The news of the Government's Intention had been fore-
shadowed by the Wide Bay Times, a newspaper published in 
5 
Maryborough. There had been, moreover, many proposals 
made to the Queensland Government by overseas firms. Late 
in 1891, an advertisement calling for Investment in a new 
Queensland syndicate appeared in the London Times. In 
consequence of this, P.W. Pox had written to Griffith in 
March, 1892: 
I would be glad to again organize, as I did in 
1881 a syndicate which would be composed entirely 
of new parties and groups of capitalists, but 
which might include, if you desired it, some of 
the members of the old syndicate.6 
4. Q.P.D., LXVII, (1892), pp.345-9. 
5. Reported in the Warwick Argus, 12.1.92, 
6. Fox to Griffith, 9,3.92, (Premier's Dept, in Letter, 
Q,S,A.). 
9 1 . 
Gr i f f i th ' s reply i s not ava i lab le , but presumably Pox 
received some encouragement. In October I89I, the House 
7 
had talked out 4^ ' motion in favour of land grant railways 
but by June I892, it was evident that a considerable section 
of Parliament would be favourable to such proposals. There 
was lengthy debate;' on the Bill, although, with so small 
o 
an opposition its passage was a foregone conclusion. 
Opposition to the Bill was centred around three major 
criticisms - that the Bill itself was inadequate, that the 
principle on which it was based was inher'iantly vicious, 
and that it was unconstitutional. Leader of the Opposition, 
Hugh Nelson admitted that "so far as I can see, the House 
is unanimous on the main principle", but he regarded, "the 
machinery for carrying out the system ... radically bad 
n 
all through". Nelson argued that the syndicate, which was 
to carry out its own survey, could place lines wherever 
it wished, and that fourteen days was insufficient time to 
allow Parliament to exercise sufficient control. Charles 
Powers examined the Bill, clause by clause. He objected 
to the amount of land proposed to be alienated, to the lack 
of Parliamentary control over contractual arrangements, and 
I* Br1sbane Courler,'23.10-91. 
I, At thil time,rit' consisted of three Labour Members, a 
few Ex-Liberals, and a few disgruntled Mcllwraithians, 
see Ch. 14. 
f, Q.P.D., LXVII (1892), p.348. 
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described the Bill as one of vague generalities: 
The only way such proposals should be dealt with 
is not in a general act, but in a,n act dealing 
with specific agreements that are thought good 
enough by"the Ministry to submit to the House.1^ 
J:G. Drake attacked the Bill as unconstitutional, as it 
reversed the policy laid down in the 1888 Elections without 
recourse to the electorate. 
The major argument in favour of the Bill was based 
upon expediency - Queensland had to have land grant railways 
or no railways at all. That only fourteen members opposed 
12 the Bill Indicated the strength of such arguments. The 
Bill thus passed' into law. The Warwick Argus with the 
Maryborough Chronicle argued that the Bill would be 
practicable only in pastoral areas, because land was to be 
granted in blocks contiguous to the line- This would 
preclude the closely settled districts, where most of the 
land had already been alienated. It was impossible, for 
example, to build such a railway from Warwick to St. George, 
where a line was desperately needed, or from Brisbane to 
13 the border- The Maryborough Chronicle stated its position 
forcefully: 
The Land Grant Railway Act will be an acceptable 
and serviceable tool in the hands of the Government 
10. Ibid., p.365. 
11. Ibid., p.419. 
12. See Ch, 12 for further political details, 
13. Warwick Argus, 23.5.92. 
93. 
at the General Elections, therewith to curry 
favour with the western and northern electorates, 
by promises of lines built on this principle and 
secure the return of Ministerial candidates. We 
anticipate that this is about the only use to 
which this reckless and unpopular Act will ever 
be put,14 
The Government had thus secured parliamentary sanction 
for land grant railways; early in I893, it proposed a number 
of lines to be built on the principle. They included four 
major lines - from Charleville to the western boundary; 
from Longreach to the western boundary; Hughenden to the 
border; and Normanton to Cloncurry. Thus it was only the 
western and northern pastoral areas which would benefit from 
the Bill. The seven minor trunk lines, also envisaged in 
the proposals, likewise served pastoral areas. Immediately 
prior to the 1893 elections, the Worker published Its 
famous "grid-iron" map, indicating the amount of land which 
would be alienated to the syndicates. In round numbers, 
the railways would traverse about 2,500 miles at an 
estimated cost of ^ 12.1/2 million sterling. The Worker 
pointed out that no syndicate would construct a line which 
was to become the immediate property of the Crown, when it 
could gain twice as much from either of the other two 
contractual alternatives. The map showed that under the 
14. Maryborough Chronicle. 2.7.92. 
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first type of contract, 200,000,000 acres would be 
alienated to the syndicates. 
The Government, mindful of the coming elections, 
published its own map and calculations. It valued the 
land at 6/8 an acre Instead of the Worker's 2/6. Instead 
of estimating the cost of construction at ^5,000 per mile, 
the Government valued it at between p/2,500 andi3,500. 
Moreover, the Government estimated the length of line at 
1640 miles, even though Parliament had authorized 2,500 
miles. The Toowoomba Chronicle pointed out that none of 
the western railways had cost less than ^ 5000 per mile, and 
that the value of land on the Ministerial map was three 
times that set down by the last Parliament. The same journal 
felt that Parliament had blindly committed a "terrible 
15 legislative blunder". -^ 
Those opposed to the proposals found they had nothing 
to fear- The original reason for the land grant Bill was 
Queensland's Inability to float a loan. The bank crash in 
1893 had further weakened Queensland's financial standing 
in London and British investors were as unwilling to invest 
in private as in public enterprise. As early as October, 
1892, London bankers Preshfields and Williams informed 
15. Toowoomba Chronicle, 18.3.93. 
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W.H. Wilson, M.L.C., Minister without Portfolio that: 
If we were to express our own views on the subject, 
we should say that it would be very difficult to 
raise capital in this country on the security of 
the land grant principle only, and we should 
doubt very much whether capital could be raised, 
on sufficiently economical terms, without a 
government guarantee, in addition to the 
advantages of the land grant principle.1° 
Such a guarantee was not forthcoming, with the result that, 
for all the furore surrounding the Bill, no land grant 
railways were actually built in the Colony. 
RAILWAY MANAGEMENT 
The depression had effectively halted railway 
construction, particularly the building of large main lines. 
Moreover, the lines already laid down were becoming less 
remunerative. This was the result of Inadequate survey 
and spiralling costs, as well as exorbitant freight charges. 
As early as I89I, the Warwick Argus reported that committees 
were being appointed in each of the Downs Electorates to 
request a reduction in costs. The Argus maintained that 
"The present railway rates render profitable farming an 
impossibility; and unprofitable farming means general 
17 
stagnation". The Government's reaction to persistent 
demands for reduction was described by the same journal as 
16. Preshfields and Williams to W.H. Wilson, 20-10.92. 
(Premier's Dept. Q.S.A.). 
17. Warwick Argus, 20.1.91. 
96. 
1 R 
"miserably inadequate". The Government refused to 
reduce rates on general farm and dairy produce, although 
there was a slight reduction in rates for fruit and 
vegetables. The Railway Commissioners had Increased the 
charges in January I89I, and there was little doubt that 
greater costs reduced the farming traffic, and much produce 
lay rotting in barns and fields. The Toowoomba Chronicle 
commented on the situation: 
For how much of the depression the Commissioners 
are directly responsible cannot of course ever be 
known; that they have caused a large proportion 
of it is doubted by few on the Downs.1° 
The argument between the producers and the Railway Commissioners 
continued throughout the decade. Demands for relief flared 
up again in 1894, and again in I899. In 1894, the Brisbane 
Courier which consistently opposed reduced rates, discussed 
the alternatives: 
It seems to us that the real issue the Government 
has to determine is whether the existing rate is 
a fair one as between the consumer whose bread 
is made dearer by it and the general taxpayer who 
has to make up the deficit. A lower rate would 
give consumers cheaper bread, but at the expense 
of the whole community. 
The Government's general policy with regard to railways 
18. Warwick Argus , 31.5.92.. 
19. Toowoomba Chronicle, 5.6.92. 
20. Brisbane Courier, 27.3.94. 
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was also called into question. The former policy of paying 
enormous sums for land reclamation in order to lay lengthy 
main lines was now out of the question. The Queensland 
Times expressed a fairly common opinion: 
The idea of building short branch lines as 
"feeders" ... is well worth considering 
.,,. Being merely short branches there 
would be no necessity for such'lines to be 
costly in construction. Even a very narrow 
gft^ ge might be admissible, the main object 
being the carriage of goods at a low freight.^1 
This was about all the Queensland finances were able to 
absorb, and most lines constructed in the decade were 
feeders. Even when public works resumed in 1897, all the 
lines were small in scope. In I897, all the lines were 
constructed in the southern division of the colony, and 
this caused considerable regional jealousy. Parochialism 
can be detected in nearly every railway debate- In 1894, 
the residents of Bundaberg and Maryborough were Incensed by 
government refusals to build a branch line to Plalba and 
extensions to the Isis line. The Maryborough Chronicle 
urged that "our district railway association should be 
resuscitated, and closely watch and influence the coming 
22 
railway policy of the Government". Similarly, most of the 
21. Queensland Times, 11.1.94. 
22.. Maryborough Chronicle. 13.3.94 
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provincial journals were markedly hostile to Brisbane- The 
Gympie Miner urged "the idea of centralizing everything in 
23 Queen Street must be fought inch by inch in the provinces". 
During Nelson's Premiership, all groups Interested in 
railway extension were becoming restive. The 1895 estimates 
had provided for several new railways, after Nelson had 
previously announced severe public works retrenchment. It 
appeared that Parliament was being asked to sanction railways 
24 for which it would later have to authorize a loan. Some 
discontent was allayed by the passage of a Railways 
Construction Guarantee Act. This was a Bill to enable local 
authorities to build railways, with half the cost being 
25 borne by the councils, and half guaranteed by the Government. 
The Act was welcomed by many provincial councils, and under 
it, the Maryborough Council began to build the much vaunted 
Plalba line. The Act was not popular with the Railway 
Commissioners, In 1897, Matheson urged upon the Government 
"the necessity for extreme caution in dealing with proposals 
27 for making lines under this system". The Commissioner felt 
that local authorities would attempt too much, and too much 
financial responsibility would, fall onpo the guarantor- In 
23. Gympie Miner, quoted in Maryborough Chronicle, 18.3.94. 
24. Brisbane Courier, 21.10.95. 
25. Q.P.D., LXXIII, (1895), p.665. 
26. Q.V.P., IV, (1897), p.659. 
27. Ibid. 
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1899 Commissioner Gray reported that, for this very reason, 
p o 
the system had been an unqualified disaster-
PRIVATE RAILWAYS 
29 The guarantee system had proved uneconomic and the 
Government was still unwilling to undertake the risks 
attendant upon railway production. Thus, private railways 
seemed to provide the only other alternative. It was made 
clear that only lines which would promote closer settlement 
would be laid. This precluded railways into areas where 
the terrain made settlement unlikely. Thus, far western 
and mining districts were the major areas where private 
lines were envisaged. The Western Champion, published in 
Barcaldine, regarded private railways as a necessary evil: 
The railway is a necessity and without it, nothing 
can be done ... so whatever are the terms they 
must be accepted. Unfortunately for the western 
country there, is every indication that for this 
year and some after the drought is ended, there 
will be a great scarcity of employment for bush 
workers; but should the Government accept the 
offers of syndicates for constructing railways, 
there will be employment for everybody, work 
will last till the good seasons return.30 
The labour movement, which had so fiercely condemned the land 
grant railway scheme, was unlikely to be convinced by such 
transparent reasoning. By the end of the decade, private 
28. Q.V.P., IV (1898), Report of the Railway Commlssioner-
29. Most of the lines were uneconomic to start with. 
30. Western Champion, 5.6.1900. 
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and syndicate railways were still being strenuously opposed 
31 by the Labour Party and other opponents of the Government. 
Meanwhile, the vitality^had'been injected into government 
construction in I897 and I898 had again been dissipated, 
so much so that in I9OO, only 55.1/2 miles of track had 
been laid in two years. Once again, the administration 
came under attack for the drift and muddle of its public 
32 
works policy. 
During the Eighties, Queensland Governments had 
undertaken to provide the colony with sufficient, and 
efficient means of communication. It has been argued in 
Chapter Three that the failure of Government railway policy, 
which contributed so much to the public revenue, had in 
part caused the contraction of Investment at the onset of 
the depression. Two alternatives, the land grant system 
and the guarantee system had failed, and the third, private 
railways, was also doomed to failure. In I883 opposition 
to land grant railways had been so fierce that a Government 
had fallen. In I892, the system had been sanctioned by 
Parliament, with only l4 dissentients. In 1899 and 19OO, 
the battle against private ownership was renewed in earnest. 
31. See below, Ch. 17 
32. Ibid. 
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Meanwhile, Government construction had languished. This 
failure on the part of the Government, allied with its 
performance in other economic fields, was partly responsible, 
after thirteen years of almost uninterrupted office, for 
its ignominious downfall in 1903. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LAND, LABOUR AND IMMIGRATION 
The huge area and climatic diversity of Queensland, 
with her unlimited and largely untapped resources, had 
predictable repercussions in Queensland politics. Confronted 
with an often unfriendly environment. Government was 
required not only to promote, but to actively participate 
in the economic development of the colony. The Government 
was required to open up land for settlement, to promote its 
maximum productivity and to ensure a sufficient supply of 
labour- During the nineties, one of the constant pre-
occupations of Government was the efficient utilization of 
the land, particularly in the west and the north. In the 
tropical north, this entailed providing cheap labour for the 
sugar industry still suffering from the depression. In 
agricultural areas, a supply of suitable agricultural labour 
was regarded as a government function. 
LAND AND CLOSER SETTLEMENT 
By the Nineties, the slogan "closer settlement" had 
lost much of its. political force- The 1884 Land Act was 
1, See above, Ch.2. 
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the most consummate expression of the philosophy of the 
yeoman farmer which had been so prevalent in that decade. 
Griffith and his fellow Liberals believed. In almost 
Jeffersonian terms, that the small farmer was the backbone 
of the State, inherently good, kind and virtuous. In 
Queensland, the move towards legislative encouragement of 
closer settlement had begun Immediately after separation, 
but was frustrated by the greater resources of the already 
entrenched pastoral group. The Nineties exhibited the 
same characteristics - Government legislation at once tried 
to promote closer settlement and pastoral expansion. The 
policy had the same net result - the resources of pastoralism 
triumphed over the more equitable division of land. 
The 1884 Land Act produced many amendments, most of 
which were contrary to the expressed Intention of the 
original Bill, The Crown Lands Act of I891 ostensibly 
promoted closer settlement by introducing unconditional 
selection. This meant that selection was made conditional, 
not on Improvements or residence, but upon the payment of 
rent. Such provisions, however, made it a simple matter 
for large capitalists to lock up the available land. The 
Pastoral Leases Extension Act seemed to express more clearly 
the nature of most of the Nineties' Legislation. The Bill 
was brought down as a result of direct pressure from the 
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United Pastorallsts Association, through its parliamentary 
2 
representatives. The Act provided that the Government would 
extend the tenure of pastoral leases, for a fixed term of 
seven years, provided rabbit proof fences were erected 
and kept in. good order. A clause was also included in 
which compensation was paid on land improved in this way. 
The provisions for fencing, however, were naturally 
difficult to enforce, and Macfarlane (Ipswich) regarded the 
entire act as a hoax, perpetrated "by the man behind the 
scenes ... for getting squatters an extended lease". 
Another example of the ambiguous nature of Government 
land policy was the Agricultural Lands Purchase Bill. This 
was designed to repurchase land in some settled areas, for 
5 
the purposes of subdivision and closer settlement. Like 
all Government attempts to promote settlement this was 
"chiefly remarkable for its utter absence of enthusiasm, and 
gave rise to doubts as to whether the Government was merely 
playing with the question". 
2. While the U.P.A. did not actually field candidates, almost 
all pastorallsts belonged to it and strove to pursue its 
alms. 
3. A clause Inserted at the insist^ce of the U.P.A. 
4. Q,P.D., LXVII, (1892),, p.1713. -
5. Doubt is cast upon the Intentions of the Government by a 
special clause, inserted after the main debate on the 
bill, which enabled the Government to purchase the 
Clifton Estate, owned by the Queensland Investment and 
Land Mortgage Co. of which Mellwraith was a director. See 
Ch. 14. 
6. Warwick ARgus, 6.10.94. 
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Nevertheless, the belief in the virtue of the small 
farmer, so entrenched during the Eighties, lingered into 
the next decade, and found expression in two facets of 
Government activity - immigration policy until the onset of 
depression and a peculiar piece of legislation called the 
Co-Operatlve Communities Land Settlement Act. 
IMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT 
The aim of Queensland's immigration policy was two-
fold to Increase population, in which it was successful, 
and to promote closer settlement, which met consistent 
failure. In the early years of Queensland's existence, 
the immigration Acts were aimed primarily at increasing 
the labouring population of the colony. Hence, early 
legislation provided assisted and free passages for this 
7 
type of immigrant. In I869, the Government granted 40 
acres of land to any immigrant who paid his own fare. 
Queensland was thus beginning to look to immigration as a 
major method of "filling her spaces". By the Eighties, this 
had become a virtually ami. unchallenged assumption. 
Archibald Archer, a former Agent-General for Immigration did, 
however, criticize the delusion of the "agrarian myth": 
7. The 1864 Act provided free passages to labourers and 
• domestic servants, assisted passages to skilled workers, 
and nominated immigrants, whose sponsors paid half the 
fare. 
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It is rijfcileulous to tell men, who in a different 
climate, have farmed with the assistance of lots 
of ploughs and horses and men, that they can come 
out here and do exactly the same as those who 
have been here for years ... those who really 
know what farming is in this country will 
deprecate any attempt to bring English farmers 
out here with the idea that they will be able 
to conduct their farms in the way in which 
they conducted them in the old country.8 
The Government consistently failed to promote closer 
Settlement by its immigration policy. This was primarily 
due to the strangeness of the environment, although lack 
of Government aid once the immigrants had arrived, was a 
contributory reason. The Government did make some attempt 
to alleviate the problems of the new arrivals. In 1886, 
the land order system was revived. Clause 25 of the Crown 
Lands Amendment Act provided that the Agent-General might 
issue a land order to every European immigrant who paid his 
9 
own fare'. The failure of this experiment may be attributed 
to a general lack of interest among immigrants, and the 
small amount of good agricultural land available. In I890, 
the Under-Secretary for Land reported the complete failure 
10 
of the experiment. Also in I886, the Government established 
a Labour Bureau within the Immigration Department, It Is 
B, Q.P.D., XLVIII, (1886), p.290. 
9, This was to the value of ^ 20. for each adult (which could 
buy a homestead of up to I60 acres) andi'lO. for each 
child between 1 and 12. 
10. Q.V.P., Ill, (1890), p.181. 
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somewhat significant that a General Labour Bureau was not 
set up until 1891. 
The new settlers received little else in the way of 
Government assistance with the result that immigrants 
usually stayed in their ports of disembarkation. Crook 
points out that the urban areas held significantly higher 
proportions of inhabitants from England, Ireland and 
Scotland than other areas. In 1886, the proportion had 
Increased by 7.8^ in Brisbane, compared with a general 
increase of 3.7^- The myth of the yeoman farmer, which 
had been the basis of so much political thought in Queensland, 
had proved, indeed, a myth. Agricultural conditions were not 
conducive to success and subsistence farming in self-
contained units had no place in the harsh Australian 
environment. 
Despite the failure, the Queensland Government still 
aimed at increasing the labouring population of the colony. 
The more practical aim of securing a large supply of 
Agricultural labourers also met with failure. Many Immigrants 
who, in order to gain more favourable terms of passage, 
classed themselves as agricultural labourers, were in fact 
11. Crook, D.P., Aspects of Brisbane Society in the Eighteen-
Eighties. (Unpub. B.A, Thesis, U, of Q,), p,7. 
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mechanics and factory hands.. The agricultural labourers 
who did arrive found better wages as general labourers in 
urban areas, with the result that Queensland farmers 
remained chronically short of skilled agricultural labour-
Moreover, the large number of immigrants who remained in the 
towns only served to swell the unemployment rate during the 
depression, 
THE DEPRESSION AND IMMIGRATION 
As depression settled over the land, the Government was 
compelled in I892 to halt state aided immigration. Prior 
to this, immigration figures were not markedly down on those 
of the Eighties. During this decade, the Government had been 
able to attract nearly 110,000 immigrants. Their national 
origins, abstracted from the reports of the Agent-General 
12 
are given by Crook: 
^ milQNAL ORIGINS OF QUEENSLAND IMMIGRANTS 
English Scots Irish Others Total 
Number 60,295 16,889 26,253 6,119 109,556 
Percentage 55.03 15.4 '23.9 5.67 100 
Crook argues that the rate of assimilation was rapid, and that 
12. Ibid., p.10. 
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there was not so much a dislocation of social life, aS a 
significant strengthening of already entrenched social 
values. The predominantly Anglo-Saxon and Irish origin of 
the new arrivals meant there was only a small degree of 
cultural differentiation, particularly as most non-British 
immigrants tended to move into rural areas. Isolated in 
relatively homogeneous social units, at the same time 
accepting their adopted socio-political environment. 
Waterson's research indicates that the Germans on the Darling 
Downs, while they remained a coherent and consciously 
cohesive social group, nevertheless took an active part in 
Downs politics : 
The Germans were attracted to personalities rather 
than 'parties' and problems. Most were relatively 
poor selectors whose economic aspirations drew 
them to the side of the country town radicals who 
were attempting to redistribute the land..,. 
Groom negotiated their land orders, transacted 
their business and smoothed the difficulties that 
alien immigrants inevitably encountered.... 
After the wave of German immigration subsided, 
the memory of these services remained, and was 
passed onto the Australian born.13 
Another reason for the staunch support given by the Germans 
to the Liberals was undoubtedly the clear alliance between 
Protestants and that party. This allegiance was strengthened 
13. Waterson, D.B., Squatter, Selector, Storekeeper. 
(Sydney U. Press, 1968), p.252. 
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by the cohesive nature of the Lutheran Church, a cohesion 
which, however, was not strong enough to cement a sealed 
14 
and isolated German community on the Downs. 
While the Eighties had been a peak period in immigration, 
the depression of the Nineties sharply halted Queensland's 
annual Intake, with the result that there "arOse a hitherto 
unknown phenomenon in Queensland history, for continuously 
during the following years, the increase in population due 
to natural increase outnumbered the Increase due to net 
15 immigration". 
During the first two years of the Nineties, about 6,000 
immigrants had entered Queensland, although by I891, this 
rate had fallen slightly. The type of immigrant conformed 
to the pattern of the Eighties, being predominantly Anglo-
1 6 Irish and lower working class. 
NATIONALITIES I89O-I89I 
Year English Scots Irish Others 
1890 1549 352 1045 155 
1891 1299 263 892 455 
14. Ibid., p.132. 
15. Tomkys R., Queensland Immigration Policy I859-I9OI 
(Unpub. M.A. Thesis, U. of Q. 1930). 
16. Extracts from Reports of Agent-General^ Q.V.P., pp.l891-2 
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Of these, 2,003 were classed as farm labourers, and 2042 
as female domestic servants. The free passages thus appeared 
to be attracting the kind of Immigration Queensland required. 
But the Maryborough Immigration Agent pointed out: "A far 
greater number of immigrants could have been absorbed had 
they been of true agricultural class and capable of doing 
the work required on a faicm. 1 regret to say that many who 
represent themselves as such have been proved otherwise". ' 
On the 2nd March I892, State aided immigration was 
suspended, with the result that in this year, 729 Immigrants 
landed in Queensland, all engaged prior to that date.. No' " 
labourers were indented. This situation continued until I897. 
The intervening years were remarkable only for the small 
amount of independent immigration, although this was 
characterized by an Increasing national diversity. 
Immigration Agents in Great Britain were not optimistic 
about Queensland's chances of attracting fully paying migrants 
In 1896, the Agent-General explained the reason: 
... The reports which I have received from the 
Agents have been disappointing as to the number 
of enquiries .... The reason, I believe, is the 
general contentment of the farming class, owing 
to lately Improved conditions.I8 
17, Report of Agent-General, I890. 
18. Report of Agent-General, I896. 
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As late as I896, the Labour Party was stoutly opposing 
proposals to reintroduce free and assisted passages for 
19 farm labourers and domestic servants. "^  The Gympie Truth 
made clear the Labour viewpoint when the Treasurer indicated 
that the.Government was considering such a renewal: 
Of all the fatuous, mischievous, evil and foul 
smelling 'remedies' put forward as safe cures 
for the present apalling depression, that of 
State aided immigration stands out prominently 
for extra-special condemnatinn.20 
This extreme view was not shared by a majority of Queenslanders 
Among farmers, still pl<xgued by labour shortage, the. opinion 
was strong that immigration should be renewed. The Warwick 
Argus applauded the reappointment of George Randall as 
Immigration Agent in February, I897: 
It must,not be forgotten that it is becoming 
more and more difficult as time goes on to 
induce the rural Britisher to migrate ... 
Mr. Randall is familiar with the methods most 
likely to prove successful, and the 
Government have done the right thing in 
deciding to send him back.21 
Remarkable activity attended the immigration programme in 
1897 and. 638 persons obtained passage, of whom 125 were full 
paying passengers and 46 nominated passengers. In keeping 
with the trend developing in 1895-6, the number of non-
19- Proposed in the Assembly by J.R. Dickson, Q.P.D., LXXV, 
(1896), p.208. 
20. Gympie Truth, IO.IO.96. 
21. Warwick Argus, 9.2.97. 
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22 British migrants continued to rise. Once again, Queensland 
was looking to immigration to provide labour for the 
developing industries of the Colony. 
THE COOPERATIVE COMMUNITIES LAND SETTLEMENT ACT 
An experiment in cooperative farming, the Cooperative 
Communities Land Settlement Act, passed in I893, contained 
elements both old and new. It was. a culmination of the 
Agrarian myth, stimulated by the needs created by the 
Depression. A favourite Labour panacea, the Bill was 
Introduced primarily as a defence of the unemployment policy 
of the government, as well as to give the unemployed some 
outlet for their frustration. The Courier had suggested in 
1891, that,"of all the remedies for the unemployed difficulty, 
the most natural, the most sensible and the most practical is 
2Q 
the placing of the people on *the land." -^  
The Act was introduced by A.H. Barlow. It was a 
relatively non-contentious measure, incorporating the. 
principle of the self-contained community, settled on a 
selected area, which they could later convert to freehold. 
The settlers were to be given substantial government aid. 
This had been the final recommendation of the Select Committee 
22. In 1897, 42 immigrants came from Italy, Germany, Russia 
and Scandinafia, while in 1899, 525 Scandinavians emigrated 
to Queensland. 
23. Brisbane: gourier, 6.2.91. 
114 
on Assisted Land Settlement (I89I), consisting of Barlow, 
J-G. Drake and M.H'. Black. Barlow had dissented from the 
majority opinion, and this fact does tend to cast doubt 
upon the Government's sincerity in the matter- The Committee 
had rejected two other suggestions. The first, the employment 
of men in the clearing of land was rejected as it was merely 
relief work,.and the second, providing "working men's blocks" 
24 
on perpetual lease, because it was too expensive. 
Reaction to the Bill varied. Most farmers were sceptical. 
In 1891, the Warwick Argus had agreed that, "to facilitate 
and encourage settlement is well within the province of the 
State, but we are persuaded that no amount of coaching by 
experts, however zealous, ,,. however well-meant, will result 
25 in anything but disaster to all concerned." ^ The Queensland 
Times probably echoed prevailing conservative opinion: 
Time alone will tell whether these State aided 
colonization schemes will be an unqualified 
success. Cooperation on an extensive scale in 
the practical affairs of everyday life is yet 
in the experimental stage .... There can be... 
no two opinions that the policy of getting 
idle hands away from the towns and settling 
them to the work of production is a wise one 
at the present juncture.2° 
Farmers and graziers felt that the reduction of freight charges. 
24. Report of Committee on Assisted Land Settlement, p.viil, 
Q.V.P., 1891. 
25. Warwick Argus, 21.2.91. 
26. Queensland Times, 31.1.94. 
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and similar encouragements would give a sufficient boost to 
primary industry to significantly reduce the unemployment 
2*7 
figures. ' 
The experiment was doomed to failure from the start. 
Many factors militated against the scheme. Each individual 
was given his own separate section for agricultural purposes, 
while grazing land was held jointly. This was an unwi&ldy 
arrangement, and the groups soon reported severe dissensions 
within their ranks. Most of the settlements were around 
Rockybank, Chinchilla and Wetheron. The land was quite 
productive, but inexperience proved to be the most common 
cause of failure. Moreover, government aid was often tardy 
and insufficient, even though the selectors received two 
years free rent, and free railways for persons arid goods. It 
was not enough. Most groups had abandoned the experiment 
by 1895. The Cooperative Communities Act had failed as 
an experiment in agricultural organization, but it had 
succeeded in what was perhaps its primary aim - to keep the 
unemployed off the streets. 
FURTHER LAND LEGISLATION 
FOXTON'S LAND ACT OP l897 
The years which had elapsed since the l884 Land Act 
had seen so many amendments to the original that Queensland 
27. Ibid. 4 
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Land Law was in a hopeless state of confusion. For this 
reason, J.P.G. Foxton brought down a Land Act which, while 
far from innovatory, was Intended to simplify and Improve 
existing laws. The trend towards closer settlement had been 
ostensibly continued. In 1895, the Grazing Homesteads Act 
"was passed by Parliament for the purpose of enabling 
, . . , . . , , * • - ' 
shearers, carriers, and casual labourers generally, to select 
grazing homesteads in the western interior on which they 
could make permanent homes for themselves and their families 
... with the exception of a few carriers, those for whose 
benefit the Act was intended have availed themselves of its 
provisions to only a limited extent". The Act had proved 
only a partial success because too often the land put aside 
for selection was of inferior quality, and because the 
conditions, such as fencing and residence, were often too 
great to be met by those with only a little capital. ^  
The 1897 Bill attempted to ease conditions on grazing 
farms, while ensuring that priority of selection went to the 
man who proposed to reside on the land. There were a few 
other major changes. The Land Board, set up in 1884-was 
replaced by a Land Court,consisting of three officials, any 
28. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), p.647. 
29. Ibid., p.722 (Hardacre). 
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one of whom could make conditions. The right of appeal was 
Incorporated in the Act, Pastoral leases were fixed at 
twenty-one years, but this disturbed no existing rights, 
except for one sub-section dealing with the lowering of 
pastoral rents. Many members argued that as an attempt at 
simplification, the Act was a.singular failure, and that in 
reality it only complicated the position still further- The 
30 plethora of small Acts remained in existence. 
The land policy of the Government was subject to an 
en®-©mous difficulty, pointed out in debate by W.H. Groom: 
In. considering the Land Bill I think we ought to 
start with this important fact in view. 
Unfortunately for Queensland - probably for.all 
the Australian colonies - we are compelled to 
look to the land, as a source of revenue.31 
This, difficulty had been pointed out in I891 by Arthur 
Morgan: 
It is a very easy thing to bring in a Land Bill 
which will promote settlement; it is a very 
difficult thing to frame a law which will do 
one and the other at the same time.32 
The need to raise re.ve.nue militated against the desire to 
promote closer settlement, and vice versa. This almost 
30. Some of these laws inducted: Pastoral Leases Act of I869 
(Am. 1890) Land Act of 1884 (AM. 1885-86-89-91-92-94); 
Special Sales of Land Act of I89I; timber regulations. 
Mineral Land Sales Act of 1892; Co-op. Communities Act 
1893; Pastoral Leases Extension Acts of 1892 and 1892 
etc. Ibid.a p.721, 
31. Ibid, ,Tr8"84, 
32. Q,P.D,, LXIV, (I89I), p,195. 
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insuperable difficulty was complicated by the fact that 
the Government did not co-ordinate other aspects of its 
policy, i,e, finance, the tariff, rural credit, to a 
sufficient extent to allow each aspect of land policy to 
comple|nent the other. Moreover, even good intentions 
sometimes led to unexpected results. The 1897 Bill included 
a provision to reduce grazing leases from fifty years to 
twenty-one years. As Hardacre pointed out, "It may be 
proposed with a view to protect the lands of the colony from 
being locked up for long terms, but it will not conduce to 
settlement. I think that selectors might have been given 
a shorter term of lease, with a preferential right of 
33 
renewal"-
Other reasons militated against an equitable division 
34 
of land. While the activities of squatters and banks 
were no doubt fairly successful in gaining advantages for 
large capitalists, agriculturalists often squandered their 
resources. In 1894 the Agricultural Department reported 
that: 
33. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), p.721. 
34. Banks l^sed large tracts of Queensland land -
Queensland National Bank, 578 square miles; Bank of 
N.S.W, 1000 square miles; Union Bank, 277 square miles; 
Mercantile Bank of Sydney, l42 square miles; Queensland 
Investment Co., 620 square miles; Mutual Life 
Association, 478 square miles. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), 
p.722. 
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Perhaps the greatest annual loss comes to the 
agricultural community through the practice of 
haphazard" system, or rather lack of system which 
may be called farming for prices rather than 
profits ... about one year ago, maize by 
reason of short supply commanded very high 
prices on all markets ... the result of this 
boom, in maize growing is seen in the great 
crop of the present year with the Inevitable 
accompaniment, glutted markets and prices 
belOw. thi cost of production... .35 
On the other hand, the Government was slow in providing 
agricultural colleges and other trained expert help to 
farmers coping with a still unfamiliar environment. The 
agricultural Industry also suffered from a chronic under-
supply of labour, caused by the Government's failure to 
attract bona--flde agricultural labourers. 
LABOUR FOR TROPICAL INDUSTRY 
ITALY 
Providing labour for Queensland's industries provided 
constant problems for the Government, none more vexatious 
than labour for tropical industry. It was almost Impossible 
to attract British labour to the tropical north, particularly 
for the sugar Industry. Griffith's decision in 1885 to 
abolish the importation of Pacific Island labour after 1890 
had dealt a severe blow to the industry, and/the planters 
who now had to find an alternative source of labour- Both 
35. Q.V.P., III (1894), pp.1494-96. 
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the Queensland and Indian Governments had vetoed the 
indenture of Indian labourers. Thus, a new source was 
contemplated - Italy. The early months of I891 saw long 
drawn out negotiations to secure indentured Italian labour 
37 for the canefields.-^' In June I891, a prominent sugar firm, 
centred in Mackay, wrote to the Under-Colonial Secretary: 
If our mill is to be kept going after the Polynesians 
leave us, we must get cane grown by some other 
labourers .... These few Italians who we propose 
to get are. likely to be suitable for cane growing; 
they will work under one^of their own countrymen 
here, who is a farmer, and speaks English.38 
While the Government, for financial reasons, refused to 
implement an official policy regarding the negotiations, it 
nevertheless sanctioned private arrangements between 
Queensland Agents and the Italian Government.-^ -^  The first 
shipload of Italians arrived in Queensland in December I.891. 
Italians however were more expensive and less efficient 
than Polynesians, with-the result that the Indenture of 
Italians was abandoned in I892, after the reintroduction of 
coloured labour- Labour leaders were relatively unconcerned 
with.Italian labourers, but they had proved that white men 
could work in the tropical north. 
36. See above;, Ch. 2. 
37. Q>V..P., 1891-92. 
38. Ldrigand Robertson to Und.Col.Sec., 20.6.91 (Q.V.P.) 
39. Und. Col. Sec. to Long and Robertson, 25.7-91 (Q.V.P.) 
40. Report Agent-General, I89I. 
121. 
THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 
The abolition of Pacific Island labour had long been 
an objective of Liberal-radical policy. Until I892, Griffith 
had steadfastly refused to sanction employment of coloured 
labour on the sugar plantations. In April I885, he expressed 
these views to the Governor of Queensland, advancing three 
major arguments against the employment of such labour-
Firstly, he doubted the validity of the assumption that the 
climate made it impossible for white men to work in the 
North: 
I believe that the land can be cultivated by 
Europeans and that it will so be cultivated, 
although under different conditions.^1 
By different conditions, Griffith meant that the plantation 
system would have to be replaced by one based on small 
farming, in accordance with his views on closer settlement. 
He was also concerned with the political consequences of 
the labour trade: 
It is not desirable, regarding Queensland, or 
the northern portion of it, as a country which 
Is to be civilized and governed on the model 
adopted, to create a class without a share of 
political power, and whose interests will need 
protection by a paternal government.42 
41. Q.V.P., I (1885), p.308. 
42. Ibid., p.318. 
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Thirdly, Griffith believed that "there is no country in 
which Asiatic and European labourers are found working side 
43 by side on terms of equality." Following this, he had 
brought down I885 legislation. He warned planters that "if 
they wished to exist, it would be their business to work 
with the rest of the community and not go against the rest 
44 
of the community with regard solely to their own interests". 
The expiration of the five years grace coincided with 
deepening depression in North Queensland. In I891 .and 
early I892, agitation for the renewal of black labour 
reached almost hysterical proportions. The I885 legislation 
was seen as the sole scapegoat for the troubles of the sugar 
industry, and to investigate its position, a Royal Commission 
had been appointed in 1889- The Commission had consisted of 
W.H. Groom, H.E. King and A.S, Cowley. Groom, a journalist 
and leader of Downs radicalism, was not expected to favour 
any concessions to the industry, but his appointment was 
balanced by that of A.S. Cowley^ a sugar planter- The reports 
of the Commission may well have affected Griffith's attitude 
to coloured labour-
The majority report, from King and Cowley, gave the 
opinion that the depression in the industry was due to a 
43. Ibid. 
44. Q.P.D., LVI, (1885), p.1143. 
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combination of many factors - mismanagement and inexperience 
on the part of the planters, the fall in the international 
price of sugar, competition from the South. They felt that 
another reason was "loss of confidence in the Industry, 
which it is alleged, is owing to the abolition of black 
labour in the future, and which prevents planters from 
obtaining the necessary advances to carry them on".^ The 
report continued that "the present cost of black labour In 
the colony has Increased by more than 50^ since I883, and 
we find that the Increase in working expenses, concurring 
with the great fall in the price of sugar and unfavourable 
seasons has caused the working expenses of the plantations 
lift generally to exceed the value of their produce". They 
went on to recommend the Introduction of new sugar strains, 
duty free export to the South, and the reintroduction of 
il 7 
"Polynesian" labour- ' 
W.H. Groom, in his Minority Report, assigned the CWSE OF 
depression primarily to the fall in prices, and also to the 
competition of beet sugar. He pointed out that a return to 
black labour, to which the southern colonies were markedly 
48 hostile, could hi-hder or even destroy federation. He also 
45. Q.V.P., I (1889), Report of the Royal Commission, p. 
46. Ibid., p.XXX. 
47. Ibid., p.XXXVI. 
48i Ibid. , p.XLVIII. 
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argued that, many planters, caught up in the boom of the 
Eighties, held unnecessarily large amounts of land, much 
of which was unproductive, and which engendered unremunerative 
interest upon unused land. Groom also rejected any 
reciprocity agreement with the southern colonies, fearing 
this would damage other branches of agriculture. He was 
convinced that the industry would profit from a system of 
49 
smaller, more intensely cultivated farms. 
There was no doubt that the industry was languishing. 
Export values, as the table below indicates, had dropped 
considerably, 
EXPORT VALUE OP QUEENSLAND SUGAR (j) 
Year Value Year Value 
1885 179,927 
1886 233,575 
1887 154,468 
1888 .167,764 
1889 107,187 
1890 156,161 
49. Ibid., p.XLXII. 
50- Lewis,KG., The Crisis Years. (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of 
Q'?.^ ; p.91. "* 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
105,257 
589,753 
753,983 
886,834 
796,116 
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The shrinkage in export value was due largely to the 
fall in the world price of sugar, but also to falling 
productivity. The recovery in 1892 was so rapid that it 
must have been connected with the reintroduction of "Polynesian' 
labour- This was not, however, the only reason. Another 
was the increasing success, after a slow beginning, of the 
system of central milling, introduced by Griffith in I885. 
In 1890 the Colonial Sugar Refining Company had organized 
their Queensland works along the lines of central milling. 
The Sugar Works Guarantee Act, by which the Government 
guaranteed the construction of new mills, had met with some 
success late in the year, making capital more easily 
available. The growth of mechanization also contributed to 
recovery. The Mackay Sugar Journal commented that "White 
men who are working for themselves and using the best 
labour saving devices are displacing the coloured workers 
rapidly. The large estates are rapidly becoming peopled 
51 
with small farmers."-'^  
Thus, while the report of King.and Cowley was accurate, 
it was Groom who recognized the great value of central 
milling and closer settlement. In I885, he had written: 
The position now is: Better perish the sugar Industry 
than perpetuate the atrocities of an unjust traffic 
in human beings.52 
51. Ibid. ,. p.106. 
52. Toowoomba Chronicle, 10.10.85. 
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Objecting to the system on humanitarian grounds, most 
opponents of the trade couched their arguments in these 
terms. In I892, the Courier remarked that outside the 
Labour movement, the humanitarian argument was the only one 
53 
advanced against reintroduction.•'^ •^  An example of the type 
of argument used by the planters may be taken from the 
Mackay Sugar Journal: 
The Government of Queensland has a clear duty 
to perform if it wishes the third greatest 
Industry in the colony to thrive and grow 
apace .... If It wishes to do its duty by 
the country, it must keep the Industry 
supplied either with some cheap labour or 
its equivalent.... The planters do not need 
to agitate; their wishes are clearly defined.54 
In their stress on the importance of the sugar industry, 
the planters had a strong case. The table below Indicates 
the relative export earnings of the major producing 
55 industries. 
COMPARATIVE EXPORT EARNINGS (j) 
Year Wool Meat Sugar 
1885 
1886 
1891 
1895 
1,799,682 
2,258,365 
3,453,548 
2,986,989 
117,286 
181,119 
222,358 
985,391 
179,927 
107,187 
105,257 
796,116 
53. Brisbane Courier, 12.2.92, 
54. Mackay Sugar Journal. I, I, (I892), p,4, 
55. Lewis,FG,, op,clt,, pp,15, 115, 91. 
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The sugar industry was thus an extremely valuable asset to 
Queensland primary industry, and even in 1888, a bad year, 
the export value of the industry exceeded that of all other 
56 
agricultural industries combined. 
With its importance established, and its difficulties 
clearly apparent, what was the real value of Polynesian 
labour to the sugar Industry? There appears to have been 
a considerable narrowing in the wage rates for black and 
white labour. In 1867, the white labourer enjoyed an 
57 
advantage of about 10:1.^' This had considerably shrunk 
by the eighties. There is no doubt that strict government 
regulations Increased the cost of Pacific Islanders. On 
the other hand, there was an increasing demand for theltr 
labour as the indust?ry moved further north. There was also 
the added factor of the increasing productivity of the 
labourers who had signed on for a second term. Bir©h argues 
that, despite decreasing numbers of Pacific Islanders, the 
58 
number of white labourers was not increasing. After I890, 
when recruiting stopped, the number of black labourers 
remained fairly constant. This was probably due to Increased 
productivity in I889. The Maryborough Chronicle reported 
56. Ibid., p.91. 
5.7. Birch, A., "Pacific Island Labour in the Queensland 
Sugar Industry", B,A.H., (1968), p, 68, 
58. Ibid., p, 68, the percentage of white labour was 13. 
in 1888; 23.4^ in I892; and 11.6^ in 1895. 
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"a feverish activity pervades the recruiting trade. The 
vessels employed in it cannot go and come fast enough to 
meet the insatiable demand".^^ In I892-3 there was a 
considerable jump in the number of white labourers employed, 
caused by the time lag between the reintroduction and the 
arrival of the first shipments. It was also caused to some 
extent by the conditions of depression, with unemployed 
white labourers taking work which they might otherwise have 
refused. Despite these considerations, which certainly seem 
to indicate the importance of kanakas to the industry, it 
remains doubtful if many employers tried to use white labour 
with maximum efficiency. According to the Maryborough 
6n 
Chronicle, they had not. On the other hand, opponents 
had to admit that white labour was notoriously hard to 
flnd.^1 
This would seem to imply that there was no viable 
alternative but to employ coloured labour. Griffith in I885, 
had suggested two - a greater supply of white labour, which 
had singularly failed, and central milling. Encouraging white 
immigration, particularly that of Italians, was also a 
politically unpopular move at a time when the labour force 
59. Maryborough Chronicle, 25.5.90. 
60. Ibid., 22.5,90, 
61. Ibid,, 12.12,92, 
was already too large to fill the jobs available. 
The Central milling scheme, at least until 1894, was 
also a qualified failure. It was primarily an attempt to 
aid the small farmer by giving him easy access to an 
Inexpensive co-operative method of crushing. The smaller 
farmers^however, simply could not afford the higher initial 
cost of central mills. Most had always relied on coloured 
6? 
labour- Thus economic and productive .circumstances, rather 
than preference, contributed to the failure of the scheme. 
As the depression deepened, the number of mills, whether 
independent .or state aided, fell very rapidly. Admittedly 
these sixty.-four were far more efficient than previously, 
which did aid in the successful recovery of the industry. 
But by this time the whole purpose of the scheme had collapsed, 
because in order that the State might not lose its capital 
outlay, the Government allowed the mills to he thrown open 
to cane harvested by coloured labour-
Thus by I892, with the failure of both his experiments, 
Griffith could see little alternative but to abandon his 
former position. He published his Manifesto on February 13 
1892. He felt, according to his statement, that it was now 
62,. Of the 176 northern sugar planters employing .coloured 
labour between I886 and I888, 132 employed less than 
a. dozen, Bolton, G,, A Thousand MileasAway. (Jacaranda, 
Brisbane, I963), p.155. 
63. Ibid., p.154. 
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safer to employ Polynesians, because the large estates no 
longer existed, considerably lessening the danger of slavery. 
He believed the depressed state of the industry necessitated 
the reintroduction of recruiting for a further-period of 
ten years: 
By that time, I have no doubt that such further 
development will have taken place as will enable 
the sugar industry to be carried on without 
reverting to the former system ... and in the 
meantime, I believe that a valuable impetus will 
be given to the producing Industries of the 
Colony.64 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
The enormous responsibility which the State undertook 
with regard to land, labour and Immigration clearly emerges 
throughout this period. The Government had undertaken to 
provide land for those who wanted it and to provide labour 
to work that land. In both areas, it achieved at least 
partial success. The failure of the immigration programme 
to provide bona--flde agricultural labour was compounded by 
its failure to provide good land on reasonable terms, for 
agricultural selection. While the former was only partly 
the fault of the Government, the latter was due almost wholly 
to its insistence that land should bring in revenue. The 
Government did achieve the doubtful success of providing 
64. Brisbane Courier, 13.2.92. 
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labour for the sugar industry, although the voracious 
planters were to turn next to Japan for an even cheaper 
source of labour. Just as the success which attended 
Government.policy was piecemeal, so was the policy Itself. 
Each separate strand was regarded as a separate entity; there 
was little co-operation between the civil service and the 
Ministers; one policy often cancelled out the other-
Nevertheless, the ubiquitous activities of the State achieved 
some remarkable successes in lifting the primary industries 
of the Colony out of the quagmire of depression. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SEPARATION AND FEDERATION 
The normal pattern of political life during the 
Nineties was disturbed by two movements - agitation for the 
separation of North and Central Queensland from the Southern 
portion of the colony, and the movement towards a long 
established Australian ideal - the federation of all the 
colonies. These constitutional changes provided a strong 
counter current, cutting across party battles over land, 
immigration and railway policy. The separation issue_j 
particularly, was a continual source of disturbance, without 
eve'3?. reaching a position where success appeared Imminent. 
Northern and Central members formed a powerful voting bloc 
within the House, and Governments had always to be aware 
of their potential voting power- Federation, however, 
involved a far greater constitutional (and emotional) change, 
and while a federal sentiment was slow to emerge in Queensland, 
a predominantly anti-federalist government was eventually 
forced to bow to public opinion and join the Federation. 
AGITATION FOR SEPARATION 
Until 1890, the separation movement, while it had been 
133. 
aggressively vocal, had achieved little success, failing to 
influence decision-makers in either Australia or the United 
Kingdom. Confronted by what they considered a southern 
dominated Parllam.ent in the Colony, the separationlsts had 
tried to influence the Imperial Government and British 
public opinion. An 1886 Petition, signed by nearly 1500 
citizens of Townsvllle, stated the reasons why Northerners 
wished to become separated from the rest of the Colony. The 
petition listed six major reasons why separation should be 
granted by the Queen: 
(1) North Queensland was more populous and more wealthy than 
was the colony of Queensland on its separation from 
N.S.W. 
(2) North Queensland was inadequately represented in 
Parliament, 
(3) The revenue obtained from North Queensland was constantly 
in excess of the expenditure in the division, 
(4) Inordinate distance, from the Capital. 
(5) The tropical environment and industries of North 
Queensland were at variance with the rest of the colony. 
(6) The Government had failed to supply an adequate source 
of labour for tropical, industries. 
1. Q.V.P., I, (1886), p.434. 
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While the first five arguments would find sympathy 
in the mother country, the issue of labour proved extremely 
damaging to the cause of separation. The London Times 
regarded the movement as inspired chiefly by the sugar 
planters and commented: 
Their pretensions to a separate administration may 
and oUght to be repulsed, while their circumstances 
arid numbers give no security against the abandonment 
of a magnificent domain to the cultivation of 
produce rathei* than free men.2 
The argument that the planters wanted separation simply to 
enable them to employ what was virtually slave labour was 
constantly reiterated during the Eighties. In I885, the 
Brisbane newspaper, the Week argued that the agitation for 
separation was primarily "in order that the Northern 
districts of the colony should be turned into a second 
Mauritius on a larger scale where white unskilled, labour 
would be impossible and unnecessary through an ample supply 
of coolies from British India".-^ Griffith regarded the 
decline in the movement for Northern separation, observable 
in 1892, as the result of the reintroduction of coloured 
4 labour in that year. 
The Queensland Government proved consistently hostile 
1. Ibid,, pp.431-2. 
3. Week, 14.3.85. 
4. Moles, I., A Brief History of the Separatist Movements 
in North Queensland. (Unpub. B.A. Pen. Thesis, U. of Q.). 
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to Northern separation. In I887, Griffith proposed to 
combat separatist agitation with measures of decentralisation. 
In a letter to Governor Musgrave, he made his views clear: 
I am disposed ... to think, that, although no 
reasonable ground for complaint exists with 
respect to the expedition (sic) used in respect 
of public works in the northern districts, 
considerable advantage mmght be gained by 
making provision for the administration of 
some departments ... locally and without 
reference to the Ministerial head at the 
capital.5 
The result of Griffith's plan was the Financial Districts 
Bill Introduced in August'^  I887. It was Griffith's Intention 
to divide the Colony into three parts, each having separate 
accounts for expenditure and revenue. The revenue accounts 
were divided into local and general accounts, the former 
including customs, land and excise receipts. 
The Bill was not popular in the House and was carried 
by a small majority of 25 to 21, although the poor attendance 
Indicates the relative lack of Interest on the part of 
southern members. The division, while not strictly on 
regional lines, shows that the issue was non-partisan. 
Five of those members who voted against the Bill (Nelson, 
Allan, Donaldson, Lalor and Jessop) did not represent either 
5. Griffith to Musgrave, undated, Q.V.P., I, (I887). 
6. Negative votes: Norton, Morehead, Chubb, Macrossan, 
Nelson, Hamilton, McWhannell, Murphy, Wallace, Allan, 
Philp, Brown, Stevens, Palmer, Scott, Pattison, 
Donaldson, Allen, Black, Lalor, Jessop. Q.P.D., LII, 
(1887), p.496. 
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central or northern electorates, but belonged to the 
squatting section of the Opposition. The Bill did not please 
separationlsts. Macrossan warned the Government that: 
I am certain that it would not satisfy the people 
of the North in the slightest degree, because 
what we want is control over our own expenditure. 
I shall record my vote against it, because it is 
unsatisfactory and unsatisfactory to the demands 
of the people of Northern Queensland.7 
Speaking for Central members, William Pattison remarked: 
I am sure that this measure will not be acceptable 
to any reasonable man in the Central District ... 
what we want is the right to tax ourselves to a 
certain, extent, or rather that, while submitting 
to taxation, we demand the right of controlling 
our own expenditure.8 
The movement in North Queensland, however, lost momentum 
when the Bill became law, not because Northerners were in 
any way satisfied, but because there was now less hope of 
immediate success. 
There was little evidence that separation was a 
contentious issue during the 1888 Election Campaign, and 
Indeed the number of northern members returned who were 
committed to separation had declined. One reason for this 
was that Griffith's I887 Redistribution Act^ had created 
three new northern mining seats, areas traditionally hostile 
7, Ibid., p.468. 
8, Ibid., pp.471-2. 
9, See below, Ch. 8. 
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to separatiori. Moreover, r^ orthern Interests felt they 
would receive a more sympathetic hearing from Mellwraith, 
than from Griffith, dependent, as was the latter, upon 
southern electoral support. 
By October I89O, however. Northern separationlsts had 
again become vocal, and Macrossan Introduced a separation 
resolution to the House. In an amendment to the motion, 
Griffith proposed "that it would be to the advantage of the 
colony to establish in the southern, central and northern 
districts, separate legislative and executive authorities." 
11 Griffith's motion was carried by 32 votes to 26. The 
division was on party lines only in the sense that the 
majority of the northern members had been elected in I888 
as members of the National Party, primarily because of the 
indmstrlal and demographic characteristics of the area. These 
Mcllwraithians, however, would oppose their leader if he 
announced his hostility to the movement. 
Griffith's amendment is a good illustration of his 
tactics in regard to. separation. Whenever the movement 
appeared to be gaining strength, he would propose some 
alternative, stopping shoi't of complete separation, but 
10,, Woothakata and Charters Towers (2), M.H. Black commented 
on separationlst apathy in mining areas. Q.P.D., XLIX, 
(1885), p.49, 
11. Four southern oppositionists (Morehead, Perkins, 
0'Sullivan and Casey) voted against the motion, and one 
Northern Ministerialist voted with Griffith. 
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designed to mollify the less extreme of the agitators. In 
the 1880's Griffith had raised the spectre of slavery, but 
by 1890 the movement had struck another problem, the 
depression. Then, Morehead countered demands with a 
financial argument: 
The separation Of Queensland into two or more 
provinces is to a very large extent a financial 
quest-ion, and when the amount of the public 
debt which is now i 28,000-OOC" is taken into 
consideration, together with the large interest 
thereon ... it must be evident that a very serious 
responsibility to the public creditor is involved 
in the question of the separation and dismemberment 
of the colony.12 
Morehead, despite his voting record in favour of separation 
while in opposition, proved no more amenable to separationlst 
demands than had Griffith. The result was that by the time 
of the Coalition discontent had again become manifest, and 
Griffith once more felt constrained to make some sort of 
concession to separationlst sentiment. 
The Central Queensland movement, centred in Rockhampton, 
had by I890 begun to organize Itself. The central movement 
was not possessed of the same mass character as its Northern 
counterpart. According to'V.R. de V. Voss "Agitation in the 
centre began and was maintained as the result of the efforts 
of a conscious, and ambitious, minority within Rockhampton 
12. Chiefs Sec. to Gov. of Qld., Q.V.P., I, (I89I), 
p.1160^. 
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itself. Essentially Central Separatism was a Rockhampton 
movement. At no time outside Rockhampiton and its immediate 
district was the separatist feeling even strong". Because 
it was a limited and dedicated movement. Central agitation 
was far better organized, and Central members far more 
disciplined in Parliament. Archer's motion in favour of 
separation however, received no better treatment than had 
Macrossan's a month earlier, and was defeated by 34 votes 
to 19. 
Meanwhile, Griffith was preparing to follow up his 
amendment of October 1890. In early I89I, he moved that 
the House resolve Itself"into a Committee of the Whole to 
consider resolutions on the institution of separate 
Provincial Legislatures. Despite a comfortable majority 
14 
of 31 to 23 on this division the first Resolution was 
defeated by a similar margin. This resolution was a very 
general statement of principle: 
That it would be of advantage to the colony to 
constitute as separate and autonomous provinces 
with separate legislative and executive authorities, 
having full powers of legislation and government 
as far as regards matters of local concern; 
but so that''matters of general concern including 
the administration of the public debt should 
remain under the control of one legislative and 
13. V.R. De "\l.- Voss, Separatist Movements, in Central Queensland 
in the Nineteenth Century. (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.), 
p. 2. 
14 22 of those voting against the resolution represented 
Southern constituencies. See Appendix 5. 
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executive authority for the whole united provinces, 
having jurisdiction over the whole of the present 
colony of Queensland until the establishment of 
an Australian Federal Government.15 
The .defeat of this resolution Indicates the strength of 
southern opposition to separation, and this once again 
disposed of the question for a time. The Brisbane Courier,' 
consistently antl-separationist, commented: 
Whatever may have been the view taken by Sir 
'Samuel Walker Griffith before last night's 
division, it is impossible that a Bill ... 
could in any case have been passed through 
the existing Parliament. There must have 
been an appeal to the people, and a new 
mandate from the constituencies, before 
such a measure be seriously entertained, 
not to say passed by our legislature.16 
With the colonial battles consistently ending in defeat for 
the separationlsts, the various groups appealed to the 
Imperial Government. The Executive Committee of the Central 
Separation League wrote to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in 1890, pointing out "the neglect of the interests 
of the people of this division" and the consistency with 
17 
which all petitions had been Ignored. In reply to requests 
for Imperial intervention, the British Government maintained 
a discreet policy of non-interference, referring the question 
back to the Colonial Parliament. In May I892, Lord Knutsford, 
15. Q.P.D., LXIV, (1891), p.1750-
16. Brisbane Courier, 20.10.91. 
17. Q.V.P,, I, (1890), p,ll80. 
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Secretary of State for the Colonies, in answer to a 
deputation from the Central Separation League, gave his 
opinion that the time was not opportune for Imperial inter^ 
ference, at least until Griffith's Provinces Resolutions 
had again been considered by the Queensland Parliament. 
THE QUEENSLAND CONSTITUTION BILL 
These resolutions were to provide the basis for the 
first Queensland Constitutional Bill, introduced in 1892. 
A constitution along the following lines was proposed: 
(1) The colony to be divided into three provinces. 
(2) Each province should have a separate Lieutenant 
Governor, and Executive Council appointed by him, 
and a Legislature consisting of one or two Houses, 
one to be elected upon an unspecified franchise. 
(3) There should be a Central Government with a Governor 
and an Executive, with a Legislature of two Houses, 
one elected by the Provincial Legislatures, and one 
by the electors in proportion to population. 
(4) Customs to be raised by the provinces, leaving all 
other taxes and duties to the central Government. 
(5) The Central Government to distribute all revenue. 
(6) On the attainment of Federation, the duties of the 
Central Government to be taken over by the Federal 
142. 
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Government. 
This complicated scheme, very similar to early schemes 
for federation^was received coldly by the North Queensland 
Separation League. The provision for the election of 
representatives to the Central Government was attacked on 
the grounds that it would lead to the over-representation 
of the South. It was also argued that Federation would 
wreck the whole arrangement, while it would deprive northern 
19 
citizens of their right of appeal to the Crown. 
With Northern Separatists displeased with the proposals, 
and southern opinion still strongly against any change, it 
was unlikely that the Bill would pass the House. Moreover, 
by 1892, another argument was being used by antl-separationists 
directly expressed by the Courier when commenting on the 
Central agitation: 
The movement has really assumed a quixotic aspect 
since the late disturbances in the western 
districts and amidst the disquietude that now 
affects the London bondholders.20 
Thus, while previously the anti-separation cry had been 
"beware-the slave", now it was "beware the worker". Fear 
of a labour dominated North and Central West was converting 
many former separationlsts. 
18. Q.V.P., 1, (1891), p.1184. 
19. Ihid., pp.1185-6. 
20. Brisbane Courier, 12.8.92.. 
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The movement was also confronted by regional hostility 
in areas other than the South. The Maryborough Chronicle 
feared northern separation: 
Maryborough has a very deep-seated Interest in the 
Northern separation question. The North is a 
great market for our foundries and saw mills, and 
we enjoy a practical monopoly there under the 
protection of a high tariff .... Our interest 
therefore as a community lies in the shutting 
off of Northern separation, and a modified form 
of self-government, if acceptable to the north 
would command our support as a last resort, in 
as much as the power of regulating the tariff 
would rest with the. general Assembly of the 
whole colony.21 
The northern districts felt that their interests would best 
be served by free trade. A largely export economy was 
combined with an extremely high cost of living, with the 
result that the southern areas exporting to the tropical 
North continued to talk of "tariff wars" when attacking 
separation. The Warwick Argus, on the other hand., approved 
Northern separation with reservations and reported a general 
feeling on the Downs that the Central District "should unite 
their destiny for another generation at least with that of 
the people of Wide Bay, East and West Moreton and the Darling 
22 Downs". 
The Queensland Constitution Bill was introduced on 
21. Maryborough Chronicle, 27.7.92. 
22. Warwick Argus, 10.5.92. 
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iti^ Ust 2nd, 1892, On:- Griffith's motion for the second 
reading, A.H. Balr'loW moved an amendment: "That this House 
approved of the division of the colony into two provinces 
on the basis of this Bill". Central claims were thus 
completely Ignored. Such, an amendment meant that the two 
branches of the separation movement simply could not combine, 
with a consequent certainty that the Bill would not pass. On 
the first, division for the abandonment of the second reading. 
Barlow secured a 34 to 22 victory and on the second, for the 
adoption of the amendment, the result was an alternative 
vote of 38 - 19. 
Northern and Central members voted almost to a man 
against Barlow's amendment and they were joined by Cabinet 
members Tozer and Unmack, two Maryborough Ministerialists, 
Annear and Hyne, Perkins, Griffith and Mellwraith. Of those 
voting with Barlow, Sayers and Rutledge represented Northern 
constituencies. On the second division, those opposed 
Included only one Northerner, Stodart, and five Central 
members, Callan, Murray, Paul, Corfield and Stevenson. Apart 
from these five, the rest of the opposition could be 
described as opposed.to any regional self-government at all. 
On August 18, Griffith withdrew the Bill, and subsequently 
reintroduced it on the basis of Barlow's motion. The third 
reading was carried by 30 votes to 13, The smallness of the 
14.5. 
House, at times so small that a quorum could not be formed, 
indicates that the Bill was now regarded in a most apathetic 
light. Nevertheless, Northern members accepted the Bill as 
better than nothing, but it appeared they had little faith 
in its eventual implementation. The Maryborough Chronicle 
shared this opinion. 
We still adhere to the opinion previously expressed 
that this cleverly drafted and voluminous Bill has 
been brought into existence with no other object 
in view than to divert the attention of northern 
malcontents from the more serious question of 
territorial separation,23 
For this reason, there appeared to be little reaction in the 
24 North when the Council rejected the Bill. Indeed, there 
appeared to be more comment outside the colony. The Sydney 
Morning Herald was of the opinion that: 
The result is to be regretted, for this was an 
Australian question, the project of Federal 
provinces having been moulded in the spirit of 
Australian Federation, with the object at 
once of satisfying the reasonable demands of 
North Queensland, and of preventing difficulties 
that might stand in the way of the greater... 
union of the States.^^ 
The rejection of the Bill by the Council dealt an effective 
blow against the separation movement. One reason why it 
was not again to gain the political limelight, except briefly 
in l897_,was pointed, out by Mellwraith, "In 1893 the success 
23. Maryborough Chronicle, 1.11.92. 
24. Bolton,&3&7, A Thousand Miles Away. (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 
1^53), P.206. 
25. Reprinted Warwick Argus, 5.11.92. 
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of Labour in the Elections has alanned employers of labour 
and has finally forced them to the conclusion to which they 
have been gradually coming for the last twelve months, that 
..their own interests are. better protected by the colony as a 
whole than they would be if separation took place. Thus, 
but for the Labour representatives, separation is dead in 
the North, and. their chances of agitating effectively here 
?6 
are nil." 
The eclipse of the separatist movement was also a 
result of the Cabinet policy of the Queensland Premiers, 
pointed out by Labour member George Kerr at the I893 
Separation Convention: 
Sir Thomas has nobbled the leader - Mr. Hume Black 
- and sent him to England. He placed Mr- A.S. 
Cowley in the Speakei^ s Chair, .he^ ''gave Mr- R, Philp 
the portfolio of Mines, and he gave Mr- Dalrymple 
and Mr. Chat^way, the members for Mackay, a sop 
in the form! of a central sugar mill.27 
The Separation movement had thus been badly damaged by the 
Queensland Constitution Bill, in the sense that moderate 
supporters gradually drifted away, due both to the rise of 
the Labour Party and the realization that unless separatists 
could combine, there was no remote chance that they could 
achieve their ambitions. 
26. Mellwraith to Qld. Agent-General, 28.10.92. Q.V.P., 
I, (1894), p.516, ' 
27. Q.V.P., I, (1894). 
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SEPARATION AND FEDERATION 
With both Central and Northern separation movements 
apathetic and disorganized, the prospects of the Federation 
of Australian Colonies gave separationlsts much food for 
thought, and it was regarded with mixed feelings. 
Most separationlsts regarded federation as a more 
desirable alternative than remaining under the Queensland 
Parliament, which they still regarded as dominated by the 
southern portion of the colony. The Commonwealth, many 
felt, would be more amenable to the demands for a separate 
existence. In I89O, Macrossan had expressed his view at 
the Federal Convention: 
My Honourable Colleague ... thinks that the people 
of Queensland might be opposed to Federation 
because they are opposed to centralisation, being 
separatists in some parts of the colony; but the 
honourable gentleman ought to know that the 
strongest separationlsts are ardent federatlonists 
.... Centralisation has no terrors for anyone 
who thinks on the subject if sufficient local 
autonomy is left to local legislatures-2° 
This opinion was shared by most separatists until the I898 
Federal Convention passed Clause 124 of the draft Constitution, 
which stated that "a new State may be formed by separation of 
territory from a State, but only with the consent of the 
28. V.R. de Voss, op.cit. , p.107, 
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Parliament thereof"- As Queensland was not represented at 
the Convention it was left to Waller, a New South Wales 
representative with sympathy for separation, to suggest 
that the Royal Prerogative be retained in the Clause. This 
move was immediately negated by a telegram from Sir Hugh 
Nelson, in which he pressed the views of his Government: 
We do not think the clause would tend to promote 
the. cause of federation in this colony-30 
The Queensland Government had thus remained adamant in its 
attitude to any dismemberment of the Colony. The clause 
remained as it had been proposed, despite a strongly worded, 
but useless protest from the Central Queensland Separation 
League. 
In 1899., the Federation Enabling Bill was Introduced 
to the Queensland Parliament, and Central members took the 
opportunity of recording their vote against the second 
reading of the Enabling Bill. They maintained that the 
retention of Clause 124 would "extinguish all hope of self-
31 government for generations to come." The fears of 
Central separationlsts were expressed by William Kidston, 
when he echoed the words of Macrossan neaj?ly a decade 
before: 
29. For the j^ olitical reasons for this, see below, Ch.l3. 
30. V.R. de ¥oss, op.cit. , p.l09-
31. Q.P.D., LXXXI, (1899), p.121. 
I49c 
I am a federalist, but I am also a provlnclallst 
..,. It is unfair to allow provincial ideas 
to block the way to union of the Australian 
Coloniesj but no wise scheme of federation will 
Injure the provinces .... For the proper 
development and good government of a vast 
territory like Australia, we should have a 
strong central Government, but it is no less 
desirable that there should be effective local 
autonomy.32 
Central separatlonism, however, had always remained a 
movement confined to Rockhampton and its immediate environ-
ment , haisring its roots in the civic ambitions of that city. 
Serious opposition to federation then, was primarily 
confined to that city, and the results of the federal 
referendum support this contention. • 
Northern separatism, more disorganized, as well as 
being more a movement of the people, had, by I898, become 
a dead issue. Wallace Nelson, Radical and former Separatist 
noted with regret: 
So far as separatiori is concerned there is little 
enthusiasm in the Centre and absolute apathy in 
the North, and in the face of these facts, the 
accomplishment of territorial autonomy is at 
the present moment impossible.34 
While Rockhamptonites had felt their civic Interest, as a 
port and Industrial centre, would be furthered as a capital 
of a separate territory, the economic basis of the Northern 
32. Ibid., p.402. 
33. Only Rockhampton recorded a No Vote. 
34. Progress,^ 19.8.94. 
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movement had been a desire for free trade. An impossibility 
while the North remained part of Queensland as a separate 
colony, free trade would, in all likelihood^be attained upon 
the federation of Australian States. Thus, little opposition 
to federation was expressed by former Northern separatists. 
Northerners argued that the removal of Intercolonial trade 
barriers would reduce the cost of living in the North. 
P.P. Hannan, Ministerialist member for Townsvllle, estimated 
that the reduction would be as great as 20^ to 25^.^^ 
Queensland separationlst fervour retreated before the 
greater force of federalism. While some separationlsts 
remained staunchly anti-federalist, the great weight of 
opinion in Central and Northern Queensland negated their 
efforts. The movement had died a natural death in the 
North. It had been unable to overcome the consistently 
antagonistic attitude of the Queensland Government, and 
because it could not co-operate with its Central counterpart, 
the movement had been gradually fragmented until it ceased 
to exist. Central separatlonism had managed to survive 
longer- Perhaps if some common goal could have been reached 
between Rockhampton and Northerners, they may have entertained 
some hope of success. But Rockhampton was not interested in 
35. Q.P.D., LXXI, (1899), p.400. 
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free trade, and the North would not sacrifice that long 
held policy, merely for the civic ambitions of Rockhampton. 
Clause 124 of the Federal Constitution drove the Tinal 
nail into the coffin of separatism. It is ..significant that 
of the Central electorates, only Rockhampton voted against 
Federation. In the North, the electorates were overwhelmingly 
in,favour- Federation had thus effectively negated the 
separation movement in Queensland. 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND FEDERATION 
It can be argued that if a federal sentiment existed 
in Queensland it was almost entirely negative. The North 
Queensland Register commented in February, 1893: 
The Federal Council has broken up, and its 
labours have been small. There is nothing 
to justify a meeting of delegates from the 
various colonies, as the people take no 
interest In their deliberations, and their 
legislation is simply useless ... until 
the people of Australia show more interest 
... pollticans should stay at home and 
, attend to local matters.3° 
Nevertheless, as the decade grew older, the movement towards 
federation began to capture the attention of Queenslanders. 
Many now had to decide to what extent federation-would 
a,ffie€t their livelihoods. 
Broadly speaking, those interests associated with 
36» North Queensland Register, 15.2.93. 
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industries which were dependent upon an export market favoured 
federation, while those whose industries relied upon Internal 
colasumption regarded union as inimical to their interests. 
Industries and crafts which had grown behind the protection 
of intercolonial customs barriers felt especially threatened. 
The incipient manufacturing sector in Queensland had been 
built up under the protection of a high customs tariff 
Imposed in 1888. Much progress had been made since 
Mellwraith had introduced his tariff. Infant Industries had, 
developed, but manufacturers still did not feel secure 
enough to withstand Southern competition, Frank McDonnell 
argued in I899 that Queensland Industry was in no position 
to compete with Victoria: 
I say Queensland is not in that position; that 
if we are placed in that position under a policy 
of inter-colonial free trade, and have to compete 
with Victoria and New South Wales on equal terms, 
the manufacturing industries will not be able to 
stand,37 
The manufacturers had a good case. The table below 
Indicates the great strides taken in three branches of the 
manufacturing sector since I888, In that time. Imports from 
interstate in certain lines had dropped dramatically: 
37. Q.P.D., LXXXI, (1899), pp,2 82-3. 
38, Ibid, 
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IMPORTS - LEATHER, DAIRYING, GROCERIES 
Year Boot and Shoe Grocery Items Butter and Cheese 
1888 179,097 57,845 93,328 
1897 51,0'97 17,249 12,197 
• ^ i . ^ ^ , . I M M I . I I — I I H I III • ! • • . l l » l • • • — • • • • I . . , . II MM. I I . . _ • - _ _ _ . _ ^ , _ ; ^ j 
This Impressive drop in Import figures, at a time when 
Queensland population had increased by about 97,000jwas 
certainly a strong argument against federation. It is 
indicative that on the referendum, the two areas of the 
greatest manufacturing strength in Queensland, Brisbane and 
Rockhampton, both recorded No Votes. 
For dairy farmers and some wheat producers, the 
situation was much the same. The butter and cheese Industry 
had made great strides since 1888, and those dairy farmers 
producing for the Internal market feared intercolonial free 
trade.^-^ The export of such produce had been encouraged 
by various Meat and Dairy Produce Encouragement Acts, but 
these had operated almost solely to the advantage of the 
4:0 
pastoral industry as had the various schemes of refrigeration. 
39. Warwick Argus, 28.5.98. 
40. Se©' below,, Ch. 13. 
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Thus, dairy producers still were almost completely confined 
to the Internal market and were thus hostile to federation. 
The wheat industry, centred in the Darling Downs found 
Itself in a ;S'©Mewhat more complicated position. The 
Northern Downs, a newly established wheat growing area, and 
producing almost solely for the internal market, was 
decidedly hostile to federation. On the other hand, farmers 
on the Southern downs, closer to the N.S.W. border and 
mindful of their trading advantages over their northern 
counterparts, were more friendly to the cause. Moreover, 
the southern downs, was, of necessity, aiming at an export 
market, and therefore welcomed the destruction of Inter-
41 
colonial trade barriers. Many Downs farmers agreed with 
the sentiments of the Warwick Argus: 
If we join our neighbours, we will do so at 
considerable sacrifice to our struggling 
Industries, but to remain, as we are would 
probably expose us to still greater dangers.^2 
It was argued that if Queensland stayed outside the federation, 
she would be excluded in all southern markets, whereas, if 
she joined federation, her markets would expand, despite 
temporary dislocation. Once Queensland could gain a foothold 
in this expanded market, production Increase would automatically 
41. Green, Queensland Attitudes to Federation. (Unpub. B.A. 
Thesis, U. of Q.), p.31. 
42. Warwick ArgiTs, 28.5.98. 
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follow. 
The pastorallsts had little problem. George Thorn, 
representative of Passifern, indicated that pastorallsts 
generally favoured federation, maintaining that in his' 
"own electorate ... with the exception of a few pastorallsts 
and a few agents, the people.... are .against the Commonwealth 
43 Bill". -^  Pastoralism was an export industry, and thus did 
not fear free trade. Many pastorallsts however were. In the 
somewhat peculiar position of favouring federation as an 
economic benefit, but fearing the "democratic tendencies" 
44 
which might then be let loose. 
FEDERATION AND COLOURED LABOUR 
The political domination of conservatism in Queensland 
was in part due to the economic structure of the colony, with 
its almost complete dependence upon primary Industry-
Pastorallsts provided a large section of conservative support, 
while the sugar planters provided another- Sugar producers 
regarded the use of cheap coloured labour as the basis of 
their successful lindustry. They had fought hard and long 
to retain their supply of Pacific Islanders after Griffith 
had announced the cessation of the trade in 1884, and had 
43. Brisbane Courier, 4.3.99. 
44. See below, Ch. 13i 
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45 
won the battle in 1892. -^ It seemed likely that Federation 
would threaten the labour supply, and hence this industry, 
more than any other primary industry in Queensland, was 
hostile. It had long been recognized that federation would 
mean the end of coloured labour and would Introduce the 
strict maintenance of a White Australia. Green indicates 
the basis of the anti-kanaka movement in the decade: 
While the desire to expel alien labour was 
one of the chief reasons for the development 
of national aspirations, once these 
aspirations had been, formed their realization 
demanded that Australia should be made the 
preserve of the white race, or more particularly 
of the English people. 46 
There was however, some suspicion in anti-federalist circles 
that Federation was a gigantic hoax, perpetrated in order 
that a black state could be set up in the Northern Territory. 
There was some basis for this somewhat paranpid opinion. In 
1893, Miss Shaw, a London Times special correspondent (in 
reality Lady Lugard, wife of the great colonial administrator 
in Africa) had visited the colony, and had proposed that a 
black state might be desirable. This proposal had received 
wide publicity, and had been endorsed by theHBritish Colonial 
Party. Such proposals drew bitter criticism from labour 
45. For a discussion of Coloured Labour, see above, Ch. 5, 
46. Green, Op.cit., p. I7. 
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member Joe Lesina. In one anti-convention Bill article, he 
maintained that "at home and abroad, it would appear that 
there is a movement afoot to fasten upon the shoulders of 
Australia for all time and for the paltriest of commercial 
47 
reasons, the curse of alien blood". ' 
It is doubtful that many Queenslanders took these 
assertions very seriously, but there is no doubt that the 
planters were unwilling to abandon Pacific Island labour. 
The Pacific Islander was still of tremendous value to them. 
In 1902, they constituted 88.55^'of the field workforce, 
and while the expenses associated with their employment 
had continued to rise throughout the decade, the Polynesian 
was still cheaper and more efficient than the average white 
48 
worker in the canefields. 
In an economic sense, the planters could gain much 
from federation. The Townsvllle Bulletin was confident 
that "after the Improvement in prices which is likely to 
result from federation, the planters would be enabled to 
49 do away with coloured labour". The well publicized 
sugar bounty had also done much to mollify the planters. 
The Mackay Sugar Journal felt that once the bounty was In 
47. Lesina, J., Federation, Black Labour and Monopoly. (I899 
pamphlet published by the Worker). 
48. Birch, A., "The organization and economy of Pacific Island 
Labour in the Australian SUggr Industry I863-I906". 
(B.A.H., VI, I, 1966), 
49. Quoted in Brisbane Courier, 15.4.99. 
158. 
operation, "Federation will give us a sure market for our 
50 
present production of sugar". Moreover, many planters 
were aware that if Queensland hoped to remain outside the 
federation, the bounty would also apply to them, and the 
industry could not hope to compete with cheaper sugar from 
51 
other parts of the world.-^ 
The economic arguments should have been enough-to 
convince most sugar producers. They did not fall to see 
the advantages of federation, but their psychological 
attachment to black labour remained firm, so that "it 
could be argued that it took, the decisive and overriding 
force of federal authority, representing of course,, the 
political forces fixed upon social ideals, to secure the 
acquiescence of the planters to the abolition of one of 
52 
the foundations of this branch of tropical agriculture".-^ 
THE IDEAL OF FEDERATION 
The Federal conventions throughout the decade generated 
their own type of Australian nationalism, but, as Crisp 
remarks^"even Alfred Deakln's oratory was not of the order 
which makes hard-boiled intercolonial politicians fall 
weeping on each other's shoulders amid universal protestations 
50. Mackay Sugar Journal, 8, 12 June I899, p.l6. 
51. Maryborough Chronicle, 4.12.96. 
52. Birch, A., op.cit., p.75. 
159. 
' 5^ 
of Indissoluble federal brotherhood"."^-^ This applied equally 
to the Australian public. In Queensland, the federal 
movement simply did not capture the Imagination of the 
people, at least until the referendum forced them to think 
about it. Conservatives, Liberals and the Labour Party all 
had different conceptions of the nature of the new Federal 
Government. The conservative, not to say reactionary, 
government of Sir Hugh Nelson, thus refused to send delegates 
to the 1896 Convention, because such delegates were to be 
elected by popular franchise. The Government if it could 
not have its views presented by Parliamentary nominees, 
preferred to remain outside the mainstream of the federal 
54 
movement. While the Labour Party had included a federation 
55 plank in its platform since its inception the Worker was 
pessimistic about the prospects for labour gains under a 
55 
federal parliamentary system. Many Labour politicians, 
such as Joe Lesina, regarded federation as a vast capitalist 
trick, particularly during the battle for popular election 
of delegates. Lesina regarded federation as simply the 
means towards imperialist plundering of the great natural 
resources of Australia, and ridiculed pro-federation meetings. 
53. Crisp, L.F., The Parliamentary Government of the Common-
wealth of Australia. (Longmans, Melbourne, 1954), p.2. 
54. See below, Ch.. 13. 
5-5. Labour regarded federation with suspicion, but as 
more desirable than Imperial federation. 
56. Worker, 24.12.94. 
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with their "showman attributes of flaunting flags, big 
drums, organ solos. Federal haloes, and florid and 
meaningless appeals to the audience to arise and become 
57 
a great nation"-
There were some federalists in Queensland, however, 
who shared the view of Sir Samuel Walker Griffith,, when he 
exhorted Queenslanders to decide "the question whether they 
will be citizens of a great Australian Dominion, prepared 
to step at once into a place amongst the nations of the 
world, or whether they prefer to remain a small and separate 
community, liable to all the disadvantages of isolation, 
and at the mercy, in many respects, of a powerful and 
overwhelming neighbor with whom they are too diffident or 
58 too distrustful to cast in their lot.""^  
For Queenslanders unconvinced by such faith, the 
dictates of prudence were equally as compelling. Many felt 
it would be far safer, despite some temporary disadvantages, 
to join the other colonies, rather than to try to exist in 
isolation. Even so. Interest in the federation of Australia 
was far from consuming. In the Federal Referendum of 1899, 
only 66.19^ of eligible voters went to the polls, slightly 
less than in the average General Election. 
57. Lesina, J., op.cit., 
58. Griffith,. S.W.,. Australian Federation And The Draft 
Constitution Bill. (Govt. Printer, Brisbane), p.22. 
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THE RESULTS OP THE REFERENDUM I899 
The heated partisanship displayed during July and 
August 1899 made federation, almost for the first time, a 
real issue in Queensland life. Voting, undertaken, on the 
principle of one man - one vote, showed that a majority of 
only 53.39^ of Queenslanders were favourable to federation. 
A brief analysis of the results confirms the Impression 
that it was economic interest which dictated the attitudes 
of most Queenslanders. The four south-eastern electoral 
districts - inner urban, suburban, the south-eastern 
farming areas and the Darling Downs-all returned negative 
votes, while the south-western pastoral district was 
favourable to union. In Brisbane, the ratio was largest, 
59 
with almost a 2 - 1 majority against federation."^^ This 
ratio ^ was maintained in the south-eastern farming district, 
but on ,the Darling Downs, voting was closer and results less 
c l e a r - c u t . Of the Downs e l e c t o r a t e s , Warwick, Carnai?v!Qn, 
and Cunningham returned a favourable vote, and Dalby was 
evenly divided. Cambooya, Aublgny and Toowoomba, in the 
northern part of the Downs determinedly opposed any form of 
union. .«Thus, the manufacturers and retail traders of 
Brisbane, jealous of their commercial domination, 
59. See Appendix 6 for referendum results. 
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along with the farmers of the south east and northern downs, 
voted firmly against Federation. 
On the other hand, only two other electorates, 
Rockhampton and Rockhampton North, voted against union. The 
hard core of separationlsts may have had some effect on this 
vote, but economic considerations no doubt Influenced many, 
Rockhampton was becoming the manufacturing centre of the 
central and northern areas. Thus, manufacturers there 
regarded southern competition in the same way as the Brisbane 
business men. Moreover, the civic ambitions of Rockhampton, 
which had long provided a basis for the separation movement 
had also come into play, and Rockhamptonites feared the 
loss of the town's hard won status. 
Perhaps the most remarkable federal victory was in the 
north, where the vote was 12,376 in favour of federation and 
only 3,330 against. It can thus be said that it was the 
north which carried Queensland into the Commonwealth, for 
the rest of Queensland had been carried by the gigantic No 
te of the South-eastern area. 
Queensland thus entered the Commonwealth of Australia, 
as one State, and not two or three. Separation had given 
way to Federation and Queensland entered the new Federation, 
with all the rights and duties, advantages and disadvantages 
thus entailed. 
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G1AP.TER 7 
THE QUEENSLAND NATIONAL BANK 
1 
The Queensland National.Bank was the colony's premier 
financial institution from its inception in I872 until the 
turn of the century. It had been founded by a group of 
businessmen, with a paid up capital of il06,000. Its first 
directors were P.H. Hart, A.B. Buchanan and John Bramston, 
and its first General Manager was E.R. Drury. Drury was an 
experienced banker and became the close friend and associate 
of Thomas Mellwraith. Mellwraith's connection with the 
bank began when he joined the Board of Directors in 1874, 
and although he resigned in 1879, he kept a link with the 
Q.N.B. through his brother-in-law, Arthur Palmer, who took 
his place on the Board. Many politicians were to become 
shareholders in the tjank. In I896, the Board of Directors 
included three members of the Council - B.D. Morehead, Palmer, 
and Robert Hart. Other Council members owned substantial 
blocks, of. shares - Wilkle Gray, Ferguson, Marks, Mosman, Power, 
Raff, and of course, James Tyson. Several members of the 
1. There is a lot of material relating to the Bank in the 
Queensland State Archives, but much of it has yet to 
be released by the Justice Department. 
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Assembly are also to be found on the list of shareholders -
Callan, Crombie, Dickson, Lord, McMaster, Stodart and George 
2 
Thorne. 
In 1879, Mellwraith had given Drury the Government 
Account. The bank made spectacular headway during the boom 
conditions of the early Eighties. Its deposits more than 
doubled between 1884 and I889. But, like all Queensland 
Banks, there was an unfavourable ratio between British and 
colonial capital, a characteristic which, did not promote 
stability. The Bank had a number of major weaknesses. 
Firstly, because it conducted all Government business, its 
reserves tended to fluctuate with fluctuating government 
demand. The link with Parliament was strengthened by the 
fact tha;t of all the members who were shareholders only one, 
•2 
George Thorne, was an active oppositionist. This left a 
wide avenue for attempted pressure on the Bank's directors. 
General policy was one of extreme sepculatlnn, a far more 
serious fault. Mellwraith, and men like him-tended to spurn 
immediately profitable enterprises such as land improvement, 
for the greater anticipated benefits of long term specu-
lation. Improving pastoral land, the colony's great asset, 
was not [profitable enough; buying up land in the expectation 
2. Worker, 21.11,96. 
3. Dicksons loyalties tended to fluctuate. 
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4 
of railway construction was profitable; mining was. profitable; 
but. gambling in land values exceeded these in attraction. 
This type of speculation is dangerous, even if only practised 
by private investors, but when the banks also speculate, 
the situation becomes disastrous. To make matters worse, 
it was not Queensland money that was used; it was imported 
capital, borrowed in the expectation that profits would pay 
the interest. Throughout the decade of the Eighties, this 
ruinous speculation, practised by small and large Investors 
alike, proceeded apace, with no restraining hand placed on 
it by the-Bfenks, who themselves were caught up in the fever-
In 1898, The Committee of Inquiry into the Q.N.B.'s 
affairs and .management, had severely criticized this policy: 
To invest in one year i 2,500,000'^ "''^  in a young 
colony, during a period of Inflated values 
without undue risk, required on the part of 
those charged with the responsibility, quite 
exceptional experience and sagacity. But the 
money had to be lent, because the Interest had 
to be' paid on the deposits .... It was, we 
believe, the disastrous turning point in the 
history of the Bank." 
Even so, with sound management the bank could have been 
salvaged. And this was not to be had from E.R. Drury. 
Drury was given a free hand in the management of the 
I, The Mareeba-Chillagoe Railway scandal is a good example. 
5. Particularly with a paid up capital of only il,050,950. 
fi* Further -report of the Committee of Inquiry into the 
business and affairs of the Queensland National Bank 
Ltd. and its past management. Q.V.P., II, (I897), 
p.700. 
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Bank, and the Head Office was never inspected. Branch 
managers were also given far too,.much discretionary power-
None in authority at the Bank saw fit to try to put a 
brake upon its speculative transactions. Prior to I893, 
however, there was no lapse of confidence in the Bank, The 
rapid growth of the institution had owed much to the security 
gained from the government account, but depression placed 
the Bank in a perilous position, particularly as cautious 
British investors ,  had been steadily withdrawing most of 
7 their capital.- In I892, the bank admitted to the Government 
that it would have difficulty providing funds to meet the 
withdrawal of capital. The Government then borrowed 
i600^000 from the Bank of England, ostensibly for official 
purposes. It was admitted to the I898 Committee, however, 
that "this money was not borrowed by the Government to 
meet the Interest on the public debt, but ... was really 
o 
negotiated in the interest of the Bank." 
Despite this desperate measure, the Q.N.B., faced with 
shrinking. Government business, was forced to suspend 
operations on 15 May, 1893. The effect in business circles, 
and on the general public, was nothing short of catastrophic. 
7. See Ch. 3. 
8. Further Report ... op.cit., p.701. 
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Even now, few Queenslanders realised the severity of the 
crisis, or that the Government had on two occasions during 
1892, borrowed substantial sums from Great Britain to 
avoid distutRbing its acGc>unt. Now the time had come to 
face the consequences of such a foolish and short-sighted 
policy. 
The Government acted swiftly. Griffith appointed-
H.M. Nelson, a respected financier, and A.H. Barlow to 
inquire into the affairs of tjie Bank. After a rapid 
examination they pronounced the Bank solvent. The Government 
then decided to prop up the falling reserves by guaranteeing 
9 the holdings. Despite some temporary success in restoring 
confidence, the action was a palliative rather than a cure. 
On Drury's death in February I896, Walter Ralston 
became Manager- He found, to his astonishment, that the 
Bank was in an almost unbelievable state of Insolvency. 
After Informing the directors, Ralston then approached the 
Queensland Government which agreed to investigate the 
situation. In August I896, Labour member Charles McDonald 
tabled the following question in the House: 
Is it the intention of the Government to cause 
an Independent inquiry to be made into the 
affairs of the Queensland National Bank before 
any legislation is Introduced?10 
9. The Governihent and the Bank agreed that i2,000,000 was 
to be placed in fixed deposit for 6 to 12 years, while 
3360,000 was to be repa^ clci at an Interest rate of 4.1/2^ 
per annum. 
10- Q.?*D., LXXV, (1896), p.605. 
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McDonald received little satisfaction from the Premier at 
this time, but on 2nd September, Nelson announced that a 
Committee had been set up "to ascertain the position of the 
Affairs of the Q.N.B. Ltd.". The Committee consisted of E.B. 
Forrest M.L.C., John Cameron, former President of the United 
Pastorallst Association and Employers Union, and E.V. Reid, 
a prerainent Queensland businessman. The satisfaction with 
which the news of the committee was received was somewhat 
lessened when, its membership was announced. Labour and 
Opposition members alleged that two members were shareholders 
of the. Bank. Nelson replied that there was only one share-
holder, and that he was only a trustee. McDonald 
countered; 
I know that Mr- Forrest is a shareholder, according 
to the list filed in the Supreme Court ... to show 
that he is connected with the Queensland National 
Bank, I may mention that he is a shareholder in a 
certain firm in the colony., who have .[:sic] a very 
big overdraft at the Bank. 
This firm was Barberry Lamb and Co., which had extensive 
13 business relations with the squatters. Forrest was also 
a close personal friend of Mellwraith and Palmer. E.V. Reid 
was a director of Walter Reid and Co., also with close 
connections with the pastoral industry. The Worker pointed 
11. Ibid., p. 720. 
12. Ibid., p., 721. 
13. Worker, 5.10,96. 
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out that Walter Reid were agents for the A.U.S.N. Co., a 
shipping firm owned by Robert Philp and James Burns, whose 
Manager, E.S. Dawes was a director of the London branch of 
Q.N.B. If this were not enough to question the appointment 
of Reid, the Worker listed several other shareholders of. 
Walter Reid: Mellwraith, MeEache|/rn & Co., McEachELki, A.J. 
14 Callan, Ferguson, A.H. Palmer- That the Nelson Government 
could have appointed such.an obviously partisan Committee 
was an act of either supreme cynicism or unmitigated 
stupidity. Continued pressure from the opposition benches 
eventually forced the Premier to include the Auditor-General, 
E. Deshon, in the Committee-, -
The .report of the investigators stated that the 
liabilities of the Bank exceeded Its assets by 12,435,423.''" 
It avoided any judgment on the past management of the Bank 
save an admission that "it must be obvious that grave 
17 
mistakes have been made". The Committee recommended: 
To prevent the stoppage of the Bank, to avert 
what most people would regard as a public 
disaster ,., we have resolved, notwithstanding 
our strong aversion to any form of State 
guarante&i to recommend the Government to 
guarantee temporarily the balances at credit 
of current accounts, and also, such of the 
now fixed deposits as may mature during the 
same period.1° 
14. Ibid. 
15. Q.P,D., LXXV, (1895), p.721. 
16. Q.V.P., II, (1896)3 p.721. 
17. Ibid., p.510 ' 
18. Ibid., p.511. 
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In accordance with this, the Government introduced the 
Queensland National Bank Ltd. Guarantee Bill in November 
1896. The Bill aimed at guaranteeing all the deposits of 
the Bank, including the fixed accounts which had been opened 
after the reconstruction of 1893. The Bill did not affect 
overdrafts, simply current accounts in credit. The. accounts 
19 
were to be guaranteed for a period of 12 months. 
CH. Buzacott, former prominent Liberal, and at one 
time owner of the Brisbane Courier and Maryborough Chronicle^ 
regarded the Bill as an explosive political issue. He wrote 
to Nelson that he felt that it might have a difficult 
passage, particularly as many other banking'Institutions 
opposed such a course- He continued that, "evidently the 
Labour Party could not be counted upon. Many Labour 
members are, I know, favourable to giving the bank substantial 
aid, but my impression is that they would be carried away 
in an epidemic of demolition which could seize an opposition 
once they saw the opportunity of thrusting out the 
20 Government". J.C Smyth later believed that the fate of 
21 the Ministry was Involved, 
The attitude of the Labour Party was therefore crucial. 
A variety of opinions was expressed during debate on the 
19. Q.P.D., LXXVI, (1896), p.1453. 
20. Buzacott to NM,lson, 31.8.96 (QNB Papers, Q.S.A.). 
21. Smyth to Mellwraith, 27.11.97 (QNB Papers, Q.S.A.). 
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Bill. Anderson Dawson opposed guarantee, wondering "whether 
we are. justified in keeping alive by means of public money 
an institution which must Inevitably fall. Will it not 
by doing so, create a false public confidence?" 
Thomas Finney expressed an opposite view: 
We must look at the fact that if the bank stops, 
hundreds of people will be thrown out of 
employment all over the colony, business will 
be crippled and it will be a great misfortune 
to the whole community.23 
Many labour members feared the repercussions of unemployment 
which might follow the closing of the bank. George Sim, 
at a meeting in Ipswich early in I897, maintained- Labour 
parliamentarians had been given complete freedom of action: 
In regard to the Q.N. Bank question, it was 
determined at a meeting of labour representatives 
that each member should be entitled to vote as he 
thought best ,,, he was answerable to the party 
on any matters affecting the platform of the 
party, but in regard to other affairs, his 
constituency was his only tribunal.24 
The Worker, however, condemned those who had voted for 
guarantee: 
Seldom, if ever, do we venture to publicly 
question the |tcts of Labour members of the 
House ... there are occasions, however, when 
it would be neglect on our part to remain 
silent .... We. heartily support the actions 
22. Q.P.D., LXXVI, (1896), p.l46l. 
23. Ibid., p.1463. 
24.. Brisbane Courier, 8.1.97 
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taken by Messrs. Dawson, Turley, McDonald, 
Dunsford, Fitzgerald and Kerr, in opposing 
the Government Guarantee Bill .... If the 
bank is to close, the sooner it goes into 
liquidation the better ... we think every 
member of the LabOur Party who voted for 
the Guarantee legislation will regret his 
action at no distant date.25 
The Worker maintained that the Q.N.B. case was a matter of 
party platform, and was covered by the referendum platform. 
All those who had voted with the Government had directly 
contravened this principle, and all agreements made between 
the Executive and an outside body should be submitted to 
?6 
Parliament for ratification. 
Many Labour men. felt there was merit in Glassey^ s view;* 
He felt that it would be the small depositor, the man who 
could least afford it, who would suffer most if the bank 
was forced into liquidation. Labour members who voted for 
guarantee also tended to agree with the arguments of Finney, 
and believed that if the bank did close its doors, mo.re 
businesses would be forced into the bankruptcy courts, and 
the unemployment rate.-would rise even further. The Worker 
disagreed. It insisted that the situation made too many 
businesses inherently unsound, and that it would be even 
more dangerous to carry on with money received from Q,N,B, 
25. Worker, 21,11,96, 
26. Ibid, 
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overdrafts, ' 
Had this dissension within liabour ranks been merely 
the result of differing attitudes to the Bank, the party 
may have survived this public bickering with little harm 
to its image. The causes, however, went deeper than this 
particular issue. Rivalry between the Glassey faction, 
and the A,L,P, Worker faction^ had been evident during the 
1896 Election campaigns, and in the following three years, 
this rivalry became more Intense, finally resulting in 
?8 
open rupture. 
When the first Report of the Committee had been 
published, the issue of the Bank's past management had been 
carefully avoided. But, the "great mistakes" mentioned in 
the first could not be Ignored indefinitely. The Committee 
was thus given a second commission, to inquire into the 
"past management" of the bank. Meanwhile, the Reconstruction 
scheme went ahead. It soon became obvious that the scheme 
did not embody the leading recommendations of the Committee 
of Enquiry, which had not favoured the establishment of 
prior claim for the Government despite the fact that Queensland 
public opinion favoured such prior claim. The A.I.B.R. felt 
27. Worker, 13.12.96. 
2"8.. See below, Chs. I3 and 15. 
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that the "attitude of the Queensland Government is, under 
all circumstances, a peculiar one. If merits only were 
taken into account, it is beyond question that the 
Government would abandon its claim to priority. That it 
does not do so, shows how easily the dictates of a high 
29 
sense of honour can be disregarded by Governments". 
If the A.I.B.R. was hinting that the Government was 
trying'to protect some of its more prominent members, the 
Courier was inclined to agree: 
Let the possibility of good motive be frankly 
conceded ... but such mixing up of politics 
and finance is always dangerous. The party 
historically associated with the Bank is 
largely the Ministerial Party of today. We 
believe that all the directors may be 
accurately described as Ministerialist 
in their political sympathy. All, or nearly 
all, the people intimately connected with the 
Bank are personal or political friends of 
the Government. In proposing State concessions. 
Ministers were open to suspicion that they were 
trying to save their friends.30 
It was not until November I897, that the second Report 
of the Committee of Inquiry was published, and only after a 
prolonged delay on the part, of a Government, unwilling to 
publish facts automatically detrimental to its reputation. 
After persistent questions in Parliament and the Press, the 
29. A.I.B.R., XXI, 20.2.97. 
30. Brisbane Courier, 28.3.97. 
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)ort was finally tabled in the House. It was clear in 
its condemnation of Drury's management, but it did not 
accuse the directors. Hart, Morehead and Palmer of complicity 
in the co.rruptlon of the Drury regime. Of Drury, the 
report sfeated: 
It would appear that the late Mr- Drury, as 
General Manager of the Bank made large-scale 
advances to himself, without the sanction of 
the Board, on security that might or might 
not have been considered full cover at the 
time.31 
Moreover, the Bank had imprudently helped promote speculation, 
particularly in the mining Industry. According to the 
Report, "It is difficult to estimate the actual loss sustained 
by the Bank through the mad traffic in shares, but it may 
be moderately computed at <^350,000- The evil, however, 
did not end here, because large speculations ;©-n the part of 
certain clients of the Bank imperilled the safety of many 
otherwise excellent accounts. Solvent men, who were induced 
to speculate by the fatal facilities aj their disposal went 
down". 
The general lending policy of the Q.N,B., reckless as 
it was, was characteristic of most financial institutions 
during the boom period of the eighties. More serious was the 
31, FU^I^IQreport ,.. op,clt,, p,701. 
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fact that Drury, as manager of the bank, not only aided 
his friends arid misappropriated bank funds, but also 
manufactured fictitious returns in order to mislead the 
public and the Government, Drury himself owed the Bank 
i67,744 at the time of his death, of which 146,700 could 
not be redeemed. Sir Thomas Mellwraith owed the Q,N,B, 
^251,700 in June I896, The Committee valued Mellwraith's 
security at ^ 60,700 leaving a deficiency of nearly 
^200,000, The report also attacked a number of accounts 
34 held jointly by Mellwraith and Drury, According to Hart 
and Morehead, "they had no idea that the late General 
Manager was so heavily indebted to the bank, nor did it 
35 
occur to them that Sir Thomas Mellwraith owed so much". 
The Committee was also of the opinion that the 
financial policy of the Griffith Government in I892 had 
contributed to the false position of the bank, Griffith, 
in a long letter sent to the Committee and the Press defended 
this policy, saying that he was at all times thinking of 
the colony and not of the Bank, The Rockhampton Morning 
Bulletin commented that "the facts show clearly that all 
through 1892, the Griffith Government was directing its 
33. Ibid, 
34. Including accounts for Mount Morgan Shares, land in 
Adelaide Street, Dotswald Station and Newcastle Brewery, 
35. Report of Committee, op,clt. 
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financial policy to save the Queensland National Bank ,,, 
it would have'better become Sir S,W, Griffith's position 
if ... he had ,,, acknowledged candidly that the Government 
of which he was head worked to save the Bank in the honest 
belief that It was thereby doing the best thing possible 
in the circum.stances for the colony". 
The publication of the report- had immediately 
serious political repercussions. The Government stood 
condemned on every side, both for the long delay in 
publishing the report, and the serious implications contained 
therein. The Brisbane Courier criticized the relationship 
between Drury and Mellwraith: 
Here is a partnership, or whatever you like to 
call it, between the general manager of the bank 
which transacted the large business of the 
Government, and a prominent politician who 
filled the offices of Treasurer and Premier while 
the partnership ... continued in existence: 
Ought such a relatlGn between banker and 
poiitlclan be approved or disapproved by 
Parliament and the country? Can there be any 
hesitation as to the answer?37 
Mellwraith, far away in England, objected to his condemnation 
before he had had the opportunity of effective reply. He 
wrote to Nelson: 
You and the Ministry and the House, and following 
you the press of the colony generally, ignoring 
the fact that I had been charged without any 
36. Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, 19.11.97-
37. Brisbane Courier, 5.3.98T 
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evidence from me whatever ... proceeded to pass 
and execute judgment with a ferocity unparalleled 
even in Colonial warfare.38 
In Queensland, Glassey moved in the House that "No Government 
of which Mellwraith, Barlow and Nelson are members can have 
39 the confidence of the House".-'^ The Governor reported to 
the Secretary of State that "Sir Thomas Mellwraith is still 
a member of the Executive Council, but until he has had 
full opportunity of reply ... I do not propose to take any 
40 
steps with a -view to his resignation." 
Nelson wrote to Mellwraith that within the Ministerial 
Party, "while a very small section were prepared to fight 
the motion as it stood, the large majority were of opinion 
that they would never ag,aln be able to face their 
constitdents unless they showed in some manner their 
dissatisfaction with your action in entering, while a 
Minister of the Crown, into a virtual partnership with the 
4l General Manager of the Bank holding the Government account". 
The subsequent debate quickly developed along party lines, 
and the Government moved an amendment which cut out Nelson 
and Barlow from the censure motion, which was subsequently 
passed by 39 votes to 26. 
38. Mellwraith to Nelson, 5.1.98. (Q.N.B. Papers, Q.S.A.). 
39. Q.P.D., XXXVIII, (1897), p.1633. 
40. Govf^ Despatches to Sec. of State (Sec'i^)l8.11.97. 
41. NelMbn to Mellwraith, 27.11.97, (Q.N.B. Papers, Q.S.A.). 
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Mellwraith, in his absence, had been made the scapegoat, 
and was forced to shoulder the blame for what must have 
been an executive decision. Both Barlow and Nelson had 
purported to have examined the accounts in 1893. There was 
Indeed some justice in Mellwraith's anger, expressed to 
Cecil Palmer: 
I am waiting for the arrival of the Bank report; 
there has been very little of the substance of 
it cabled to the Press, and that little shows 
me what complete traitors the Ministry has 
been to me.^2 
The Warylek Argus felt the Ministry had been unjust: 
As a political factor in Queensland, Sir Thomas 
Mcllwralth's days are numbered ... Sir H. Nelson 
and Mr- Barlow occupy a different position. It 
has not been proved that they were culpable ... 
[but] they assured Parliament that they had made 
a minute and searching analysis of the Bank's 
position, whereas the facts now disclosed, show 
that their examination was superficial and 
practically valueless.^3 
Nevertheless, Mcllwralth's position had been a culpable 
one. He had been associated with Drury in several ventures, 
and had been advanced ^86,000 by the Bank. Mellwraith had 
insisted that all transactions had been undertaken between 
1887 and, the middle of I888, when he.was not a member of the 
44 Government nor even a member of Parliament. While this 
42. Mellwraith to Palmer, 26.12.97, (Mellwraith Papers, 
Oxley Library). 
43. Warwick Argus, 27.11.97. 
44. MCXlwraith to Nelson, 5.7.98, (Q.N.B. Papers, Q.S.A.). 
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assertion was perfectly correct, nevertheless Mellwraith 
continued the association while a Minister of the Crown, 
and more importantly while Treasurer. His personal over-
draft was considerable and in itself should have precluded 
him from taking part in decisions concerning the Bank. The 
Toowoomba Chronicle thought it "incredible that a Minister 
of the Crown should have assisted in the preparation of a 
measure, and in passing it through Parliament, when he 
was both directly and indirectly interested in its provisions 
The absence of Mellwraith gave Ministerialists the 
opportunity of condemning the past association of Government 
and the Bank without endangering the Ministry or their own 
positions, Most_j therefore, were able to overlook the 
negligence of Nelson and Barlow. However, the scandal did 
much to undermine confidence in the leadership of Nelson, 
which had already been weakened by the Premier's stance on 
46 the Federation Enabling Bill, 
After the publication of the report, it remained only 
to fix responsibility. The A.I.B.R. was of the opinion that 
47 
this was of criminal proportions and in I898, the Attorney-
General instituted criminal proceedings against the surviving 
„ ^5 
45. Toowoomba Chronicle, 26.2.98, 
46. See below Ch. 15. 
47. A.I.B.R., XXI, (1898), p.819. 
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members of the Board, Hart and Morehead, and against the 
48 Accountant, A.C. Webster. There was ample evidence that 
the Bank had, on many occasions charged interest on over-
drafts and tMken this to profit. There was agreement that 
the existence of a Morehead-Pattison-Drury Trust Account 
49 
was highly improper- Moreover, it could be easily proved 
that the Bank was sustaining large personal losses on the 
part of its directors and their friends. But it could not 
be proved that Hart, Morehead, and Webster h„ad conspired 
with Drury, and the defendants were acquitted on all three 
counts. 
Thus, with Drury dead, and Palmer dead, with Mellwraith 
living in obscurity in London, and with Hart and Morehead 
freed of responsibility, this sordid chapter in the history 
of Queensland Government was closed. It had destroyed 
forever the political reputation of Sir Thomas Mellwraith, 
and had cast great discredit on Nelson. It had caused the 
first major split in the ranks of the Labour Party. Indeed, 
It would be a very long time before the ghosts of the 
Queensland National Bank were laid to rest. 
48. They were charged with conspiracy with Drury and Palmer to 
(I) deceive and defraud the shareholders by Inflating 
the value of shares frauc^ently 
(II) deceive and defraud the creditors and 
(ill) deceive and. defraud the public. 
49. In debt to the Q.N.B. for ^ ^8,502. 
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SECTION TWO -. THE POLITICS OF REALIGNMENT 
CHAPTER 8 
THE GENERAL ELECTION OP I888 
ELECTORAL CHANGES 
The formal conduct of the Elections of I888 was governed 
by a new electoral law. Introduced by the Griffith Government 
in 1885, and by a redistribution of electorates in I887. 
Mainly concerned with voter registration, the former 
legislation had little material effect upon the campaign or 
the results. The preparation of the rolls was now undertaken 
by an Electoral Registrar and a Registration Court. The 
Court was to be composed of Justices of the Peace resident 
in the district together with any Judge or Crown Prosecutor 
who might be present. Interested persons, however, were now 
able to peruse the rolls. This provision aimed at preventing 
wholesale disqualifications. Impersonation was to be impeded 
by marking the ballot papers against the roll. Papers not 
initialled by the presiding officer, without official numbers, 
with additional numbers or too many names were declared 
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invalid. While these changes still did not prevent abuse, 
it nevertheless became more difficult to engage in electoral 
manipulation. 
The Electoral Districts Act of I887 Increased the 
number of seats in the Assembly to seventy-two. The re-
distribution was based upon population, although there were 
three other considerations: areas where there was a large 
proportion of adult males such as mining areas; geographical 
considerations; and the necessity that the metropolitan area 
2 
should be under-represented on a strict population basis. 
To a certain extent, the Bill favoured urban areas. 
In Brisbane, Fortitude Valley was given an extra member, 
and two new constituencies were created, Nundah and Toowong. 
Townsvllle was given an extra member, and Charters Towers 
was detached from Kennedy and given two members. Cairns 
was detached from Cook, Gympie was given an extra member, 
and the Herberton mining area detached from Musgrave and 
named Woothakata. Darling Downs was divided into two new 
electorates, Cambooya and Cunningham. Several large 
pastoral constituencies were divided. 
1. Q,P.D., XLVIII, (1885), p.120. 
2. Q.P.D., LII, (1887), p.449. 
3. See Appendix 2, 
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The Northern.district, with only a slight Increase in 
population, gained an extra six seats, while the Central 
area received no additional representation. While this 
may have appeared remarkably Inequitable, the nature of the 
new seats shows that the Increase was justified. Townsvllle's 
population had Increased fairly rapidly, and three extra 
seats were gained by mining areas Charters Towers and 
Woothakata, where there was a very large proportion of 
adult males. Gympie was in the same category, while the 
new electorate of Burrum was also a mining area. The waning 
influence of the Darling Downs is.reflected by the few 
changes made in this area, although the new electorate of 
Murilla was on the fringe of the Tableland. The re-
distribution had little other significant effect outside 
Brisbane. Areas close to Brisbane, however, fared well. 
East Moreton gained an extra three seats, of an average 
population of I316, instead of the previous average of 2000. 
By all accounts, the redistribution was expected to 
favour the Liberal Party. Griffith's support was almost 
overwhelmingly urban. Twenty-four of the Ministerialists 
returned in I883 represented electoral districts in the 
It was a triumph for the centre to retain all their 
at ' ^ 
seats, as it was originally intended that it should 
be represented by only ten members. Central pressure 
forced the Government to create Rockhampton North. 
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ft|i?tropolitan area, the south-east farming districts, the 
5 
suburban seats and the Darling Downs. Cairns could be 
expected to return a Liberal candidate, as could the mining 
electorates. .The only changes expected to benefit the 
opposition were the creation of a second Townsvllle seat, 
and the two new electorates of Bulloo and Maranoa. The 
election proved so disastrous for the Liberals, however, 
that no amount of r^edistribution could have aided them. 
ELECTION ISSUES 
The election campaign was opened with Griffith's 
Manifesto to the electors of North Brisbane on March 6, 
1888. Mcllwralth's Manifesto was presented to the same 
electorate a week later- It was a bold move to confront 
the Premier in North Brisbane^, regarded as a blUe ribbon 
Liberal seat. Mellwraith emphasized that he spoke for all 
those opposed to the Liberal administration, in the name 
of a truly "National" Party. A new name for the 
Conservatives had thus been coined. Bassett remarks: 
Candidates did not contest elections as Liberals 
or Nationals, but none would have denied the 
existence of these bodies, for if "Ministerialist" 
and "Opposition" betrayed attitudes to a particular 
Government, "Liberal" and "National" made clear men's 
views on society at large.6 
5* See Appendix 1. 
6. Bassett, P.G., Queensland Politics 1889-93 (Unpub. B.A. 
Thesis, U. of Q., 1968), p.2, 
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Judging from the Manifestos of the two leaders, the 
election issues' were fairly clear-cut. Griffith and 
Mellwraith reached the appearance of agreement on the questions 
of coloured labour, Chinese immigration, protection and, 
7 
fairly loosely,_ naval defence.' While Mellwraith was 
conspiciiiously sllerit on the issue of land grant ra i lways, 
Griffith attacked the opposition for their stand on this 
issue, emphasizing the Liberal policy of extending railways 
into elosely-'Settled, rather than pastoral areas. Mellwraith 
attacked the financial ineptitude of the Liberal administration, 
the failure of the Land Act, and Griffith's proposal to 
Institute a land or property tax. Separationlsts, an ever 
present problem for Queensland Governments^were not very 
active in these elections. Neither was sectarianism. In 
the absence of any significant issue, such as denominational 
endowment, sectarianism played only a local part. Similarly, 
temperance proved prominent only locally. It can be argued 
therefore that there were two main areas of disagreement -
railway extension and finances. It was, however, the 
financial policy of the Government, the failure of which 
was due to the failure of the Land Act to raise revenue, and 
the upshot of which was Griffith's land tax proposal, which 
T, Mellwraith was more extreme on the question of Chinese 
immigration, being prepared to abolish it outright, 
while Griffith expressed concern at the Imperial 
repercussions of such a policy. 
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was responsible for the downfall of the Liberals, 
While Mellwraith had reached a "Modus vivendi" 
regarding the Naval Defence Bill, his opposition to it was 
well known, and this gained him some electoral advantage. 
The problem of Queensland defence had arisen in I887, after 
the Australian representatives at the I886 British Australian 
Naval Defence Conference,, had agreed to help finance the 
o 
defence of Australia. It was agreed that the British 
Government would furnish the ships, while the colonies paid 
for their maintenance plus 5^ annually oi. their cost. The 
ships were to remain under the control of the British 
Commander in Chief of the Australian Station, Initially, 
public and editorial opinion had been favourable to this 
agreement, until British proposals that the colonies should 
bear the whole cost of fortifying and defending King George 
Sound, Somewhat heatedly, the Courier argued: 
If we are still to remain children, let England 
do a parent?s duty and provide for our security, 
but if we are men and called upon to undertake 
the responsibilities of nationhood, let us see 
to it that we also have the privileges of our 
position,9 
If Australia was to bear the whole cost of the King George 
Sound operation, argued the colonies, then she should have 
8, O'Rourke, T, , Problems of Queensland Defence, I878--I90I. 
(Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q., 1959), p.152. 
9- Brisbane Courier, 25.7.87. 
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full command of the squadron. Nevertheless, all Australian 
Governments had agreed to Introduce the Bill simultaneously. 
In Queensland, Griffith's tenure was nearly over, and the 
opposition considered it irresponsible to Introduce the Bill 
to a dying Parliament. The Bill was attacked on the grounds 
that Queensland was "being asked to tax the people of the 
colony to support what is practically an Imperial thing," 
Most of the opponents of the Bill regarded it as an insult 
to Australian nationality and felt that Imperial policies 
could endanger Australia unnecessarily. Another argument 
was "that Britain, having required the colonies to provide 
defences on shore ... should undertake freely the defence of 
12 the shipping trade". The extent of the Opposition forced 
Griffith to withdraw the Bill, even though it was ratified 
in Victoria, Tasmania, New South Wales, South Australia and 
New Zealand, 
While Mellwraith tended to de-emphasize the Bill in his 
Manifesto, he nevertheless regarded it as a reflection of 
colonial servility. He agreed, however, to aid in its 
passage in the Interests of unity with the other colonies. 
Mellwraith had a reputation for nationalism, and many felt 
10. Q , P , D . , L I I I , ( 1 8 8 7 ) , p , l 6 2 6 (Morehead) . 
1 1 . B r i s b a n e C o u r i e r , 24 .11 .87 . . 
12. O 'Rourke , op^ c l t . , p . 1 6 4 . 
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he was aligned with the Courier, which argued that Griffith 
"has sought to commit the colony to an odious agreement 
which for ten years at least will make us helpless dependents 
rather than independent allies of the United Kingdom". -* 
Another area where Griffith and Mellwraith reached 
agreement was fiscal policy. During the Eighties, Queensland 
had pursued an only mildly protectionist policy, Griffith, 
formerly;a staunch free trader, had been gradually moving 
in the opposite direction.. The tide had begun to turn 
14 
against free traders. The Courier remarked in August 1887: 
With one enthusiastic protectionist leader in 
retirement crouching for a spring py[ellwraith3 
and the other a new convert in actual possession 
of the vantage ground of power, it would be the 
height of folly for free traders to look on 
with unconcern.15 
In general, both Brisbane merchants and some western 
pastorallsts favoured free trade, the former.in order to 
stimulate business, the latter because of the export aims 
of the Industry. W.H. Groom^representative of Downs 
agriculturalists who were afraid of competition from the 
13. Brisbane Courier, 15.3.88. 
14. There were divisions in both parties over this issue. 
Liberal free traders Included Praser (Brisbane South)> 
Brookes (Fortitude Valley), Smyth (Gympie), Hardgrave 
(Moreton),Fox (Normanby)^and Bullock (Nundah), Among 
their opponents, free traders included Morehead, Nelson, 
Murray, Norton (all pastorallsts), and Campbell and 
Glbbs (Brisbane Merchants). 
15. Brls.b:arie; Cpur 1 er, I6.8-87. 
16. See ab'dve, Ch. 3. 
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South, reflected the views of protectionists: 
The whole tariff requires remodelling ... until 
we have a national protective tariff, I am 
thoroughly convinced that the manufacturing 
Industries of the colony will never advance 
and become permanent, nor will the increasing 
population of the colony find profitable 
avenues of employment.1' 
Both leaders avoided being dogmatic on this issue., causing 
1 o 
editorial comment from partisan newspapers. 
In North Queensland, the issues of free trade and 
19 
separation were closely linked. There was little strong 
feeling for separation manifest in this campaign, despite 
the lip service paid to it by both leaders. Griffith had 
made some concessions to the separatist movement in his 
proposals for district representative assemblies, but 
Mellwraith did not appear to consider the subject significant. 
He did, however, propose a compromise solution in his 
Manifesto: 
I thoroughly believe that a measure which would 
give them, fthe Northern peoplel through their 
representatives, the complete control of their 
own revenue, would satisfy their present 
requirements, and honestly administered, would 
obviate the demand for separation.20 
17. Brisbane Courier, 20.3.88. 
18. The Courier (8.3.88) accused Griffith of trying to 
Introduce protection under another name in his proposals 
to lower railway rates. The Warwick Argus (10.3.88) 
felt neither leader had sufficiently committed himself, 
19. Brisbane Courier, 11.4.88, 
20. Ibid..,, 17*3.88. 
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While some of Mcllwralth's supporters - Macrossan, Hamilton, 
Black, Dalrymple and Goldring - came out in favour of 
separation, the movement had nevertheless lost ground. 
Before the redistribution, nine out of the ten northern 
members had been separationlsts. In 1888, of the sixteen 
candidates elected, only eleven were in favour of 
21 
separation. W.H. Corfield, standing unopposed for Gregory, 
22 
wrote later that he stood primarily as an antl-separationist. 
He felt that the separation cry had been caused by the 
maladministration of Griffith, and that once the National 
Party were returned to power, the need for separation would 
23 
end. John Murray, candidate for the Central Queensland 
.seat of Normanby, declared himself opposed to separation 
and implied there was little feeling on the subject in his 
24 
region. 
Just as separation was a continuing problem in Queensland 
politics, sectarianism had been rife during the late sixties 
and seventies. The Roman Catholic Church was traditionally 
favourable to the more conservative party, particularly as 
the Protestant alliance with the Liberal Party was still 
tacitly accepted. In 1875, the Rev- P.T. Brentnall first 
21. Warwick Argus, 2.6.88. 
22. Corfield, W.H.j Reminiscences of Queensland. (Prazer, 
Brisbane, 1921), p.51. 
23. Brisbane Courier,. 19.3.88. 
24. Ibli'^"11.4.88. 
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published the Queensland Evangelical Standard whose 
editorial council was composed of leading churchmen from 
25 
the major Protestant denominations. -^ The Standard alleged 
the existence "of a.compact between the squatters and the 
Catholics to enable the first group to retain control of 
the lands of the colony and the second to secure the 
retention of State aid". This somewhat paranoic attitude 
led to political alliance with the Liberals, the trend 
being strengthened when the son of the Rev. E. Griffith 
began to play a prominent part in local politics. The 
Standard was also a moving force behind the drive for 
political organizations, but the Protestant, faction failed 
in their attempt to Incorporate Protestantism and Liberalism 
within one party. Nevertheless, Brentnall and his friends, 
including Robert Buleock, tended to accelerate sectarian 
feeling during the seventies, and the residue of such 
activities drifted into the Eighties. 
Militants on both sides, however, had no issue on 
which to stir up sectarian feeling. No doubt Mellwraith 
hoped his Nationalist reputation, and stance on the Defence 
27 Bill would appeal to Irish Catholic voters and the Catholic 
25. Morrison, A,A., "Religion and Polities in Queensland to 
1881", J.R.Q.H.S., IV, 1952, p.468. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Gilley, S., Catholic Social and Political Attitudes: . 
(Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q.), p.l80. 
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newspaper- the Australian quoted approving articles On his 
?8 
attitude. •: Indeed Mcllwralth's expectation was realized. 
The Week analyzing the results had at first doubted 
Archbishop Dunne's assertion that no official attempt had 
been made by the Church to influence the Election: 
The Irish vote in North Brisbane was no doubt 
solidly given for Sir Thomas Mellwraith. The 
incontrovertible fact temporarily shook many 
people's faith in the absolute candour and 
honesty of Archbishop Dunne's disclaimer ... 
the evidence in North Brisbane was in favour 
of such remarkable unanimity as to create 
doubts of individual freedom from ecclesiastical 
influence ... but as the provincial returns 
eame in... the monopolist party's candidates 
were in such a pitiful plight that it was no 
longer possible to conclude that the Roman _ 
Catholic body had given them solid support.29 
The strong Catholic vote in Ipswich, Toowoomba and 
Gympie had not been exercised in favour of the National 
Party. In Warwick, Patrick Hlgglns failed to attract the 
Catholic vote. John Pogarty, also a Catholic, had been 
defeated by Groom and Aland in Toowoomba, although this was 
probably due to the great electoral strength of Groom, more 
than to Pogarty's religious affiliations. On the whole, it 
can be concluded that in the absence of any great issue such 
as education, sectarianism had had only local significance 
in this election. 
28. Ibid., p.181. 
29- We.ek, 12.5.88. 
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Temperance, so closely related to the religious issue, 
30 
was also important locally in several electorates. The 
strong temperance advocates in the House were all members 
of the Liberal Party, which had Introduced both local option 
and an excise tax on beer and spirits during its term of 
31 
office. The Licensed Victuallers, however, were very 
well organized. The Courier commented on this situation: 
Temperance reformers, impressed as they are with 
the vital connection of their movement with the 
general welfare have not yet ... formed them-
selves into a separate political party ... but 
the licensed victuallers have no such scruples 
... they have constituted themselves into a 
third party in the State ... fpledged^ to vote 
only for such candidates ... as shall support 
their object.32 
The publicans had powerful support within the National Party. 
Mellwraith had included in his manifesto the abolition of 
the tjeer duty. Present at a dinner given by the Licensed 
Victuallers Association (L.V.A.) in I885 were Mellwraith, 
33 Morehead, Thynne, Perkins and Lissner.-^ -^  According to the 
Toowoomba Chronicle the L.V.A. was very active in this election; 
"they, banded together as a solid body to support Sir Thomas 
Mellwraith and his party and they sent circulars to all 
country electorates advising the publicans to follow the 
30. Particularly Fortitude Valley and Toowoomba (Brisbane 
Courier, 14.3.88). 
31. Robert Buleock was President of the Temperance League. 
32. Brisbane Courier, 13.4.88. 
33. Week, 31.10.85. 
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same tactics ... on polling day, the whole of the Licensed 
Victuallers at Brisbane voted in a solid body, plumping for 
Sir Thomas Mellwraith,. and in country districts, the 
publicans largely supported the Mellwraith candidates"-^ 
Such Issues as the Naval Defence Bill and temperance, 
while they exercised some effect on voting in several 
electorates, were not the central Issues of the election. 
According to the Warwick Argus: 
The chief point of difference appears to be upon 
the all important questions of dealing with the 
lands and the construction of railways.35 
The differences between Griffith and Mellwraith over railway 
extensions were well known - State control versus private 
ownership, extension into agricultural districts versus 
pastoral areas. Similarly, it was well known that Mellwraith 
favoured auction sales of Crown Land to raise revenue, while 
Griffith pinned his faith to the doctrine that the public 
estate should be alienated only as required for bona fide 
settlement. But it was equally obvious to electors that the 
Liberal land policy, which had received expression in the 
1884 Land Act had been a disastrous failure in two respects -
as an attempt to raise revenue and as an attempt to promote 
34. Toowoomba Chronicle, 17.8.90. 
35. Warwick Argus, 10.3.88. 
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closer settlement. According to Mellwraith, "never in the 
history of the colony has there been less settlement on 
the land," But it was the failure to raise revenue which 
had the greater electoral impact, because this led to 
Griffith's proposal to levy a property tax. This had been 
made clear in his manifesto: 
I hold that the present situation in Queensland 
is such that the possessors of realized wealth, 
whether in the form of land or invested money 
ought to make a larger contribution to the 
public income, and whenever additional revenue 
is found necessary, it is from these sources 
that I shall seek it.37 
It was clear from such an uncompromising statement, 
that Griffith was prepared to stand or fall on this issue 
alone. Mellwraith attacked the proposal as an unfair 
burden on the successful and responsible citizens of the 
colony, and approved only a property tax for the purposes 
of carrying out public works undertaken by local bodies. 
This attitude was shared by many Liberals. Had Griffith 
confined himself to the imposition of a land tax, perhaps 
the stand he had taken would not have been so disastrous. 
But by including invested wealth, he alienated one of the 
traditional areas of his support - urban business. 
36. Brisbane Courier, 15.3.88. 
37. Ibid., 11,4.88. 
38. Ibid., 8.3.88. 
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Investment in urban development, particularly the building 
trade, had been slowly gaining impetus during the Eighties, 
and the threatened property tax was regarded by Investors 
as a paralysing blow. The issue had already split the 
Liberal Party, and a number of influential candidates, 
including Buleock, Brooks and Theodore Unmack expressed 
their open hostility to it. Many other Liberals avoided 
mentioning it altogether, realizing that the advocacy of 
on 
the property tax was hardly an electoral asset.-"^ It was 
this facet of Griffith's policy which was the major reason 
for his defeat. Had he been able to hold his ground in 
urban areas, he may have just managed to retain the Premier-
ship but by alienating the business community he lost 
whatever chance he had. 
THE CAMPAIGN 
The campaign was marked by the supreme importance of 
the two party leaders, more disparate in personality, perhaps, 
than in policy. Their electoral meetings were accompanied 
by much cacophony, particularly those of Mellwraith, who was 
constantly attacked by the more radical liberals and members 
of the infant labour movement as a landgrabber and proponent 
of servile labour- Griffith on the other hand, was attacked 
39,. Brisbane Courier, 2.5.88. 
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as an imperialist, content to remain forever under the 
control of the mother country. Rowdy meetings were the 
order of the day, with beer and whisky flowing freely. 
While meetings were well attended and showed considerable 
liveliness, the percentage of electors who recorded their 
votes was not high. Only five electorates were keenly 
enough contested to record over 80^ of votes, while the 
premier seat of Brisbane North, featuring the clash between 
Griffith and Mcllwraithjdrew only a meagre percentage of 
4l 72.06. The election campaign was not as fierce as that 
conducted in I883-, as there was no single great issue over 
which parties divided. But on a number of issues there was 
a clear-cut choice between Griffith and Mellwraith, and it 
was the former who had to contend with the failures of his 
previous administration. 
RESULTS 
The results of the election proved a triumph for 
Mcllwral-th and the National Party. Of the 72 seats, the 
42 
conservatives had gained 44 and the Liberals 25, with 3 
40- These were Drayton and Toowoomba, Passifern, Ipswich, 
Lockyer, Rosewood, Toowong, and Warwick, all except 
Lockyer going to the Liberals. There appears to have 
been no single policy issue which had caused the high 
percentage of votes cast, but Liberals in the electorates 
worked very hard to retain their seats. 
41. Q.V.P., II, p.1006. 
42. Leahy can be regarded as an Independent. 
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independents. Such a high majority was unexpected, although 
it had been confidently anticipated that Griffith would be 
defeated. Such an overwhelming defeat defies comparison 
with the election of I883, as on that occasion, the great 
43 
victory had been Griffith's. -' Nevertheless, some comparison 
can be made- In I883, the Conservative Party had been the 
squatter party, but Griffith had managed to wrest three 
squatting constituencies (Kennedy, Lelchhardt and Clarmont) 
from his arch rival. Kennedy in I888 was retained by 
Mellwraith, but Charters Towers now separated from that 
electorate returned two Liberals. Rockhampton and Stanley 
also constituted defeats for sit.ting Liberals. But we must 
go elsewhere to find the great reversal - into the urban 
areas. Liberals were defeated in South Brisbane, Fortitude 
Valley, Nundah and Toombul. Griffith was relegated to the 
Sptatus of junior member by his defeat at the hands of 
Mellwraith. Many factors contributed to this reversal in 
Brisbane. In the electorate of Fortitude Valley, a split 
anti-McIlwralth vote led to the victory of an Opposition 
candidate. Three candidates, McMaster, S.W. Brooks and the 
new Labour candidate, W. Colbourne effectively split the vote 
to allow John Watson to head the poll and the Intervention of 
43. The task is made more difficult by the redistribution. 
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Labour candidate Albert Hinchcliff contributed to the 
defeat of Dickson in Toombul. 
The party also lost ground on the Darling Downs, a 
traditional Liberal stronghold. Here, the eight seats were 
evenly divided between Griffith and Mellwraith. The Liberal 
Party lost the two new seats of Cunningham and Cambooya, as 
well as Aublgny. In Cunningham, William Allan defeated 
former Darling Downs representative, Francis Kates. Both 
men were personally popular, but with the set taken against 
the Government by the electorate, Allan managed to win the 
seat. Like most Darling Downs members, Allan regarded 
himself as an independent member, though he stood on an 
Opposition ticket. The prosperous son of an Edinburgh 
Attorney, Allan a pastorallst, owned three properties in 
Queensland, Braeside near Warwick, and two stations on the 
Balonne and Mararioa Rivers. He spoke for the larger 
pastorallsts of the Downs, threatened as they were by the 
terrors of the property tax. 
In the north, Griffith could hardly hope for any support, 
given his stand on Polynesian labour and separation. A 
44 
comparison of the regional representation of the parties 
in 1883 and I888 shows the areas where the Liberals lost ground. 
44. The redistribution makes this very rough. 
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THE ELECTIONS OF I883 AND I888 
Griffith Mellwraith Griffith Mellwraith 
Metropolitan 
Suburban 
South-East 
Darling Downs 
South-West 
Wide Bay 
Central 
C-West 
North 
North-West 
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1 
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:|| 
5 
4 
-
5 
« 
-
1 
3 
4 
i 
% 
4 
E 
^ 
^. 
,1 
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It can be thus seen that the reversal took place in the 
metropolitan suburban and south-eastern regions, and to a, 
lesser extent the Darling Downs. There are two reasons for 
this result, one of which directly concerned a question of 
policy, and the second of which is more intangible. The 
threatened property tax made elear the failure of Griffith's 
land policy to raise revenue, "this would have alienated 
southern property, as well as the business class of the 
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metropolitan area, which regarded sound financial adminis-
tration as the first ••pedrequlslte of government. The 
Darling Downs reverse may have been due to the unfulfilled 
promise of the Land Act, as well as fear of the property 
tax among small farmers. 
There is, however, another reason for Mcllwralth's 
great success. His Manifesto was moderate. Indeed almost 
negative. The moderation shown on the questions of black 
labour, railways and naval defence was calculated to 
alienate as few voters as possible. It was not that he 
believed that the sugar industry could survive without 
45 black labour or that land grant railways were no longer 
desirable, but that he recognized he could no longer rely 
on a purely pastoral vote. Nor had he forgotten his 
desertion by the squatters over the Transcontinental Railway 
Bill. But neither did Mellwraith do or say anything which 
might alienate that section of the community, realizing 
that Griffith's land policy had assured him (Mellwraith) of 
squatter support. Mellwraith was now fighting for a larger 
proportion of the urban vote. Griffith's financial policy 
had alienated urban property, so Mellwraith severed his 
connection with black labour and moderated his stance on 
4^. See above, Ch. 2 p.42. 
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protection in an attempt to capture this section of the 
community. Mellwraith, indeed, had no positive policy to 
offer, except that of a government run on sound business 
principles. In this appeal to urban business, he was 
remarkably successful. Luya, Watson, Gannon and Agnew 
were all prominent business men, who could persuade 
electorates primarily concerned with business. 
It was Mcllwralth's great virtue that he recognized 
that political conditions were changing and was able to adapt 
to the new situation. There was no mysterious force working 
against the Liberals. The failure of land and financial 
policies, the unpopularity of Griffith's stand on the Naval 
Defence Bill, and the threat of the property tax, all 
combined to bring about their downfall. Mellwraith, with a 
moderate policy designed to alienate few, provided a reasonable 
alternative. Had his connection with the squatters been so 
obvious as had previously obtained, his success would not 
have been so great. But since I883, he had moved away from 
this section of the party, and had been replaced as leader 
of the squatters by Morehead. The results of the election 
were a measure of his success. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE COALITION OF I89O 
In 1890, two momentous developments changed the whole 
complexion of Queensland political life. In August, the 
Australian Labour Federation was formed. Henceforth, 
labour was to become a political force of great strength. 
And in September Sir Samuel Walker Griffith and Sir Thomas 
Mellwraith fashioned a coalition. Inaugurating what became 
known as the Continuous Ministry, which was to hold office 
until displaced by another Coalition in 1903. This 
development had not been altogether unexpected, and had been 
preceded by a series of events which had culminated in the 
complete estrangement of Mellwraith from the party he had 
led to victory in the I888 Elections. 
The new Government, which met the House in June I888, 
appeared to have a bright future. Mellwraith had chosen 
2 
a very able Cabinet which seemed to transcend the regional 
1. See below, Ch. 10. 
2. Mellwraith (Premier and Treasurer), B.D. Morehead (Colonial 
Secretary), M.H. Black (Lands), J.M. Macrossan (Mines and 
Works), H.M. Nelson (Railways), J. Donaldson (P.M.G- (0*0 
Pub. Instruction), W. Pattison (Without Portfolio). 
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jealousies and economic diversity of the Colony. At first 
sight, the Cabinet looked like the pastorallst dominated 
assortment of I883, and yet it represented a far greater 
variety of interests. Morehead, like his chief, was 
described by the Week as "a city man of commerce intimately 
3 
connected bp business with the squatters". Morehead was, 
however, closely connected with other areas of investment, 
primarily in the liquor and export trades. Maurice Hume 
Black had long been recognized as a spokesman for the sugar 
industry. William Pattison, as a Director of Mount Morgan, 
could presumably represent the mine owners, while Macrossan 
had long spoken for those who worked in the mines. 
Donaldson and Nelson were pastorallsts. 'While it may have 
appeared strange that Pattison was to represent the pre-
dominantly pastoral central districts, he was probably chosen 
to redress the balance of the Cabinet, already weighted in 
favour of pastoralism. Northern separationlsts were 
represented by Hume Black and Macrossan. 
The necessity for such diversity was clear. The party 
was a congerle of Interests, and no longer as closely associated 
with pastoralism as the, followers of Mellwraith had been in 
1883. Griffith im tendering the former Government's 
3. Week, 16.6.88. 
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resignation remarked that the National Party was "a new 
name supposed to consolidate the variety of discordant 
opinions held by different groups of Honourable Gentlemen 
sitting opposite me now". Still the Cabinet consisted, 
with the exception of Macrossan, of men who had intimate 
connection with the financial world, particularly directed 
towards the financing of Queensland's premier Industry, 
pastoralism. Despite this fairly general identity of 
interest among the leaders, the Cabinet did show some 
diversity in regard to matters of policy. Two examples 
were black labour for the sugar industry and fiscal policy. 
While the National Party had announced its opposition to 
black labour in the elections, Morehead and Black remained 
avowed supporters of the labour trade, and Macrossan was 
just as strongly opposed to it. On fiscal policy Norton 
(the Speaker), Nelson and Morehead were free traders, while 
.Mellwraith had always been a staunch Protectionist. 
Nevertheless, despite such differences, it appeared that the 
new Government would enjoy a long life. 
In. May I889, however, Mellwraith resigned the Premiership 
on the grounds of ill health. He retained his place in the 
Ministry as Minister without Portfolio, Pattison assuming 
4. Q.P.D., LV, (1888), p.3. 
^0,7. 
control of the Treasury, and Morehead becoming Premier-
Mcllwralth's resignation caused little comment as his health 
had been uncertain. In September, he resigned from the 
Ministry. The Courier reflected surprised public reaction: 
Rumours have been persistent for some time past 
that matters were not running altogether smoothly 
in Cabinet ... but no one dreamed that open 
rupture would come from the leader of the Party 
now in power. The immediate cause of the 
resignation was a difference of opinion 
between Sir Thomas and his colleagues on the 
Loan Estimates.5 
In October, the Courier hinted at other reasons for Mellwraith's 
resignation: 
It Is alleged that a very large number of Members 
on the Ministerial benches are politically 
embarrassed by' Mount Morgan obligations. So much 
has not been stated openly in Parliament, but 
outside Parliament it is in everybody's mouth.6 
MOUNT MORGANISM 
These allegations of excessive pressure being brought 
to bear by Mount Morgan interests bear some examination. If 
such influence did exist, it would have been through the 
agency of William Pattison, the only unexpected member of 
Mcllwralth's Cabinet. His appointment as Minister without 
Portfolio was unusual as this position was normally filled 
by a man of long parliamentary experience. Why then was 
5. Briijbdne Courier, 6.9.89. (This difference of opinion was 
over'the construction of the Ann Street Railway terminus, 
an electoral promise made by Mellwraith to his electors. 
6. Brisbane Courier, 10.10,89. 
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Pattison appointed? Was it simply because Mellwraith liked 
the man, and had confidence in his financial ability; or is 
there a more sinister explanation? Mellwraith had bought 
5,000 Mount Morgari shares under very generous terms from 
7 
Pattison, a deal which had been closed just two months 
before the general election. Pattison and Mellwraith were 
personal friends, and such a transaction would have been 
beneficial to both, Mellwraith as an Individual and Pattison 
as director of a company desirous of further investment. 
Moreover, Mellwraith had similar business dealings with many 
other men in the colony, and did not feel obliged to include 
them in the Ministry. Stoodley, after careful examination, 
finds little evidence that there was any attempt to use 
Pattison's position as either Minister without Portfolio or 
as Treasurer, to directly foster the interests of the Mount 
o 
Morgan Company. 
With a Cabinet largely composed of men of finance, it 
was unlikely anyway that any action would be directly taken 
to harm such a large and profitable company as Mount Morgan. 
Many other parliamentarians possessed shares in the Company'. 
7, 5,000 shares at ^ 9 payable by promissory notes, at 7% 
Interest and purchaser's option to cancel the contract. 
Stoodley, J., The Queensland Goldmlner in the 19th_ 
Century , (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of.Q.), p.95. 
I, Ibid., pp. 120-133. "^ '^*' 
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Morehead, Lyons, Callan, Philp, Griffith, Stevenson, R. Jones, 
Perkins, Archer, Hamilton, Dalrymple, Casey and Sir Arthur 
Palmer all held shares. This was not unusual in Itself, 
but with Pattison, Callan, Morehead and Jones all holding 
enough shares to qualify as directors, the potential for 
Influence existed. It was recognized that the existence of 
such a clear-cut avenue of influence was contrary to the 
best interests of the colony. Opposition newspapers were 
also particularly concerned that Morehead, Mellwraith, 
Pattison, Palmer and E.R. Drury, all large Mount Morgan 
shareholders, had also all been, at one time. Directors of 
the Queensland National Bank. The pernicious influence of 
that institution has already been chronicled. However, 
after exhaustive investigation of the available sources 
concerning Mount Morgan, June Stoodley has reached the 
general conclusion that no direct and reprehensible influence 
Q 
was exercised by Mount Morgan upon the actions of Government. 
But, as with the Q.N.B., this close connection between 
business and finance was inherently undesirable and 
destructive of the political harmony of the colony. 
THE RESIGNATION OF MelLWRAITH 
The resignation of Mellwraith caused much disturbance in 
9. Ibid.. p.l40 
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the House. The Government called a Caucus meeting, and, 
according to W.O, Hodgkinson, "The wavering rank and crowd 
were cemented to adhesive party loyalty, and poor Sir Thomas 
was -treated as a political Jonah, and thrown, overboard by 
the very men to whom he had given political prominence". 
The position of Minister without Portfolio was one in which 
Mellwraith was uncomfortable, and while Hodgkinson had 
described the Issue of the Ann Street railway as a "trumpery 
11 item" the question was whether Mellwraith could override 
a majority Cabinet decision. Mellwraith was not a man to 
brook opposition, and loss of control over the Ministry must 
have been.Infuriating. Moreover, it was Morehead, and not 
Mellwraith who now held the allegiance of the more conser-
12 
vatlve pastorallsts. The Premier was as volatile a 
personality as Sir Thomas and most probably resented 
dictation from the latter. 
Sir Thomas did not mention "Mount Morganism" when he 
resigned in September. But in July I89O, when attacking 
Donaldson's Financial Statement he maintained that "In the 
very manner of the Cabinet there demonstrated a strong 
influence, that was dominating. I will call it Mount 
10. Hodgkinson, W.D., "A Memorable Chapter in Queensland 
Politics", Centennial Magazine, II, I89O, p.603. 
1 1 . I b i d . , p .602 . 
12.. Pj'ob.ably a r e s u l t of the Transcon t inen ta l Railway B i l l , 
See Ch. 2. 
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13 Morganism". -^  It appears unlikely, however, that'Mellwraith 
resigned because of Mount Morganism. The appointment of 
Pattison in the first place was probably the result of 
personal patronage rather than financial pressure. This is 
reinforced by Mcllwralth's later opinion of Pattison: 
This is not the first time I have failed to make 
a silk purse out of a sow's ear-1^ 
Mcllwralth's final resignation then may be seen as the result 
of a growing cleavage, both personal and political, between 
Morehead and Sir Thomas. His allegations of Mount Morganism 
however, severely damaged the prestige of the Ministry, and 
this would appear to be the main significance of the whole 
curious shabby episode. 
THE MOREHEAD GOVERNMENT 
The Courier felt confident that the Ministry would still 
be able to function competently without Mellwraith, 
Oppositionist Hodgkinson realized that the Cabinet "dls-
Intm^t'.Q'ttdd as it is by a variety of circumstances fostering 
innate discordance, may, individually, bp fairly deemed, a 
strong one. Its members rank as men of more than average 
15 Intellectual calibre", ^ Perhaps it was the very strength 
of the individuals within the Cabinet which precluded their 
13, Q,P,D,, LX, (1890), p,5l8, 
14, Mellwraith to Pattison, Nov, I899, (Mellwraith Papers, 
Oxley Library), 
15, Hodgkinson, op.cit, , p.602. 
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harmonious co-operation. But it soon became obvious that 
the Ministry was losing its cohesion along with the confidence 
of both press and public. 
The Government was finding it increasingly difficult to 
control the House. Financial policy was all drift and 
muddle, a characteristic of most Government business. An 
intimation of the. way it conducted land policy is given by 
Arthur Palmer in a letter to the Minister for Lands, Hume 
Black, "Referring.to our conversation of this morning, I beg 
tb suggest that before proceeding further with the land 
applied for ... Ci-t!j should be thoroughly surveyed ..> the 
1 /T 
department seems to be proceeding on guess work". 
Morehead's difficulties may be illustrated by the "Great 
Stonewall", the subject of Hodgkinson^s article in the 
Centennial Magazine. The stonewall arose over a Government 
proposal to grant a loan of /l,000,000 for the general 
construction of railways. This was debated from the 21st 
October to the'1st December, resulting finally r±tii the 
withdrawal of the proposal. The Government was completely 
unable to control the proceedings of the House, but the 
Courier foresaw little danger to the Ministry, because "there 
16, Palmer to Min. for Lands, 31.12.90. (Mellwraith Papers, 
Oxley Library). 
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are not two defined political parties in our Legislative 
Assembly, for on a motion of confidence, probably nine 
tenths of the members would be found voting with the 
Ministers if the Government was really in jeopardy". ' 
This would seem to indicate that the clearly defined party 
groupings of 1888 had already begun to dissolve. Hodgkinson 
however, seemed to have little doubt that parties, 
1 R 
antagonistic to each other, still existed. The resignation 
of Mellwraith, however, had significant repercussions on 
general party groupings. He must have retained the first 
allegiance of a group of Ministerialists who would follow 
his lead in a division. Thus, there was probably a three 
way division - adherefits of Griffith, Mellwraith and 
Morehead, The absence of significant parliamentary divisions 
in the period between September I889 and July I890 makes 
this contention difficult to Illustrate, but in July I890, 
the voting upon Griffith's want of confidence motion should 
indicate which Ministerialists had drifted away from the 
Premier, 
THE FALL OF MOREHEAD 
The Morehead Government was described by the Courier in 
17. Brisbane Courier, I3.II.89. 
18. Hodgklnson, cop.clt,, p.607. 
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October 1889: 
So long as Sir Thomas Mellwraith held his 
incompetent team in hand, they managed to 
travel with fair security along the 
administrative road. Directly his guiding 
spirit and restraining hand were removed, 
the 111 assorted lot displayed their political 
vices and broke free from all harmony of 
action.19 
The finances of the Government had been slipping into almost 
complete disarray for almost a year, and Donaldson, who had 
replaced Pattison as Treasurer, was compelled to admit a 
deficit of ,1969,000. The Treasurer saw two alternatives 
to remedy this - to reduce expenditure or to Increase 
taxation. He excluded the former possibility and instead 
proposed: 
The Government have decided to resort to what 
they believe the best form of direct taxation, 
and the shape which it will feake will be a 
property tax of Id. in the Jl.0.0 on all 
property above the value of ^ 500.0.0.21 
This immediately provoked scathing attack from Mellwraith. 
Referring to the policy of the National Party in I888, he 
maintained that "if there was one principle more than another 
that gained for us the election it was the principle of no 
land taxation". On 31st July Griffith joined the attack and 
proposed that "the financial proposals of the Government are 
19. Brisbane Courier, 10.10.89. 
20. Q.P.D-., LXI, (1890), p.366. 
21. Ibid., p.374, 
22. Ibid., p.377. 
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23 
not satisfactory to the House". After protracted debate, 
the division was taken, resulting in a majority of two for 
24 Morehead. With Mellwraith in so hostile a frame of mind, 
Morehead was aware that this majority was Insufficient and 
25 
so tendered his Government's resignation. 
In his Secret and Confidential Dispatches, the Governor 
Sir Henry Wylle Norman made little comment. He observed 
that Griffith was supported by Mellwraith and several 
Ministerialists while "various members on the same side, while 
Intimating that they would not support the amendment, very 
plainly stated they had strong objections to the property 
tax." He continued that he had "no option" but to accept 
Morehead's resignation, and that while Griffith had agreed 
to form an administration, the Leader of the Opposition had 
admitted to him "that he will have a difficult task before 
2fi him" with the financial question. 
23. Ibid. 
24. For the Govt: Morehead, Macrossan, Black, Nelson, Powers, 
Donaldson, Casey, Jessop, Dunsmure, Callan, Stevenson, 
Crombie, Jones, Campbell, North, f?lunkett, Agnew, M'^ '^ P^ .V 
Battersby, Little, Jones, Cowley, 'Luya, Dalrymple,'^ '="T^ ''^ °'^  
Stevens, Gannon, Lissner, Archer, Allan, Philp, Palmer, 
0'Sullivan, Pattison, Paul. 35. 
Against: Griffith, Mellwraith, Rutledge, Perkins, Groom, 
.. Aland, Foxton, BarlOw, Isambert, Hodgkinson, Stephens, 
Mellor, Buckland, McMaster, Tozer, Hyne, Unmack, Drake, 
Grimes, Wimble, O'Connell, Murray, Corfield, Watson,5allceld, 
Sayers, Morry, Annear, Glassey, Morgan, Smyth, Macfarlane, 
Smith. 33. 
2 5 . Q . P . D . , LXI, ( 1 8 9 0 ) , p . 5 2 9 . 
26. Gov. Sec, and Conf. d i spa tches to See. of S t a t e , 8 .8 .90 . 
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THE COALITION OF I89O 
The new Ministry was sworn in on the l6th September 
189,0. It consisted of Griffith as Premier and Attorney-
General, W.O. Hodgkinson (Mines and Public Instruction), 
A.S. Cowley (Minister for Lands), Horace Tozer (Colonial 
Secretary), Mellwraith (Treasurer), T.J. Byrnes (Solicitor-
General) and W.H. Wilson (Minister without Portfolio). 
Thus a Coalition had been formed between Griffith and 
Mellwraith. Even though its possibility had been discussed 
27 in political circles for some months, it still provoked 
shocked response from many journals. The Toowoomba 
Chronicle recognized that "the amount of support they can 
jointly command will be very uncertain and perhaps 
?8 
unreliable". Mellwraith could probably command the 
support of those Ministerialists who followed him in the 
division - Stevens, Smith, Watson, Murray, O'Connell, and 
W. Stephens, The lure of a Cabinet post for A.S. Cowley 
would probably placate most Northern members. Griffith 
could count on losing.only a little support in his own party. 
Yet, the success of the Coalition was not a foregone 
conclusion and the Government would have a testing time if 
27. In the debate on Griffith's Confidence motion, Mellwraith 
denied the two had come to any arrangement. Q.P.D., 
LXI, (1890), p.818. 
28. Toowoomba Chronicle, 9.8.90. 
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the disaffected members on both sides could effectively 
combine. 
The reason for the Coalition remained uncertain. The 
paucity of private material makes it difficult to assess 
motives, but a letter from J. Thornloe-Smith to Mellwraith 
indicated that Griffith had approached Mellwraith in August 
29 1890. Vockler, however, produces some evidence that the 
latter had first approached Griffith through Charles Hardle 
30 Buzacott, a Liberal of longstanding.-^ There seems little 
other evidence to end the confusion. Both men were, however, 
in a virtual political wilderness, and both realized that 
the Morehead Government was too inept to cope with the 
impending financial crisis. Griffith knew from bitter 
experience that the Liberal Party had no member who could 
match, the reputed financial ability of Mellwraith. Mellwraith 
was still smarting from the attacks made on him by the Morehead 
Ministry. He was not a man to remain off the Treasury 
Benches for long, and his animosity towards the Morehead 
Cabinet prevented his j^ oining his former colleagues. Some 
eommentat?ors hinted at other reasons for the Coalition. 
Henry Hardacre, in the 1897 debate on the Queensland National 
29- J. Thornloe-Smith to Mellwraith, 12.8.90. (Mellwraith 
correspondence, Oxley Library). 
30, Vockler, op.cit., p.117. 
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Bank suggested that "in 1890, influence was brought to bear 
to bring together the two men who had been lifelong political 
opponents. Probably the bank compelled him tarifflth3 then, 
31 
on account of his overdraft, to join Sir Thomas Mellwraith". 
Griffith's debts at this time were•considerable, most of 
which had been incurred by losses on Mount Morgan shares, 
^bought at a peak price of J15.O.O in 1888.-^ But this debt 
was not tbethe Q.N.B. but to his personal friends T.S. & W 
33 Hall, directors of Mount Morgan.- They showed him great 
generosity, and,, it seems unlikely that Griffith felt 
compelled by them to join Mellwraith. 
It is possible that the reasons for the Coalition were 
far less sinister than such accusations suggest. Griffith 
was well aware of the difficulty of the financial situation, 
just as he believed that Mellwraith was the most capable 
Treasurer the Colony could produce. There is little doubt 
r' 
that both men regarded the Coalition as a temporary expedient 
in order to restore the finances of the colony and to once 
again assume political control. Griffith, always an 
opportunistic politician admitted that: 
The essence of polities was compromise, if not 
opportunism, meaning that sometimes, even a 
31. Q.P.D., LXXVIII, (1897), p.1677. 
32. Stoodley, J., op ..clt. , p.ll7. 
33. Vockler, Sir Samuel Walker Griffith . (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, 
U. of Q.), Appendix 2. 
\q53 
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statesman must do that which is possible, even 
if it is not the best.34 
Perhaps here is the explanation of the Coalition of 1890. 
The Coalition created a political watershed. Bassett 
described the new situation: 
• Voting behaviour in I889 reveals well defined 
blocs indicating a further reinforcement of 
the party groupings established in I888. In 
1890, the unusual alliances which resulted 
from the "Griffilwraith" Coalition, were 
reflected in generally uneven voting. The 
movement away from the well regulated and 
party patterns of former years continued 
in 1891 and it had not been checked when 
the tenth Parliament drew to a close in 
1892.35 
It may be suggested on the other hand that the political 
disparity between the two parties has been exaggerated. It 
has been argued in Chapter 1 that while fundamental 
differences of opinion did exist between the two parties 
prior to I888, their primary aims were at all times similar. 
Both looked to the State to promote Industry and to aid in 
increasing productivity- They differed as to the best ineans 
by which to fulfil this role. The Liberals favoured closer 
settlement; the National Party, while admitting the theore-
tical advantages of such a policy, regarded large freehold 
34. Ibid., p.286. 
35. Bassett, P.G. . "Queensland Polities 1888-93". (Unpub. 
B.A. Thesis, U. ^f Q.), P.^-
220. 
estates as more, practicable. The Liberals looked to the 
extension of.railways and communications under the patronage 
of the State; the National Party tended to favour private 
enterprise.-^ The Conservatives too, were not averse to 
cheap foreign labour, provided this was efficient and 
remunerative; the,-Liberals remained adamantly opposed to 
this expedient. And yet, these differences represented a 
different conception of the same idea of progress, and to 
the majority of members, if one failed, the other might be 
tried. Under the boom conditions of the Eighties, however, 
neither side was prepared to admit the wrongheadedness of 
their conception. 
There were certain indications that opinion was 
changing on some questions- The hostility which Griffith's 
land tax proposals had aroused in-I887 mas one of the major 
strengths of the National Party during the I888 Elections. 
In 1890, it was this same party which was proposing to levy 
a land tax. Moreover, to some extent the National Party 
37 had. abandoned the treasured freehold principle. During 
the,1888 Election, the policies enunciated by the two leaders 
had not been radically opposed. They agreed upon fiscal 
36. iPfo^ t favoured this in a somewhat negative way, because 
of the costliness and innefflclency of government 
railways. 
37. Brisbane Courier, 4.9.89. 
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policy and Chinese immigration^ and did not clash seriously 
on the Issues of Polynesian labour and land grant railways. 
Still the National Party remained the more conservative, 
even though Liberals were to become closer to their old 
rivals in the years ahead. 
It is nevertheless possible to argue that by I89O, the 
Issues which had separated Griffith and Mellwraith for so 
many years had lost much of their urgency and that a compromise 
could be reasonably affected. On Griffith's side, there 
appeared little sacrifice of principle- He held the majority 
in the Coalition. Previously, the Morehead Government could 
count on 43 votes to Griffith's 27. Only seven National 
Party members had followed Mellwraith on division, and of 
these some had expressed reservations. Of the former 
Government, only Stevens, Adams, Corfield, Murray and Watson 
39 
sat behind the new Government. The rest went straight 
into opposition, led by John Donaldson, even though the 
majority regarded themselves as Independents rather than 
Oppositionists. There was some disaffection in Liberal ranks 
also. Of the Liberals, Aland, Barlow, Isambert, Buckland, 
Groom, Foxton, Grimes, Drake,: Macfarlane and Glassey crossed 
38. Perkins, for example, maintained he was voting only 
against the property tax. 
39. Toowoomba Chronicle, 14.8-90. 
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40 the floor, while refusing to join the National Party. 
Thus the Coalition could count upon only 27 votes, with 
35 Morehead supporters against it, with the eleven 
Liberals somewhere in between, holding the balance of 
power until new divisions solidified. The old party 
groupings, while they had not disappeared entirely, had 
been thus thrown into complete chaos. It may be admitted 
that the parties had been fraying around the edges but it 
is nevertheless true that the Coalition was a relatively 
sudden and traumatic development. 
The breakdown of the two party system in I89O was the 
result of inner stresses - the inability of the Government 
to come to terms with finance. The breakdown, too, could 
be regarded as temporary. With the Morehead group standing 
firm, there were still two mutually opposing groups in the 
House- But this situation was not to endure long. The 
great labour unrest of I890 and I89I and the steadily 
deteriorating economic conditions had the effect of drawing 
the two ex-parties together around their two influential 
leaders. The two parties drew together to face new trials 
and the coalition which had probably been regarded by both 
leaders as temporary became a permanent arrangement. 
40. Ibid. 
223. 
Nevertheless, in I89O, these developments were not 
foreseen. Most commentators believed the Coalition to be a 
temporary expedient, and perhaps the Toowoomba Chronicle 
can express the opinion of many Queenslanders: 
It is said that expediency justifies right now 
the attempt to form a Coalition party in the 
Assembly, Instead of seeking a readjustment of 
parties on definite lines by appealing to the 
constituencies ... such a system of deferring 
principle to expediency is not in accordance 
with the traditions of Sir Samuel Griffith's 
political career, nor of the party which he 
had led.41 
4l» Toowoomba Chronicle, 9.8.90. 
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CHAPTER 10 
PARTY ORGANIZATION 
The decade of the Eighties had seen the development of 
a clear-cut two party division in the Queensland Legislative 
Assembly, with members grouping themselves around two 
Influential leaders - Sir Samuel Griffith and Sir Thomas 
Mellwraith. While there was no doubt that two parties 
existed, it can be argued that their alms were at all times 
identical, and that differences arose only in the imple-
mentation of these alms. There -was little formal party 
organization, and parties tended to depend upon the 
personalities of their leaders. 
The Coalition of I890, however, tended to destroy this 
delicately balanced system. Former adherents of Griffith 
and Mellwraith now had to find a new position in the House. 
This situation, at first chaotic, was gradually consolidated. 
The old factionalism was ruled out by the emergent force of 
labour in politics.. What began as a temporary expedient 
between two former political enemies became a permanent 
alliance against a new force. The rise of the Labour Party 
1. See above, Ch, 2. 
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was thus a catalyst in the Identification of the Liberal-
Conservative Coalition. The Nineties exhibited a similar 
bi-partisan division to that which.had pertained in the 
previous decade, but the parties were entirely dissimilar-
No longer was there a virtual identity of aims, no longer 
a similarity of membership. Parties very rapidly assumed 
what might be called a class character, and peculiar 
Queensland conditions precluded the Liberal-Labour 
compromise which occurred in the southern colonies and New 
Zealand. The possibility of such a compromise definitely 
existed, but it did not come to fruition until 1903, The 
development of party organization was slow and spasmodic, 
and even the Labour Party, which had began its existence 
with fairly sophisticated extra-parliamentary organization, 
did little to refine it during the decade. 
In July 1891, the Brisbane Courier had observed that 
2 
"there is really no Opposition Party in the House." The 
Coalition of I890 had originally maintained a tenuous two 
party division in the House, but gradually those members 
who had chosen to oppose the new government drifted back 
to their old leaders. Between I890 and I892, there were 
four Opposition- leaders - Donaldson, Morehead, Nelson and 
2. Brisbane Courier, 2.7.91. 
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Powers. Only Powers remained in Opposition, with Donaldson 
vacillating between Government and Opposition. Most 
prominent National Party members - Black, Perkins, Stevens, 
and Allan -. rejoined the Government along with some Liberals, 
notably Sayers, Barlow and Macfarlane. In I89I the only 
members voting consistently against the Government were 
Groom, Drake, Hoolan, and Powers, joined on several occasions 
by Cadell, Isambert, Morgan and Grimes. During this session, 
many members from both former parties classed themselves as 
Independents, but although they occasionally challenged the 
Government on specific instances, they did not threaten its 
continued existence. This was primarily because there was 
no alternative leader who could challenge the leadership of 
Griffith and Mellwraith. 
Thus, the Ministerial Party was largely an amalgamation 
of old parties, united in the strength of Its two leaders 
and a common fear of labour. Labour militancy was bound to 
draw the traditional parties together- Members were men 
of property all, and they could see only danger in the 
political organization of the working class. Over 1/3 of 
4 the members were in some way connected with pastoralism. 
3. Aland, Barlow, Isambert, Salheld, Macfarlane and Sayers 
of the Liberals^and Allan, Archer, Black, Donaldson, 
Morehead, Luya, Palmer, Paul, Nelson, Stevens and Cadell, 
4. See Appendix 2. 
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In 1892, every member of the Executive of the Pastorallsts 
Association, with the exception of Vice President John 
5 
Cameron, was a member of Parliament. Moreover, many members 
were associated with various large business and banking 
institutions, indicated in the table below. 
FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT 
Queensland National Bank: 
Bank of North Queensland: 
Queensland Deposit Bank: 
Imperial Deposit Bank: 
Queensland Investment-Land 
Mortgage Co.: 
Stock Exchanges 
Hart, Palmer, Morehead, Unmack, 
Mellwraith. 
Black, Cowley, Dalrymple, Lissner, 
Philp, Hodgkinson, Thynne, 
Wimble. 
Agnew, Donaldson, Moreton, 
Brentnall. 
Stephens, Stevenson. 
Dickson, Forrest, Stevens, 
Mellwraith. 
Stevenson, Unmack, Paul. 
Many members also belonged to the Federal and Queensland 
Employers Unions. The Queensland Parliament was Indeed a 
Parliament which represented the propertied interests and 
in'consequence, hostile to the alms of Labour-
The rapid development of Labour organization gave 
5. Allan, Donaldson, Black, Crombie, Casey, Murphy, Dunsmure, 
Morehead (M.M.L.A.), Lalor, Brentnall (M.M.L.C). 
6, Allan, Black, Crombie, Brentnall, Agnew, Luya, Watson. 
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Conservatives reason to be fearful. In I885, a group of 
energetic unionists had formed the Trades and Labour Council 
in Brisbane, and in the same year, Queensland sent her first 
representatives to the Trades Union Congress of Australia, 
held in Sydney. Nevertheless, union organization up until 
1887 was slow in developing, particularly in Queensland. 
There were few unions for the unskilled workers which had 
large memberships. In I887, only I6 registered unions 
existed in Queensland, but by I888, this number had doubled, 
7 
while membership had more than doubled. W.G. Spence had 
formed the Amalgamated Miners Association in 1882, but it 
was not until I886 that the Queensland Miners joined the 
A.M.A., endorsing the aspiration of Spence: 
My ambition was to unite all unions - gold, silver, 
copper and coal in one body, with an Intercolonial 
Council to deal with large issues and arrange for 
financial aid in time of need, leaving each 
colonial district self governing in its own sphere." 
After 1888, union organization spread throughout Queensland. 
Co-ordination was now a necessity. This was provided by the 
Provincial Council of the Australian Labour Federation, 
This replaced the T.L.C. in June 1899, and was at first 
confined to Brisbane Unions. In January I890, the Barcoo 
7. Murphy P. Joycee.HughesC.Prelude to Power. (Jacaranda, 
Brisbane, 196^), p.315. 
8. Spence, W.G., Australia's Awakening. (The Worker & 
Trustees, Sydney, 1909i pp,23-4. 
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unions joined, followed by those-in Wide Bay and Burnett, 
Townsvllle, Charters Towers and Rockhampton, The structure 
of the A,L,P, in I89O appears below,^ 
AUSTRALIAN LABOUR FEDERATION 
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE 
(5) MEMBERS 
CHARTERS BRISBANE CENTRAL WIDE BAY TOWNSVILLE ROCKHAMPTON 
TOWERS COUNCIL COUNCIL & BURNETT COUNCIL COUNCIL 
COUNCIL COUNCIL 
INDIVIDUAL UNIONS 
AFFILIATED WITH 
DISTRICT COUNCILS 
In March I89O, the Worker began its controversial career- In 
August of the same year, the A,L,P, held its first General 
Meeting, to draw up its own constitution as well as a People's 
Parliamentary Platform, The structure was completed by 
the formation in Blacli4lrl of the Official Parliamentary 
Labour Party, Thus, by December I89O, all the elements, 
necessary for a successful and well organized labour movement 
9, Murphy, Joyce, Hughes, Op,clt., p,300^ 
10. Seie Appendix 4. 
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had been established - a central union organization with a 
constitutionally strong, Executive, a Parliamentary party and 
a financially sound newspaper through which to propagate 
the aspirations of the movement. 
The Labour Party consisted of unions affiliated with 
the A.L.F., as well as unaffiliated unions, and individuals 
sympathetic to the aims of labour. Selection and endorsement 
of candidates was left in the hands of the exclusively 
"political" Worker's Political Organizations. The importance 
of local conditions was recognized; this decentralization 
allowed considerable latitude in the selection of candidates. 
Every candidate was supposed to sign a pledge in support of 
the political programme of the party, thus keeping public 
dissension to a minimum. Murphy described the evolution of 
the Labour Party through the decade. 
Between I892 and 1916, the Labour Party evolved 
from a loosely linked, localized political 
organization to a closely knit centralized body 
which was able to have its own permanent 
secretariat. This evolution was not an even 
continuing process. The origins of the 
political party had stemmed from the increasing 
desire of sections of the working class to have 
representation in the colonial Parliament and 
from the tremendous Increase in trade union 
membership between I887 ,and I89I; but with the 
decline in union strength after 1893 the 
initial impetus was lost and the Party 
struggled through the remainder of the decade 
.... It had to wait for. the resurgence of 
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unionism beginning around 1907, for the return 
of the political fevour which had marked its 
first steps into the political arena.H 
The radicalism of the Labour Party was tempered by the 
pragmatism of most of its leaders. Very rarely did the two 
ideals clash; and the early parliamentary success of the 
party militated against extreme radicalism. The first 
platform of the A.L.F. called for the nationalization of 
the means of production. AB the same. Labour's Parliamentary 
programme was not much more radical in its proposals than 
the views held by radical Liberals of the middle Eighties. 
Albert Hinchcllffe, first and only Secretary of the A.L.F., 
believed wholeheartedly that the only way for organized 
labour to achieve Its alms was by capturing the machinery of 
12 the State. Consequently, the central tenet of the first 
parliamentary platform was universal, adult male sufferage. 
13 Even after humiliating defeat in the I891 Shearer5?.i Strike, 
Hinchcllffe retained his faith In the ballot box. 
The great need for education was recognized in the call 
for free,, compulsory education, provision for adult education 
and free libraries. The party also constantly pressed for 
the amelioration of working conditions, stressing legislative 
11. Murphy, D.J., "The Changing Structure of the Party" in 
Prelude to Power, p.94. 
12. See above, Ch. 1. 
13,, See below, Ch. 11. 
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enforcement of the eight hour day, a Shops and Factories 
Act and a St at e^* Department of Labour. Such a department 
should seek to, provide work at a'minimum wage for all workmen 
who registered. Old age pensions were demanded; "not as a 
charity but as alright". 
This pragmatism was'early recognized by William Lane, 
regarded as the most "revolutionary"'of Labour's early leaders. 
He never tired of repeating that: 
>se who accuse, the A,.L,F. of mere anarchist 
agitation do not usually know that its 
socialist teachings are in its platform only, 
and that on its industrial side it has 
persistently attempted to replace more violent 
methods of righting wrongs by conciliation and 
arbitration.14 
It may even be argued that initially. Labour was prepared to 
co-operate with Government and Capital to the mutual 
advantage of all. The I89O Shops and Factories Commission 
exhibited a high degree of co-operation between Labour members, 
led by Thomas Glassey and such Liberals of long--standing as 
B.B. Moreton and Thomas Crawford and Frank McDonnell, a 
prominent union leader, worked hand in hand with Conservative 
storekeeper Thomas Finney in an effort to achieve early 
closing. There did seem a possibility of compromise in I89O, 
but a hardening of attitudes took place after the I89I strike. 
14. Hannan, G., "William Lane" in Prelude to Power, 
p. 182. 
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and such a compromise proved impossible until I903.  
The' Labour Party continued to show moderation in both 
doctrine and parliameritary practice. John Dalton presents 
a forceful argument: 
It is clear ... that the Labour Party was 
regarded not just as a^  trade union party, 
but also as a party of reformers opposed 
to the powerful privileged groups of 
Queensland society .... The Labour Party 
was evolving into the Liberal Party of 
Queensland politics ... the keeper of the 
Liberal ethos as the party of reform.15 
Even so. Labour, if carrying on an old tradition. Introduced 
two entirely new elements into Queensland politics -
organization on a colony wide basis, and the representation 
of the working man by working men. 
Former Liberals and Conservatives, who now formed the 
Ministerial Party, were slow to match the development of 
Labour organization. Members of Parliament who had always 
operated within the established pattern of patronage were 
loath to accept rigid controls upon their actions and opinions, 
There were some attempts to promote'organization for the 
purposes of more efficient electoral activity. The Queensland 
Patriotic League was founded by Robert Buleock and T.E. 
White in I89O. White gave some indication of the raison 
15. Dalton, J., "An InterpretdfcnaeSurvey" in Prelude to Power, 
 p.9. 
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d'etre of the League when he maintained that he did not 
fight the A.L.F. because it was a Labour organization but 
"because it was a socialist conspiracy against the State". 
Dire consequences were foreshadowed: 
The victory of the A.L.F. would mean the spreading 
of insecurity in the land, no further imports of 
money, and the exit of as much capital as could 
be taken out of the Country ... and they might go 
even further; because some of them believed in 
abolishing marriage, and also in abolishing 
Christianity. l6 
The Provisional Executive of the League was composed of many 
prominent commercial identities. J.E. Leresche was a Joint 
manager of the A.U.S.N, Company, owned in partnership by 
Robert Philp. Both T.E. White and Arthur Midson were 
ex-presidents of the Employer's Association. J.J. Kingsbury 
had signed the Minority Report of the Shops and Factories 
17 Commission. The President, Robert Buleock, was described 
by the Warwick .Ar,gus in 1894: 
He has long been known as one of the stormy petrels 
of Queensland politics, and what he does not know 
about engineering an election is scarcely worth 
studying. In the old days before the Coalition he 
was generally found fighting on the Liberal side 
... but he took fright at the methods of the New^o 
Unionism and made common cause with the enemy... 
The. formation of the Patriotic League was the result of fear 
16. Brisbane; :CQurier, 21.7.91. 
17. Worl^ er,. 30.7-91. The Executive consisted of R. 
Buleock, J.E. Leresche, A. Midson, J.J. Kingsbury, 
R. Newton, R. Porter, T.E. White. 
li, Warwick Argus, 1.9.94-
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engendered by the organization of labour- It was a far more 
cohesive group with more far-reaching alms than any other o/ 
the traditional parties had developed. It rented an office 
in the Brisbane Courier building, and its operations included 
a tight scrutiny of the electoral rolls, and the attempted 
selection of suitable candidates. During the 1893 Elections, 
the League was unable to assert its will over Sir Thomas 
Mellwraith, and other individuals also refused to submit 
to its pre-selectlon procedures. 
During the years between I89O and I894, the Queensland 
Patriotic League remained in existence but did not extend 
the scope of its political activities. In 1894, the Q.P.L. 
was superseded by the formation of the Queensland Political 
Association. The Q.P.A. was also the work of Buleock. The 
Labour Party had just won two by-elections in Wide Bay and 
Ipswich, and Ministerialists now recognized the need for 
greater organization. The new body did not express the 
same wild anti-labour sentiments as had its predecessor, but 
it was, nevertheless a simply the League rejuvenated, R,P, 
Adams was its- paid Secretary, The Q,P,A, carried on the work 
19 
of scrutinizing the rolls and pre-selectlon, Morrison 
19, Its success was only limited - The I896 Elections - See 
below Ch, 13, 
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describes the;activity: 
It must be granted that an extremely competent 
organization had been developed to supervise electoral 
rolls .,. Buleock or one of his associates, seated 
in the committee room during the actual periods of 
polling were able, through their pre-election 
canvassing and the contacts they had established 
to ensure that their own supporters had all recorded 
their votes ,,, they were thus able to assess the 
actual result of the election within a few votes,,.. 
A system of pre-selectlon of candidates had been 
established, which though it had not gained 
universal acceptance, was still a very considerable 
factor in preventing the loss of seats through the 
splitting of votes.20 
The Q.P.A. still had not, however, tried to enter the policy 
making field. The political Influence of Buleock was enhanced 
by the fact that Sir Hugh Muir Nelson was Chairman of the 
Q.P.A. at the same time as he was Premier. Its organization 
was still haphazard and it lagged far behind the growing 
sophistication of the Labour machine. 
One of the reasons for the failure to develop a coherent 
extra-parliamentary organization was pointed out by the 
Western Champion: 
There is always a disagreement among persons who 
oppose the Labour Party as to their status in 
the political cosmos. Many people who are not 
democrats object to be called Conservatives ... 
it ... becomes difficult to fix upon a rallying 
title to which none can object,21 
20, Morrison, A.A,, "Liberal Party Organizations before 1900", 
(Typescript, Fryer Library), p,20. 
21, Western Champion, 2,9-98, 
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The furore which had surrounded the North Brisbane election 
P9 23 
in 1896 had effectively reduced the prestige of the Q,P,A, -^  
In November 1901, the Mackay Mercury indicated that "the 
organization, which at one time held the government together 
24 in this district, is now entirely lacking". 
The continued parochialism of Queensland politics 
hindered the growth of extra-parMamentary organization. 
This was manifested in two ways. Regional branches of the 
Q,P.A. often had little contact with the central offices 
in Brisbane. Secondly, some areas or sectional groups 
established their own political organizations. The Darling 
Downs produced the Queensland Farmers Alliance, formed at 
Clifton in September I89I. The platform had been drawn up 
in August of that year, mainly at the instigation of W.H. 
Groom. Among its planks were: 
1. The proper representation of farming Interests in 
Parliament. 
2. Electoral reform, including one man, one vote. 
3. State aided farm settlement. 
4. Protection. 
5. A State Loan Bank to assist selectors. 
22. See below, Ch. 13. 
23. In the same article, the Western Champion remarked that 
the whole anti-Labour organization was "quite dormant". 
24. Mackay Mercury, 12.11.1901. 
23.8. 
25 6. Courts of Conciliation. 
The Farmers Alliance was essentially the product of long 
established Downs radicalism, and easily established links 
with the Labour Party, and opposed the Ideals of organizations 
such as the Q.P.A. 
While this lack of efficient extra-parliamentary 
organization did not weaken the Coalition in the first years 
of the decade, this was only due to the presence of strong 
leaders. The absence of a leader of strength and prestige 
after the retirement of Griffith and Mellwraith meant that 
party discipline and cohesion was bound to suffer. Signs 
of Ministerial disunity were clearly discernible by I896, and 
the factionalism Increased after the elections. The Labour 
Party too was exhibiting a disunity hitherto'.-' unknown and 
the internal problems of both parties tended to blur the 
clearcut division between Labour and Conservative, This 
would eventually result in a Liberal-Labour Coalition in 1903, 
Throughout the Nineties, party organization was still in its 
Infancy, and until the development of extra-parliamentary 
bodies on both sides, the Parliament of Queensland would 
continue as a Parliament of shifting alliances and instability. 
25, Waterson, D,B,, Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper 
(Sydney U,P,, 1968), p,296. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE RETREAT OF LIBERALISM 
In December I888, an article entitled "Wealth and Want" 
appeared in the Boomerang in which Sir Samuel Walker Griffith 
argued that: 
It is the duty of the State to underfeake the task 
of insisting upon a fair division of the products 
of Labour between the possessor of raw material 
and the producer ,,,, Is it not to a great extent 
an Intuitive perception, not perhaps articulately 
expressed, of these and allied principles that has 
given rise to the strong and Increasing sense of 
the Injustice of the land monopoly and the fierce 
objection to the competition of alien races? Is 
it not beginning to be felt that unrestricted 
competition. Instead of being the result of a 
natural law of good, is a dangerous social evil^l 
It was with such ideas that Griffith, and other middle class 
radicals appealed for the vote of the working men of 
Queensland, That the ideas were sincerely held is not open 
to doubt, but the paternalistic expression of them had little 
contact with social realities. The Eighties had been a 
decade of fairly high and continuing prosperity, with the 
result that employees had not been militant in their demand 
1, Boomerang, 21,12,88. 
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for a greater share of accumulated wealth. The lack of 
aggression was probably due to the slow industrial 
development of the colony. Until the Eighties, Queensland's 
secondary industries were slight, but that decade showed 
an accelerated growth, with the number of Industrial 
2 
establishments more than doubling, 
A greater concentration of labour began to emerge 
during the Eighties, a development which was conducive 
to labour organization. Government immigration policy 
also provided an Impetus in this directions It has been 
argued in Chapter 3 that a large proportion of immigrants 
tended to congregate in the ports of disembarkation, 
swelling the urban workforce, thereby creating unemploy-
ment problems as depression set in. Immigration had 
another, equally significant effect. Many Labour 
Parliamentarians who were prominent during the Nineties 
had arrived on the immigrant ships the decade before. For 
an Incipient labour movement, the arrival of men like Thomas 
Glassey and Frank McDonnell, already experienced in union 
organization, was a tremendous asset. Equally important. 
,^. In 1870, only 470 industrial establishments existed; 
in 1880 this had increased by only 100, while I890 
saw the operation of 1322 establishments. Laverty, J. 
"The Queensland Economy I86O-I915" in Murphy, Joyce, 
Hughes (eds.) Prelude tO Power, (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 
1969), p.38. 
3» Rawllngs, Givens, Hamilton, Kidston (1882), Hardacre 
(1883), Glassey (1884), McDonnell, Reid (I887)-
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the drive to halt state-aided immigration, which began in 
the late Eighties, was an immediate political issue around 
4 
which the forces of labour could be concentrated. 
While political labour had been slow to develop, it 
was nevertheless in an Infant state of organization by 1890 
The depression of the late Eighties and early Nineties had 
led to large--scale unemployment, wage cuts and general 
hardship. The Government, despite expressed concern, had 
neither the desire nor the ideological equipment to cope 
5 
effectively with this new situation. It was the primary 
producer, also affected by the slump, and not the wage 
earner who received the great bulk of government aid. This 
development was due to the retreat of Griffith from the 
radical position exemplified in "Wealth and Want". This 
in turn was caused by the inability of Liberal ideology to 
cope with the economic measures necessary for relief from 
the depression, and more dramatically, by the series of 
events during the great shearing strike of I89I. 
THE 1891 STRIKE 
In April I89I, the Worker described the situation in 
which Queensland shearers saw themselves; 
4, See above, Chs. 5 and 10. 
5. See above. Chapter 3 for Government attitudes to 
unemployment. 
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The last fortnight has seen the climax of the 
capitalist conspiracy against unionism .,, with 
1500 or so police and military occupying a few 
places along railway lines, the Government has 
felt Strong enough to invite lawlessness by 
the wholesale arrest of union officials on 
evidently trumped up "conspiracy charges" ,,, 
it is for freedom of contract which will 
degrade wage earners that the Government is 
fighting - not for the suppression of 
lawlessness which is mostly on its own 
capitalistic side," 
By this time, the strike had been in progress for nearly 
two months, and it was to continue until l6th June, when 
it was called off by the A,L,F. due to insufficient funds. 
The strike was the result of intransigent attitudes 
on the part of both the Pastorallsts Union and the A,L,P. 
towards the principle of freedom of contract. The insistence 
upon freedom of contract by employers meant that unionism's 
greatest strength,collective bargaining, was placed in 
immediate jeopardy. There could be no union control over 
wages, and under such conditions the working man had no 
redress. The strength of the Pastorallsts was enhanced by 
their greater resources and organization and by the failure 
of the Maritime Strike- In December I89O, the Pastorallsts 
Associations of the various districts had combined to form 
the Queensland Pastorallsts Association, a tightly knit 
6. Worker, 4.4.91. 
iZif.3 
group complete with a Central Executive to co-ordinate 
7 
activities and policies. The Australian Labour 
Federation, with which the shearing unions were 
affiliated, had also been.formed in I890. Both 
organizations were well Integrated and disciplined, with 
the result that the strike took on the character of a 
head-on clash between capital and labour. In this way 
it differed from previous strikes in Queensland, which 
had exhilited the characteristics of isolated disputes 
between private paie'tles. 
The strike had begun in January I89I, when the new 
shearing agreement had been published, which the shearers 
at Logan Downs had refused to sign. While it included 
no reduction in shearing rates, it did contain reductions 
Q 
of up to 33^ in labourers' rates. Moreover, the 
pastorallsts, by proposing that th.te contract should take 
place between individuals, also meant to by-pass the 
unions. The challenge to collective bargaining was thus 
clear, and the shearers in other regions soon followed the 
Logan Downs men out on strike. The Brisbane Courier 
indicated that the pastorallsts would have no hesitation 
in Importing outside labour: 
Ranson, P., History of the United Graziers Association 
of Queensland. (Typescript, U.G.A., Brisbane) pp. 9-IO, 
Kenway, "The Pastoral Strikes of I89I and 1894" in 
Prelude to Power, p. 112. 
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It is probable that the pastorallsts will wait 
a few weeks to see if the men will give in, 
and if not, will then make arrangements to 
obtain a supply of free labour from the south,9 
The U.P.A. later claimed that no such arrangements were made 
prior to the publication of the Queensland Shearers Union 
Manifesto on l8th March. But evidence of such negotiations 
as early as 7th January appear in the Minutes of the 
Association. In the bitter weeks which followed, there 
appeared daily press reports of bloodshed and violence on 
the part of the shearers. Not all these reports were 
accurate, but there is no doubt that the decision of the 
Government to send troops to the Central districts exacerbated 
an already explosive situation. While Griffith had been 
away at the Hobart Federation Conference during most of 
the strike, the decision to despatch troops rested with 
him and was taken with his full knowledge. In a letter 
to Mr. C. Holyer, Secretary of the General Labour Union of 
Queensland, he said "The first duty of every civilized 
Government is to maintain law and order, and to protect 
peaceable citizens in pursuing their lawful associations 
12 
without molestation". Thus, with Government troops 
"protecting" the free labourers imported from the south and 
9. Bri*sbane Courley, 7.1.91. 
10. Cameron, R.E. , ''Pastorallsts Organizations in Queensland 
1884-1900'' (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, U. of Q,, 1956), p.41. 
11. Telegraph, 3.3.91. 
12. Vockler, J.C, Sir Samuel Walker Griffith (Unpub. B.A. 
Thesis, U. of Q., 1953), p.258. 
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the pastorallsts refusing to come to the Conference table, 
the strike dragged on. 
On the whole, it was the U,P,A, who proved the more 
intractable. Despite repeated requests for negotiation on 
the part of Albert Hinchcllffe, Secretary of the A,L,P. to 
Sir Thomas Mellwraith, as a member of the U.P,A, and an 
influential public citizen, the latter refused to aid in 
any way, Mellwraith argued that unless the unions first 
accepted the principle of freedom of contract, conference 
13 
would be useless. Free labourers had every right to 
work if they wished, and it was the duty of the Government 
to ensure that work was possible. An employer had the 
14 
right to employ whom he wished, when he wished, Mellwraith 
thus reflected the intransigence with which the pastorallsts 
regarded freedom of contract. At no time did he attempt to 
bring his pastoral colleagues to the tjonference table. His 
attitude was shared by most members of the House, including 
the Premier. He wrote to Hinchcllffe that "for his part. 
Sir Samuel Griffith had no hesitation in repeating that the 
claim that employers should not be allowed to employ any 
but union men on union terms is in his own union altogether 
13, The Correspondence is reprinted in Prelude to Power, 
op.^clt,, Appendix A - Mellwraith to Hinchcllffe, 1.3.91. 
14, Mellwraith to Hinchcllffe 2.3.91. 
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15 inadmlssable in a free country and amongst free men". 
Hinchcllffe argued that "Queensland workers ChaveO the 
right to have a voice in the conditions of labouring ... 
to talk of equal law Is bombast. There is no equal law at 
1 <r 
present. It is capitalist law, pure and simple". This 
is certainly not much different from Griffith's 1888 
assertion in "Wealth and Want" that "unrestricted competition 
*.. is a dangerous social evil". 
Despite all requests for a conference the strike continued, 
The Rockhampton Morning Bulletin reported a coneiliation 
proposal from A.J. Thynne. He suggested a Board of 
Conciliation, composed of impartial members, with two 
advocates from each side. The Bulletin reported that this 
17 
was acceptable to Hinchcllffe, but not to the pastorallsts. 
Inflammatory^press reports created an Impression of organized 
rebellion on the part of the workers of the west, led by 
communist rabble-rousers, Griffith considered that if troops 
had not been dispatched "there would have been nothing less 
1 8 
than armed insurrection in the rest of Queensland". That 
a revolutionary situation existed in Queensland at this time 
is extremely doubtful. Even the partisan Courier reported 
15. Ranson, P., op.cit. , p.l9-
16. Hinchcllffe to Mellwraith, 3.3.91. 
17. Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, 29.4.91. 
18. Q.P.D., LXIV, (1891), p.116. 
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early in the strike that it felt Magistrates were 
19 
exaggerating the danger'of the situation. Even if this 
danger was illusory, the strike generated a fear of revolution 
in men's minds, unused as they were to direct labour action 
of this type and magnitude. And while the failure of the 
strike damaged the cause of Labour in Queensland, its very 
occurrence damaged that of Liberalism. 
THE 1891 STRIKE AND THE LIBERAL PARTY 
Griffith and his colleagues had regarded themselves 
as sympathetic to the cause of the working man, but the 
strike proved to them that this .concern was misplaced. So 
traumatic were the events of I89I, that most Liberals now 
regarded Labour with fear rather than patronage. Griffith 
felt almost personally insulted, with the result that he 
treated the strike- with a severity that was in no way 
warranted. He joined Mellwraith in refusing to heed calls 
for compulsory arbitration, even from former colleagues. 
Traditionally antl-pastorallst, some Liberals remained 
steadfast in their sympathy. They agreed with W.H, Groom, 
who believed the strikers perhaps had a just cause: 
There is an inherant desire in the minds of some 
men to get as muck as they possibly can out of 
the machine called "the labourer" ,,,., Freedom 
of contract is a phrase that looks very well on 
19. Brisbane Courier, 7.1.91. 
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paper, but is likely to be abused.20 
Most Liberals however, tried to avoid taking a stand. Sir 
Charles Lllley suggested compulsory arbitration, although, 
as he made clear in a letter to the Australian Socialist 
League, "I have not on any occasion expressed or implied 
approval of the doings of either party in the present 
21 dispute-" Reaction on the part of Liberals was nevertheless 
mostly negative - already, perhaps,they recognized that their 
old Ideology was becoming Irrelevant in a new political 
situation. 
The strike tended to change parliamentary alliances. 
Dissident members"of the National Party, including Morehead, 
Donaldson, Macrossan, Black, Dalrymple and Perkins now 
drifted back to the Ministry. The death of Macrossan early 
in 1891 had already deprived the faction of much of its 
vitality, and in I892, most had become strong consistent 
supporters of the Coalition. The combination of dissident 
Mcllwraithians and dissident Liberals could not have been 
expected to survive. By I892, the Coalition was opposed 
only by a small group of former Liberals, disgruntled and 
disorganized. 
20. Toowoomba Chrpnlele, 23.5.91. 
21. Worker, 5.5.91. 
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THE ELECTIONS BILL 
The years between I89O and 1893 were marked by 
cynicism and demoralization in Queensland public life. 
Unable to comprehend either the Depression or the Strikes 
the Queensland public endorsed actions which had previously 
generated extreme antipathy. Queenslanders were prepared 
to accept a Government, of whatever political affiliation, 
so long as it promised relief from economic distress. The 
Liberal financial failure of the Eighties had contributed 
to the Coalition of I89O, and it precluded the continuation 
of Liberal dominance in the new Government. Griffith was 
no longer the embodiment of Liberal aspirations. The 
demands of Industry for relief from the depression, combined 
with the great force of character and alleged financial 
ability of Mellwraith, and with the shock engendered by 
labour militancy, all served to drive Griffith into the 
camp of political conservatism. 
No single piece of legislation illustrated this better 
than the Elections Bill, introduced in June I892 by Griffith. 
In its original form, the Bill contained two major changes. 
The first tightened residence qualifications, effectively 
striking at nomadic workers in the pastoral and mining 
Industries. Griffith justified this flagrant attack on 
democratic principles by asserting the greater political 
250. 
rights of property: 
When men are wandering about and do not settle 
down at all, I, for one, do not think they are 
entitled to as large a share in the Government 
of a country or the making of its laws, as 
persons who are really settled in it.22 
A second clause was concerned with voter registration. It 
provided that if an objection was lodged against a prospective 
voter, the onus was placed upon the voter, rather than the 
objector, to prove his case. Thus, it was to be made far 
more difficult to place an elector's name on the roll, and 
easier to strike it off. Such a provision well suited the 
activities of such organizations as the violently anti-
Labour Queensland'Patriotic League. Moreover, the ordinary 
working man was unlikely to find either the time or the 
resources to attend Registration Courts to prove his right 
to vote-
Wlth the House in a disorganized State, and with 
Opposition strictly limited, the passage of the Bill was a 
foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, it was withdrawn at the 
suggestion of A.H, Barlow, and reintroduced in September-
The two new clauses remained intact, but a new provision was 
added - the contingent vote, or optional preferential voting. 
The Opposition made some attempt, however, forlorn^to 
22. Q.P.D., LXVI, (1892), p.313. 
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prevent the passage of the Bill in its new form. Opposition 
leader Charles Powers moved an amendment embodying the , 
principle of one man, one vote, or the abolition of the 
23 plural vote. He received support from only ten members. 
J.G, Drake argued that the contingent vote was only another 
device in an attempt to secure the continuance of the 
Coalition, by making it difficult for third parties to gain 
electoral success. Under the system, all but the top two 
candidates were eliminated in the first count of votes, 
Thomas Glassey dubbed the Bill "The Prevention of the 
Worklngman from Voting Bill". He estimated, on the basis 
of the 1891 census, that under this and other election Acts, 
the total of 26,491 adult males were deprived of the franchise, 
and that the new enrolment procedures were designed to 
24 Increase that number-
Attitudes to the Bill varied among Parliamentarians. 
Some members, who could be counted Oppositionists, supported 
the Government. John Macfarlane (Ipswich) feared the 
abolition of the plural vote, believing that this would lead 
25 
to the overrepresentatlon of labour at the expense of capital. 
He believed this could only lead to class legislation, and 
23. Sayers, Hyne, Hall, Hoolan, Glassey, Salkeld, Gannon, 
Drake, Mellor, :&BEBBSB, O'Connell, 
24. Q.P.D., LXVI, (1892), p.472. 
25. Q.P.D., LXVII, (1892). 
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seemed unable to comprehend that the Bill he was supporting 
was a piece of political chicanery designed to ensure the 
political supremacy of another class. Many of Glassey's 
amendments, however, received the support of only three 
Labour members - Hoolan, Ryan and Hall. Nevertheless, 
whatever the political differences between Opposition and 
Labour Party, those opposed to the Bill recognized that it 
was designed almost exclusively to deprive workers of as 
many votes as possible. 
The Elections Bill was the result of middle class 
over-reaction to the labour troubles of I89I. The Liberal 
retreat made impossible any sort of compromise between 
Liberal and Labour in order to achieve the social 
amelioration necessitated by the disastrous affects of 
the depression upon the poorer members of the community. 
The Government did indeed heed some calls for relief -
from the sugar planters and from pastorallsts. The provisions 
for land grant railways, sales of land, reductions in 
pastoral rents were all intended to aid the pastoral 
Industry. The reintroduction of Pacific Island labour 
meant, or was intended to mean, the salvation of the sugar 
27 Industry. And yet, despite the recommendations of the 
26. See,;&.b.ove,,Ch. 4. 
27. See' ,abbve, "Ch. 5. 
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Shops and Factories Commission nothing significant was 
done to aid the unemployed, to better working conditions, 
or to help the underprivileged in any way. Thus, the period 
can only be termed one of complete expediency, in which 
industrial oppression was unmitigated by social legislation, 
of the type observable in the southern colonies. 
THE OPPOSITION TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
The Coalition Government had, within two years become 
a Conservative Government, dominated by Sir Thomas Mellwraith, 
dedicated to the maintenance, at all costs, of the privileges 
of Queensland vested Interests. Opposition was limited and 
disorganized, and after I89I, too small to make any impression 
upon executive decisions. A glance at the division lists 
of the period gives an indication of the extent of opposition 
to the Government, and its constitution. The divisions have 
been chosen as examples of significant Issues which caused 
considerable bi-partisan disagreement during the previous 
decade, characterized by party solidarity. No division was 
affected in any significant way by regional cross pressures. 
28. See above, Ch. 3. 
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DATE LEGISLATION RESULT OPPOSITION 
7 July Second Read. 
Naval Defence 
Bill 
42-l@> Agnew, Black, Corfield, 
Gannon, Luya, Donaldson, 
Groom, Isambert, 
0'Sullivan, Powers, Drake, 
Glassey 
29 July Second Read. 
Elections 
Am. Bill 
36-11 Groom, Hoolan, Hyne, 
Perkins, Archer, Cadell, 
Donaldson, Gannon, Powers 
Luya, Glassey, 
Aland, North, Gannon, 
Glassey, Hoolan, Isambert, 
Lissner, 0'Sullivan, Paul, 
Plunkett, Powers, Smith, 
Stevens, Drake, Salkeld 
26 Aug. Third Read* 
Partnership 
Bill 
27-15 
22 Third Read. 
Sept, Spec. Sales 
Land Bill 
33-8 Hoolan, Glassey, Salkeld, 
Sayers, Isambert, Plunkett, 
Foxton, Powers pg 
3 Committee 
Sept. Crown Lands 
Bill Am, 
Glassey 
26-15 Luya, Murphy, Powers, 
Salkeld, Gannon, Grimes, 
Hoolan, Jessop, Allan, 
Black, Cadell, Foxton, 
Sayers, Drake, Glassey. 
30 
29, See above Ch. 5. 
30. In ilpposltlon to unconditional se lec t ion . 
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DATE LEGISLATION RESULT OPPOSITION 
0 Pacific Is. 
April Labour Am. 
(Prop, by 
Drake) 
37-15 Drake, Ryan, 0'Sullivan, 
Hoolan, Isambert, Cadell, 
Aland, Salkeld, Qannon, 
Glassey, Groom, Sayers, 
Barlow, Macfarlane, Mellor 
31 
20 
Sept * 
Reduction 
Payment of 
Members 
29-17 Battersby, Black, Drake, 
Hall, Isambert, 
Hamilton, Jessop, 
Lissner, Macfarlane, 
Murray, 0'Sullivan, 
Paul, Powers, Ryan, 
Sayers, O'Connell, 
Gannon. 
Nov. 
Third Reading 
Judges 
Salaries Bill 
23-14 Barlow, Cadell, Foxton, 
Gannon, Glassey, Groom, c 
Hall, Macfarlane, 
McMaster, Plunkett,, 
Powers, Salkeld, 
Stephens, Watson m 
The opposition proper, judging from these divisions, may 
be said to consist of four Labour members, Glassey, Ryan, 
Hoolan and Hall, plus eight former Liberals, Drake, Aland, 
31, That the. Bill should be read again six months hence. 
32, From £300 to £150 per year. 
33, Griffith was given a glOOO per annum raise in salary 
©n accepting the postion of Chief Justice. 
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Isambert, Salkeld, Sayers, Groom, Cadell and Macfarlane, and 
three former members of the National Party, Powers, 0'Sullivan 
and Plunkett. There were, however, a number of members who 
maintained an independent attitude - Lissner, Plunkett, 
Foxton, Murray, Jessop, Corfield and Black all on several 
occasions voted against the Government. Black's participation 
in so many opposition votes may be explained in part by his 
hostility to the Coalition in general, and Mellwraith in 
particular. Foxton and Jessop represented Darling Downs 
constituencies, and consistently voted against the Government 
on matters of land policy. The Darling Downs representatives 
provided one source of constant opposition to the Government, 
but the clique was weakened by the absence of W.H. Groom for 
the greater part of the I891 Session. However, for most of 
the period, the Opposition proper consisted of only fifteen 
members, hardly enough to influence decisions in a House of 
seventy-two. 
THE DEMANDS OF INDUSTRY 
It has been argued that two developments directly caused 
the failure of liberalism in Queensland, the depression and 
the 1891 strikes. Griffith, the former Liberal Premier, 
embarked upon a course of complete capitulation, throwing 
overboard the principles he had held for his entire political 
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lifetime. The Elections Bill was one example, but there were 
many others. The Pacific Island Labourers (Extension) Act 
was the result of continued pressure for governmental sanction 
of black labour on the part of the sugar planters. When" 
this Bill was introduced into the House, there was little 
effective protest. Most of the Northern members favoured 
reintroduction, particularly after the failure of the scheme 
34 to import Italian labourers. Foremost among the agitators 
was A.S, Cowley, the only Northern Cabinet Minister, ably 
assisted by M.H. Black, long an advocate of cheap labour, 
and a former Minister for Lands. Charles Powers, as Leader 
of the Opposition found himself in a difficult position. As 
a representative of the sugar constituency of Maryborough, 
Powers had little choice but to voice the opinions of those 
he represented, but he expressed concern at Griffith's 
volte-face'' in a letter to the Telegraph: 
As an advocate all along of Polynesian labour 
on Plantations, I can only feel pleasure in 
seeing the cause of all the trouble a convert; 
but such a declaration from the head of a 
Ministry must cause a dissolution and an 
appeal to the country. As a Queenslander, 
I feel it would be a sad thing for the colony, 
if-these political somersaults could be made, 
and pledges broken by leaders, without reference 
back to the people.35 
34. See above,Ch. 5. 
35. Maryborough Chronicle, 18.2.92. 
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The motion for the second reading was carried by 37 votes 
to 16.-' Among'those dissenting were the Labour members, 
W.H. Groom and his colleague for Toowoomba, William Aland, 
and Independent Northern member John Sayers. Of the other 
members opposed to the Bill, nearly all were from south-
eastern electorates - Barlow and Macfarlane, (Ipswich); 
Isambert (Rosewood); O'Sullivan (Stanley) and Salkeld 
(Passifern). Smith, Murray and Cadell represented pastoral 
districts. J.G. Drake was one of the strongest opponents of 
the Bill. During an election meeting at Kelvin Grove, he 
made his position clear: 
He was undoubtedly pledged as an opponent of 
black labour- The planters are trying to lead 
the public to believe that iffthe restriction 
on Polynesian labour were removed, there would 
be a sugar boom, but there was not a scrap of 
evidence to support such a supposition.37 
It can be seen that opposition in Parliament, while small, 
came from a variety of groups. Smith and Murray were both 
former members of the National Party; Sayers, Cadell and 
O'Sullivan regarded themselves as Independents, while the 
rest were former Liberals. 
The reasons for Griffith's actions are somewhat contra-
dictory- His biographer, A.D. Graham guotes him as saying: 
36. Q.P.D., LXVIII, (1892), p.151. 
37. Brisbane Courier, 16.2.93. 
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What ought a politician to do if he is confronted 
with the alternative of abandoning the convictions 
which he has consistently held during all his 
political life, or of adhering to them with the 
knowledge that the result would be that there 
would not be one shilling to pay the salary of 
any civil servant in Queensland on the following 
payday?38 
While the economic situation was somewhat exaggerated, Griffith 
was probably well aware that Liberal financial policy, which 
had failed in boom conditions, was unlikely to be able to 
cope with depression finance. Graham assejjts that there was 
considerable pressure brought to bear on the Premier by 
39 pressure groups Interested in sugar.-^^ Accusations that 
financial pressure was brought to bear on him personally, 
seem to have little foundation, as his debts seem to have 
40 little relation to the sugar Interest groups. It would 
appear that the apparent failure of other suggested 
alternatives - central milling and cheap white labour-left 
him with little choice. Whether there were other alternatives 
or not Is largely an academic question; suffice it to say 
that Griffith, whether it be due to personal or political 
limitations^saw none. 
According to the Courier, Griffith's change of heart 
41 
was generally well received. The Northern Mining Register 
38. Graham, A.D., Sir Samuel Walker Griffith, (U. of Q.^1938), 
p.47. ^ 
39. Ibid., p.47. 
40. Vockler, J.C, op.cit. , p.356. 
41. Brisbane Courier, 15.4.92. 
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observed thai; outside labour circles, particularly in 
Charters Towers, there was little opposition to Griffith's 
42 Manifesto in the North. The Maryborough Chronicle_^while 
it had long stood as an opponent of black labour could see 
little other alternative if the sugar industry were to be 
43 44 
saved. Not all journals agreed. Most objections were 
similar to that of the Gladstone Observer: 
We can see no sound argument for asking a dying 
Parliament, and one moreover that is pledged 
almost to a man against black labour to 
dishonour itself by a shameful and unwarrantable 
breach of trust.45 
The Premier received support from a womewhat surprising 
source. The Brisbane Ministers Union, a Protestant group, 
announced its approval. Their opinion was probably Influenced 
by the comments of many of the clergy who had had some 
missionary experience in the South Sea Islands. Bishop 
Selwyn, a former Bishop of Melanesia, considered that 
adequate protection was given the labourers, and that there 
46 
was now no question of slavery. The Bishop of Tasmania 
reported to the Governor, Sir Henry Norman, that "no complaint 
42. Northern Mining Register,6.4.92. 
43. Maryborough Chronicle, 12.2.92. 
44. The Toowoomba Chronicle quoted opposition articles from 
the Gympie Times, Gladstone Observer, Wide Bay Times, 
Rqekhampton Morning Bulletin, Lockyer Star and 
Queensland Times. Toowoomba Chronicle, 17.3.92. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Vockler, J.C., op.cit., p.267. 
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is made by the Natives against the Queensland system ... 
it is conclusive of the fact that the old traditions of 
cruelty and deceit have finally passed away ... I believe 
these sentiments. ... are those of the majority of the clergy 
of the Mission".^"^ 
In Labour circles, the effect of Griffith's Manifesto 
was little short of devastating. The I891 Strikes, and the 
Government actions in reaction to them had had the effect 
of propelling the more radical'to direct political organization, 
But many Queensland workers, such as members of craft unions 
and non-unionists, still regarded Griffith as a popular 
leader- Even after the strikes, it is possible he might 
have reasserted this position. His actions in March I892 
now made this politically impossible, reinforced by the 
Elections Act, and his sanction of land grant railways. 
Few workers would now disagree with the Worker: 
If we analyse Griffith's conduct we shall see 
that his dominant motive is an Insane desire 
to hold office ^at any cost ... lacking the 
courage and determination necessary to 
maintain his position as a popular leader ... 
he concludes that he can save himself as a 
politician by joining hand and glove with the 
reactionary party.^8 
47. Gov. in Letters,. 14.11.92. (Q.S.A.). 
48, Worker, 5-3.92. 
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THE POLITICS OF EXPEDIENCY 
While the Worker tended to castigate Griffith personally, 
his position was an extremely difficult one- In a way, the 
events of the first three years of the decade were a natural 
outcome of the previous decade. Nearly every measure of 
importance during this period had been in answer to the 
demands of industry for relief from the depression. The 
whole ethos of the Eighties had been based on the necessity 
of economic development, from which social welfare would 
necessarily flow. While this may have been defensible in 
conditions of economic stability, it was no longer defensible 
once the finances and economy of the colony had crashed. And 
yet, the political traditions of the old parties of Queensland 
were no longer able to cope effectively with the new 
situation, and, at the same time to secure social Justice. 
The severity of the I89I strike precluded the necessary 
broadening of outlook to enable the Government to sympathe-
tically deal with the labour problems arising from the 
depression. The result was that politics in Queensland were 
reduced to simple questions of economic and political 
expediency. Principles were jettisoned; the public demoralized^ 
the continuous Ministry had begun its inauspicious history. 
263. 
CHAPTER 12 
THE 1893 ELECTION 
In 1893, the depression in Queensland had reached its 
nadir. Political life too, had become cynical and corrupt. 
The Coalition of I89O, had, despite all expectations, 
survived to create a reputation for callous expediency 
almost unknown in the colony- Several developments almost 
Immediately prior to the election had further cast Queensland 
politicians into disrepute. Sir Samuel Griffith had 
resigned the Premiership to become Chief Justice. Sir Charles 
Lllley had suddenly resigned from that office. The Robb 
Arbitration Case had given striking evidence of political 
dishonesty. The elections were also to prove the harbinger 
of two very Important political events - the entry of the 
Labour Party into the House as a significant force, and the 
final evidence of the complete eclipse of the old Liberal 
Party, which after Griffith's coalition with Mellwraith, had 
developed into a sad disorganized opposition. 
THE PRELUDE 
The Queensland Investment and Land Mortgage Company 
included among its directors Sir Thomas Mellwraith and Sir 
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Arthur Hunter Palmer. In I89I, charges of fraud had been 
brought against the Directors and Accountants of the Company. 
The trial began in November I891, and the Solicitor-General, 
T.J. Byrnes, led the defence- Sir Charles Lllley, however, 
in his capacity of Chief Justice, had disregarded much 
evidence produced by the defence to reach a verdict 
unfavourable to Mellwraith and his colleagues. His 
resignation on the heels of the trial caused considerable 
comment, particularly as it had been widely hinted that 
Mellwraith intended to force such an obvious political 
opponent from the bench. Because of Lllley's partiality 
during this trial. In overruling evidence, and in allowing 
the Crown to change its plea with@ut hearing defence 
objections, Mellwraith was, according to Morrison, "determined 
that Lllley had to be driven from the Bench .... According 
to Bernays, he swore he would pass a resolution through 
both Houses of Parliament, removing him from his position. 
But he was fully aware of the difficulties and dangers of 
such a course: he must above all avoid the appearance of 
using Parliament against the judiciary simply to satisfy a 
2 
political feud". Sir Charles Lllley however, resigned on 
1. The decision was later reversed on appeal to Justice 
Wlndeyer. 
2. Morrison, A.A., "Charles Lllley", Q.R.A.H.S. I, p.23. 
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the grounds of ill-health, thus relieving Mellwraith of the 
necessity of such an action. E.R. Drury described the 
resignation of Lllley in a letter to Mellwraith: 
The C.JIS exit was not a grand one. Griffith 
intimated the resignation to Harding, but 
absented himself from the Court. Harding 
mourned over Sir Charles - was "labouring 
under deep emotion" - and eulogized the 
retiring colleague. Real sat by looking 
on grimly. Byrnes - sent by Griffith to 
represent the leader of the Bar - sat mute.3 
While Lllley had been in poor health for some time, there 
was no doubt that the major reason for his resignation was 
his Intention to re-enter political life. Premier of 
Queensland in 1868, Lllley had never really been happy away 
from the intrigues of politics. From the middle of the 
Eighties he had been in close contact with the Labour 
Electoral League M New South Wales. He found it difficult 
4 to act Impartially in his position of Chief Justice, and 
now harboured the desire to lead the forces of radicalism 
against Sir Thomas Mellwraith, his lifetime political enemy. 
Lllley was succeeded by Sir Samuel Walker Griffith. 
While he was eminently qualified for the position, his 
elevation was accompanied by a Jl,000 a year raise in salary 
Many commentators felt that the raise in salary was sheer 
3, Drury to Mellwraith, 29.2.93. (Mellwraith Papers, Oxley 
Library). 
4,, Morrison, A.A., op.cit. , p.2. 
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political dishonesty, particularly at a time when the 
5 
Governfient was severely reducing Civil Service salaries. 
Griffith had by this time, tired of politics, and his 
complete lack of enthusiasm had been noticed by all. The 
gradual abandonment of political principles had so disheartened 
him that he welcomed the new position. Mellwraith too was 
glad to see Griffith go. He had become almost an embarrass-
ment, in the sense that he still represented an old Liberal 
Party which had come to have no place in the Coalition. 
The Robb Arbitration case, which concerned the Government 
contract for the Cairns - Herberton railway^ gave more 
evidence of political dishonesty. It showed that "the whole 
Government work in connection with the contract has been a 
muddle of incompetency and favouritism". The reintroduction 
7 
of Pacific Island Labour, the land grant railway legislation 
and the Elections Act of 1892, had all contributed to the 
demoralization of the Liberal Party. 
The Elections Act had disfranchised about 30^ of voters 
by tightening residence qualifications. Particularly affected 
were nomadic bush workers and miners and according to W.H. 
Groom: 
5< Only 14 members of the Assembly opposed the Bill. 
6. Warwick Argus, 1.4.93. 
7. See above, Ch.4. 
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The influence and power of the Government were 
used to enfranchise 25,000 electors, and an Act 
was passed which in the sparsely peopled 
districts of the colony means, and was Intended 
to mean, total disfranchisement.8 
Moreover, the Payment of Members Bill, which had reduced 
the salaries of members by half,was seen by many critics 
' 9 
"as a blow aimed specltically at the Labour Party", 
THE PARTIES 
THE MINISTERIALISTS 
The Elections surprised many in their tardiness. As 
early as January 1892, the Courier had felt that the Ministry, 
which had so changed since 1888, did not have the mandate 
of the people and should call for new elections. The 
Labour Party, late in I891, had felt that elections could 
be expected reasonably soon. Therefore, most groups were 
relatively well prepared when the date of the Elections was 
announced. The Queensland Patriotic League provided the 
Ministerialists with some form of extra-parliamentary 
organization although Mellwraith retained full control. 
Mellwraith Insisted that J.J. Kingsbury should stand as his 
colleague in North Brisbane, and not the Q.P.L's candidate. 
8. -Toowoomba Chronicle, 15.4.93. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Brisbane Courier, 16.1.92. 
11. A.L.F. Platform, See Appendix 4. 
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12 J.D. Campbell, a well known Brisbane merchant. In South 
Brisbane, Buleock organized a private meeting to cut down 
lo 
the number of candidates. -* Only partial success attended 
the League's activities, A.F, Luya, a League reject, still 
contested South Brisbane with the result that the split 
Government vote allowed the election of Labour candidate, 
Henry Turley. Luya reflected the attitude of mariy 
Parliamentarians to such outside control. He insisted that 
he "would not submit to the Premier- It tis3 the endorsement 
of the people of South Brisbane Cl want3 not of anyone 
1 n 14 else". 
THE OPPOSITION 
The opposition was under the great disadvantage of 
lacking a strong and prestigious leader who could capture 
the public imagination. Late in I892, Hugh Muir Nelson 
had become Acting Premier while Griffith and Mellwraith were 
out of the colony. The appointment was not welcomed by 
15 Cabinet or public. The general effect of the new political 
situation was well described by the North Queensland Register: 
The recent startling Ministerial changes, by 
which parties have been fused in a most perplexing 
manner have bewildered the majority of electors. 
12. Morrison, A.A., Liberal Party Organizations Before 1900, 
(Typescript, Fryer Library), p.12. ~ 
13. Ibid,, p.13. 
14. Brisbane Courier, 3.5.93. 
15. Brisbane Courier, 12.12.92. 
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The most pathetic figures ^  however., are the once 
blind supporters of Griff 1th ..and IVIcIlwralth. 
While party lines were sharply defined, their 
politics admitted of no doubt, but now.they 
are too dazed to have any political opinions 
at all. They have lost all confidence in party 
backers and nothing short of a miracle will 
awaken their old fire and enthusiasm.l6 
In Charters Towers, Labour member Charles Pltzgei?ald asked 
the party to invite Sir Charles Lllley to come forward. The 
party leaders refused but indicated they would support the 
17 
ex-^hlef Justice should he come forward. Sir Charles 
s. 
intimated early in I893 that he was prepared to stand against 
Mellwraith in North Brisbane, as an Independent Oppositionist. 
-With all his old independence of mind, Lllley thus threw 
his vast prestige into the fray. 
Lllley was a great acquisition to the disorganized forces 
of opposition. For reasons both of personal rancour and 
political principle, he was prepared to co-operate with all 
antl-mlnlst-eriallsts, although his natural radicalism placed 
him to the left of many opponents of the Government. Never 
a party man, he was not prepared to undertake the arduous 
-1 o 
task of forming a new party. The Labour Party, despite 
the rebuff at Charters Towers looked forward to the association. 
According to the Worker "A tacit understanding between Sir 
16. North Queensland Register, 4.1.93. 
17. Drury to Mellwraith, 28.2.93. (Mellwraith Papers, Oxley 
Library). 
18. Brisbane Courier, 5.4.93. 
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Charles Lllley and his friends, and Mr. Glassey and his 
friends is of the very ijiast importance.... With Sir Charles 
Lllley, Mr- Glassey may reasonably look forward to prolonged 
and friendly association". ^ 
The Opposition formed a semi-official party around 
Lllley. It Included W.H. Groom, Arthur Morgan, J.G. Drake,] 
John Donaldson and Charles Powers. The Courier felt it 
could repiy upon the support of the Central constituencies, 
with the members of which they had voted against the 
20 Queensland Constitution Bill. 
The Labour Party's organization has already been discussed. 
For these elections, they agreed to leave several safe 
opposition seats unchallenged. The Opposition extended the 
21 
same courtesy to Labour- Tightly organized as it was 
however. Labour still showed its Inexperience by fielding 
too many candidates in several electorates - Balonne, 
Townsvllle, Cambooya and Woothakata. In Townsvllle, Ogden 
certainly would have been successful if there had not been 
three labour candidates. The Government was no wiser- Six 
electorates (Fortitude Valley, South Brisbane, Lockyer, 
Passifern, Croydon and Rosewood) were endangered by a plethora 
19. Worker, 1.4.93. 
20. Brisbane Courier, 5.4.93. 
21. Enoggera, Maryborough, Wide Bay, Port Curtis and 
Burnett. 
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of candidates. Of these, the Government lost Croydon and 
Enoggera. Extra-parliamentary organization was still a 
fairly haphazard process, 
THE ISSUES 
The Mcllwralth Government entered the elections pledged 
to maintain its retrenchment policy, to enforce law and 
order, and to increase the scale of Government borrowing to 
resume public works. The Government offered little in the 
way of positive legislation, content to rest upon its past 
record. Critics of the Government were not loath to take 
up the challenge. The major issues of contention were 
Polynesian and other coloured labour, land grant railways, 
the 1892 Elections Act, and the complete cessation of 
immigration. The Opposition, appealing to traditional areas 
of Liberal support also Included proposals for lower freight 
charges, a bonus on dairy produce and mining on private 
property. Sir Charles Lilley issued a separate Manifesto, 
more radical than that of the Opposition, advocating the 
repeal of the land grant railways legislation^and a favourite 
Labour platform, amA a progressive land tax, the issue which 
2S had split the Liberal Government in I887. -^  The Labour Party 
22, Warwick Argus, 11,4,93, 
23, Brisbane Courier, 14,4,93. 
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Issued its Manifesto somewhat later than the other parties. 
There was little in it which might provoke fears of 
revolution. Among its planks were included adult suffrage, 
a land tax, and state aid for the unemployed.^ The new 
party attacked the Government on black labour,railway policy 
and its general failure to implement election pledges. The 
Courier could find little to criticize, so contented itself 
with commending Labour's moderation, while insisting that 
"its iconoclastic designs are only thinly veiled .... The 
aim is to destroy existing institutions, to blacken the 
names of public men whose careers have made them worthy of 
the confidence of the people". -^  
While most election debates revolved most fiercely 
around these issues, other areas provided discussion. All 
parties paid some attention to separation. Opposition and 
Labour Parties advocated a separation referendum, while the 
Government promised to give the movement its consideration. 
Nevertheless, separation was not a major electoral pre-
occupation. The North Queensland Register, commenting on 
McLarty's independent candidature for Cunningham^felt his 
separation platform unwise. "Were Mr- McLarty otherwise 
acceptable to the electors, we do not believe his separation 
24. Worker, 22.4.93. 
25. Brisbane Courier, 19-4.93. 
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pl&nk will affect his chance, for just now there is no strong 
feeling on that question. The reply of Lord Ripon, and 
the financial crisis which has overtaken the colonies, puts 
the division of Queensland outside the realm.of practical 
27 politics". ' Thus, in both North and Central Queensland, 
separation had become a quiescent, albeit still live, issue 
in 1893. 
The fiscal question was also relatively non-contentious. 
Basically, a belief in the efficacy of free trade held sway 
?8 in North Queensland. The North Queensland Register gives 
an indication of the strength of free trade sentiment in 
that region: "Bad times are converting protectionists. Mr. 
29 Sayers was a believer some time ago but has fallen away 
30 from grace and'is now on the high road to free trade". 
The Queensland Protection League endorsed four candidates 
in the first batch of elections - Mellwraith, Kingsbury, 
31 John Watson and J-G. Appel. In the second batch, Foxton, 
32 Groom, Drake, Luya, and Midson were endorsed. Of these, 
Appel, Drake and Groom were Oppositionists, thus indicating 
that a belief in protection was not the sole preserve of any 
26. Referring the Separation question back to Parliament. 
27. North Queensland Register, 26.4.93. 
28. See above^Chs.. 3 and 6. 
29. Independent candidate for Charters Towers. 
30. North Queensland Register, 3.5.93. 
31. Brisbane Courier, 11.4.9"3'. 
32. Brisbane Courier, 14.3.93. 
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single party. 
While the sectarian issue was not strong, the Worker 
alleged that "on the very eve of the battle, the Catholic 
Church took the field against the Labour Party But 
for that, Mr- McCarthy would in all probability have been 
returned for Dalby, Sir Charles Lilley would have stood a 
better chance in North Brisbane, and one, if not both 
candidates would have almost certainly been successful in 
the Valley". ^-^  There is however, little overt evidence that 
any of the Churches took an active part in the elections. 
The Protestant Churches made their usual calls for action 
against drinking and gambling, but this does not seem to 
have affected the results in any electorate. 
Thus the parties faced each other over the battlefield 
of the previous three years - land grant railways, black 
labour, European immigration, and the franchise provided 
the main Issues upon which Queensland electors were to 
de cl de., 
THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS^^ 
The Mellwraith Government was returned with a convincing 
majority in the elections, held during April and May I893. 
33. Worker, 13.5.93. 
34. The results are tabled as fully as possible in 
Appendix 1. 
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The Government gained 42 seats, the Labour Party l6, and the 
Opposition 7. Seven Independents were returned. Governor 
Norman commented.upon the results to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies: 
It can be seen therefore that the Ministerialists 
have a slight majority over the other three parties 
combined, but this does not show the real strength 
of the Ministerialists, for certainly half, and 
possibly more than half, of the Opposition and 
Independent members would on nearly every vital 
question range themselves on the side of the 
Government.35 
It would seem, however, that Norman was slightly astray in 
his estimation. The voting record of the Opposition members 
returned show that all had consistently voted against the 
Government. Groom, Drake, Powers and Boles would certainly 
not align themselves with the Mellwraith Government, and 
Morgan and Thorn were also consistent in their hostility to 
it. Among the Independents, four were from the Central 
districts, and would probably vote with the Government on 
all Issues but separation. It would, however, need a leakage 
of thirteen Government votes to bring the Ministry down. 
Mellwraith had reason to feel secure. 
REGIONAL REPRESENTATION 
The most distinctive feature of the Elections was the 
35. Gov. Dispatches to Sec. of State for the Colonies 
(Conf), June, 1893. 
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great success of the Labour Party. Their success was, 
however, tempered by its regional nature. Of the sixteen 
members returned, seven were from North-western electorates 
(Kennedy, Lelchhardt, Charters Towers, Woothakata, Flinders 
and Croydon); and three were returned from the Central-west 
^lermont, Barcoo, Burke). Maranoa, also carried by Labour, 
was west of the Diving Range. Two Labour members were returned 
from Brisbane electorates, and' one each from Gympie, Cambooya 
and Toowoomba. 
The excellent results In the North were due to several 
factors. To some extent, the rise of labour was a reaction 
against the separation movement, which appeared to many 
workmen as simply a pretext under which coloured servile 
labour would be introduced. The association of the 
planters with the separation movement, Griffith's skilful use 
of anti-black labour sentiment, and the direct link of the 
planters with the National Party all contributed to this 
Impression. Griffith's actions^ in 1892, tended to convert 
many former Liberals into supporters of the Labour Party. 
A second factor of major significance is that many 
electorates won by labour were mining constituencies -
Croydon, Woothakata, Gympie, Charters Towers were actually 
36. Bolton, G.C, A Thousand Miles Away (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 
1963), p.193. 
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gold-fields, while Flinders, Kennedy and Clermont, contained 
the major fields of Ravenswood, Cloncurry and Clermont, 
This direct link between working class radicalism and the 
37 
mining industry has been analysed by June Stoodley. It 
was particularly centred in, Charters Towers, which was 
described by the Worker in I89I: 
CCharters Towers^ as the most settled and 
concentrated place necessarily gives decided 
tone to the whole North Country .... Unionism 
at Charters Towers, aifer' all has been said 
that can be said after local jealousies, 
means really unionism in North Queensland.38 
To a certain extent, mining areas had always been centres of 
Liberal-radical strength so that in Charters Towers, Labour 
replaced Opposition rather than Ministerial candidates. In 
this seat, R.J, Sayers ran as an Independent, in complete 
opposition to the Mellwraith Government. His platform was 
a radical one, including repeal of the Inmigratlon Act and 
coloured labour, the state ownership of all railways, 
reservation of all minerals and the right to mine on private 
property with compensation. Along with a general support for 
separation, Sayers also advocated two favourite labour 
39 platforms a-land tax and one man one vote. That he was 
.A 
37. Stoodley, J., ^The Queensland Goldmlner in the 19th 
Century" (IJii|)u|l. Sa.A. Thesis, U. of Q..>(^ 60 
38. Worker, -5.9.91. 
39. Northern Miner, 20.4.93. 
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relegated to third place, six hundred votes behind Dunsford, 
Indicates the complete dominance of Labour, In this election^ 
however, most Opposition candidates avoided the mining 
electorates, thus leaving the field clear for a straight-out 
battle between Labour and the Ministry, 
Labour strength in the mining areas was weakest at Mount 
Morgan and Gympie, as well as in the South-eastern coal 
district of Bundamba. In 1888, Glassey had won Bundamba, 
primarily because of a split Opposition vote. Opposed in 
1893 only by Thomas, a local mine owner, Glassey failed to 
retain his seat. This indicates the strength that mine 
owners could muster in small mining electorates. According 
to the Worker, Gla,ssey's defeat was attributed to Thomas's 
40 threat to close the mines unless elected. While this 
rumour may have had some effect,. Glassey's defeat was brought 
about rather by the far greater resources commanded by his 
opponent. Mount Morgan is a better illustration of the 
power of owners and managers, and the growing split between 
Labour a^nd capital. The Worker malnta4=ned that "of all the 
elections in Queensland, none equalled Mount Morgan for 
intimidation". In l893, McCarthy, standing in the Labour 
40. Worker, 20.5.93. 
41* Worker, 10-6.93. 
279. 
interest againstaDlrector A.J. Callan, was dismissed after 
the election. There were constant reports of intimidation 
and lack of secrecy in the. ballot. On the other hand, 
Stoodley points out that the Company was particularly 
mindful of the safety of employees. W.R. Hall, a personal 
friend of Griffith, was particularly popular with the miners, 
and is described by Stoodley: 
One gains the impression of a paternal despot 
governing Mount Morgan kindly but rigidly; one 
facet the provider of comforts and amenities, 
the other an autocrat very likely to resent 
union organization and action as disloyalty 
and ingratitude- This reading may perhaps 
explain the paradox of the Company's attention 
to the welfare, and yet apparant restriction 
of the political independence of its employees.42 
It would appear then that party representation may be partly 
defined in regional terms. The Darling Downs returned three 
opposition candidates and two Labour representatives from 
eight seats; the mining areas were predominantly Labour; the 
inner urban and manufacturing areas were primarily Ministerial. 
The greatest areas of Ministerial strength were the Northern 
43 
coastal areas, centres of the sugar industry, the Brisbane 
metropolitan area, the. South-eastern farming belt and Wide 
Bay, 
42. Stoodley, J., op.clt., p.399 -
43. One exception, at least until 1893,was Cairns, not 
so much confined to sugar production. 
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That the Darling Downs was predominantly a centre of 
political radicalism was the result of the long struggle of 
the selectors and small businessmen against the overriding 
Influence of the squatters. That it remained a Liberal 
stronghold after this Influence had faded, as it had by I89O, 
is probably the result of two factors - the entrenchment of 
personalities actively engaged in Downs politics, and the 
neglect shown by the Coalition towards the agricultural 
industry. Moreover, with land more equally divided. Labour 
was not as militant on the Downs as it was further wept. 
In the south-east, the farming areas exhibited similar 
conditions of land equality. But this area remained with 
the Ministerialists because it lacked the tradition of 
radicalism and also received more government patronage. A 
third factor was the lack of an Opposition press apart from 
the Worker, of the standard of either of the Downs Opposition 
newspapers, the Toowoomba Chronicle and Warwick Argus, 
In the metropolitan electorates, labour and opposition 
candidates fared badly. Some of this may have been due to 
the plural vote, McDonnell, Labour candidate for Fortitude 
Valley, claimed that 5OO votes were cast against Labour by 
44 
absentee landlords. The failure in metropolitan areasIs 
44, Sullivan, R,, 'Early Labour in Queensland with Special 
Reference to Albert Hinchcllffe"(M.A. Qual. Thesis, 
U. of Q. 1969), Ch.5, p.20, 
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however explainable in less specific terms. Lacking the 
special characteristics of mining and farming areas, the 
metropolitan businessman could only fear the radicalism of 
Labour- Many former Liberal voters could not vote Labour, 
and with such a small Opposition, were left with little 
alternative but to vote for Mellwraith, Moreover, Mcllwralth's 
financial reputation would have swayed many of those voters 
who were severely hit by the closing of the banks. Despite 
the enormous prestige of Sir Charles Lllley, the Opposition 
could field no candidate with the financial ability, real 
or supposed, of Mellwraith. 
A CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT 
That there was no formal Liberal-Labour alliance probably 
did not affect the result. The I893 Elections had shown 
that_, despite all evidences of political dishonesty on the 
part of the Government^the electors, suffering from empty 
pockets, were not prepared to accept an alternative. The 
Labour party had emerged with tremendous regional strength, 
the Opposition had managed to retain seven seats, but it 
was the Ministry which emerged victorious. Perhaps the 
Toowoomba Chronicle best described the new Government, 
which was to hold office until 1903: 
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Coalition cannot be decently applied to it. It 
is purely and simply conservative, and conservative 
in its worst sense.... It is the old National 
Party revived, with renegade Liberals thrown in 
to catch the votes of the groundlings.45 
45. Toowoomba Chronicle, 25.3.93. 
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SECTION THREE - THE POLITICS OF EXPEDIENCY 
CHAPTER 13 
THE FIRST NELSON GOVERNMENT 
The 1893 Election had destroyed any semblance of 
Coalition Government in Queensland, a development which had 
already been hastened by the elevation of Griffith to the 
Chief Justiceship in I892. Political life was in the future 
to exhibit a new i-Stpartlsan division, following three years 
of confusion. The solidarity of the sixteen Labour members, 
combined with a consistent Opposition bloc^meant that 
effective opposition was possible. Between the two election 
years of 1893 and I896, the Government, first under the 
leadership of Mellwraith and then under that of Sir Hugh 
Muir Nelson was' defeated on several occasions, but art rio 
stage was it possible for Opposition and Labour to combine, 
with the result that there was little defection from 
Government to the Remnant Opposition, which at no stage 
seemed likely to gain power. 
The period may be described as one of general political 
stability, characterized by an enormous amount of "roads 
and bridges" legislation, as the Government continued to 
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answer the needs of Queensland Industry, which had only 
partially recovered from the effects of depression. To 
other, non-economic demands, the Government maintained a 
deaf ear. It was also a period of continued labour unrest, 
culminating in the l894 Shearers Strike and an incredible 
piece of repressive legislation called the Peace Preser-
•^ ation Act. The continued hostility on the part of a 
reactionary Government towards labour activity, only tended 
to strengthen the resolve of Labour Parliamentarians to 
remain an Independent force within the political framework, 
and to resist Opposition overtures towards Coalition. 
THE DEMANDS OF INDUSTRY AND ITS PRESSURE GROUPS 
Of all Queensland industries, pastoralism was the most 
organized, and niost insistent in Its demands. Its demands 
moreover were those most promptly answered. Sugar too, 
which had Improved since I892, was also given encouragement, 
while agriculture ran a poor third in the battle for 
Government assistance. 
While the Pastorallsts Association had come into 
existence in response to challenges from trade unionism, its 
members had decided to use it as an Instrument of pressure in 
the legislative field. According to Ranson, one time Secretary 
of the U.P.A., "it was found that the Government of that day 
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was not averse to having some competent authority to whom 
it could look for information from the practical point of 
view in regard to any legislation proposed for submission 
to Parliament". The Introduction of a Bill to Encourage 
the Manufacture and Export of Beef and Dairy Produce was 
largely the result of pressure from the U.P.A. This Bill 
placed a tax on stock, the proceeds of which were to be 
placed in a loan fund for the establishment of meat and 
2 
dairy processing works. The legislation received a mixed 
reception. Pastorallsts situated near ports where meatworks 
would be built preferred this to either a bonus system or 
guarantees. Those in the far west felt that a guarantee 
system was preferable, whereby pastorallsts could avail 
themselves of Government aid only if they wished. While 
the Encouragement Bill was all Inclusive, the Toowoomba 
Chronicle regarded the Bill as aimed exclusively at the 
pastoral Industry: 
It may, and we hope it will, have a beneficial 
effect in providing some outlet for our surplus 
, meat supply, but as regards the encouragement of 
dairy produce, we are sadly afraid the results 
would be the reverse of encouraging.4 
1. Ranson, F., A History of the United Graziers Association 
in Queenslan¥^ (Typescript, U.G.A,, Brisbane), p.36. 
2. The tax was to be levied on all sheep and cattle de-
pastured in Queensland at the rate of 15/- per 100 
cattle and 1/6 per 100 sheep. 
3. Warwick Argus, 15.8.93. 
4. Toowoomba Chronicle, 24.8.93. 
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The sugar Industry had benefited from the reintroduction of 
coloured labour, and received further aid in the sugar works 
Guarantee Act, which provided a guarantee on a ifor sf basis 
on all milling works constructed. But the agricultural 
industry, which had always been the poor relation of the 
four primary industries received little government assistance, 
except where this coincided with the aid given to the 
pastoral Industry, such as remission of rents on construction 
of rabbit-proof fencing. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIES 
The period saw a tendency towards far greater organization 
on the part of the producing Industries. This may be 
attributed, directly or Indirectly, to the needs created by 
the depression. The development of labour organization may 
be seen as partly a response to depression, and the formation 
of the U.P.A. was in reaction to the growth of unionism. The 
5 Queensland Farmers Alliance may also be seen as the result 
of declining prosperity. The Alliance was seen as a pressure 
group because "for the first time, the utterances of those 
who believed in pressure politics on a sectional basis and 
conducted by farmer representatives were taken seriously by 
5. See above^Ch.10. 
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the majority of Downs settlers." The radicalism of the 
alliance precluded it from achieving the success of the 
U.P.A. Farmers had never been solid supporters of 
Conservative Government in Queensland; more often than not 
they had supported the old Liberal Party, and now were to 
be found in opposition. The Sugar Industry too had its own 
organizations. The Pioneer River Farmers Organization was 
primarily an organization of the sugar planters. The Mackay 
Sugar Journal had observed in May I892 "the necessity of 
some form of combination amongst growers, manufacturers, 
and others Interested in sugar is gradually forcing itself 
upon the people who at present are acting singly, or in 
7 
small coteries, in the different sugar districts." 
POLITICS AND THE PRESSURE GROUPS 
Some of the pressure groups were overtly political, 
such as the United Pastorallsts Association and to a lesser 
extent the Farmers Alliance, while others professed to be 
non-political, as advocated by the Sugar Journal: 
The Sugar Journal is absolutely indifferent to 
party politics, its sole desire being to assist 
such measures as will lead to the protection and 
expansion of our tropical Industries.8 
6, Waterson, D.B., Squatter,, Selector, Storekeeper (Sydney 
U.P., 1968), p.72. 
T. Mackay Sugar Journal, I, IV, I892, p.6l. 
i. Ibid., II, I, 1893, p.l. 
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However, the,Pioneer River Farmers Association was very 
hostile to labour objectives, and many Conservatives feared 
such organizations as the Farmers Alliance. The Darling 
Downs Gazette argued that: 
Farmers should look to assistance within themselves 
and not to Parliament. The former resolve is 
noble and the latter contemptible. The one will 
land the country in peace and prosperity, the other 
precipitate it into anarchy and misery.^ 
Pew producers agreed with this point of view. The A.P.R. 
indicated that pastorallsts had no hesitation in appealing 
to the Government or its agencies. It called for the 
Railway Commissioners to build freezing works at depots to 
facilitate meat export: 
The contention that it is a matter for private 
enterprise is no doubt a sound one, but in the 
present exceptional conditions ... it is 
believed that unless the matter is taken up 
by the railway authorities, it may lie in 
abeyance for years.10 
Just as the pastoral Industry relied on its parliamentary 
representatives to propagate its views, agriculture was 
also represented. The members from farming communities did, 
to some extent, form a group which cut across party 
distinctions. In 1894 they had formed themselves into a 
Parliamentary Agricultural Union, which met weekly in order 
9. Darling. Downs Gazette, 3.10.91. 
10. A.P.R., IV, II, p.59. 
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to discuss matters affecting the agricultural Industry. 
Its members included eight Ministerialists, three Oppositionists 
and two members of the Labour Party. The group, according 
to the Courier was a useful Innovation: 
The union of members who represent farming 
constituencies will be able to render valuable 
assistance to the industry if it is left clear 
of party passion and aims.12 
Despite this pr6.mising beginning, however, party cleavage 
was becoming too great for combination along these lines. 
J-V. Chataway, a future Minister for Agriculture, addressing 
the Pioneer River Farmers Association, lamented the lack of 
Government interest in agriculture and advised farmers to 
build up a political organization. But, he continued, this 
13 
should be "bitterly hostile" to Labour. Labour attitudes 
were not always conducive to rapport with the farmers. The 
Queensland Times indignantly reported Mat Reid's remark that 
if the farmers put in as many systematic hours of work as 
the man in town, they would be in a 10^ better position than 
they are now. The Ipswich newspaper commented: "The member 
for Toowong and his colleagues in the Labour Party will 
scarcely advance their project of "capturing the farmer" by 
11. Ministerialists: Stevens, Grimes, Crlbb, Armstrong, 
Allan, G. Thorn, Thomas, Lord. 
Opposition: Groom, Morgan, Plunkett. 
Labour: Daniels and King. 
12. Brisbane Courier, 1.8.95. 
13. Ibid., 6.2.95. 
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that sort of talk",""-
MelLWRAITH AND THE PASTORALISTS 
The strength of the Queensland pastorallsts is illus-
trated by the stormy history of the Railway Border Tax Bill 
introduced by Mellwraith early in the session of I893. The 
Bill was the outcome of differences between the Queensland 
and New South Wales Railway Commissioners. N.S.W- officials 
had instituted a system of lower freight rates, and had 
attracted considerable Queensland traffic. Mellwraith, by 
placing a tax on all outgoing produce hoped to put a stop 
to this practice which was depriving Queensland lines of 
much needed revenue. 
It was apparent that Ministerial members from south-
western areas, where most pastorallsts used the N.S.W. 
lines, would oppose the Bill, and the Premier prepared for 
a tough battle. He was to win by only the barest of margins. 
Debate on the Bill was protnacted. Most of those opposed 
to the Bill purported to oppose it on principle. John 
Leahy argued that, "This is not a railway tax. It is a 
wool tax ... if a wool tax is desirable, whg? not tax the 
15 
whole of Queensland. Why penalize a few people?" ^ J. 
Hoolan, leader of the Labour Party took a similar line: 
14. Queensland Times, 28.6,94. 
15. Q,P,D., LXX, (1893), p.151. 
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,,, as a measure of taxation it must be condemned 
by every fair minded person, seeing that it 
applies only to a few persons, and not to the 
whole colony, or to the whole of those engaged 
in the particular Industry concerned,16 
The vote on the Bill resulted in a 29-29 draw- Governor 
Norman attributed the close vote to the fact that all the 
non-Ministerialists voted together, joined by some 
Ministerialists, with several Government supporters abstaining. 
Of those Ministerialists who did not vote, Hamilton, Foxton, 
Bell, Chataway and Dalrymple were in the precincts of the 
17 House, and therefore had refused to vote. Ministerialists 
voting with the Opposition were Agnew, Murray, Phillips, 
Crombie and Allan. Independents Leahy and Harding voted 
with the Opposition and Archer and Callan abstained. 
Mellwraith had already indicated that he regarded the 
issue as a party question, and so announced his resignation. 
The Governor however was "determined to decline as far as I 
could do so to accept the resignation of Sir Thomas 
1 8 
Mellwraith." With the inexperience of the other major 
party in the House, Labour, and the smallness of the Opposition, 
no alternative Government could be found, and Mellwraith 
proceeded to do his utmost to push the Bill through. The 
16. Ibid., p.163. 
17. Warwick Argus, 8.7.93. 
18. Gov. Conf. Despatches to the Sec. of State, 13.7-93. 
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near destruction of the Government rallied Ministerial 
supporters, and Dalrymple, Callan, Thorn and Petrle came to 
the rescue of the Ministry. Commenting on the events, the 
Courier drew attention to the domposltlon of the House: 
— '} 
The incident brings to light the inconvenience 
of the House being split up into distinct 
sections, only one of which is entitled to 
the designation of a parliamentary party. 
The Labour group has the numbers, but not the 
experience or the leadership. The remnant of 
the old Opposition is helpless even for effective 
critieism, although they have able leaders. The 
other section comprises the Central members, the 
majority of whom express Ministerial sympathies, 
except on the question of separation.19 
This incident, while not of great significance in itself. 
Illustrated the ability of the Government to control fractious 
supporters, and the extent to which it relied upon the 
pastoral vote. If once that vote was alienated, it would 
have scant hope of survival^ even with the House still in 
such a fluid state. 
NON-ECONOMIC DEMANDS - EDUCATION 
While the Queensland Government was quick to recognize 
the need for state aid to some sectors of Queensland industry, 
non-producing fields were neglected in the allocation of 
moneys. The depression was affecting the education system as 
19. Brisbane Courier, 6.7=93. 
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well as other areas of social life. In 1893, the Queensland 
Parliament had reduced the education vote from /20,000 to 
^10,000. In order to meet this vote, "the classes for the 
instruction of teachers in drawing, kindergarten and drill 
were done away with; children under the age of six were no 
longer admitted; the number of grammar school scholarships 
reduced from'120 to 52 ... the allowances of teachers were 
considerably lowered, and this diminution was additional 
to the special 10| deduction from the salaries of all civil 
20 
servants; and promotions in classification were arrested." 
Understandably, the Queensland teachers felt they were 
being singled out for excessively harsh treatment. The 
Queensland Teachers Union, formed in I889, rapidly became 
severe critics of the Government, attracting considerable 
support from those interested in Queensland education. This 
attempt to "retrench education" was typical of the Government's 
complete indifference to matters other than economic develop-
ment and labour militancy. Calls for a system of State 
secondary and tertiary education fell on deaf ears. In 
1895 O'Connell moved in Parliament that superior schools be 
established. This meant that children in areas where there 
were no grammar schools could benefit from higher education. 
20, Q.V.P., II, (1894), p.564. 
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The Government reacted halfheartedly to the affirmative vote 
received on this occasion. An amendment Act was introduced, 
which increased the number of secular subjects which might 
be taught in fifth and sixth grades, under the control of 
the Governor in Council. Even this concession was 
disapproved by some members. Battersby maintained that, 
"my contention is that if we confined ourselves to teaching 
the "three R's" in State schools, we would be doing all that 
is necessary; parents who wish their children to be taught, 
more than that should pay for it themselves. The sooner the 
Government recognize that this is the principle they ought 
PI 
to adopt, the better for the taxpayers of the colony". 
Similar arguments attended debates surrounding the 
establishment of. a University in the Colony. Sir Samuel 
Griffith and Sir Charles Lllley had long promoted the cause 
of 'tiertlary education, and university extension had been a 
politico-educational topic for nearly two decades. But it 
was to no avail. Tertiary education suffered the same fate 
as other.fields of education. During the Nineties, it was 
also confronted by. labour hostility. In 1898, Glassey 
illustrated the attitude of the majority of his party: "the 
establishment of a university would merely benefit those who 
21. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), p.999 
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are in a position to give their children a higher education 
22 in some other part of the world". 
Throughout the Nineties, then, the needs of education 
were ignored. The Government was evidently satisfied with 
the system as it stood. The system of Grammar Schools was 
felt adequate for the needs of the colony in the field of 
higher education. Under the provisions of the Grammar 
Schools Act, a grammar school could be established in any 
area where a sum of not less than ilOOO had been raised 
locally. The Governor in Council could authorize a subsidy 
equal to the amount raised. Secondary education then was 
regarded as the responsibility of private individuals. 
THE QUESTION OP STATE AID TO DENOMINATIONAL SCHOOLS 
The private schools of Queensland, existing alongside 
those of the State, had also been affected by the depression, 
and some of the denominations again began to agitate for 
state aid. This period saw a revival of the demands for 
state aid on the part of the Roman Catholic Church, and for 
religious instruction by the other denominations. The 
education issue had been settled in I88O, when, in accordance 
with the 1875 Education Act, all State aid had been withdrawn 
from Church schools. Provision had been made for Ministers 
22. Q.P.D., XXLIX, (1898), p.3. 
297. 
of Religion to visit the State Schools for the purposes 
of religious instruction, but the idea had never been 
popular and had been attended only by apathy- In 1894, 
the Inspector General of Education reported that "there 
is no stir in regard to biblical education, except in 
some of the Church Courts; apparently, those who would 
like to see the Relg^ gion of the Bible taught in our 
schools ... are too hopelessly in the minority to secure 
23 
a hearing for their views in the political arena". 
Nevertheless, the Bible in State Schools League had been 
formed in I89I, and its activities steadily Increased 
throughout the decade. The "free compulsory and secular" 
system of education was well established by the Nineties, 
but in 1895, the Roman Catholic Church made clear its 
determination that the State should pay a subsidy for the 
secular instruction carried out in Church schools. 
In this aim, the Catholic Church was opposed by all 
other denominations. In January 1895, Anglican Bishop 
Webber, stated: 
F03^ the Government of Queensland to make grants 
to denominational schools would be to go back 
on the whole principle which distinguished the 
Australian from the English system of education. 
The English is for the State to subsidize; in 
Australia the State undertakes the work of 
education.24 
23. Q.V.P., II, (1894), p.613. 
24. Brisbane Courier, 3.1.95. 
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Despite their opposition to State aid, it was becoming 
clear by I895 that the Protestant denominations were 
dissatisfied with the system as it stood. Throughout the 
period, the Bible in State Schools League tried to reconcile 
differing opinions among the various groups, and their 
failure to achieve unanimity was partly the reason for the 
failure of their campaign in the Nineties. The denominations 
simply could not agree about the type of instruction or 
the time in which it should be given. 
Throughout the decade, the Government turned a deaf 
ear to the demands of both Catholic and Protestant Churches. 
By 1901, the movement was beginning to lose patience, a 
development indicated by the Presbyterian journal. Austral 
St ar: 
If the Government persistently refuses to accede 
to the reasonable request of the majority of 
the electors of Queensland, viz. the members of 
the Anglican, Presbyterian and Wesleyan Churches, 
we will have no alternative but to join- hands 
with those who demand a return to denominational 
endowment.25 
Nevertheless, the demand for religious' instruction in state 
schools did not become an immediate political issue until 
the turn of the pentury. The potential for action remained, 
but it was the Catholic challenge to the education system 
25. Aiisfrai Star, Sept. 190I. 
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which provided a sectarian reaction during the I896 
Election dampaign. 
•PARLIAMENTARY' LIFE 
While the struggle for Increased educational 
opportunities, either secular or religious, continued, it 
was a struggle conducted largely outside Parliament. 
Parliamentary life was characterized by the growing experience 
of the Labour Party, the determined resistance of the 
Opposition to complete loss of identity, and the entrenched 
conservatism of the Ministerialists. The period was for 
the most part fairly uneventful, but one sequence of events 
brought the Queensland Parliament under Australia-wide 
scrutiny- These events were described by the' Warwick Argus 
in October 1894: 
Neither the Government nor the country can be 
congratulated on the character of the proceedings 
in Parliament last week.... Ministers brought 
down a measure to preserve the peace ... by 
which means, no other British colony, so far as 
we are aware, has ever yet found it necessary to 
employ.27 
Drastic words Indeed. And yet the measure the journal 
described, the Peace Preservation Bill, remained a shameful 
blot on Queensland Statute Books. It had been brought 
down as a result of events during the 1894 Shearers strike. 
26, See below, Ch. l4. 
27. Warwick Argus, 22.10.94. 
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and while it was never put into operation, it illustrated 
the reactionary nature of the Queensland Government. 
THE 1894 STRIKE 
In September 1894, the Australian Pastorallsts Review 
observed that "the feeling of depression in pastoral 
circles is, at the present time, more intense than has been 
?8 the case for many years". There are several reasons for 
this - the breakdown of American tariff negotiations, 
shearing trouble, and static wool prices. It surprised 
no one when the pastorallsts proved as Intransigent towards 
the unions as they had In I89I. At the beginning of the 
year, the A.P.R. had made its attitude very clear, when it 
had warned that "the maintenance of union on the part of 
the pastorallsts was never more necessary. To be prepared 
for war is, under the present circumstances, the first 
29 
condition of peace". 
Pastorallsts were therefore well prepared for trouble 
when they published the new shearing agreement. The 
Agreement included a new clause which gave the shed overseer 
much more authority than he had previously exercised. He 
could interpret the rules of the agreement and could decide 
28. A.F.R., IV, 7, 1894, p.l. 
29. 'IbM. 
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whether sheep were, or were not, "wet". Shearers believed 
that shearing wet sheep would lead to arthritis and that 
30 the decision should remain with them. A second 
contentious article was the discharge system whereby the 
employer, the shearers feared, could use the reference 
system to blacklist unionists they considered dangerous. 
Even the Courier felt the pastorallsts were being needlessly 
intransigent on this issue: 
The doubtful point in the situation is the 
apparent indisposition of the squatters to 
entertain a proposal for a conference. A 
request for one was made as long ago as January, 
but it cannot be considered by the Queensland 
Pastorallsts Council until June, and even 
then it must be remitted to the Federal 
Council for decision. This delay does not 
look well.32 
The strike of I894 began in late June, after the U.P.A., 
two months after the Courier^s editorial, had again refused 
to confer with the A.L.F. The strike did not last as long 
as its counterpart in I891, but was marked, if possible, by 
even more bitterness. The pastorallsts were in a strong 
position and were not seriously affected by the strike, 
particularly as it was not as widespread as that of I891. 
The strike was officially called off on 26th September I894. 
So. Brisbane courier, 20.4.94. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid-., 26.4.94. 
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The Government again proved as partisan as in I891. 
Instead of employing the Army, it used the police, and 
under Tozer's Instructions to Justices of the Peace and 
Police the forces of the law were given almost unlimited 
powers of arrest at the slightest sign of trouble. The 
Sydney Daily Telegraph described the instructions as a 
"ghastly official announcement" and continued: 
Not even in the most autocratically governed 
country of Europe has a more, cold-blooded 
Incitement to take human life been issued 
with official sanction.33 
THE PEACE PRESERVATION BILL 
Tozer's instructions were followed by legislative 
legitimization in the form of the Peace Preservation Act, 
Introduced on 5th September, 1894. It gave the Government 
power to arrest any man on the grounds of suspicion and 
to hold him, without trial, for thirty days with a provisional 
warrant, or for two months with a special licence. Clause 
11 prevented a man from refusing to answer questions on the 
grounds that he might incriminate himself. 
The Bill produced extraordinary scenes in the Assembly, 
Labour members, Browne, Dawson, Dunsford, Reid, Turley and 
McDonald were suspended for disorderly conduct, and were 
33. Reported in the Worker, 8.9.94. 
303 
voluntarily followed out of the House by their colleagues. 
The stormy passage of the Bill through Parliament showed 
that the labour members were still too Inexperienced to be 
a maximally effective political force. Together, the 
Opposition and Labour members could perhaps have amended 
the Bill out of existence. By allowing themselves to be 
suspended, the Labour Party allowed the Government to gag 
the Bill through the House, which together, the opposition 
could have prevented. 
The Bill, and the proceedings which accompanied it, 
were regarded by many Queenslanders as being contrary to 
the traditions of British justice and parliamentary firactice. 
The' Warwick- Argus ,, was of the opinion that "the expelled 
members were denied the rights clearly contemplated by the 
Standing Orders of the House and established by precedent 
»., i the question ,,, ought to be taken to the Supreme 
34 Court."- Nelson defended the actions of the Speaker and 
the Government in a letter to Governor Norman. He accused 
the Labour Party of "flagrant obstruction" and continued 
that he failed to see any grounds for legitimate complaint, -^  
Opposition members, Drake, Boles, Groom, Morgan, Powers and 
34. • Warwick-Argus , l8.10.94, 
35. Nelson to Norman 25.10.94 (Premiers Dept. Q.S.A.), 
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William Thorn consistently opposed the Bill, and all except 
Boles signed, with the Labour members, a petition to the 
Governor requesting him to withhold assent to the Bill. 
The Governor, however, felt that he was constitutionally 
unable to do so, and the Bill duly received royal assent. 
LABOUR AND THE OPPOSITION 
The Peace Preservation Bill had given evidence that 
there existed the possibility of a far greater degree of 
co-operation between the Labour and Opposition members.,> 
This, however, failed to reach any definite position of 
coalition. Prior to the introduction of the Bill, Glassey, 
as Leader of the Labour Party had declined to accept Powers 
as leader of a combined Opposition. Labour was not prepared 
37 to accept the position of constitutional Opposition. 
Powers had made every overture possible to promote such an 
alliance. In an address to his constituents he had said: 
The Opposition was prepared to meet the Labour 
Party and sign a practical radical programme 
.... He could support all that was practicable, 
but if they wanted more than that, their remedy 
was in the next Parliament ... he condemned the 
principle of sending members to Parliament 
boundj to the political platform of the A.L.F. 
and also subject to the dictation of that body.38 
36. Ibid. 
37. Warwick Argus, 1.10.94. 
38. Maryborough Chronicle, 9.6.94. 
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The Worker made it clear that it would countenance no such 
combination: 
There must be no compromise either with the 
Opposition or the Government supporters .... 
Why should Labour coalesce ,,, the duty of 
the Labour Party is now more distinct than 
it ever was. It must give no quarter and 
take none.39 
Without some sort of Liberal-Labour coalition the 
likelihood of bringing the Government down was very distant 
indeed. The Opposition suffered from a lack of dynamic 
leadership. The Courier discussed alternatives; 
There is in fact, no leader of the Opposition 
proper ,,, who is politically qualified for 
the leadership, Mr, Groom a veteran politician, 
though powerful on the platform and saturated 
with parliamentary practice has never been a 
good fighting man within the walls of the 
Assembly .,, Mr. Powers ,,. shrewd, 
indefatiguable and fluid, fails to command 
the intelligence of the House ,,,, Perhaps 
a better lieutenant than Mr. Powers could 
not be desired by a natural leader.40 
FURTHER CHALLENGES' TO THE' GOVERNMENT' PAYMENT OP' MEMBERS 
Payment of members had always been a bi>*partisan issue 
in Queensland politics during the Eighties, and continued 
to be as the new bijtpartisan division of the Nineties emerged. 
In 1892, the salaries of members had been cut, and in August 
1893, the Government was defeated by seven votes on Hamilton's 
39. Worke,r,, 2.4,94, 
40. Brisbane Courier, 16.4.94. 
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resolution: "That it was desirable to Introduce a bill to 
amend the Payment of Members Act of I89O and I892". On  
this occasion seven Ministerialists crossed the floor, and 
4l four Independents voted for the motion. MOst of the 
Ministerialists were from far distant electorates - Musgrave, 
Cook, Mackay and Normanby. While defeat on such a resolution 
did not constitute sufficient reason for resignation, the 
Government was bound, by custom, to introduce legislation 
along the lines suggested. It soon became obvious that 
the Nelson Government had no intention of acting upon 
majority opinion. According to the Government, it would 
be unfair if parliamentarians increased their salaries while 
those of most of the Civil Service had been cut. On the 
othfer hand, the Opposition felt that the Government resisted 
every measure which may have increased the strength of 
the Labour Party, 
The question arose next session, when Hamilton Introduced 
a Bill to increase payment of members. The Government was 
defeated a second time when the second reading was passed by 
32 votes to 22, and on the third reading by 31 to 28. The 
second reading saw two more Ministerialists cross the floor -
41, Ministerialists were Battersby, Bell, Chataway, Hamilton, 
Murray, O'Connell, Duffy, Independents were Leahy, 
Curtis, Cadell and Harding, 
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Dalrymple (Mackay) and Duffy (Bundaberg). Even though the 
third reading had been passed, the Bill did not become law, 
as the Legislative Council rejected it by 24 votes to 2. 
As this Bill was regarded by most members as a money 
Bill, the action of the Council was widely condemned on 
constitutional grounds. Ministerial journals defended the 
Council. The Queens1and Times could see no flouting of 
the constitution: 
Had the Bill been sent to the Upper Chamber by 
the Government, the Upper Chamber would 
naturally have been chary in refusing its 
passage into actual law, but it must be 
remembered that it did not emanate from the 
Ministry.^2 
Few members agreed. Hamilton, with unusual tenacity, tried 
again, proposing that the increase be laid aside in the 
Estimates. After a fierce struggle, the Government carried 
the Estimates by 31 votes to 30. The threat of Nelson's 
resignation had brought some of the recalcitrant Minister-
ialists, O'Connell, Duffy and Battersby, out of Opposition 
ranks, and the numbers were increased by the presence of 
Tooth and Phillips. The Governor commented to the Secretary 
of State; "A very serious crisis involving dissolution or 
43 the resignation of Ministers was thus avoided". 
42. Queerisland Times, 15.10.94. 
43. Gov. Sec. Despatches to Sec. of State for the Colonies 
13.12.94. 
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THE- POSITION OP THE NELSON GOVERNMENT 
The course of the payment of members crisis shows very 
clearly that although the Opposition could defeat the 
Government with the aid of Ministerial leakage, the leakage 
was not reliable- The rebels who voted against the Ministry 
on the Railway Border Tax Bill and Payment of Members were 
not the same, and it cannot be said that there was a hard 
core of Ministerial dissent. Opposition within Government 
ranks was usually the result of pressure from the 
constituencies, or personal views on individual issues, but 
not of cleavages on political principles. This situation 
continued until I896, but the last four years of the decade 
were to show a greater cleavage upon broad political 
principles resulting in the fall of the Ministry. 
Despite the relative ease with which the Nelson 
Government held office, its first three years were 
characterized by a very marked lack of enthusiasm on the 
part of both public and press. The Warwick Argus commented 
in 1894: 
The fact seems to be that in the absence of 
Sir Thomas Mellwraith his colleagues in the 
Ministry have but a very vague notion of what 
the policy of the Government will be during 
the next session ... and in the meanwhile, 
the colony must continue to wallow In the 
depths of depression.44 
44. Warwick Argus, 24.3.94. 
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The Courier, while giving general support to the Government^ 
was concerned with the lack of direction shown, particularly 
45 in the field of public works. The' A'.'P'.R. complained of 
the "indifference of the Government'concerning the land 
46 laws and their administration, and railway rates". 
The first two years of Nelson's Premiership had been 
far from inspiring, but the difficulties experienced during 
the depression had taught the public to prefer caution to 
experimentation. By I896, the Queensland economy was 
showing signs of recovery and the forces of conservatism 
werebbecomlng much more effectively organized. Whether 
economic Improvement and remedial legislation would triumph 
over vacillation and the Peace Preservation Bill was to be 
shown during the General Election of 18.96. 
45. Brisbane Courier, 21,10.95. 
46. A.P'.R. , VII, X, p.520. 
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CHAPTER 14 
THE GENERAL ELECTION OF I896 
In May I895, a new party had been formed in Queensland -
The Progressive Democratic Party. Formed by parliamentarians 
known as the Remnant Opposition, its major aim was to gain 
support in,the forthcoming General Elections. The Elections 
were held in early March, I896, a month earlier than usual. 
All parties were by this time, fairly well prepared. The 
Elections was to prove that once again, Queenslanders 
preferred a "safe" policy of general development to the 
challenge of change and reform presented by Labour and 
Opposition Parties. Once again, the Continuo.us Ministry 
was to be returned by a sizeable majority, in an election 
marred by the,, return of sectarianism so prevalent in 
.Queensland political history. 
PARTY ORGANIZATION 
Paradoxically, it was the Labour Party which was least 
well prepared for these Elections. The decline in union 
membership after I891 meant that Labour's funds were 
shrinking. The sheareri"*' strike of 1894 had almost 
exhausted the coffers of the party, and Labour prepared for 
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the elections without an Executive Council and with a 
platform which had not been revised for over four years. 
The growth of disunity within the Labour Party was manifest 
in the incipient hostility between the Central Executive 
and the Regional Councils. Moreover, there was considerable 
evidence of dissatisfaction among Labour members such as 
King and Hoolan, and dispute over the effectiveness of 
Glassey's leadership. The general disorganization of the 
party was in marked contrast to its appearance in 1893, 
and the plebiscite ideal had been dissipated by lack of 
funds. The members of Parliament and the Executive of 
the AjL.F. were thus responsible for the final selection 
of candidates and the management of the Election. 
The monolithic unity of the party had been one of 
Labour's major electoral assets in 1893. In I896, this 
unity while far from destroyed, was definitely somewhat 
frayed. In I896 also. Labour's attitude to the opposition 
had changed. In 1893, the Worker had welcomed and 
encouraged the cooperation of Sir Charles Lllley and Thomas 
Glassey. In sharp contrast, Andrew Fisher's Gympie Truth 
maintained that with the exception of Drake and Boles, the 
1. Murphy, D., "The Changing Structure of the Party" in 
Murphy, Joyce, Hughes (eds.) Prelude to Power (Jacaranda, 
Brisbane, 1969), p.95. 
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2 
opposition was "merely the Government out of Office". 
In some ways, this deterioration of relations is 
difficult to understand. The official platform of the 
Progressive Democratic Party was radical, if somewhat 
vague: 
1. Electoral Reform - Universal Suffrage, abolition of the 
plural vote and staggered elections. 
2. Opposition to black and servile labour in any form. 
3. Encouragement of Agriculture. 
4. Equality of opportunity, 
5. Democratic Administration. 
Since 1894, the Opposition had been making overtures to the 
Labour Party.-" Most influential Labour Parliamentarians, 
however, were determined that Labour should remain completely 
independent in its political stance- Oppositionists were 
equally determined to remain an Independent Liberal force 
inside Parliament. Neither side being prepared to 
compromise to the extent needed, co-operation remained 
beyond political realities. The resignation of Charles 
Powers in February I896, was evidence of the complete 
breakdown of negotiations. Powers in his announcement, 
gave his description of the relations between the two parties: 
2. Gympie Truth, 29.10.96. 
3, Dawson asserted that it was Labour which had made the 
first advances, to be repulsed by the Opposition. 
Maryborough Chronicle, 29-2.96. 
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I do not see how I can do the country any good 
by continuing in politics ... I would not 
support the present Ministry, or join a Labour 
Ministry, and we as an Opposition Party cannot 
come to any arrangement with those who are 
allowed to decide the matter for the Labour 
Party, or come within any reasonable distance 
of an arrangement about (1) a platform for the 
election (2) an agreement as to the seats to 
be contested (3) the formation of a party 
after to work out any policy ... I know that 
the only reason why the Ministry was not 
ousted from office last session was because 
the Labour Party was under the leadership of 
Mr- Glassey and because nothing short of the 
whole Labour programme at once will satisfy 
him ... the position the Opposition found 
they were expected to accept was absolutely 
absurd.4 
On the breakdown of negotiations. Labour was insisting that 
in return for nine Opposition seats uncontested by Labour, 
the Opposition were to concede thirty-seven. Powers and 
his colleagues felt the conditions untenable and the Leader 
of the Opposition continued that "he wished it to be 
distinctly understood that whatever he had said that evening 
about the Parliamentary Labour Party, he sincerely hoped 
that the Labour members who had been in the House would be 
5 
returned." 
The Opposition was thus to enter the elections as a 
separate political entity. Most Queensland journals felt 
4, Ibid. 
5, Ibid, 
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that the group was fighting a losing battle, particularly 
as they refused to take a stand on the issue of socialism. 
According to the Maryborough Chronicle the Opposition should 
take one side or the other-
The way out of his present predicament for Mr-
Powers is to sign the hitherto repugnant pledge 
to the whole platform, or to find an honourable 
means of assisting the Government to thwart it.6 
The Brisbane Courier was decidedly hostile: 
Let the Opposition, following the now justified 
precedent of the late leader, make haste to 
efface itself.... The country at large will do 
well we think to look upon the Opposition as a 
dead party. Let it join the beloved ghosts of 
1888. The two real parties with real policies 
are the Ministerialists and the Labour-Socialists, 
The choice that is to determine the political 
history of the next three years is between them.7 
The Ministerialists had learned from the Labour success 
in 1893 and subsequent by-elections, and the Queensland 
Political Association was early in the field, selecting 
candidates and examining electoral rolls. The efforts of 
the Q.P.A. were often far from welcome. In the seat of 
North Brisbane, T.J. Byrnes received the endorsement of 
the Q.P.A. (of which Premier Sir Hugh Nelson was President) 
during a Cabinet meeting attended by several prominent 
o 
members of the Q.P.A. . The electors of North Brisbane, 
6. Maryborough Chronicle, 8.8.95. 
7. Brisbane Courier, 28.2.96. 
8. Ibid., 11.3.96. 
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however, did not like this new way of selecting candidates. 
In reply to the selection of Byrnes and Kingsbury by the 
Q.P.A., they requisitioned Thomas Macdonald-Paterson, and 
the Mayor of Brisbane, Robert Praser- Nelson in the next 
round of the battle. Indicated that although the two were 
standing as Ministerialists, he did not regard them as 
supporters of the Government. According to the Week: 
The electors of Brisbane North, who hold the 
strongest position of any electorate in 
Queensland are told that the Premier will 
disfranchise them, or will nullify their 
choice if they elect Messrs. Macdonald-
Paterson and Praser.9 
Thus, North Brisbane was to be contested by four Ministerial 
candidates - two selected by the traditional method of 
requisition, and two supported by the Premier and the 
Queensland Political Association. 
THE ISSUES 
Some issues, grounded in executive decisions of which 
Parliament knew little, tended to overshadow the formal 
manifesto|c of the major politicians. The Clifton Lands 
Transaction, the activities of the Q.P.A. and the Government's 
handlitig of the Queensland National Bank provided much 
ammunition for the Opposition forces. Overshadowing other 
$, Week, 20.3.96. 
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issues too, was the ugly mi^n of sectarianism which was 
to play a significant part in these elections. 
The Premier opened his campaign with a Manifesto 
to the electors of Murilla. The government programme was 
not designed to capture the imagination, but it was a sound 
and safe exposition, buttressed by the anti-socialist 
spirit in which it was conceived. The major elements in 
the Manifesto were: 
1. A refusal to enter the Anglo-Japanese treaty on the 
grounds that it would Interfere with colonial trade, 
and make impossible the prohibition of the importation 
of Japanese Labour. 
2. A revision of the Customs Tariff. 
3. A Bill to facilitate the entry of Queensland into the 
Commonwealth. 
4. No change in the Education Act. 
5. Simplification of the Land Laws. 
# 10 
i, A refusal to abolish the property vote. 
The Labour Manifesto, incorporating the I892 Platform, 
attacked the Government on the Mirani-Cattle Creek Railway, 
the Clifton Lands and the Q.N.B. Labour and the Opposition 
were also unanimous in the condemnation of the date of the 
10. Brisbane Courier, 25.2.96. 
11. See above, Ch. 12. 
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elections and the continued use of staggered elections as 
12 
a political manoeuvre. The major issues of the election 
then were Education, Government misdem^eonowe^alleged by 
its opponents, the tariff and the threat of Japanese labour 
entering the colony under the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. 
Education policy in Queensland had always been inter-
woven with the theme of sectarianism, and the election 
campaign proved no exception to the rule. The question 
had been sparked off by the Roman Catholic Church and its 
challenge to the education system. The period between 1893 
and 1896 had seen a revival of demands for state aid to 
denominational schools by the Roman Catholics, and for 
religious instruction by other denominations. Queensland 
educational policy had been settled in I88O, when in 
accordance with the 1875 Education Act, all state aid had 
been withdrawn from Church Schools. Provision had been 
made for ministers of religion to visit the state schools 
for the purposes of religious instruction, but the idea 
had never been popular and was attended only by apathy. In 
January I896, the Pastoral Letter of the Archbishops and 
Bishops of Australia in Second Plenary Council Assembled 
was published in the Brisbane Courier. The heads of the 
11., Worker, 7.3.96. 
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Roman Catholic Church showed tremendous hostility to the 
state education system: 
You, Catholic parents, would not commit your 
children's education to teachers who make no 
secret of their wish to proselytise them. 
We can conceive of no Catholic parent so 
callous,... The Catholic child who is 
compelled to attend a secular non-Catholic 
school, not only runs risks to his faith; 
his morals may also be Imperilled.13 
This paranoid attitude was more than matched by the Brisbane 
Courier, in describing the letter as: 
... an appeal to the country and the Government, 
or that part of it supposed to be amenable to 
Catholic authority, to turn its back on the 
State School, or' Inaugurate an antagonistic 
system ... it seems to us that on the eve of 
a general election, it is the bounden duty of 
the Government to say that it will uphold the 
State School ...i No political considerations 
of the moment should be. allowed to weigh against 
the obligation to promptly defend the character 
of the State School 1^ 
The Press, however, appeared to take the issue more seriously 
than did the pollticans. Discussing Nelson's attitude to it 
in his Manifesto, the Week commented "He has thrown down a 
marrowless bone - ftoj be quarrelled over by two parties 
that are fast ranging themselves under two separate sectarian 
15 banners". ^ The Queensland Political Association, formed by 
13. Brisbane Courier, 3.1.96. 
14. Ibid., 18.1.96. 
15. Week, 28.2.96. 
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founder members of the Queensland Evangelical Standard and 
largely Protestant Temperance League made it impossible 
for Catholic T.J. Byrnes to take a neutral stand by 
endorsing him for North Brisbane^ a centre of the controversy-
Nevertheless, while the education issue was a significant 
election- theme, much of the virulence which might have 
accompanied it was dissipated. The religious political 
alliance so obvious during the Seventies and to a lessor 
extent, the Eighties, had definitely broken down with the 
general merger of political parties in I890, Results in 
several electorates.however, may have been affected by 
17 the attendant sectarian feeling. 
Opposition policy is perhaps best Indicated by W.H. 
Groom, Groom expressed approval of the Government's stand 
on the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, opposed any drift to free 
trade, (clearly indicated in Nelson's Manifesto), called 
for substantial electoral reform and criticized both the 
timing of the elections and the muddled public works policy 
of the Government. 
The elections were held in early March, about a month 
earlier than usual. Nelson argued that this was to avoid 
16. Particularly Robert Buleock, See above Ch. 1. 
17. See below. 
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the clash with the close of the financial year, but 
according to the TOowoomba Chronicle: "The real reason why 
the elections are to take place immediately is ... to 
prevent those persons whose names were registered in the 
18 January Registration Courts from voting". The Chronicle 
amassed considerable evidence that the registrations could 
quite possibly effect results to the detriment of the 
Ministry, a fact certainly not missed by the Political 
Association. The table below Indicates the more crucial 
19 electorates which would be effected. -^  
Electorate 
Carpentaria 
Stanley 
Bundaberg 
Lockyer 
Gympie (1) 
Warrego 
Carnarvon 
Townsvllle (1) 
Mitchell 
Balonne 
18. Toowoomba Chronicle, 25.2.96. 
19. Ibid. 
Ministerial 
Majority 1893 
3 
5 
21 
28 
29 
33 
37 
62 
68 
136 
January 
Registration 
3^  
4fl 
fi 
4l 
41 
34 
•11 
pi 
T5 
163 
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The continued staggering of elections also came under 
attack. The first batch of elections Included twenty-seven 
20 
of the thirty government held seats. T.J. Byrnes, for 
example, if defeated on a sectarian vote in North Brisbane, 
could always contest another seat. On the other hand, 
leading Opposition and Labour seats such as Toowoomba and 
Charters Towers, normally in the first or second batches, 
were now included in the third batch. These sorts of 
tactics, while fairly common during the Nineties, were 
rarely pursued with such open political dishonesty. 
The Queensland Political Association also came under 
fire from another source. As early as 1895, questions 
were asked in Parliament concerning the activities of 
Robert Buleock. On 7th August, Glassey asked the Colonial 
Secretary, Hugh Tozer, whether he had hired Buleock to 
issue instructions to the electoral registrars with the 
object of purging the rolls. Receiving a denial, Glassey 
the next day, produced a circular signed by Buleock and 
Nelson which was sent to the electoral registrars. It 
suggested: 
As we are anxious to have the rolls purged of 
all names that are not entitled to be thereon. 
20. Carnaraton, South Brisbane, Herbert, Murilla, Bundaberg 
and Fortitude Valley were in the second batch, which 
Bundamba arid Locksser were in the third. 
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we have taken the liberty of requesting our 
friends to try to assist you by forwarding 
such information as they may be in possession 
of, and hope it will be of service.21 
According to Powers, "The charge is that somebody outside 
the Government service has attempted to tamper with the 
electoral registrars of this colony, and that he has sent 
to them Instructions different from those properly sent 
22 by the Colonial Secretary". In a purely party vote, 
the Government defeated Glassey's adjournment motion. 
Nevertheless, this incident is an example of the scope 
of the Q.P.A.'s activities. The Toowoomba Chronicle 
reported that an Electoral Registrar had received a 
telegram from the Association enquiring whether the 
January Registration lists were likely to favour the 
23 Government or the Labour Party. Such activities pursued 
so openly, produced further evidence of the complete 
cynicism with which the Government conducted these elections 
In two other areas. Government actions gave its 
opponents much room for criticism - the Mirani Cattle Creek 
24 
railway line and the Clifton Lands transaction. The 
transaction had been carried through just prior to the 
election. The lands had originally been sold as small 
21. Q.P.D., LXXIII, (1895), PP^511 & 532. 
22. Ibid., p,533. 
23. Toowoomba Chronicle, 25.2.96. 
24. See below, Ch. 16. 
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farming units on a system of deferred payments, the Clifton 
Estate at that time being owned by a syndicate headed by 
Parliamentarian M.B. Gannon. It was later taken over by 
the Queensland Investment and Land Mortgage Company, of 
which Mellwraith was one of the Directors. At the time 
the Agricultural Lands Purchase Bill was passed, a special 
clause had been inserted covering the Clifton Estate, 
under which the Clifton farmers applied to the Government 
to buy back the land from the Investment Company. The 
Government would then re-sell it to the present owners as 
Crown Land. The Toowoomba Chronicle pointed out that at 
the time the amendment was passed, negotiations with the 
26 
25 
Company were already under way. The Courier felt that 
the insertion of the clause was illegal in the first place, 
while the Worker was suspicious that the Government was 
acting solely in the Interests of the Investment Company. 
A,H. Barlow defended the Administration, arguing that the 
only alternative was the eviction of the farmers. The 
Clifton farmers, however, had not been mentioned the previous 
session, and the Toowoomba Chronicle pointed out that "it is 
difficult to understand the secrecy shown in this matter. 
25. Toowoomba Chronicle, 13.2.96. 
26. Brisbane Courier, 11.2.96. 
27. Worker, 7.3.96. 
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and the manifest unwillingness of the Government to state 
•>>28 the case in Parliament. 
Despite the attempts of Labour and Opposition candidates 
to capitalize on these equivocal Government actions, the 
elections were determined by the tactics of the Ministry 
in stressing the danger of socialism, and the futility of 
trying to continue an Independent Opposition. A.H. Barlow 
pursued this line of attack. According to him, there could 
be only two parties in the Colony, "the party which would 
maintain the rights of the people to do that which was 
lawful in their own eyes, and the party who, either by 
open violence or concealed sympathy, must go on opposite 
29 lines." ^ As the campaign drww to a close, the Queensland 
Times commented that "never perhaps in the history of the 
colony have the Issues been so clear and distinct as they 
30 
are at the present election".-^ The Ministry constantly 
stressed that the Labour Party was a source of anarchy and 
to vote for Labour representatives would thereby be clearly 
31 
unpatriotic. -^ 
Local and secondary issues seemed subordinate to this 
one overriding theme. Labour appealed to the farmers, but 
28. Toowoomba Chronicle, 13.2.96. 
29. Queensland TimesT~5'. 2.96. 
30. Ibid., 19.3.96. 
31. Ibid., 17.3.96. 
325. 
their land tax stand was not designed for this section of 
the population, particularly as Nelson promised them easier 
credit. Ministerial newspapers constantly attacked the 
danger of the land tax to farmers: 
The farmers have ne^er had any say in formulating 
the programme that the Labour Party wish to see 
carried into effect. The A.L.F. which practically 
controls the Queensland Labour Party, is made up 
of units whose Interest it is to buy produce and 
commodities as cheaply as possible-^2 
Nelson's promise to lighten the protective tariff may have 
33 had some effect on voting in the North,-^ --^  but this would 
have been compensated by a decrease in the southern portion 
of the colony. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this 
issue materially affected the election. 
THE CAMPAIGN 
The campaign was marked by three major characteristics 
the stress upon the dangers of socialism, the influence of 
sectarianism and the clear evidence of party disunity. 
The Opposition and Labour leaders attacked the Government 
as reactionary and Nelson as an opportunist. Groom was 
particularly scathing: 
I believe in gentlemen sticking to their principles. 
I do not believe in a gentleman who makes a 
pretence - for it was only a pretence - of leading 
the Opposition, who goes to Goondlwindi, delivers 
a speech to his constituents, and tells them that 
32. Queensland Times, 15.3.96. 
33. See above, Ch. 3. 
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the Coalition Government are a miserable failure 
».. and then goes back to Brisbane, and two 
weeks afterwards becomes the locum tenefts of 
the Premier and afterwards takes charge of the 
finances of the Coalition Government ... I say 
the Coalition ... has demoralized the public 
life of the colony,34 
The sectarian feeling which had been aroused by the education 
issue-had been exacerbated by charges of sectarian bias in 
the public service. Two Roman Catholic Ministers - A.J. 
Thynne (Posts and Telegraphs); and T.J. Byrnes (Justice) -
came under particular attack. Hugh Tozer denied any 
sectarianism was operative in the public service: 
It had been said that Mr- Thynne had been guilty 
of sectarian unfair play. As a Protestant, and 
one who had worked with him, he said there was 
no scintilla of foundation for the charge.35 
It was the Government which was mainly disturbed by the 
issue as it stormed directly around two senior members. 
Moreover, the Ministry was also labouring under the 
disadvantage caused by the retirement of A.H. Barlow, 
compounded by a rumour of jealous rivalry between Byrnes 
and Tozer- Byrnes Indeed was very unpopular with Ministerial 
journals, particularly due to his evinced determination to 
contest North Brisbane rather than Cairns.-' Further 
evidence of general disunity came from the announcement that 
34. Toowoomba Chronicle, 13.3.96. 
35. Queensland Times, 11.2.96. 
36. Ibid., 10.3.96. 
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J.R. Dickson would stand as an Independent. The Courier 
felt this a quixotic move, but Dickson defended himself 
in a letter to the Courier: 
If I felt assured that Mr. Nelson and his colleagues 
of today would personally conduct the administration 
of the country for the next three years ... and an 
Opposition with clearly defined views existed, then 
I admit that as an Independent member I would be 
but an isolated unit in the Assembly .... Am I ... 
to be condemned because I cannot subscribe myself 
to be a follower of the Government, of a Ministry 
which is Itself about to change some of its 
members...?37 
Despite evidence of growing factionalism within the 
Ministry, the Labour Party'had little to gain from it, 
because of growing disunity in their own ranks. The 
allegations made by Powers of the overweening influence of 
the Q.C.E. at the expense of Parliamentarians were not lost 
upon electors, particularly as both. Robert King-^  and 
39 prestigious John Hoolan had refused to sign the pledge. 
The Darling Downs Gazette rather gleefully reported Henry 
Daniels: 
They JTThe Labour Party^ ^ were unfortunate in the 
choice of a leader, as Mr- Glassey lacked the 
qualifications essential in a leader, but the 
position of choosing him was forced upon the 
party .... He was certain that if Messrs 
Hoolan and Glassey were both returned to the 
37. Brisbane Courier, 3.3.96. 
38. Queensland Times, 24,3.96, 
39. Maryborough Chronicle, 25-2.96. 
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next Parliament, the leadership would be offered 
to Mr. Hoolan but he was equally certain that 
Mr, Hoolan would refuse in favour of Mr- Glassey.40 
RESULTS 
The results of the election show that despite a 
relatively uninspired and uninteresting programme, the 
Government was still able to persuade the electorate to 
choose the familiar rather than the unknown quantity -
the Opposition, The Ministerialists gained 42 seats. 
Labour 20, the Opposition 6 There were two Independents 
{Leahy and Curtis) and one Farmers representative. 
The most serious reverses suffered by the Government 
were in North Brisbane and Bundaberg. The defeat of 
Kingsbury and Byrnes showed that the public was not yet 
ready to accept extra-parliamentary organization in the 
41 form of the Q.P.A. Bundaberg, a strong black labour 
constituency, fell to Thomas Glassey. Sectarianism may 
have been partly responsible for the defeat of some 
Government candidates. All of the Ministerialists returned 
in the first batch of electorates were Protestants. Roman 
Catholics, Byrnes, Agnew, Plunkett, Duffy and Watson were 
defeated. Other factors however, probably contributed to 
40, Queensland Times, 12.3 96 & Maryborough Chronicle, 12.3.96 
41. Byrnes later stood for Warwick, where the Impregnable 
Arthur Morgan had retired from political life. 
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their defeat. The activities of Q.P.A. caused the defeat 
of Byrnes, There was a split Government vote in Fortitude 
Valley where Watson was defeated. The defeat of Duffy in 
Bundaberg was probably due to the strength of Glassey as 
an opponent. Plunkett was defeated by fellow Ministerialist 
R.M. Collins, who declared himself "not entirely opposed 
42 to state aid." Nevertheless, sectarian bias must have 
had some effect, for after the first batch of elections, 
from a population which was 1/4 Roman Catholic only three 
Catholics were returned - Keogh (L), McGahan (F.R.) and 
McDonnell (L). While the proportion of Catholics in the 
Assembly was at no time high, this was considerably lower 
than usual. 
The pattern of labour representation remained similar 
to that of 1893. Twelve of Labour's seats were western 
constituencies, seven of these in the North-West. Two 
seats were won in the Central district. Rosewood was gained 
in the South-East, and there was a gain of one seat in the 
metropolitan area. Sitting members, Reid, Ogden, Wilkinson, 
43 
and Fisher -^ were defeated. The defeat of Reid and Fisher 
was a serious blow to the party, as both were strong party 
men, and their defeat left the leadership unchallenged at 
42. Brisbane Courier, 2.3.96. 
43. Standing fOr^ffpowong, Townsvllle and Gympie. 
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a time when Glassey was becoming more and more unpopular 
in the party. 
Given the hostility of both the Labour and Ministerial 
Press, Drake's Opposition made a remarkably good showing. 
While Maryborough was lost after the resignation of Powers, 
Drake was entrenched in Eripggera, Groom and Pogarty in 
Toowoomba, and Boles in Port Curtis. Bridges gained Nundah 
for the Opposition, and William Thorn retained Aublgny. 
McGahan (Cunningham) while standing as a Parmer's represen-
tative, could also be called an oppositionist. 
On the whole then. Labour and Opposition parties had 
failed to make significant Inroads into the strength of the 
Government, resting on a solid and unwavering southern 
vote. The election had shown that the two party system, 
which was gradually reappearing was still far from 
consolidated. The defeat of Reid and Fisher, to give 
way to men like William Kidston, reinforced this, as the 
latter was far more favourable to co-operation with other 
parliamentary groups. The election also indicated that 
Queenslanders were not yet prepared for such an extra-
parliamentary organization as the Q.P.A. The Week 
reflected this sentiment: 
During the campaign just closed, the Political 
Association was very much In evidence. 
Electorates were dictated to ... they over-
reached themselves in many instances and as in 
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North Brisbane their own candidates were thrown 
back in their faces .... Surely there was 
enough evidence to be deduced from the results 
... to convince the Premier and his friends 
that the public are decidedly of the opinion 
that such associations must cease to exist.44 
The elections over, the new members prepared to take their 
seats. The strength of parties had not altered to any 
significant extent. Yet the following years were to see 
a growth in party factionalism and a decline in Government 
popularity, to culminate in the formation of the first 
Labour Ministry under the leadership of Anderson Dawson. 
44. Week, 14.5-96. 
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CHAPTER 15 
FOR WANT OP AN OPPOSITION 
In July 1896, it must have appeared that the Continuous 
Ministry, which had scored such a decisive victory in the 
General Elections, could look forward to three years of 
power, uninterrupted by party strife. The economy had 
shown signs of considerable Improvement. Sir Hugh Muir 
Nelson remained Premier, even though his imminent retirement 
was widely rumoured. The Opposition had failed to 
significantly Increase its strength, and the Elections had 
shown considerable disunity within the Labour Party. All 
appeared calm and untroubled as the Ministry met the House. 
And yet, the period between I896 and 1900 was to exhibit a 
growing factionalism, caused by discontents within 
Ministerialist ranks, a development which was to culminate 
in the accession to power of the first Labour Government 
Australia had experienced. 
During the period between the I896 Elections and l899 
the parliamentary alignment continued to exhibit a bi-
partisan division between Labour and Conservatism, with the 
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hapless Remnant Opposition, unable to join either group. 
This Parliament however saw the number of members who 
constituted a "swinging vote" within the House grow larger 
and more coherent, creating a greater problem for the 
Government. There was also considerable dissatisfaction 
on the part of the public. In April I898, the Warwick 
Argus observed: 
The most remarkable feature of the situation in 
this colony is that the need for a strong and 
responsible opposition is as urgent as the 
necessity that the offices of Government be 
placed in capable hands.1 
Both major parties were beset with leadership problems. 
The Labour Party clearly was seething with dissatisfaction -
and the I896 Elections had shown that Thomas Glassey was 
losing his hold on the leadership of the party. He was 
opposed with especial fervour by those members who formed 
2 
what Rayner called the "A.L.F. clique", - Dawson, McDonald 
and Dunsford within the House, and Hinchcllffe, Reid and 
Seymour outside. They were not yet prepared to undertake 
the role of formal Opposition, and criticized Glassey's 
decision to do so. This decision was made easier by the 
fact that Tozerj as Acting Premier while Nelson was away in 
Warwick Argus, 9=5.98. 
Dalton, G. "An Interpret^ ttsseSurvey" in Murphy, Joyce, Hughes 
Prelude to Power (Jacaranda, Brlsbanvf>)^60 
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England, adopted a far more conciliatory tone towards the 
Labour Party. Yet Tozer had been the instigator of the 
notorious "Instructions to the Police" during the 1894 
Shearing Strike, and th-w Worker felt that Glassey was 
betraying the Labour movement by co-operating with such a 
man. In April 1897, the Gympie Truth led a bitter attack 
on several Parliamentarians: 
Mr. King is one of a little band of Labourites, 
who, finding labour principles to stand in the 
way of Parliamentary promotion, are for keeping 
them out of sight as much as possible, consistent 
with the safety of their seats. They want 
nothing more than to be old time Liberals in 
action ... Mr. J.P. Hoolan is another of this 
little band - its leader probably-3 
The Truth thus pointed to the main source of discord within 
the party - most older Parliamentarians had not been closely 
connected with the unions, and had entered Parliament while 
the strength of the Liberal ethos still survived. Many 
regarded themselves as partly Liberals, albeit Liberals 
more closely associated with the working men they represented. 
They represented the Labour Party, and remained staunch to 
Labour principles as they saw them, but they had little 
connection with the unions or the A.L.F. which aspired to 
extra-parliamentary control of the actions of Parliamentarians 
3. Gympie Truth, 3Q-4.97. 
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The Ministerialists found themselves in a not dissimilar 
position, with several discontented factions causing unrest. 
In February I897, J.R. Dickson was appointed Minister for 
Railways.. This seemed a wise move, with the Premier 
attending the Jubilee celebrations in England. According 
to the. Warwick Argus, "It became necessary that thought 
should be taken of what might befall the party in the 
absence of its leader, and precautions adopted to, as far 
as possible, prevent disaster- Thus the choice fell upon 
Mr. Dickson who outside might prove the most dangerous 
4 
opponent of a headless Government". The appointment of 
Dickson, whose Independent stance and position on the cross 
benches was well known, caused considerable stir within 
the party. Other, similar appointments added to the 
discontent. John Murray, Invulnerable in the Central 
Queensland seat of Normanby, resented the appointment of 
A.J. Thynne, a member of the Council, as Minister for 
Agriculture. The appointments of William Allan and John 
Archibald to the Council were equally unpopular, John Leahy 
5 
discrlbed the appointments as "scandalous". Many regions, 
notably Wide Bay and the Western areas were not represented 
4v Warwick Argus, 27-2.97-
5. Q.P.D., LXXVIII, (1897), O'Connell was equally scathing 
in his criticism of the appointments. 
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in the Council, whereas Allan and Archibald represented 
6 
areas already well treated in Council appointments. 
It was expected, as.the riew session approached, that 
the Government would be received with some hostility by 
members on its own side. John Murray, during the address-
In-reply "was particularly hostile, denouncing the land 
.administration, the Minister and all. his works, with a 
7 
fervour which we believe was altogether genuine". The 
Western Champion, was, of the opinion that in: any,, move 
to censure the Government, Murray could rely on the support 
of Curtis, Eraser, Leahy and J.T. Bell. While these 
discontents appeared minor, they certainly weakened the 
Government in the eyes of'the public, whose confidence had 
already been shaken; by the Queensland National Bank 
revelations. The Western Champion observed that "many 
firm supporters of the Government in 1895 have had good 
reason to change their opinions concerning the honesty and 
o 
efficiency of Sir Hugh Nelson and, his colleagues". The 
Brisbane Courier, indicated that"' the Government was losing 
ground even before the storm broke over the Queensland 
clonal Bank: 
Warwick' Argus,29.6^97 
Western Champion, 13.7.97. 
IbMV^ fll.l,p.^ .^ 
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During last session, it lost much of its former 
hold on its own party and in the country. The 
loss was its fault and not its misfortune. 
Legislation proceeded on no definite plan 
resolutely adhered to .... It did not inspire 
respect .... The Government exists now more 
on the general want of confidence in their 
opponents than of confidence in themselves.9 
THE BILL TO ENABLE FEDERATION 
The attitude of the Government of the Federal Enabling 
Bill caused further accusations of vacillation from public 
and press. The question of federation however, also 
showed further evidence of disunity within Labour ranks, 
as well as among Ministerialists. The Federation Enabling 
Bill had been dragged through two sessions without agreement 
in the Assembly. When introduced by Nelson in I896, the 
Bill had been regarded in a very apathetic light. Nelson 
had said: 
It is not a question upon which the Government 
are in any way tied down, but it is a question 
upon which we ought to show a friendly feeling 
towards the whole of Australia.10 
Many Ministerialists were demonstrably anti-federalist. Early 
in 1895, T.J. Byrnes had said "I cannot see that Queensland 
could gain any benefits from Federation at the present 
moment". In I899 Mellwraith had written to Cecil Palmer: 
9. Brisbane Courier, 21.3-97-
10. Q.P.D., LXXV, (1896), p.135. 
11. Brisbane Courier, 15.2,95. 
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I think Jlmmie Dickson a veritable prig ... he 
believes in Federation no more than I do, and 
yet for the sake of carrying federation while 
he is Premier, he stands at the head of it.12 
Other less prominent Ministerialists opposed federation -
representatives of the Northern Downs, Bell,McGahan and 
Thorn; Brisbane merchants, McMaster, Stephens and Praser 
13 
and some pastorallsts. 
The attitude of the Premier was at best half-hearted, 
and if he had sincerely desired federation, he gave little 
indication of it. The Government also hindered the cause 
of federation by its insistence that the colony should have 
the right to use any method of securing the approval of 
the people, both in the election of candidates to the 
14 Conventions, and of Federation Itself. The Courier took 
it for granted that Queensland would follow the other 
15 colonies, gaining such approval by a direct vote. This 
was not to be. When it was brought down, the Australasian 
Federation Enabling Bill made provision for the Parliamentary 
election of delegates to the Federation. When the 
inevitable amendment for direct election was proposed, 
1 6 
Nelson threatened that the Bill would be withdrawn. Thus, 
12. Mellwraith to Palmer, 2.6.99 (Mellwraith Palmer Papers, 
Oxley Library). 
13- See above, Ch. 6. 
14. Brisbane Courier, 19-2=95-
15- Ibid. 
16. Q.P.D., LXXV, (1896), p.138. 
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the Ministry had assured that a non-partisan attitude to 
the Bill was impossible. According to Hoolan, "the 
Government seem to have some latent fear that if they fall 
in with the views of the adjoining colonies ... I may say, 
views to which they are indelibly pledged, certain dangerous 
demagogues and arch agitators might become councillors at 
17 this Convention". The Bill was carried by a purely 
party vote and the direct election amendment, made by 
1 p 
Curtis, was defeated by 36 votes to 26. It was evident, 
however, that the Government had little Intention of 
proceeding with the Bill, which was subsequently allowed to 
lapse. 
The Bill, almost in its original form, was reintroduced 
in 1897. With the Federal Convention set down for September. 
the Government was expected to be more in earnest, and 
consequently determined anti-federalists were also expected 
to oppose the Bill. Once again an amendment incorporating 
direct election was moved, this time by Glassey. During 
the debate, a motion for adjournment was moued, for which 
Labour members, Glassey, Cross, Jackson and Stewart voted 
with the ayes. This immediately provoked a hostile reaction 
17. Ibid., p,153. 
Ifi, Dissenting were the Labour Party plus Dickson, Drake, 
Groom, W. Thorn, Pogarty, Armstrong, Macdonald-Paterson. 
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from the Worker which called for the resignation of the 
party's leader. ° The-Gympie Truth also attacked Glassey: 
It was known, almost for a certainty, that had 
the division been taken on Tuesday night, Mr. 
Glassey would have carded with him the majority 
of the House.... The Labour Party ... have 
good grounds of complaint against their leader. 
He committed them to the adjournment without 
consultation and by doing so, compelled them 
to flatly contradict him in division, and 
subject him to the humiliation of seeing his 
followers publicly repudiate his action.20 
The actions of Glassey hardly seemed to warrant such a 
vicious attack. Glassey, Stewart and Cross all defended 
their actions by appealing to standard procedure regarding 
adjournment time. McDonald and other Labour members, however, 
conscious that they might defeat the Government, were 
becoming impatient of the delays and wasted time which 
21 
characterized the debate. It was obvious that the 
adjournment vote was used only as a pretext, and he was 
criticized only on the principle of tight party discipline, 
under which he was visibly beginning to chafe. 
The motion for direct election was carried a week 
later by 36 votes to 28. Joining Opposition and Labour were 
Ministerialists Bell, Stephens, Fraser, Bartholomew, Petrle, 
22 Stumm, Smyth, Murray, Annear and George Thorn. Once again 
19- Worker, 6.797-
20. Gympie.Truth, 9-7.97. 
21. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), P-217-
22. These men were mostly anti-federalists, hoping to force 
the withdrawal of the bill. 
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the Bill was withdrawn. This combination of Labour, 
Opposition and anti-federalists on the Government side 
defeated yet another Bill late in the Session, when Curtis 
moved yet another direct election amendment. This amendment 
was carried by 21 - 19 votes, although the size of the 
House Indicates that interest in the Bill had flagged 
considerably. Once again the Bill was withdrawn, and 
once again, the charade culminated in the refusal of the 
Government to make any positive step towards federation. 
THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP 
Both major parties were faced with leadership problems 
during this period. Thomas Glassey was no longer the 
commanding leader he had been in the inexperienced days 
after 1893- He continued to maintain a tenuous hold on 
the leadership until 1899, although under constant attack 
from the more radical wing, led by Hinchcllffe, Reid and 
Fisher- There was a growing split between the two factions, 
as one, led by Dawson and Kidston, began to make terotative 
overtures towards Liberal groups in the House, More and 
more, Glassey began to appear only a figurehead and in 
1899, he ceased any pretence of leading the party. 
Factionalism within the Ministerialist Party however, 
had perhaps more far-reaching consequences. The anti-
federalists were a splinter group within the party, and the 
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impending resignation of Nelson, to go to the Council, created 
further intrigue. There was no obvious successor. Tozer, 
Byrnes, Philp and Dickson all had some claim to the Premier-
ship, while Dalrymple had an outside chance. The Warwick 
Argus reported that the Government would split in all 
directions if Byrnes rather than Philp were chosen to 
23 
succeed Nelson. There were also rumours that Tozer was 
24 planning to form a third party. His appointment to the 
position of Agent-General in January I898 lends some 
evidence to the view that Tozer was planning to fight the 
appointment of Byrnes, who acceded to the Premiership on 
13th April, 1898. 
The appointment of Byrnes was regarded by many 
Queenslanders as heralding a period of liberalization. The 
Toowoomba Chronicle remarked in 1899: 
There can be no doubt that had he lived and put 
forward the democratic policy which he had 
privately confided to a few of his more 
intimate political friends he. would undoubtedly 
have changed political parties.25 
His untimely death in I898 however, ^ eft only an impression of 
unfulfilled promise, and there was little in his Inaugural 
speech which indicated any liberalization. According to the 
23. Warwick Argus, 16.2.97. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Toowoomba Chronicle, 10.1.99-
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Worker, "there is not a vestige of the Democratic programme 
?6 
which the public.were led to expect". 
While the appointment of Byrnes was a generally popular 
one with the public, several Ministerialists were disappointed 
with the allocation of portfolios. But the way had been 
well prepared for the appointment of Byrnes. According to 
the Mackay Mercury the resignation of A.J. Thynne would 
"certainly weaken the Cabinet by depriving it of one of its 
most courteous, shrewd and diplomatic members, but on the 
other hand it will relieve it of the accusation made at the 
last election ... that two powerful Ministers of one 
particular religious persuasion exercise a predominating 
27 
and undue influence in the Government of the country". 
The portfolio of Agriculture was then taken over by J.V. 
Chataway- Chataway was an acknowledged expert on tropical 
agriculture, but his appointment was primarily an attempt 
to placate those Northerners who felt that Philp, not 
Byrnes, should succeed Nelson. 
Other individuals were no doubt disappointed. John 
Stephenson, proprietor of the Queensland Times showed 
distinct hostility to the new Government. The appointment 
26. worker, 30.3-98. 
27. Mackay Mercury,, 6.1.98. 
344. 
of John Murray as Minister for Railways received a mixed 
reception. Diehard Central Separationlsts saw it as just 
one more attempt to weaken the separation movement. Public 
and Press in Central Queensland for the main part, saw the 
appointment as entirely beneficial for the district, and? 
exhibiting a provincialism which still characterized 
Queensland politics, the Western Champion observed, "We 
?8 
must make hay whiie the sun shines." The appointment 
was not popular with southern representatives. William 
Armstrong, member for Lockyer, felt that Murray was 
consistently hostile to the farming Industry, and publicly 
29 
absolved himself of loyalty to Byrnes. -^  But according to 
the Warwick Argus in July I898; 
Mr- Byrnes ... appears to have managed to reunite 
the great bulk of the Ministerialists and the 
chances are he will have a working majority in 
the Assembly. The members for North Brisbane, 
Bulloo and Lockyer [30] may make some show of 
Independence, but there is not the faintest 
chance that they will unite with the Labour 
Party-31 
The opening of Parliament in I898 saw some hope of a 
more progressive government programme. Although there was 
little in Byrnes' programme that was expected to prove 
contentious, there was hope that at least something 
28. Western Champion, 30.4.98. 
29. ligia-7 3^5.98. 
30. Miicfcloriald-PatersOn, Fraser, Leahy, Armstrong. 
31. Warwick Argus, 12.7-98. 
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constructive would be done. The previous two sessions had 
been barren of worthwhile legislation, and even so staunch 
a Ministerial journal as the Mackay Mercury had admitted 
that "the Government had not succeeded in pushing business 
32 through the Assembly as rapidly as it might have done". 
It was in this session that Glassey again assumed the role 
of Constitutional Opposition, and this was seen in many 
quarters as reducing the possibility of defection from 
33 Ministerial ranks. The session promised to be productive, 
with the Government "evincing ... a readiness to adopt a 
34 policy of expansion when the proper time arrives". 
The death of Byrnes in September, however, effectively 
removed any such possibility. Who now was to become 
Premier? Byrnes had only fractionally united the Ministerial 
factions, and it seemed unlikely that any other man could 
even achieve this small modicum of success. The field of 
candidates was narrowed down to three - Dickson, Dalrymple 
and Philp. Dalrymple's reputation as a "keen and sparkling 
35 debatel:'" with a prodigious capacity for work was well 
known, but it was thought unlikely that he could command a 
majority in the House. Philp was regarded as perhaps best 
32. Mackay Mercury, 30.12.97. 
33- Ibid., 1.8.98. 
34. Warwick Argus, 23-4,98. 
35. Memoirs of the Hon. Sir Robert Philp, K.C.M.G. I85I-
1922. (Watson 8e Ferguson, Brisbane, 1923), P-52. 
346. 
qualified for the leadership, but the Mackay Mercury pointed 
out that "as member for Townsvllle, it is very questlonahle 
if he could secure a majority on appeal to the country; but 
if he stood for a southern constituency, many of the 
objections to him would be removed." Dickson was by no 
means popular in the House, but he was a Brisbane man, and 
therefore had more chance of securing a majority in the 
South, where the strength of the Government lay The 
Western Champion however, pointed out the most salient 
feature of the new situation: 
The appointment of Mr- J.R. Dickson in succession 
to Mr- Byrnes is the best that could have been 
done under the circumstances He is not a 
brilliant statesman, but an eminently practical 
politician. A Ministry which has been re-
constructed under the leadership of five 
successive Premiers is a curiosity in its way 
Had the original custom of making it compulsory 
upon newly appointed Ministers to be re-elected 
by their constituents JD3een continued^ it is 
quite possible that the "Continuous Ministry" as 
it is called, would long since have ended its 
career.37 
By now, most commentators felt that the Government was losing 
ground and that the sooner Dickson called for a new mandate 
the better- Nevertheless, Dickson decided not to hold the 
elections until the scheduled time, early in 1899- Given 
36. Mackay Mercury, 1.10.98. 
37 Western Champion, 10.10.98. 
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his tenuous hold over Parliament, it is not surprising that 
little was achieved during the rest of the session, with 
one exception being the defeat of the Government on the 
Officials in Parliament Bill. This was the creation of 
Byrnes, a seemingly Innocuous piece of drafting "intended 
to convenience Ministers who have occasion for temporary 
purposes to leave their offices, and to ask some of their 
qQ 
colleagues to perform their duties during their absence". 
Any member of the Cabinet or Executive Council, according 
to the Bill, could perform such duties. While Dickson 
refused to regard the Bill as a party measure, the Government 
had made it difficult for themselves by the appointment of 
J. Wilkle Gray to the Executive Council immediately prior 
to the introduction of the Bill. Many Governments members 
resented the appointment, particularly as Gray was a member 
of the Legislative Council. According to Macdonald-Paterson 
"there are other members who are older members of Parliament 
and had longer experience than the gentleman who had the 
39 honour to be appointed the other day". Opposition 
members regarded the Bill as ultimately dangerous, and feared 
40 that "these appointments might go on ad infinitum". . After 
38. Q.P.D., LXXIX, (1898), p.753-
39- Ibid., p.757. 
40, Ibid., p.760. 
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a short debate, the division was taken, resulting in a 34 -
27 defeat of the Mew Ministry. Ministerialists voting 
against the new Premier were Bell, Armstrong, Macdonald-
Paterson, Stephens, Leahy, Petrle and Moore. It is unlikely 
that any objected strongly to the principle of the Bill, 
but voted with the Opposition simply with the Intention of 
making life difficult for the Ministry- Dickson^however, 
refused to claim the Bill as his own, and refused to treat 
the vote as one of confidence- The Ministry thus continued 
in office. 
The prospects of the Ministry did not appear very bright 
after this defeat. Throughout the Parliament the factions 
continued to cause trouble. During the I897 session, it 
was a section of the pastoral supporters of the Government 
who were most noticeable in their dissidence, together with 
anti-federalists. Stephens, Luya, Petrle, Fraser and 
Macdonald-Paterson were often found allied with George Thorn, 
John Leahy and John Murray. Leahy, Invulnerable in Bulloo, 
continued to provide a constant source of irritation. He 
was a man of great Influence and in I898, he made plain 
his dislike of both Foxton and Dickson:. 
Mr. Foxton and Mr- Dickson are understood to 
be the particular objects of the member for 
Bulloo's aversion - the former because he 
is unfriendly to the pastorallsts^ the 
latter because he "moves in a narrow commercial 
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groove and is incapable of taking a wide view 
of the requirements of the Colony".^1 
Nevertheless, few people contemplated the fall of the 
Government. Ministers had come and gone, Governfiants had 
been defeated, but there seemed no chance that the basic 
personnel of Government would change- Early in I898, the 
Remnant Opposition, led by Drake, had proposed Coalition 
with the Labour Party. However, Drake refused to serve 
under Glassey, and Glassey under Drake. Kidston's proposals 
for a dual leadership were also rejected. Thus the Liberal-
Labour coalition again proved impossible of attainment. 
Electors were faced in 1899 with the same choice as in I896 -
a Government which had lost much public confidence, the 
Labour Party, which entered the elections virtually without 
a leader, and an Opposition attempting to continue the 
traditions of a party which had died nearly a decade before. 
41. Warwick Argus, 31-5-98. 
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CHAPTER 16 
THE 1899 ELECTIONS 
The General Elections of I899 were conducted in 
apparent tranquility. Overshadowed by the impending 
federation of the Australian Colonies and by Interest in the 
progress of the Boer War, the elections were marked only by 
a noticeable lack of enthusiasm on the part of both 
politicians and the public. No major issue dominated the 
campaigns Attitudes to federation had already been clearly 
enunciated, and the peopleawaited in "suspended animation", 
the milennial event which federation promised to be. If 
any one issue came close to capturing the imagination of 
the public it was Japanese labour. Even this failed to 
stir more than a ripple of enthusiasm. 
As far as party organization was concerned, both parties 
showed little development from previous encounters. There 
seemed to be almost a total lack of interest in improving 
organization and on the part of non-Labour groups, of giving 
it more far-reaching powers. The National Liberal Union, 
which was formed in 1902, was little different from its 
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predecessor, the Queensland Political Association, which 
was far from active in these elections. Yet the party 
situation was full of interest. Both major parties were 
exhibiting the factionalism so prevalent in colonial 
politlG's, and it may be argued that politics in Queensland 
were in a State of flux. The Rockhampton Morning Bulletin 
gave some indication of the general situation: 
It is one of the curiosities of the present 
position that no-one expresses any satisfaction 
with the Government. Even avowed supporters of 
the Ministry declare they have no regard for it 
and would gladly see it replaced.... Only one 
defence is offered for it - that if the 
Government goes out, the Labour Party comes in -
was there ever a more contemptible appeal made 
for support?1 
THE PARTIES 
The Labour Party entered the elections more obviously 
divided than their opponents. Factionalism within the 
party had been obvious since I896 and was caused by splits 
between the older members of the party who had entered 
Parliament without union aid or endorsement, and the new 
members, more directly allied with Queensland unionism. 
This problem was manifested primarily by differences in 
political tactics, most obvious in the public censure of 
3km Quoted in Toowoomba Chronicle, 31-1.99-
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Glassey when he decided to undertake the role of Constitutional 
2 
Opposition. 
These problems were clearly seen in the Clermont 
electorate, where the local Worker's Political Organization 
endorsed Joe Lesina rather than J.M. Cross, after Cross 
had refused to. sign the Labour pledge. John Hoolan 
contested Cairns as an Independent, and was opposed by 
Labour candidate, Thomas Givens. In February, Hoolan 
attacked the A.L.F. faction in Brisbane: 
They call themselves the A.L.F. but there is not 
a decent mechanic among them ... all the 
political reform they have done up to the 
present is to bring about endless disturbances, 
to build up endless rivalries, and to create 
interminable law suits.3 
Glassey made little attempt to lead the party in these 
electionsj and supported both Hoolan and Cross. He had 
one ally, William Kidston, who insisted that G.S. Curtis, 
and not a member of the Labour party should run with him 
for Rockhampton. The Labour splits created embarrassments 
for the whole party. In the campaign for Mitchell, the 
Western Champion observed that "in his speech, Mr- Fitzgerald 
carefully abstains from any laudation of the political 
association which "endorsed" him. Probably he is extremely 
2. See -hbai/e, Ch. 16-
3. Telegraph, 3.4.99-
4. Wanka kr: "William Kidston" in Murphy, Joyce & Hughes. 
Prelude to Power (Jacaranda, Brisbane, 1969), p.201. 
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sorry now, that he did not tacitly claim exemption from 
this humilating ceremony tthe pledge;) as Mr- Kerr has 
5 
done." 
, Evidence of Ministerial disunity was not so clearly 
apparent. There were some rumblings from the West. The 
Western Champion complained of its past representation by 
Labour: 
The Government must recognize there is something 
wrong here and, if they introduce electoral 
reform in any shape it will be in the direction 
of giving the pastoral districts some more equal 
representation. Let the miners and bush workers 
have their own representatives by all means. 
They have them now, in fact, but that is no 
reason why the rest of the community should be 
disfranchised.6 
The leadership of J.R. Dickson also created rifts within 
the party, many members preferring Robert Philp as Premier 
Federalists and anti-federalists, discontent among the 
farmers, nathern hostility^all served to factlonallze the 
Ministerial Party, and members could be forgiven for feeling 
the election could be a close one. 
THE CAMPAIGN 
The Queensland Political Association was far from 
Inactive, and found prospective candidates unwilling to 
*f 
5. Western Champion, 28.2.99 
6. Ibid., 4.4.99. 
7. See Chs. 15 and 17. 
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submit to its authority. The Government had once again 
carefully arranged the staggered elections, giving the 
Ministerialists the advantage of the majority of safe 
electorates in the first batch. The third batch contained 
most of the strong Labour seats, as well as some Opposition 
strongholds, thus depriving Labour and Opposition of any 
psychological advantage of early success. The Central 
Political Executive of the Labour Party had agreed not to 
oppose members of the Independent Opposition in seats held 
by them, in a reciprocal agreement with Drake's small 
' 9 party. -^  
The Manifesto of J.R. Dickson was a decidedly colourless 
one. He was content to await New South Wales developments 
before rushing into federation. He placed considerable 
emphasis on railway extension, which had been Ignored by 
the Government since the onset of depression, and proposed 
a public works committee, a type of parliamentary corporation, 
to deal with the endless requests for railways. He defended 
the immigration policy of the Government and gave some vague 
hint of electoral reform. The Rockhampton Bulletin mounted 
a hostile attack on the Manifesto: 
8. Toowoomba Chronicle, 7-2.99 
9- Warwick Argus, 10.1.99. 
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Mr. Dickson has not disappointed the public. 
He has produced a prodigiously long and 
amazingly empty address ... trotting out a 
great number of trivial subjects which he 
treats with tremendous solemnity. His 
address might justly be termed the 
glorification of the commonplace-10 
Similarly, Labour and Opposition policies showed only a 
degree of consequence. Once again, both called for electoral 
reform, and criticized the Government's public works policy, 
or lack of it. Both questioned the sincerity of the 
Government with regard to federation, and also their policy 
towards Japanese Immigration. The Labour platform was 
little changed, and much of the attack upon the Government 
lacked fire and enthusiasm. 
Once again the question of labour for the industries 
of the tropical north had come to political prominence. In 
1897, W.H. Browne had brought the Japanese to the attention 
of the House. He noted that as early as 1894, the junior 
member for North Brisbane J.J. Kingsbury had asked the 
Government what it intended to do about the immigration of 
Japanese. The Government had, in fact, done nothing in 
the years #lapsed. In answer to Browne, Tozer, the Acting 
Premier, explained that after protracted negotiations with 
the Imperial authorities "our proposal for excluding labourers 
10. Toowoomba Chronicle, 5.1.99. 
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and artisans has been accepted -the arrangement being 
11* terminable on twelve months notice by either party". 
The agreement had been part of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 
and was simply a temporary expedient. Nevertheless, Browne 
and the Labour Party regarded the negotiations as a start 
and withdrew the motion. 
The Japanese had been emigrating or jumping ship, or 
imported through the Southern Colonies to work on the sugar 
plantations. Most were used in the mills, but were inferior 
12 to, as well as dearer than, kanakas in field work. The 
Mackay Mercury defended the employment of Japanese: 
No one will regret more than the sugar growers 
themselves the necessity which compels them to 
use Japanese labourers for the harvesting of 
their crops ... it is not the cost, but the 
lack of any labour which has compelled sugar 
growers to hire Japanese. By all means let 
us find a substitute ... if we can get it. 
Possibly some good may come from the present 
influx of the subjects of the Mikado. It may 
force upon the attention of the Opposition and 
less clearly defined enemies of the sugar 
Industry, the necessity of either killing the 
industry, or finding some labour in addition 
to that already at the disposal of the farmers-13 
Between the debate on Browne's motion and the elections, 
the position in regard to Japanese labour had not changed. 
11. Q.P.D., LXXVII, (1897), P-347-
12. Buxton to Lord Lamlngton, l6.ll.96 (Premiers Dept. Q.S.A.) 
13. Mackay Mercury, 19-7^98. 
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The Government now avoided the issue by referring to it as 
a federal matter- W-H. Groom criticized the Secrecy of 
the negotiations with Britain and Japan: "We do not know, 
even now, nor has Parliament been made acquainted with, 
the actual conditions of the treaty between Queensland and 
14 Japan." Dickson Indicated that it was the intention of 
the Government to exclude all those "races whose Introduction 
has not been already sanctioned and regulated by law". Such 
a statement was so general that it was practically 
meaningless. The Labour attitude showed a clear racist bias: 
For any Government to tolerate this Influx of 
coloured aliens is the basest kind treachery 
to, not only the white race in Queensland, but 
also the whole race throughout Australia, and 
if the immigration is permitted to continue, 
it can only end disastrously. The price we 
are being asked to pay for the sugar industry 
is too much. Coloured and inferior races 
cannot remain for, and be confined to that 
industry by law . .. the banner 6£ra.:k"vih±te 
Australia" needs raising, and that quickly too.15 
Nevertheless, as with federation, much of the ferocity had 
left the debate on the Japanese by the time of the elections. 
One feature of the campaign was the concerted hostility 
shown by the Ministerialists towards the Independent 
Opposition, Charles Powers, in his bid to re-enter 
Parliament, found himself in a quandary as to whether to 
14. Toowoomba Chronicle, 25.1.99. 
15- Worker, 19-6.98. 
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stand as a Ministerialist or ah Independent Oppositionist. 
The Maryborough Chronicle discussed the alternatives: 
The success predicted for Mr. Powers would depend 
very largely on the party he would be prepared 
to give at least a general support. To oppose 
Mr- Glassey is to be either a Ministerialist or 
an Independent Oppositionist 5.. and Mr. Powers 
has been both in his time. If Mr. Powers will 
announce his adherence to the Dickson Ministry, 
his chances may be regarded as excellent but if 
he comes out as an Independent Oppositionist ... 
they are doubtful. Ministerialists would rather 
have Mr. Glassey as an opponent and would vote 
accordingly.16 
Powers duly announced himself a Ministerialist, and stressed 
that there was now no third party for which to vote -
electors had only two choices: The Ministry or Socialism. 
This theme,was constantly reiterated: "the Coalition party, 
under the internal Influences ... of what is known as the 
Continuous Ministry, and the external influences ... of the 
gathering strength of the party of socialism, has become 
more and more consolidated and homogeneous.,.. Individualism 
and Socialism.... This is to be described as the great bed-
17 
rock issue before the country." 
This stress on the dangers of socialism had proved an 
electoral advantage in I896, and was expected to do so again. 
The emotionalism attached to the "battle" between individualism 
16. Maryborough Chronicle, 21.1.99-
17- Ibid., 7-2.99-
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and socialism tended to obliterate any real Issues during 
the campaign. There appeared to be an air of unreality 
about this election. 
THE RESULTS 
The Elections proved once again a triumph for the Ministry 
The final result gave the Ministerialists 42 seats, including 
those who classed themselved Independent Ministerialists. 
Labour captured 21 seats and the Opposition 8. J-G- Drake 
was well pleased with the performance of his party: 
The triumph of the Independent Opposition was 
the most significant feature of the Elections, 
Despite all the attempts at ridicule, mis-
representation and calumny ... the electors 
have emphatically set the seal of approval 
upon those members who, whilst refusing to 
become merged with the Labour Party^ have 
constantly opposed the Government.1° 
Once again, the Labour Party had failed to extend its 
strength beyond the regional boundaries set in 1893. In 
South Brisbane, Turley was defeated, although there was some 
compensation in the victory of Higgs in Fortitude Valley. 
Gympie was carried by Fisher and Ryland, while Givens and 
Lesina defeated rebels Hoolan and Cross. King and Daniels, 
two strong supporters of Glassey, were also defeated, in 
Maranoa and Cambooya. The final result gave Labour an 
aggregate gain of three seats, but Ministerialists had in 
18. Toowoomba Chronicle, 20.3-99 
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some cases been defeated by only small margins. The results 
for Labour had a double aspect. Many regarded the defeat 
of Hoolan, Cross and King to be ultimately strengthening, 
as it removed one of the more obvious sources of disunity, 
and left the increasingly unpopular Glassey Isolated. On 
the other hand. Cross and Hoolan were two of the most 
experienced labour parliamentarians. The Western Champion 
coimnented that "what they have gained in numbers, however, 
has been lost in effectiveness. Pour of their best debaters -
Messrs Sim, Turley,a.HooIan and Cross are gone, and their 
places will be poorly filled by men of the Givens - Lesina 
type".^^ 
One feature of the Labour performance was the complete 
alienation of the farmers from the party. The defeat of 
Daniels severed the last link between the party and the 
south-wastern farming areas. The pattern of representation 
remained the same, with these areas solidly Ministerialist. 
This allegiance was even more solid than in previous 
electlonSj, caused by a decline in the Opposition vote in 
this area. The only reverses suffered by the Ministerialists 
were the loss of Albert, where Plunkett turned the tables on 
R.M. Collins who had defeated him in I896, and the loss of 
19. Western Champion, 23-3-99. 
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Gympie. The Ministry remained invulnerable in the 
metropolitan area, where Labour could make no inroads 
into their power. 
The Ministry's power, however, was in many ways 
more apparent than real- The fate of the Government 
20 
rested upon the support of the Independent Ministerialists 
and most of these were extremely antagonistic to the 
Northern interests so strong in the Ministry. Philp was 
always a danger to the position of Dickson, and therefore 
he had to be Included in the new Ministry. It was probable 
that two, other Northerners - Dalrymple and Chataway 
(Macfeay) would also be Cabinet appointees. 
In a party in which 31 of its 42 members represented 
southern districts, this was likely to cause considerable 
unrest. Moreover, Ministerial disunity had been only 
temporarily healed- In the next six months, the rifts 
would deepen to such an extent that the Government would 
find Itself out of office before the year was out. 
20. Toowoomba Chronicle, 30.3.99. 
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CHAPTER 17 
THE MORGAN - BROWNE COALITION 
The Government had reason to be delighted with the 
results of the 1899 Election. It had apparently been-losing 
public confidence during I898, but had been returned with a 
convincing majority. And yet, the Dickson Government had 
fallen before the end of the session, as had that of 
Anderson Dawson, which, as the first Labour Government seen 
in Australia, had lasted only six days. These momentous 
events were followed by three years in which Robert Philp 
managed to alienate sufficient support to force his 
resignation. The period closes with the formation of the 
long awaited Liberal-Labour Coalition between Arthur Morgan 
and William Henry Browne. 
THE PALL OF DICKSON 
The electoral unity of the Ministerialists was again-
shattered by the announcement of the Ministry. Dickson was 
Premier and chief Secretary, Rutledge, Attorney-General, 
Foxton was Home Secretary. Philp was given two Portfolios, 
the Treasury and Mines. Dalrymple was in charge of Public 
Lands, Murray Public Works and Chataway Agriculture- Of 
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the forty-two Ministerialists, 31 had been elected from 
southern constitutiencies, nine from the North and two from 
the Central Division. Dissatisfaction naturally arose when 
1 
the North produced three Cabinet Ministers, while the South 
was represented by only Foxton and Dickson. It could justly 
be argued that the Ministry was a Northern Ministry, held 
in power by a southern vote. These regional jealousies, 
compounded by the anti-federalist sympathies of many southern 
representatives constituted a potential for considerable 
disruption. 
The first two sessions of 1899 were however dominated 
by two events which had their origin outside Queensland 
politics - 1?he Boer War and Federation. In September 1899, 
the Federal Referendum was held, in which the giant 
favourable vote In North Queensland carried the Colony into 
the new Commonwealth. But the first half of the second 
session of 1899 was dominated by heated discussion surrounding 
the Transvaal contingent. While the House had been In recess, 
the Government had provided for a volunteer force of 
Queenslanders to be sent to the aid of the British beleague<kc/ 
in the Transvaal. In October, the Premier took the opportunity 
1. Rutledge, though elected by a southern constituency, had 
long represented Cairns. 
2, See above Ch. 10^and Appendix 7-
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of defending the action of the administration. He maintained 
that the small number of troops would make no difference in 
the military sense, but that "this is an object lesson that 
shows that the Australian States recognize that they are a 
part of the great British Empire". 
The attitude of the Labour Party to the Boer War was 
4 
similar in most of the Australian Colonies. The leader of 
the Labour Party, Dawson, felt that the Premier was affected 
by "the war craze, this thirst for blood, the jingoistic 
spirit, the overwhelming desire to hit somebody ... and 
5 
knock him out." McDonnell regarded the war as "unjustifable 
and unrighteous" and objected, "We are asked to take part in 
a quarrel that does not concern us, and that the people of 
this colony have not had the slightest opportunity of voicing 
their opinions on," The Labour attitude in October was 
therefore that the war was a®, unnecessary as it was immoral, 
and that Dickson had no right to authorize the dispatch of 
troops without the prior assent of Parliament and people-
By December-January, however. Labour had to some extent 
changed its opinion, as a result of international Interference 
and significant Boer victories. The party had already been 
3. Q.P.D., LXXII, (1899), p-341. 
4- For attitudes to the War see Grimshaw, C , 'Some Aspects 
of ^strallan Attitudes to the Imperial Connection 1900-
1919!'' (Unpub. M.A. Thesis, U. of Q.y9S/) 
f, Q.P.D., LXXII, (1899), p.343. 
i. Ibid., p.479. 
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divided on the issue, with Glassey and Jackson in favour 
of British and Queensland participation, while the Worker 
still regarded the war as "being waged in the Interests of 
7 
Rhodes, the Johannesburg mine-owners and British capitalists". 
By December^however, opinion had changed to such an extent 
that Dawson seconded Philp's motion for a second contingent. 
While Labour was no doubt aware of the electoral disadvantages 
of its largely unpopular stance on the war, it is more likely 
that the Labour attitude changed as Britain's position 
worsened. Dawson feared the Interference of Germany: 
The struggle today is not a struggle between the 
Boers and Great Britain, urged on by a coterie 
of land grabbers headed by Cecil Rhodes .., it 
is a matter of national existence - whether the 
prestige of the British Empire is to be sullied 
and to suffer humiliation in South Africa at the 
hands of its traditional enemies on the Continent.8 
On the domestic front, far less momentous events were taking 
place. In September, the Western Champion had predicted 
that these Ministerialists who were opposed to Federation 
9 
would make one last ditch attempt to wreck the Ministry. 
This faction was led by W- Stephens, who, on the occasion of 
the death of A.F. Luya, had threatened that if the Government 
attempted to nominate a federalist for the by-election, he 
f* Rayner, S. A. , ".The Evolution of the Queensland Labour 
Party 1901-1925'! (Unpub. M.A. Thesis, U.^of Q.), p. 170. 
S, Q.P.D. , LXXXIII, (1899), p. 1473- ^^""^  
pr Western Champion, 12.10.99-
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would vote for the Labour candidate, Henry Turley. A 
second faction, led by Leahy and Forrest^had always opposed 
Dickson, and preferred Philp. Mellwraith, writing to Cecil 
Palmer, felt that, "Leahy is a curious Character arid had 
managed to get himself into various confidences, he representing 
the squatters and squatting firms in the House of Assembly..** 
If his intimacy and working with the Labour Party was 
thoroughly understood, I think that would soOn drop through." 
These factions were led by strong and devious men who 
were prepared to await their opportunity. This came when 
Dickson, fulfilling his election pledge to set up a Standing 
Committee on Railways, Introduced the measure. The petty 
jealousies, diplomatic appointments, anti-federalism and 
unwise Cabinet choices all came into pi.aV, and on "November $2<, 
Ministerialists who crossed the floor were Stephens, Crlbb, 
Petrle, Forrest and Leahy. Dickson, regarding the division 
as one of confidencejreslgned. The political manoeuvrings 
following this vote have not been fully documented, but 
according to Rayner, Dawson offered both the Remnant and the 
discontented Ministerialists two Portfolios each, and had 
12 
been to all Intents and purposes, accepted. When the first 
10. Brisbane Courier, 19.7-99-
11. Mellwraith to Palmer, 12.4.1900 (Mcllwraith-Palmer Papers, 
Oxley Library). 
12. Rayner, S.A., op.cit. , p. 174'. 
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13 Labour Ministry took office_,however, only the Labour Party 
sat behind the Government, with the Independent Opposition 
on the cross benches. It was believed that Leahy would not 
have joined, but would have supported the new Government, 
had the Opposition co-operated. Drake, however, promised 
only a general support h6 the new Government. While it is 
impossible to imagine men like Stephens and Forrest being 
able to give loyalty to a party which stood in direct 
opposition to their -economic and social Interests, it seems 
odd that Drake, refused to join the Labour Party in a 
Coalition Government. Possibly, Philp had offered a 
portfolio, or more probably the majority of the Remnant knew 
that_^ even with their aid, the Labour Government had slight 
chance of survival. There was also a legacy of doubt and 
mistrust which was a result of the years of fruitless 
negotiation, which militated against successful combination 
at this stage. 
The following events were a mere formality- Dawson 
called for an adjournment to allow the Government time to 
formulate a policy. While he was supported by Drake and the 
Independent Opposition, the motion was lost by 36 votes to 26 
13* Dawson, Fitzgerald, Turley, Kidston, Browne 
Hardacre, Fisher-
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Once again, a Government had fallen. 
Two days later, a new Ministry, headed by Robert Philp^ 
was sworn in. Philp "probably knew when Mr- Forrest and 
his three followers crossed over to the Opposition benches 
to vote against Mr. Dickson that the defeat of that politician 
meant only the substitution of himself in a reconstructed 
l4 Ministry." It was Indeed the intention of Forrest and 
Leahy to dispense with Dickson, and they settled down in 
support of Philp. Once again the Continuous Ministry had 
survived. It was to survive for another three years, amidst 
declining prestige and deepening disillusionment on the part 
of both Parliament and public. 
THE GOVERNMENT OF ROBERT PHILP 
Like all its predecessors, the last Government of the 
Continuous Ministry was one dominated by business and 
finance. The best word to describe it was "mediocre". 
Whatever his personal fallings, no Government headed by 
Sir Thomas Mellwraith could be called mediocre. Even Sir 
Hugh Muir Nelson had given the Ministry strength and skill. 
Dickson had never been trusted, and had never really been 
a party man. Robert Philpj however, had always remained 
14. Mellwraith to Palmer, 12.4.1900 (McIlwralth-Palmer Papers, 
Oxley Library). 
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loyal to the party which best promoted his, and other business 
interests - in the Eighties the National Party-in the 
Nineties^the loose collection known as the "Ministerialists". 
Perhaps exhausted by long years in Parliament, Philp failed 
to assert his leadership, or Indeed any positive qualities 
at all. O'Sullivan describes the character of the 
administrative elite: 
They took the view of the average successful 
businessman. Most men of that type had started 
on the lowest rung of the ladder and had 
achieved success by industry, self denial and 
persistency. They thought the average man 
should be able to succeed in the same way and 
that if he did not, it must be his own fault. 
They considered that progressive legislation 
interfered with business by Increasing current 
expenses and lessening the control of the 
employer over his employees. They regarded it 
as opposed to their interests-15 
From such a Government, the Labour and Opposition Parties 
managed to wrest a significant victory in the election of 
Arthur Morgan as speaker- One of the most respected men in 
the House, Morgan seemed infinitely preferable to A.S. Cowley 
who had already shown himself markedly hostile to the alms 
of Labour- After long and almost unprecedented debate, 
Morgan was finally installed in the Speaker'.s'Chair- Hls-
15. O'Sullivan, T. , •'!Reminiscences of the Queensland Parliament 
(Unpub. M.S. Parliamentary Library), p.2. 
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independent stance had been long recognized and it was 
felt that no better speaker could be found. 
While the election of Morgan could be described as a 
defeat for the new Government, the position of Philp was 
much more secure than that of either of his two immediate 
predecessors. He had the support of Forrest, Leahy and 
MacDonald-Paterson, who had largely brought about the demise 
of Dickson. He also managed to capture the former leader of 
the Independent Opposition, J.G- Drake. This switch of 
sides, and to the Upper House, was probably due to personal 
reasons. It was rumoured that Drake had been in poor health 
for almost a year, and this, combined with his Parliamentary 
duties, had had a detrimental effect on his career at the 
Bar. Fruitless opposition over nearly a decade had no doubt 
exacted a heavy toll on Drake, as it had on Powers, and he 
probably welcomed the quieter atmosphere of the Legislative 
Council. His Portfolio of Public Instruction did not promise 
to be an easy task, but it is probable that Drake already had 
decided to seek a place in federal politics. His appointment 
was not received well in several quarters. A.J. Stephenson, 
once again disappointed for office, criticized Philp through 
the pages of the Queensland Times; 
15. Knox, B.A., ''Hon. Sir Arthur Morgan'' (Unpub. B.A. Thesis, 
U, of Q.), 
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Certainly tactics of this kind offer no Inducement 
to the loyal and consistent government followers 
to remain steadfast in their support, and are by 
no means calculated to promote what is so greatly 
to be desired - viz,the complete consolidation of 
the party-1? 
The only other slightly controversial appointment was that 
of O'Connell, long a spokesman for the sugar industry. 
Although he had been obviously chosen as representative for 
the long neglected Wide Bay area, many felt that with Chataway 
a good spokesman for the sugar Industry, already in the 
Cabinet, another member might have been, chosen. Nevertheless, 
Philp appeared to have effectively disposed of the problem 
of regional jealousies, which had so continuodsLy plagued 
the Dickson Ministry. Dickson, Drake, Foxton and Rutledge 
represented southern electorates, Dalrymple and Chataway the 
North, Murray the Centre and O'Connell, Wide Bay. The 
Western Champion could not foresee any imminent political 
upheaval: 
Mr. Philp is a man under whom we may be quietly 
governed. He is not likely to do anything which 
can offend even the most bitter of his opponents 
... Mr. Dawson and his followers must be content 
with their present position as critics, in which 
they can do the Government great service.18 
The two parliamentary sessions prior to the General 
17. Queensland Times, 9.1.99. 
18. Western Champion, I6.I.190O. 
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Elections of 1902 seemed to reflect the Premier's style; 
The session of 1900 produced little of value. The finances 
of the colony were far from bodyant, and the Government 
found an extensive public works policy Impossible. There 
was a marked decline in productivity, caused by severe 
drought in 1899 - 1901, and a decline in revenue when customs 
duties were surrendered to the Commonwealth. In 1900, 
Queensland had only just managed to float a loan on the 
London market. 
It was under such circumstances of general economic 
stagnation that the Government faced its first serious 
challenge. It was Impossible to satisfy all the demands 
for railways which had accumulated since I896. Therefore 
in June, 1900_, Philp intimated that the Government was 
considering numerous railway proposals, made on the basis 
of private Industry. The Government was prepared to accept 
any legitimate mining proposition which covered the building 
of railways to places "where the nature of the country makes 
the risk too great for the Government". Such a proposal was 
bound to cause uproar in Labour circles, and the chances of 
preventing the implementation of the Government programme 
were considerably Increased by the prior failure of Dickson 
to carry his Railways Standing Committee Proposal. 
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Most of the energies of the Session were thus expended 
on stonewalling the Estimates. By September, no progress 
had been made. Philp declared his Government would stand 
or fall on its railway programme, which Included railways 
in the Callide, Mt*. Garnet, Albert River,. Lllydale and 
Normanton districts. After three months nothing had been 
achieved but wasted time- The destroyers of the Dickson 
Government, Forrest, Leahy and Macdonald-Paterson were again 
becoming restive and assumed a collective threatening stance. 
Macdonald-Paterson "declined to endure this any longer, and 
if those who had charge of the team could not keep the 
coach going, he and his colleagues were determined to take 
the whip out of their hands and give it to somebody else". ^ 
Given their past history, the two could not be ignored, and 
the greatly alarmed Ministry saw, with great relief, the 
session close without incident. Once again splits had 
appeared, to be partially healed. Most of the railways had 
been eventually carried, but at the expense of all other 
legislation. 
The dreariness of the session of 1900 was repeated in 
1901, with the difference that the opposition forces were 
weakened by the federal elections, which removed from the 
19* Western Champion, I6.10.1900 
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State Parliament, Dawson, Glassey, Higgs, Fisher and Groom. 
The Cabinet was deprived of the services of J.R. Dickson. 
This was a dubious loss, for Dickson must have harboured 
some resentment against Philp and other members of the 
Government, and may not have been reliable in a crisis. The 
year was chiefly notable for a declining financial position 
and continued Government torpor. To augment falling revenue, 
the Government offered Crown Lands for auction, only to with-
draw the offer under threat of severe Labour pressure and 
opposition among some members of its own party. A Bill 
designed to widen the franchise did not come to fruition. 
In the public view, the Government was not only Inactive, 
but lacked the courage of its convictions. Late in 1901, 
the Queensland Times observed that "if there is any policy 
of the Government to which objection might be raised by a 
rational and dispassionate mind, it is that of putting away 
20 Ministerial responsibility." It was under such 
Inauspicious circumstances that the Conservatives prepared 
for the 1902 elections. 
1902 ELECTIONS 
As the elections approached, the activities of the 
National Liberal Union, formed in July 1901 under the aegis 
20. Queensland Times, 1.10.I9OI. 
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of A.J. Thynne, had become more obvious. The old Queensland 
Political Association still existed, but its vitality had 
disappeared. The aim of the N.L.U. was ostensibly to prevent 
21 
an overlapping of candidature in the various electorates". 
There was no attempt at policy formation. Yet, like .its two 
22 predecessors, the N,L.U, was essentially an anti-Labour 
organization, its objectives clearly stated by ever faithful 
R.P. Adams: 
To relieve the electors of Queensland from Trades 
Hall domination, and from interference with the 
liberty of the employer to engage the services 
of whomsoever he feels inclined to hire; to 
secure to working men the right to work for 
which employers they choose; to protect Individual 
enterprise. Industry and thrift; to prevent the 
nationalization of Industries and other matters 
as against dangerous socialistic and class 
legislation.23 
The N.L.U. seems to have had some success in organizing 
Ministerial candidates, although in Fortitude Valley, Bundaberg 
24 
and Maryborough the Union failed to Impose its will. On 
the whole, its efforts were rewarded and were not attended 
by the same degree of hostility which had characterized the 
activities of the Queensland Political Association. 
The formation of a Darling Downs Combination early in 
1902 indicates that once again the farmers were restive. The 
21. Brisbane Courier, 19.1-1902. 
22. See abovoj Ch.lO. 
23. Brisbane Courier, 22.5-1902. 
24. Ibid., 5.2.1902. 
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meeting was attended by Morgan... (Warwick),Foxton, (Carnavon), 
Mackintosh» (Cambooya))Kates , (Cunningham),Moore ., (Murilla)j 
Pogarty and "foimie (Toowoomba)^Thorn, (Aublgny),and Bell 
(Dalby). Unlike the Farmers Repres^rrtatlve Union, which had 
been a purely Informal organization during Nelson's Premier-
ship _, the new Combination issued a specific Manifesto, calling 
for lower railways rates, closer settlement and further 
export aid. It declared its opposition to the land tax, and 
25 
to any Increase in centralisation. ^ The "Downs bunch" 
carefully refrained from commenting on political questions, 
and did not attempt to propagate a political programme as 
had the Farmers Alliance a decade before. It was primarily 
the result of purely agricultural grievances and purely 
agricultural demands. But the Philp Government was well 
aware of the timing of the Manifesto and its signatories. 
All except Pogarty were Ministerialists, and coming so close 
to the Elections, the Manifesto forced some sort of 
acknowledgement of agricultural claims. 
The Courier felt that the main issues of the Election 
were clear: 
There are only two political parties in Queensland -
that which is dominated by the Socialism of the 
Trades Hall and that which seeks to be fairly 
representative nfi. the varied interests of the whole 
25. Knox, B.A,, op.cit. , p.64. 
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State ... (but) the discussion of abstract 
political principles must give place to the 
need of dealing in a businesslike way with 
financial difficulties ... the question of 
ways and means is really the most Important 
one at present.26 
Philp's Manifesto contained little to which much objection 
could be made. He concentrated on "ways asd means", 
promising general retrenchment, a cessation of public 
works, and a reduction of members and Ministers. To the 
farmers he promised Government aid in finding export 
markets, and announced himself in favour of the re-
purchase of large estates in the interests of closer 
27 
settlement. Morgan reacted with pleasure: 
Although the new found importance of the 
Darling Downs amply justifies the formation 
of the Combination, we do not think it will 
have any occasion to interfere while the 
present Government holds office, the policy 
... being so strongly in the direction the 
Combination had been formed to uphold.28 
While the finances of the Labour Party had been greatly 
depleted by the Federal election, its organization was 
efficient. Its Manifesto was a most reasonable one, in 
which the socialist objective was almost ignored in favour 
of constant stress on the "new liberalism" of the Labour 
26. Brisbane Courier, 14.1.1902. 
27- Ibid., 4.2.1902. 
28. Warwick Argus, 1.3.1902. 
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Party in contrast to the laissez-faire liberalism of the 
elder parties. The Labour Manifesto condemned the 
Government for its failure to implement its proposed 
•••r 
electoral reform, and once again called for universal-
29 
adult suffrage. Included in its programme were calls 
for the institution of a minimum wage and a land tax, 
two planks hardly designed to -appeal to an electorate which 
wanted., above all, retrenchment and economy. 
As the results of the elections flowed in, it 
appeared that the new century had not changed political 
afflHbtions one whit. The Government lost four seats, 
and returned 38 members. The Labour Party gained 24 
seats, two Independent Ministerialists were returned, 
(Bridges and Llndley) and one Farmers Representative, 
Hodge, The Independent Opposition was hanging on with 
courage, if not conspicSous success, and managed to retain 
six seats. Thus, if all members who were not Ministerialists 
were counted as Oppositionists, the Government still 
maintained a majority of six. According to the Western 
Champion however, Armstrong, Kates, Bell, Forrest, 
Macartney, Boles and Stephens were Ministerialists of 
30 
rather dubious loyalty. 
gj* Brisbane Courier, 18.2.1902. 
30. Western .Champion, 17.3-1902. 
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The Labour Party lost four of the more prominent 
members of the A.L.F. faction - Turley, Reid, Bowman and 
Fitzgerald. Kidston and Browne thus retained undisputed 
31 leadership of the party- Even though they had only 
gained three extra seats, the elections might be deemed 
encouraging for Labour. The party lost several of its 
western seats, often on local Issues, but gained seats in 
areas never before conquered. Barton and Norman won the 
double electorate of Maryborough, Martin won Burrum, and 
Barber Bundaberg. Support in the metropolitan area also 
seemed a little more solid, and many commentators felt 
Labour could look to a greater diversity of representation 
in subsequent elections. 
THE SECOND PHILP MINISTRY 
The Labour Party had gained three seats and the 
Ministry had lost four, but Philp could congratulate 
himself on winning the mandate of the country. His position 
in the Parliament was relatively secure, and he could now 
fulfil his promises of retrenchment and development. He 
showed the same wisdom as regards geographical represen-
tation in the new Cabinet, and as a gesture towards 
retrenchment cut down the size of the Ministry to six. 
31. Kidston, due to Browne's 111 health, emerged as the 
real leader. 
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Philp himself undertook the Portfolio of Mines, J.C. Crlbb 
was appointed Treasurer, Rutledge remained Attorney-General, 
and Foxton was once again Minister for Lands. Dalrymple 
was given two portfolios - Agriculture and Education^and 
John Leahy was given charge of the Railways and Public 
Works. John Murray had been appointed to the Council just 
prior to the Elections, and remained in the Cabinet as 
Vice President §f the Executive Council, Thus, Philp had. 
accommodated two sources of discontent - the West Moreton 
"bunch" „by the appointment of J.C. Crlbb^and the lure of 
a Cabinet Post for the ubiquitous John Leahy. This 
appointment of Dalrymple as Minister for Agriculture was 
somewhat provocative, as his only familiarity was tropical 
agriculture- This was not designed to appease Downs 
discontent. Crlbb, moreover, was a doubtful quantity in 
the important Treasury post. 
THE GOVERNMENT COMES APART 
In the year following the elections, the Philp 
Government showed itself completely incapable of carrying 
out its twin programmes of development and retrenchment. 
To develop the country, the Premier and his colleagues could 
suggest only an Increase in loan moneys. The traumatic 
experience of 1892-3j however, had made such a course very 
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unpopular, and it was to prove the undoing of the 
Government. The government rested on its strength in 
metropolitan areas, upon the support of business-investment 
groups, along with the solid support of the south-eastern 
farming communities. A sound progressive financial policy 
was thus a necessity. Crlbb and Philp could not handle 
the financial situation which had almost reached crisis 
point, and consequently they began to forfeit support from 
the commercial community. A sure barometer of the attitude 
of the business world was the Brisbane Courier. Prior to 
the beginning of the second session, the Courier was far 
from enthusiastic about Philp: 
Mr- Philp, in the prolonged tour which has 
terminated at his own constituency at 
Townsvllle is hardly to be credited with 
having any talent or visablllty. At 
Charters Towers, he gave some indication of 
the proposed work of the session in the way 
of electoral riform. Otherwise there was 
but little worthy of note in his utterances.32 
In March, the Western Champion had pointed out that there 
had been little progress in development and the Government 
had Ignored requests for further aid, particularly for 
33 
railways and irrigation. The same newspaper, along with 
other country journals, protested when Leahy, in June 1902, 
32. Brisbane Courier, 6.6.1903. 
33. Western Champion, 8.3.1903. 
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proposed to raise railway rates, including passenger 
34 
charges. The Mackay Mercury faithful as ever, could not 
avoid admitting: "the Government was spending money too 
fast some time ago and ... it did not reduce expenditure 
35 
as soon as it might have tried to do so". 
By June 1903, the finances of the Government had gone 
from bad to worse, and a deficit of i300,000 was anticipated. 
The Courier warned that the electors would not tolerate any 
increase in taxation.-^ Thus inept financial administration 
was gradually alienating the traditional supporters of 
the Government. Philp was also in trouble from another, 
more significant source. He had had to face a number of 
motions of censure from his own supporters, and those had 
arisen primarily as a result of the degree of conservatism 
exhibited by the Ministry. Arthur Morgan, along with three 
riew members^Blair, Hodge and Denham, was becoming increasingly 
uncomfortable under the reactionary government of Philp. 
As early as January 1903, the Western Champion remarked 
that the election of CM. Jenklnson in the by-election of 
Passifern would strengthen the forces of opposition: 
Could this party be reinforced by some of the 
discontented Ministerialists and strengthened 
by the election of more men like Messrs. Cooper, 
34* Western Chaaipion, 23-6.1902 
35. Mackay Mercury, 17.IO.I903. 
gi* Brisbane Courier, I6-6.1903. 
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Blair and Hodge, assisted by the most independent 
members of the Labour Party, such as Jackson, 
Kidston and Hardacre, it could be quite possible 
to put out the present Government and form 
another having the cnnfldence of the country.37 
The high correlation between the more progressive of 
the Ministerialists and their representation of agricultural 
communities meant that any new Government would be forced 
to rely heavily on country support. Without the co-operation 
of the Labour Party however, there would be no chance of 
forming an alternative Government. The discontented 
Ministerialists - Denham, Llndley, Plunkett, Tolmle, Kates, 
Bell, Morgan, McCartney and Thorn, together with the 
Independent Opposition could not hope to succeed without 
solid "labour support. The attitude of that party was 
therefore crucial. 
The 1899 Elections had, to all appearances^strengthened, 
by the defeat of Cross, Hoolan and King, and the return 
of Fisher, the faction which continued to Insist on complete 
iridependenfce. Glassey had been completely alienated, and 
had even refused to serve in the shortlived Dawson Ministry. 
But the party had again been weakened by the decision of 
most of its able leaders to enter the Commonwealth Parliament, 
Browne was not the nominal leader, but his 111 health WAS 6uch 
37. Western Champion, II.I.1903. 
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that most of the work devolved on William Kidston. In 
1899, Kidston had insisted upon G.S. Curtis as his running 
mate, in preference to a Labour man. In many ways like 
Arthur Morgan, Kidston had always pursued a relatively 
independent course in Parliament and was unusually suspicious 
of creeds and ideologies which clouded clear-cut political 
issues. At a public meeting in January 1903 Kidston 
had Incurred the ire of the Worker by his suggestion of 
39 fusion with the Independent Opposition. 
The relatively poor showing of Labour In 1902 may have 
convinced several members of the party that a change of 
tactics might be beneficial. O'Sullivan remarked that: 
The Labour Party had been in Impotent Isolation 
for some years and Kidston thought it was likely 
to remain so, unless it would adopt a system of 
prudent alliances which had brought many gains 
to Labour in the South.^0 
William Browne, like Kidston, was a man of compromise, whose 
long years in Parliament allowed him to see the advantages 
of such a Coalition. In indicating his willingness to co-
operate with other groups to oust Philp, and in not insisting 
upon the implementation of the whole labour programme at 
once, Browne drew reluctant praise from the Courier: 
38. Wanka, K., "William Kidston" in Prelude to Power, 
p.200. 
39. Worker, 24,1.1903-
40. O'Sullivan, op.cit. , p.3. 
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The leader of the Opposition and his lieutenant 
have shown themselves not only temperate in 
their utterances but commendably desirous of 
joining hands with some of their nominal 
opponents.^1 
Moreover, as Crook points out, the ascendancy of the 
parliamentary party within the Labour movement had been 
ensured by the departure of Fisher, Dawson, Reid and Higgs 
The local Workers Political Organizations also tended to 
42 
support the more moderate leaders. He continues that 
"the militant left ... had become gradually reconciled to 
the inevitable. Particularly compelling was the prospect 
of attaining universal suffrage, an entrenched article of 
43 faith in the Labour creed". It would appear then, that 
with moderate politicians in control of the party, and 
their willingness to coalesce with other groups, all that 
was needed to oust Philp was opportunity. 
THE FALL OP THE CONTINUOUS MINISTRY 
The opportunity was not long wanting. With no 
improvement in the finances, Philp could see no other way 
of raising revenue than a heavy Increase in stamp duties. 
Nothing could have alienated the business community mo.re. 
Most businessmen felt the taxes were unnecessary, and "as 
41. Brisbane 'Courier, 12.6,1903. 
42. Crook, D.P., "The Crucible" in Prelude to Power, 
p.6l. 
43. Ibid. 
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a prominent Brisbane merchant put it, it would be better 
to increase income tax slightly than to adopt the 
44 Government's proposals". There was no doubt, however, 
that any attempt to raise Income tax would have alienated 
a much greater proportion of the community. 
The Government's stamp tax resolutions were carried by 
two votes. Three Ministerialists who had indicated their 
dissatisfaction with Philp, (Boles, Bell, Kates) voted 
for the Government and nine members were absent. Those 
absentees included five members who probably would have 
voted against the Government (Thorn and Armstrong, and 
Labour members Woods, Lesina and Summi^ville.) Morgan, 
still speaker^had the casting vote, so it was unlikely 
that the Government could have survived a second vote. 
In this vote, the Labour Party was joined by three 
Ministerialists, Cooper, Denham and Tolmle, three Independent 
Oppositionists, Blair, Pogarty and Plunkett, and two 
Independents, Llndley and Hodge. 
Always regarding the issue as one of. confidence, Philp 
tendered the resignation of the Ministry, and called upon 
Browne to form a Ministry. Browne, without the outright 
support of the Independent Opposition and dlssaffected 
44. Mackay Mercury, 1.10.1903. 
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groups, could not hope to achieve success. After conferring 
with the Speaker, he advised the Governor to send for Morgan. 
Morgan subsequently named his Coalition Ministry on 17th 
September, 1903: 
Morgan: Premier, Ch. Secretary and Minister for Railways 
Browne: Secretary for Mines and Public Works 
Kidston: Treasurer 
Bell: Minister for Lands 
Blair: Attorney-General 
Denham: Secretary for Agriculture and Home Secretary 
Barlow: Secretary for Public Instruction M.L.C. 
Governor Chermside reported: 
... Of the prospects of the duration of the 
present Government it is premature to judge. 
The Labour Party is the controlling factor, 
but in view of its inability to undertake 
the administration alone, it's prepared to 
relegate to the background its own advanced 
programme.45 
While the Labour Party Insisted on complete autonomy 
and freedom of action, Morgan insisted that two Labour 
representatives should share Ministerial responsibility. 
Thus the Morgan-Browne Coalition was indeed a partnership, 
the Lib-Lab compromise so long sought, and so long denied 
by personalities and circumstances. Never in the previous 
45. Gov. Sec. Despatches to the Sec. of State, 30.9.1903-
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decade had defections from Ministerial ranks been on a 
matter of political principle. Always before. Minister-
ialists had objected to specific policies or principles -
payment of members or border taxes, or railway rates or 
federation. The combination of agricultural discontent 
and political progressivism had proved crucial and the 
dissensions could no longer be contained by a politically 
impotent Ministry. Never before had the Continuous 
.Ministry been so weak in the area of its greatest strength. 
In this way, circumstances favoured Coalition. Moreover, 
Kidston, Browne and Morgan were relatively unaffected by 
the disappointments, frustrations and distrust which had 
wrecked the efforts of Powers, Drake, Glassey and Dawson. 
Once again, financial and economic circumstances 
had brought about a Coalition in Queensland politics. The 
circle had turned - from the time of the Coalition of 
Liberal and Conservative in I89O, through the long, dismal, 
often incompetent, sometimes corrupt years of the Continuous 
Ministry to a new Liberal-Labour Coalition in 1903- The 
future of the Morgan-Browne Coalition was far from assured, 
but the liberation of Queensland from the reactionary 
stranglehold of the Continuous Ministry brought once again a 
fresh and exciting atmosphere to political life. 
389 
CONCLUSION 
"Expediency" is defined by the Shorter Oxford Dictionary 
as that which is politic rather than just. Nothing more aptly 
described the condition of Queensland politics during the 
last decade of the Nineteenth Century. Time and again, 
political principle was sacrificed to expediency; time and 
again the Government flew in the face of long established 
traditions of justice.and parliamentary precedent. Why then, 
did the Continuous Ministry hold office for-'thirteen long 
years while Queensland settled ever deeper into a slough o-P 
conservatism, indeed reaction, and corruption, governed 
by a political elite, posturing, self-important,. but in 
the end, very, very mediocre? 
The decade had been ushered in by a depression as severe 
as any Queenslanders had ever known. The collapse of the 
building industry heralded the collapse of the banks The 
reckless spending policy of the governments led to rapid 
and debilitating retrenchment when overseas loan sources 
dried up. Unemployment reached levels never before 
anticipated, and only feeble attempts were made to aid 
those thousands thrown out of work. The unemployed were 
regarded as social outcasts, failures in a land where 
self-help was a primary virtue and the self-made man often 
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the pinnacle of social and economic success. Samuel Smiles 
reigned supreme in society but so did government handouts 
to large-scale industry. It was not a land where the aged, 
poor, ill or unemployed were accepted as a social or 
political responsibility. 
The Queensland Parliament was very definitely a 
parliament which represented the interests of property. 
Leaders such as Morehead,-'Mellwraith, Nelson and Philp are 
typical products of a colonial elite based upon property. 
Of those leaders who had.received a tertiary education, 
only one, T.J. Byrnes^had done so in Australia, and only 
Griffith showed any,-Interest in its promotion in the colony. 
This reflected two attitudes - perhaps an attempt t© maintain 
the privileges of an existing elite but certainly it was an 
indication of the values of a society based upon material 
progress and material possessions. 
The Eighties had seen a stable 'Tl^ i-partisan political 
division, resting upon the personal magnetism of Griffith 
and Mellwraith and supported by a complicated web of intrigue, 
patronage and to a certain extent differing political values. 
But all shared the. common vision of progress, material and 
moral, concomitant with the economic development of the 
colony. The I89O Coalition did not change this vision, but 
it did create a political watershed. While it may be argued 
that the political disparity between the two parties has been 
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exaggerated, it remains true that the Coalition was a 
profound shock to the body politic. A'far greater shock 
was the I89I pastoral strike which cemented what had been 
largely an opportunistic, expedient into a long-term political 
reality. The strike sounded the death-knell of'what had 
been known, as .the Liberal Party,, which had, however,-' already 
lost much of': its identity in the conservative I890 coalition. 
By 1893, a new challenge had emerged - a Labour Party with 
eighteen seats in the Assembly, representing'a working 
population no longer content with'their former paternalistic 
representation. While the party steadily gained seats, it 
remained unable to transcend its regional character. Partly 
this was a result of Ministerial electoral machinations -
redistributions and carefully staggered elections designed 
to keep the Continuous Ministry in power. In I892 an 
Election Act had directly struck at the nomadic bush workers 
by tightening residence qualifications. By 1899 too, the 
Labour Party's solidarity was beginning to disintegrate with 
serious tussles between the industrial and political wings. 
What, meanwhile had happened to the Liberals? Some 
stalwarts struggled on as a rump opposition, but their 
numbers ..were small and morale Increasingly low. It was not 
until 1899, when some Ministerialists, mostly standing for 
farming electorates, breathed some new life into the 
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Ministerial back benches, that the Liberals saw some hope 
of breaking the reactionary stranglehold of the Ministry. 
The failure of attempts.at a Liberal-Labour Coalition 
meant that the Government continued in office as long as 
it did. Its popularity had steadily sagged from 1895-
Perhaps, in part, this survival may also have been due to 
the apathy or timidlit^ of the Queensland people. Perhaps, 
suffering from the physical and spiritual hardships 
engendered by the depression and the disastrous 1893 floods, 
they simply did not care what sort of government they had. 
Or perhaps they simply lacked the will.to change. 
Meanwhile, they were titillated, but also shocked^ 
by one financial scandal after another dominated by the 
affairs of the Queensland National Bank. The long drawn 
out Enquiry, the reluctance of the Government to table the 
Report so damaging to some of its members and former members, 
and finally the criminal trial of those implicated certainly 
demoralized the public at a time when many needed confidence 
and a fresh start. 
Ironically, the Government was finally defeated by 
rebellion from within rather than challenge from without. 
The Peace Preservation Bill, the Queensland National Bank, 
the Federation Enabling Bill, the Mirani-Cattle Creek Railway 
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scandal, counted for nothing when it came to its failure 
to satisfy the needs of business. The reintroduction of 
coloured labour and land grant railways were insignificant 
compared to financial ineptitude and a failure to balance 
the budget. Political.chicanery and social irresponsibility 
did not compare to a deficit of i300,000 in 1903- So the 
Continuous Ministry came to an end. Once again a coalition 
came to office - a Liberal-Labour coalition which promised 
a new and energetic approach to Government. Cynicism and 
expediency had, perhaps, given way to enthusiasm and 
political principle. 
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APPENDIX TWO (i) 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTIES 
1888 
MelLWRAITH 
P l u n k e t t 
Smith 
Leahy 
G* J o n e s 
Pe rk ins 
Al lan 
Campbell 
M e l l w r a i t h 
Murphy 
Morehead 
Jordan 
Luya 
Powers 
S tevenson 
GRIFFITH 
G r i f f i t h 
B u c k l a n d 
Adams 
G l a s s e y 
Hodgk inson 
Wimble 
F o x t o n 
S a y e r s 
R u t l e d g e 
Drake 
S a l k e l d 
McMaster 
Smyth 
M e l l o r 
INDEPENDENTS 
S t e v e n s 
iStephens 
! 
Jessop 
Lyons 
Goldr ing 
Watson 
C o r f i e l d 
Cowley 
L i s sne r 
Paul 
North 
Dunsmure 
Black 
Dalrymple 
Crombie 
B a t t e r s b y 
Nelson 
Agnew 
Norton 
P a t t i s o n 
Archer 
Jones 
O ' S u l l i v a n 
Casey 
Gannon 
Phi lp 
Macross£ui 
L i t t l e 
O'Connel l 
Murray 
Cal lan 
Donaldson 
Bar low 
Mocrferlane 
Annear 
Hyne 
Gr imes 
Lamber t 
Unmack 
Groom 
Aland 
Morgan 
T o z e r 
APPENDIX TWO 
^im$ 
( i i ) 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTIES 
1893 
MINISTERIALIST 
Plunkett (M) 
Morehead (M) 
Smith (M) 
Mellwraith (M) 
Kingsbury 
Midson 
Dickson ( G ) 
Thomas 
Duffy 
Tooth 
Byrnes 
Foxton ( G ) 
P h i l l i p s 
Hamilton 
Allan (M) 
Be l l 
G. Thorn 
Watson (M) 
MeMEuster 
Smyth (G) 
Corf ie ld (M) 
Cowley (M) 
Barlow (G) 
Macfarlane (G) 
Armstrong 
Dalrymple (M) 
Chataway 
Annear (G) 
B a t t e r s l e y (M) 
Nelson (M) 
O'Connell (M) 
Murray (M) 
Agnew 
Grimes (G) 
Cribb 
Lord 
Petr ie 
Philp (M) 
Burns 
Crombie (M) 
Tozer (L) 
Stephens ( I ) 
OPPOSITION 
W, Thorn 
Groom (G) 
Drake (G) 
Powers (M) 
Cameron 
B o l e s 
Morgan (G) 
• 
LABOUR 
Kerr 
Turley 
Hoolan (G) 
Demie l s 
Dawson 
Dunsford 
J.M. Cross 
Browne 
F o g a r t y 
MacDonald 
F i s h e r 
Jackson 
Hardacre 
King 
Reid 
Rawl ings 
Wi lk inson 
Ogden 
^ 
, 
INDEPENDENT 
Leahy (M) 
C a d e l l (L) 
C a l l a n (M) 
C u r t i s (M) 
S t e v e n s ( I ) 
Archer (M) 
Harding 
' 
* Appearing in brackets are 1888 Identifications (M) Mellwraith 
(G) Griffith 
^0(f 
APPENDIX TWO 
1896 
MINISTERIALIST 
Story 
Smith 
Macdonald-Paterson 
Forrest 
Stephens 
Luya 
Dickson 
Cribb 
Kent 
Tooth 
Mackintosh 
Foxton 
Forsyth 
Hamilton 
Bell 
Callan ( I ) 
Cowley 
Stephenson 
Cribb 
Armstrong 
Stodart 
Chataway 
Dalrymple 
Rutle^e 
Bartholomew 
Annear 
Campbell 
Moore 
O'Connell 
Murray 
Bridges 
Grimes 
Lord 
Finney 
Petr ie 
Philp 
Hanran 
Hood 
Morgan (O) 
Newell 
THE COMPOSITION 
LABOUR 
Kerr 
G l a s s e y 
Maxwell 
Givens 
Dawson 
Dunsford 
Les i n a 
Browne 
MacDonald 
McDonnell 
Higgs 
W. Hamilton 
F i s h e r 
Ryland 
J a c k s o n 
Hardacre 
F i t z g e r a l d 
K i d s t o n 
S tewart 
Keogh 
J e n k i n s o n 
D i b l e y 
OF THE PARTIES 
OPPOSITION 
P l u n k e t t (M) 
W. Thorn 
G. Thorn (M) 
F o g a r t y (L) 
Groom 
Drake 
B o l e s 
C u r t i s (M) 
, 
' 
KXXX) 
INDEPENDENT 
Leahy 
Kates 
"Appearing in brackets are 1893 Iden t i f i c a t i ons where they are changed. 
Ht>^ 
APPENDIX TWO 
1899 
( i v ) 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTIES 
MINISTERIALIST 
Thorn (O) 
Story 
Forres t 
Cameron 
Stephens 
Lament 
Barnes 
Leahy ( I ) 
Cribb 
Kent 
Foxton 
Forsyth 
Hamilton 
Kates ( I ) 
Bel l 
Tolmie 
Dickson 
McMaster 
Cowley 
Cribb 
Stodart 
Paget 
Dalrymple 
Rutledge 
Campbell 
Moore 
O'Connell 
Fox 
Grimes 
Petr ie 
Macartney 
Phiip 
Hanran 
Morgan 
Lyons 
Mackintosh 
LABOUR 
Kerr 
Kenna 
Barber 
Maxwell 
Martin 
Dunsford 
Burrows 
L e s i n a 
Browne 
Cowap 
A i r e y 
McDonnell 
H£unilton 
Mulcahy 
Ryland 
J a c k s o n 
Hardacre 
Norman 
Barton 
K i d s t o n 
Grant 
Turner 
Stimmevil le 
D i b l e y 
Woods 
OPPOSITION 
P l u n k e t t 
F o g a r t y 
Muray-Prior 
B l a i r 
B o l e s 
INDEPENDENT 
Cooper 
B r i d g e s ( 0 ) 
Hodge 
L i n d l e y 
i(.o(> 
APPENDIX TWO 
PASTORALISM 
MelLWRAITH 
MOREHEAD 
BLACK 
DONALDSON 
DALRYMPLE 
CROMBIE 
JONES 
NELSON 
PALMER 
LYONS 
MURPHY 
DUNSMURE 
STEVENSON 
COWLEY 
ARCHER 
O'SULLIVAN 
SMITH 
MURRAY 
PLUNKETT 
BATTERSBY 
ALLAN 
CASEY 
JESSOP 
NORTON 
STEVENS 
MACFARLANE 
CADELL 
LEAHY 
PERKINS 
OCCUPATION AND PARTY MEMBERSHIP - 1888 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(I) 
(L) 
(I) 
(I) 
(N) 
VARIED 
BUSINESS 
CORFIELD 
LISSNER 
LUYA 
WATSON 
GANNON 
GOLDRING 
STEPHENS 
ALAND 
ANNEAR 
PERKINS 
UNMACK 
ISAMBERT 
BARLOW 
HYNE 
SALKELD 
MACFARLANE 
JOURNALISM 
GROOM 
MORGAN 
WIMBLE 
HOOLAN 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(L) 
(L) 
(N) 
(L) 
(L) 
(L) 
(L) 
(L) 
(L) 
M 
(L) 
(L) 
(L) 
(L) 
4 
MINING 
MACROSSAN 
PATTISON 
LITTLE 
LYONS 
HAMILTON 
SAYERS 
SMYTH 
MELLOR 
GLASSEY 
HUNTER 
OTHERS 
PAUL 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(L) 
(L7 
(L) 
(L) 
(L) 
J 
10 
(N) 
HODGKINSON(L) 
JORDAN 
GRIMES 
NORTH 
(L) 
(L) 
(N) 
5 
LAW 
JONES 
LYONS 
POWERS 
FOXTON 
RUTLEDGE 
DRAKE 
TOZER 
GRIFFITH 
1 
(N) 
(N) 
(N) 
(L) 
(L) 
(L) 
(L) 
(L) 
8 
II 
SUGAR 
ADAMS (N) 
COt?LEY(N) 
i 
• Some members are repeated in different groupings 
N - NATIONAL PARTY 
L - LIBERAL PARTY 
I - INDEPENDENT 
^ 7 
APPENDIX TWO 
PASTORALISM GEN, BUSINESS LAW 
( v i ) 
JOURNALISM 
STEVENS 
NELSON 
MURRAY 
SMITH 
CADELL 
STEVENSON 
NORTON 
ALLAN 
JESSOP 
HAMILTON 
DONALDSON 
PERKINS 
PAUL 
CAMERON 
ARCHER 
CROMBIE 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
LEAHY 
CORFIELD 
MOREHEAD 
CALLAN 
DALRYMPLE 
O'CONNELL 
UNMACK 
STEPHENS 
KINGSBURY 
MACFARLANE 
ANNEAR 
HYNE 
TOOTH 
LUYA 
WATSON 
McMASTER 
FRASER 
HIDSON 
PETRIE 
CRIBB 
KEOGH 
( I ) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
KATES ( O ) a n d ( M ) 
AGNEW 
ISAMBERT 
PHILP 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
FOXTON 
BYRNES 
BELL 
POWERS 
DRAKE 
MCDONALD 
(M) 
(M) 
(M) 
(0) (o) 
PATERSON(IM) 
FITZGERALD (L) 
HOOLAN (L) 
MORGAN (O)and(M) 
CROSS (L) 
GIVENS (L) 
CHATAWAY (M) 
GROOM (0) 
THORNE (0) 
STEPHENSON (M) 
WILKINSON (L) 
FARMING OTHER MINING 
O'SULLIVAN (M) 
PLUNKETT (0)&(M) 
LOVEJOY (L) 
COWLEY (M) 
GRIMES (M) 
DANIELS (L) 
BRIDGES (O) 
BATTERSBY (M) 
BOLES (0) 
GANNON (M) 
RYAN (L) 
HALL (L) 
ALAND (M) 
TURLEY (L) 
THOMAS (M) 
CURTIS (I)&(M) 
FISHER (L) 
SMYTH (M) 
GLASSEY (L) 
LITTLE (M) 
A P P E N D I X 3 
THE LABOUR PROGRAMME 
AUSTRALIAN LABOUR FEDERATION PLATFORM - 1890 
POLITICAL AIMS OF THE FEDERATION 
1. The Nationalisation of all sources of wealth and all 
means of producing and exchanging wealth. 
2. The conducting by the State authority of all production 
and all exch ange. 
3. The,|.pensioning by the State authority of all children 
aged and invalid citizens. 
4. The saving by the State authority of such proportion 
of the joint wealth production as may be requisite for irt-' 
stituting, maintaining and increasing national capital. 
5. The maintenance by the State authority from the joint 
wealth production of all educational and sanitary 
institutions* 
6. The just diversion among all the citizens of the State 
of all wealth production, less only that part retained 
for public and common requirements. 
7. The Reorganisation of Society upon the above lines to 
be commenced at once and pursued uninterruptedly 
until social justice is fully secured to each and 
every citizen. 
MEANS TOWARDS POLITICAL AIMS 
The general council is satisfied- that political 
aims worthy of the Australian Labour Federation are 
V09 
imposLble of attainment so long as political power is 
withheld from the people. 
Queensland is so happily situated that a true 
People's Parliament would certainly be favourable to the 
Reorganization of Industry, yet as Parliaments are at 
present constituted the capitalistic minority rules, 
and has only to express its opinions to have them duly 
registered. Therefore, the General Council recommends 
the adoption of a People's Parliament platform and the 
subordination of all other measures to that all important 
step. In one year a People ' s Parliament will give 
Queensland workers more justice than can be wrung from 
Capitalistic Parliaments in a generation. 
AUSTRALIAN LABOUR FEDERATION ELECTION 
PLATFORM 1891 
The Special General Council of the Australian 
Labour Federation, taving regard for the approaching elections 
and the necessity for putting forward distinct legislative 
steps towards the political aims of the Federation, suggests 
to the various districts and unions the following measures 
to be advocated by all Labour Party candidates, as to be 
brought forward and the feeling of the Assembly tested 
thereon in the next Parliament, all Labour Party 
candidates to pledge themselves not only to vote for these 
measures, but to insist to the utmost of their power upon 
a fair hearing being accorded to the immediate claims of 
Labour. 
t(40 
Electoral Reform -
UNIVERSAL AND EQUAL ADULT WHITE SUFFRAGE 
The Right to Vote 
ABOLITION OF THE NOMINEE CHAMBER 
National Work -
STATE WATER CONSERVATION AND IRRIGATION 
STATE AIDED VILLAGE SETTLEMENT 
STATE BANK 
Educational -
COMPULSORY EDUCATION - absolutely free in State Schools 
FREE LENDING LIBRARIES - Compulsory in all municipalities 
Regulation of Industry -
STATUTORY EIGHT HOUR DAY 
SHOPS AND FACTORIES ACT - With elected inspectors 
MINES ACT - Giving complete protection to miners 
MACHINERY ACT - providing for inspection of land 
boilers and machinery 
Labour Rights -
STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR - to which man can apply for 
work at a minimum wage - AS A RIGHT 
WAGES ACT - Giving complete lien for wages over work 
performed and full security for wages against all 
forfieture, whether by agreement or court order 
STATE PENSION - Of all persons over 60, who have been 
in Queensland for 10 years, and of all orphans under 
school age NOT AS A CHARITY BUT AS A RIGHT 
AMENDMENT OF TRADE UNION ACT - Declared by Chief Justice 
Lilley to be "a sham and a delusion? 
4// 
Repeals -
ABOLITION OF STATE AIDED IMMIGRATION 
ABOLITION OF ALL CONSPIRACY LAWS - including Masters 
and Servants Act 
ABOLITION OF NOMINEE JUSTICES - All Magistrates to be 
elected 
ABOLITION OF C D . ACT 
The General Council urges all districts and unions 
to immediately consider those measures, and to notify the 
General Secretary if any measure of pressing importance 
has been omitted. Districts are requested to notify the 
General Executive of their decision by May 1, as the 
probability of a General Election necessitates immediate 
action. The putting forward measures of local interest 
is left entirely in the hands of the various District 
Councils. 
Worker 7-3-91. 
FIRST ATTEMPTS AT PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION (1) 
1888 General Election By-Elections 
TOOMBUL (2) BURKE 
Gannon (N) 38 7 Hoolan (I) 491 
Dickson (I.Lib) 351 Browne (L) 458 
Hinchcllffe (L) 226 Sim (L) 299 
4i2> 
FORTITUDE VALLEY 
Watson (N) 1448 
McMaster (Lib) 100 7 
W. Brooke (Lib) 82 6 
W. Colborne (L) 620 
Burton (I) 153 
WOOLLOONGABBA 
Stephens (Lib) 441 
Swanwick (N) 388 
Johnson (L) 259 
TOOWONG 
Unmack (Lib) 50 7 
Cooper (N) 395 
Valentine (L) 153 
BUNDAMBA 
Glassey (Lib) 322 
Thomas (N) 293 
Shiloto (Lib) 292 
BARCOO 
Ryan (L) 452 
(N) 252 
BUNDABERG 
G. Hall 
(1 )NJNrational Party, I.L. Ind.-Liber al ,L Labour 
(2) Hinchcllffe's large vote may have been due to a 
Liberal backlash caused by Dickson's actions in-1887-
4fl3 
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INNER URBAN 
SUBURBAN 
DARLING DOWNS 
SOUTH EAST 
SOUTH WEST 
THE 1899 FEDERAL REFERENDUM. 
BRISBANE NORTH 
BRISBANE SOUTH 
FORTITUDE VALLEY 
TOOWONG 
WOOLLOONGABBA 
BULIMBA 
ENOGGERA 
NUNDAH 
OXLEY 
TOOMBUL 
AUBIGNY 
CAMBOOYA 
CARNAVON 
CUNNINGHAM 
DALBY 
DRAYTON AND TOOWOOMBA 
WARWICK 
ALBERT 
BUNDAMBA 
FASSIFERN 
IPSWICH 
LOCKYER 
LOGAN 
HORETON 
ROSEWOOD 
STANLEY 
BALONNE 
BULLOO 
MARANOA 
MURILLA 
WARREGO 
FOR 
1028 
960 
960 
543 
543 
3764 
534 
299 
303 
363 
502 
2001 
169 
278 
542 
715 
324 
982 
529 
3549 
272 
253 
622 
387 
257 
483 
144 
194 
2612 
609 
283 
562 
318 
587 
2359 
iii 
AGAINST 
1182 
1651 
1646 
1116 
971 
6566 
795 
619 
683 
690 
817 
3604 
974 
938 
132 
638 
324 
1129 
209 
5444 
497 
729 
1146 
887 
514 
771 
668 
589 
5801 
187 
23 
404 
192 
176 
983 
APPENDIX 6 . 
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THE 1899 FEDERAL REFERENDUM. 
(ii) 
WIDE BAY BUNDABERG 
BURNETT 
BURRUM 
MARYBOROUGH 
GYMPIE 
MUSGRAVE 
WIDE BAY 
FOR 
793 
727 
732 
1165 
1337 
629 
443 
5826 
AGAINST 
320 
343 
288 
449 
712 
205 
395 
2712 
CENTRAL FITZROY 
NORMANBY 
PORT CURTIS 
ROCKHAMPTON 
ROCKHAMPTON NORTH 
1254 
271 
590 
368 
982 
3465 
579 
223 
210 
530 
1290 
2832 
CENTRAL TOST BARCOO 
CLERMONT 
GREGORY 
LEICHHARDT 
MITCHELL 
579 
832 
359 
350 
721 
352 
373 
52 
215 
326 
2841 1318 
NORTHERN BOWEN 
CAIRNS 
HERBERT 
MACKAY 
TOl¥NSVILLE 
516 
931 
484 
1337 
1494 
96 
89 
51 
3O7 
359 
4462 1102 
NORTH WEST BURKE 
CARPENTARIA 
CHARTERS TOWERS 
COOK 
CROYDON 
FLINDERS 
KENNEDY 
WOOTHAKATA 
395 
931 
2581 
503 
809 
684 
418 
793 
19 
89 
1718 
53 
41 
86 
180 
54 
7914 2230 
APPENDIX FOUR 
ELECTORAL ROLLS ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS OF 1886 
MEMBERS ELECTORATES TOTAL POPULATION 
(i) 
ADULT MALES 
NOiffHERN DIVISION 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2_ 
10 
BOIVEN 
BURKE 
COOK 
KENNEDY 
MACKAY 
MUSGRAVE 
TOWNSVILLE 
3020 
5387 
7257 
11305 
7491 
4181 
9063 
48256 
1143 
3489 
3323 
3985 
2377 
1850 
2909 
19499 
AVERAGE 4826 1945 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
11 
BARCOO 
BLACKALL 
CLERMONT 
GREGORY 
LEICHHARDT 
MITCHELL 
NORMANBY 
PORT CURTIS 
ROCKHAMPTON 
AVERAGE 
4800 
6970 
1864 
2621 
4261 
3198 
1690 
2467 
9957 
37828 
3439 
2207 
1884 
607 
1841 
1339 
1776 
673 
813 
2462 
13602 
1237 
WEST 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
7 
MORETON 
BUNDAMBA 
FASSIFERN 
IPSWICH 
ROSEWOOD 
STANLEY 
5676 
5811 
8974 
3994 
8685 
33140 
1607 
1601 
2192 
899 
2318 
8617 
AVERAGE 4734 1231 
iPPENDIX FOUR (ii) 
ELECTORAL ROLLS ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS OF 1886 
MEMBERS ELECTORATES TOTAL POPULATION ADULT MALES 
EAST 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
6 
MORETON 
BULIMBA 
ENOGGERA 
LOGAN 
MORETON 
OXLEY 
7212 
22072 
5879 
6656 
4283 
46102 
2038 
5416 
1667 
1862 
1102 
12085 
AVERAGE 7683 2014 
METROPOLITAN 
2 
2 
2_ 
6 
FORTITUDE VALLEY 
NORTH BRISBANE 
SOUTH BRISBANE 
13828 
13002 
21078 
47908 
8615 
4893 
5618 
14126 
AVERAGE 7984 2354 
SOUTHERN DIVISION - WIDE BAY AND BURNETT GROUP 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2_ 
7 
BURNETT 
GYMPIE 
MARYBOROUGH 
MUBGRAVE 
WIDE BAY 
1589 
7612 
10561 
8158 
10585 
38506 
512 
2049 
2448 
2377 
3394 
10780 
AVERAGE 5501 1540 
SOUTHERN PASTORAL 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
!_ 
9 
BALONNE 
MARANOA 
WARREGO 
AUBIGNAY 
CARNAWtoN 
DALBY 
DARLING DOWNS 
DRAYTON AND TOOWOOMBA 
NORTHERN DOWNS 
WARWICK 
3132 
4700 
5296 
4418 
3006 
2449 
8765 
8948 
2573 
3445 
33604 
1172 
1388 
2972 
1044 
881 
543 
2212 
1920 
907 
740 
8247 
AVERAGE 3734 916 
un 
APPENDIX FOUR (iii) 
MEMBERS 
NORTHERN 
1 
m 
1 
1 
m 
1 
1 
1 
I 
2 
2 
1 
16 
CENTRAL 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
m^. 
I 
% 
i 
1 
11 
SOUTHERN 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
5 
ELECTORAL 
ELECTORATES 
BOWEN 
BURKE 
CAIRNS 
CARPENTARIA 
CHARTERS TOWERS 
COOK 
FLINDERS 
HERBERT 
KENNEDY 
MACKAY 
TOWNSVILLE 
WOOTHAKATA 
BARCOO 
CLERMONT 
FITZROY 
GREGORY 
LEICHHARDT 
MITCHELL 
NORMANBY 
PORT CURTIS 
ROCKHAMPTON 
ROCKHAMPTON 
PASTORAL 
BALONNE 
BULLOO 
MARANDA 
MURILLA 
WARREGO 
REDISTRIBUTION -
TOTAL 
AVERAGE 
NORTH 
AVERAGE 
AVERAGE 
1887 
POPULATION 
2771 
1614 
1989 
1700 
8342 
3997 
2575 
2873 
3600 
7491 
8528 
3199 
48679 
3042 
3990 
3155 
1511 
2067 
3237 
2654 
3467 
2316 
10554 
3292 
36243 
3295 
2856 
2237 
4820 
2792 
2318 
15023 
3004 
ADULT MALES 
972 
1208 
858 
909 
2769 
2002 
1513 
1345 
1482 
2376 
2680 
1475 
19589 
1226 
1791 
1164 
591 
1444 
998 
1578 
1149 
653 
2560 
885 
12812 
1165 
1261 
1459 
1474 
1034 
1234 
6492 
1292 
tn9 
APPENDIX FOUR 
ELECTORAL REDISTRIBUTION - 1887 
MEMBERS ELECTOR ATF.R 
(iv) 
TOTAL POPULATION ADULT MALES 
DARLING DOWNS GROUP 
1 
i X 
I 
1 
1 
8 
WIDE 
1 
Jm 
1 
a 
S 
1 
1 
9 
WEST 
1 
1 
i 
1 
1 
1 
7 
EAST 
I 
I 
1. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
i-
9 
- — 
AUBIGNY 
CAMBOOYA 
CARNARVON 
CUNNINGHAM 
DALBY 
DRAYTON AND 
WARWICK 
BAY AND BURNETT 
BUNDABERG 
BURNETT 
BURRUM 
GYMPIE 
MARYBOROUGH 
MUSGRAVE 
WIDE BAY 
MORETON GROUP 
BUNDAMBA 
FASSIFERN 
IPSWICH 
LOCKYER 
ROSEWOOD 
STANLEY 
MORETON GROUP 
ALBERT 
BULIMBA 
ENOGGERA 
LOGAN 
MORETON 
NUNDAH 
OXLEY 
TOOMBUL 
TOOWONG 
TOOWOOMBA 
AVERAGE 
GROUP 
AVERAGE 
AVERAGE 
AVERAGE 
4006 
3929 
3571 
4654 
3701 
9290 
4276 
33427 
4178 
3900 
2648 
3989 
9747 
10405 
3458 
3885 
38032 
4226 
4665 
4285 
8974 
4196 
4913 
3692 
30725 
4389 
4942 
4604 
4931 
4458 
4799 
5226 
4609 
5291 
6399 
45259 
bO'M 
1012 
953 
1062 
1104 
965 
1990 
1046 
8132 
1016 
1030 
975 
1283 
2659 
2411 
1112 
1352 
10822 
1202 
1344 
1207 
2191 
988 
1049 
1126 
7905 
1129 
1462 
1224 
1216 
1174 
1443 
1243 
1191 
1325 
1572 
11850 
r6iw-
Uf<i 
APPENDIX FOUR 
ELECTORAL REDISTRIBUTION - 1887 
MEMBERS ELECTORATES TOTAL POPULATION 
METROPOLITAN GROUP 
i BRISBANE, NORTH 14931 
1 BRISBANE, SOUTH 14796 
i FORTITUDE VALLEY 14938 
1 WOOLLOONGABBA 6419 
f 51084 
AVERAGE 7298 
ill 
ADULT MALES 
5291 
3989 
3906 
1629 
11815 
2116 
APPENDIX 5 . 
tf^LO 
SEPARATION VOTING RECORD 
(i) 
FOR SEPARATION AGAINST SEPARATION 
29 October 1890 : Griffith's Amendment to Macrossan's Motion 
Co^ey, Donaldson, Macrossan, Perkins, 
Black, O'Sullivan, Goldring, Paul, 
Dalrymple, Arcer, Pattison, Philp, 
Casey, Smith, Murphy, Miu*ray, Little, 
Corfield, Palmer, Nelson, Callan, 
Stevenson, Crombie, Lissner, 
Hamilton, Morehead 
(26) 
18 Sept. 1891 
Griffith, Mellwraith, Unmack, 
Powers, Hodgkinson, Hyne, 
McMaster, Morgan, Drake, Glassey, 
Wimble, Aland, Stephens, Allan, 
Smyth, Morry, Gannon, Hoolan, 
Campbell, Barlow, Annear, 
Isambert, Macfarlane, Salkeld, 
Buckland, Grimes, Sayers, Watson, 
Jessop, Tozer, Rutledge, Foxton 
(32) 
: House to Resolve itself into Committee to discuss 
Griffith's Provincial Legislatures Resolutions 
Griffith, Mellwraith, Unmack, 
Tozer, Cowley, Hyne, 
Hodgkinson, Rutledge, Stephens, 
Philp, Callan, Black, Pattison, 
Stevenson, Dalrymple, Crombie, 
Hamilton, Corfield, Little, Murphy, 
Brown, Sayers, Barlow, Cassey, 
Isambert, Annear, Archer, Grimes, 
Mellor, Smith, Paul. 
(31) 
: First Resolution 
Griffith, Mellwraith, Unmack, 
Hodgkinson, Tozer, Archer, Cowley, 
Smith, Casey, Jones, Hamilton, 
Hyne, Philp, Murphy, Paul, Sayers, 
Annear, Little, Corfield, Murray, 
Lissner, Callan, Mellor, Black, 
Pattison, Stevenson, Crombie, 
Dalrymple 
(28) 
Nelson, Donaldson, Perkins, 
Morehead, Groom, Powers, Jessop, 
Glassey, Watson, McMaster, Allan 
North, Luya, Plunkett, Battersby, 
Macfarlane, Salkeld, Morgein, 
Gannon, Aland, Stephens, Morry, 
Hoolan 
(23). 
Nelson, Donaldson, Morehead, Powers, 
North, Plunkett, O'Sullivan, 
Hoolan, Aland, Allan, McMaster, 
Stevens, Gannon, Battersby, Salkeld, 
Barlow, Morry, Macfarlane, Groom, 
Luya, Isambert, Grimes, Foxton, 
Buckland, Campbell, Perkins, 
Glassey, Drake, Cadell, Stephens, 
Agnew, Watson, Jessop 
(33) 
14 Nov. 1890 : Archer's Motion for Central Separation 
Archer, Paul, R. Jones, Goldring, 
Macrossan, Stevenson, Crombie, 
Callan, Pattison, Little, Hamilton, 
O'Sullivan, Dalrymple, Black, 
Corfield, Murray, G. Jones, Palmer« 
(19) (34) 
U.^1 
APPENDIX 5 (ii) 
QUEENSLAND CONSTITUTION BILL (1) That this House 
approves of the division of the Colony into Two 
Provinces. 
(38) 
9 August 
Callan, Donaldson, Drake, Hoolan, 
Gannon, Hall, Hoolan, Jessop, 
MacFarlane, Murray, Nelson, O'Sullivan 
Paul, Plunkett, Powers, Ryan, Allan, 
Stevenson, Stevens 
(19) 
: QUEENSLAND CONSTITUTION BILL (l) Barlows Amendment, 
Annear, Black, Callan, Corfield, 
Cowley, Dalrymple, Griffith, Hamilton 
Hyne, Hodgkinson, Lissner, Little, 
Paul, Mellwraith, Perkins, Philp, 
Smith, Tozer, Stevenson, Unmack, 
Jones, Murray 
(22) 
Aland, Beirlow, Battersby, 
Crombie, Dickson, Donaldson, 
Galssey, Grimes, Hoolan, Isambert, 
Jessop, Luya, MacFarlane, Mellor, 
McMaster, Morgan, Nelson, Morehead, 
O'Sullivan, Palmer, Hall, Powers, 
Pltuikett, Rutledge, Ryan, Salkeld, 
Sayers, Smith, Stephens, Drake, 
Stevens, Watson, Gannon 
(34) 
13 October 1892 : THIRD READING QUEENSLAND CONSTITUTION BILL (2) 
Agnew, Aland, Annear, Barlow,Callan, 
Battersby, Corfield, Cowley, Crombie, 
Dalrymple, Dickson, Griffith, 
Hodgkinson, Jones, Little, Luya, 
Mellwraith, McMaster, Mellor, Morehead, 
Perkins, Philp, Smith, Stephens, Tozer, 
Unmack, Watson, Wimble, Lissner, 
Foxton. 
(30) 
Allan, Black, Cadell, Drake, 
Nelson, O'Sullivan, Paul, Ryan, 
Powers, Plunkett, Sayers, Salkeld 
Gannon 
(13) 
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